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Abstract 
The study of urban and societal collapse has long been an area of scientific, 
historical and cultural interest. In recent years this interest in collapse, and its 
corollary resilience, has increased in line with growing scientific, political, cultural and 
general concerns over energy, food and water resources, social unrest, and the 
impacts of disasters and climate change on urban environments. This cross-
disciplinary thesis should be seen as fitting clearly into this theoretical tradition of 
futurist ‘collapse studies’ and thus incorporates elements of the physical sciences 
and the history of science, complexity science and military theory into a more clearly 
social science concern with the promotion of urban resilience. 
The purpose of this thesis is to propose the conscious simplification of elements of 
our contemporary complex cities to improve their resilience to both sudden 
disruptions and slower trends such as climate change and resource depletion. It 
takes a broadly thermodynamic approach, being based heavily upon Tainter’s work 
(1990) on the energy costs of social and technological complexity and the resultant 
tendency of such complex systems to collapse. It then contributes an original 
synthesis of Tainter’s dynamic of collapse with the Panarchy model of adaptive 
change (Gunderson & Holling, 2002). Finally, it considers the fragility implied by such 
complexity in and of itself (such as the danger of cascading failures). 
Importantly, this thesis acknowledges that any program of conscious simplification 
implies a philosophical, cultural and thus political (rather than technological) 
challenge. This is because it proposes a rejection of the Wall; the utopian/positivist 
technophilia which sees ever more complex socio-technological systems as the 
(eventual if not currently actual) solution for the challenges facing modern cities. 
Instead, this thesis suggests a more ‘humble’ approach to complex systems like 
contemporary cities, in which notions of ‘complete’ or absolute predictability or 
resilience are rejected. To this end, it briefly examines some of the philosophical 
debates in military theory around technological complexity and decision-making in 
environments of radical uncertainty. In the light of these discussions, this thesis 
makes six ‘humble’ recommendations for the simplification of particular urban 
systems. 
After outlining its approach of conscious urban simplification, this thesis 
acknowledges the challenges such a program implies. Contemporary complex cities 
display a wide range of path dependencies (political, cultural, economic, 
organisational and environmental) which constrain them within orthodox narratives of 
development. However, this thesis takes a strongly social constructivist approach 
(Bourdieu, 1995) to urban path dependency, arguing that the promotion of heterodox 
narratives of urban development can overcome such inertia. Three such narratives 
are proposed: alternative modes of urban living, the narratives of dystopian science 
fiction, and a focus on individual self-interest. 
 
Gunderson, L. & Holling, C. (eds) (2002) Panarchy: Understanding Transformations 
in Human and Natural Systems, Island Press, Washington 
Tainter, J. (1990) The collapse of complex societies, CUP, Cambridge 
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Dismantling the Wall: the simplification of complex 
socio-technological systems and the implications for 
urban resilience 
‘When the direction of the wind changes, some build walls, some make windmills’  
Chinese proverb 
The study of urban and societal collapse has long been an area of scientific, 
historical and cultural interest. In the last couple of years this interest in collapse and 
its corollary resilience has increased in line with growing scientific, political, cultural 
and general concerns over energy, food and water resources, social unrest, and the 
impacts of disasters and climate change on urban environments. Recent examples 
include predictions of the collapse of industrial civilisation (Slaughter, 2010; Vairley, 
2013; Alexander, 2013; 2015; Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2013), studies from Australia 
(Blackburn, 2013; 2014) and the UK (Beddington, 2009) into the dangers inherent in 
the complexity of interconnected urban systems and the establishment of the Center 
for the Study of Existential Risk to study low probability/high impact dangers.1 This 
cross-disciplinary thesis fits clearly within the realm of futurology and collapse 
studies, as it is concerned with the tendency of human social arrangements, and 
cities in particular, to collapse.  
 
Purpose and central argument 
Like the great majority of collapse studies, the purpose of this thesis is to examine 
the dynamic of (urban) collapse in order to prepare our cities and urban systems for 
this eventuality. To do this it incorporates elements of the physical sciences, the 
philosophy of science, studies of complexity and military theory into the promotion of 
urban resilience (which is more clearly a social science concern). Its central 
argument is that urban resilience is best promoted through the conscious 
simplification of elements of our contemporary complex cities. This conscious 
simplification implies a philosophical, cultural and thus political (rather than 
technological) challenge. It involves a rejection of the Wall; the utopian technophilia 
which sees ever more complex socio-technological systems as the (eventual if not 
currently actual) solution for the challenges facing modern cities.  
To summarise the argument of this thesis in one sentence: 
Increasing complexity is a good thing for socio-technological systems such as 
cities or societies (for a range of reasons including system resilience)… right 
up until the point at which it is no longer. 
 
Original contribution to knowledge 
This thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge in a number of ways. The 
first is its integration of a classically Malthusian idea of collapse and limits to growth 
with a socially constructivist view of urban social and technological complexity. From 
the former standpoint complex systems such as cities are subject to the constraints 
of far from equilibrium (FFE) thermodynamics and the need for energy supplies to 
maintain themselves. However from the latter viewpoint cities are constructed 
through the complex interactions of innumerable social actors and technologies and 
their trajectories through time can rarely if ever be predicted or determined. The 
position of this thesis is that both conceptions of urban complexity are correct and 
                                                
I Including the area of ‘Systemic Risks and Fragile Networks’ http://cser.org/emerging-risks-from-technology/systemic-
risks-and-fragile-networks/ (accessed 18/3/14) 
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thus both must be accommodated. The deterministic vision of urban collapse due to 
energy depletion or excessive complexity cannot ignore human agency while the 
social constructivist view must be aware of (and therefore to some extent constrained 
by) the necessity of sufficient energy for the maintenance of social realities at any 
particular level of complexity. 
To balance such considerations, this thesis (in another original contribution) attempts 
to join two intellectual traditions regarding complexity. The first is the ecological 
approach to emergent complexity, often used by the life- and geo-sciences, in which 
the concept of Far From Equilibrium (FFE) thermodynamics predominates. The 
second is a more specifically social sciences model in which complex socio-
technological systems emerge through the interactions between actors, shaped by 
the competing constraints of culture, economics, politics (at all scales) and the path 
dependency of previous approaches (Samet, 2011). These two approaches have 
arisen from different conceptual frameworks and are somewhat exclusive in terms of 
their theoretical antecedents, assumptions and purposes. However, they allow this 
research to include insights from FFE thermodynamics, declining returns on socio-
technological complexity, the Panarchy theory of Holling and others (Gunderson & 
Holling, 2002; Holling, 1994) and elements of cybernetic system theory (Espinosa & 
Walker, 2011), Luhmann’s systems theory (Luhmann, 2012; Bednarz, 1984) and 
military ideas of uncertainty, planning and defensive resilience (Terriff et al, 2008; 
Lind et al, 1998; Barnett, 2010). 
This particular cross-disciplinary approach to urban resilience constitutes a further 
original contribution to knowledge. Such an approach allows this thesis to use FFE 
thermodynamics as an original frame through which to examine the ethical concerns 
around a depoliticised urban resilience agenda. Furthermore, its cross-disciplinary 
focus on the military concept of the Hedgehog Defence provides an original model for 
addressing the challenges of urban planning and system resilience in an environment 
of radical uncertainty. Above all, such a cross-disciplinary synthesis aims to 
acknowledge the inherent vulnerability of complex cities (in terms both of their own 
complexity and the energy costs this involves) while providing a solid theoretical 
framework for a localisation/decentralisation approach to urban resilience. 
 
The structure of the argument 
This thesis unavoidably makes some demands of the reader in that the structure of 
its argument cannot be linear in nature; there is not a directly deductive progression 
of claims and evidence, building to a final conclusion. Instead there are a number of 
interconnected and interdisciplinary claims which together bolster the central 
recommendation that the simplified modular organisation of cities will make them 
more resilient. Each of these claims is connected and thus the reader will inevitably 
find that thread of the argument may feel somewhat circular in nature. This form of 
presentation is necessary because particular ideas will be reiterated if addressed (or 
at least echoed) by different disciplines or fields of inquiry. At the same time, 
discussion and evidence for some claims may need to be postponed until they can 
be fully considered later in the text. 
It is important to note that this thesis, given its purely theoretical focus, will not be 
providing a specific, detailed case study of, or proposal for, urban system 
simplification. However, illustrative examples will be included throughout to explain 
specific theoretical points. 
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An outline of the argument 
In Part A ‘far from equilibrium’ (or non-equilibrium) thermodynamics provides the 
framework for a discussion of complexity and simplicity, in particular the central 
insight of such thermodynamics that open complex systems only maintain 
themselves in a stasis ‘far from equilibrium’ by the continual throughput of energy 
(Schneider & Kay, 1994a/b; Schneider & Sagan, 2005; Brown et al, 2011; Rees, 
2012; Raine et al, 2006). Chapter 1 introduces and defines this concept of far from 
equilibrium (FFE) thermodynamics: the first theoretical backbone on which the entire 
thesis builds.  
Chapter 2 then moves on from this work on FFE thermodynamics to a discussion of 
systems theory, applying the concept of organisationally closed systems (Luhmann, 
2012) to complex urban systems. This provides an explanatory framework for 
understanding how such FFE systems, while open to the environment in 
thermodynamic terms (to allow the continual dissipation of energy) are at the same 
time organisationally closed in systems terms. That is, there is a clear distinction (in 
organisational, not thermodynamic, terms) between system and environment. A 
focus on systems theory allows this thesis to address three issues raised by its 
application of non-equilibrium thermodynamics to urban socio-technological systems.  
The first of these is the obvious contradiction that exists in the synthesis of 
thermodynamics and social constructivism described above. The existence of limits 
to systems growth may seem to imply a predictive capacity with regard to urban 
systems development. However this thesis, reflecting the insights of emergent 
complexity (autopoiesis) (Maturana & Varela, 1980; Luhmann, 2012; Funtowicz & 
Ravetz, 1994), rejects the determinist approach to the complexity of the world and its 
relationship to the human socio-technological systems within it, instead arguing for 
the essential unpredictability of such complex, interconnected and emergent 
systems. Within this framework, the second law of thermodynamics thus presents an 
elastic, but real limit to the development and maintenance of our complex cities which 
nonetheless remain complex adaptive systems.  
The second issue is the problem of complex systems delineation or reification, given 
the interconnectedness of urban systems across a wide range of spatial and 
temporal scales. Systems theory does not allow for the essentialist definition of such 
systems given their openness to both other systems and their environment. Their 
existence is therefore always contingent and reaffirmed only through the continual 
dissipation of energy. Yet to consider any urban system ‘as is’ implies a process of 
delineation, and this contradiction is addressed through system theory’s 
acknowledgement of the primacy of observer viewpoint in any treatment of complex 
systems. That is, the delineation of such systems is always dependent upon the 
viewpoint of the one undertaking the delineation. 
Finally there is a need to define the term ‘complexity’ itself given its multifaceted 
nature. Luhmann (2012) and others argue that complex socio-technological systems, 
while subject to the strictures of thermodynamics, paradoxically use their increasing 
complexity to impose a hegemonic simplification (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1994) of both 
the unpredictable world and their own elements. That is, the increasingly complex 
socio-technological structures they create are designed to suppress randomness and 
variety to offer both predictability and control of systems processes and outputs. This 
is the concept of the black box; the complexity of the environment is constrained by 
standardisation, mechanisation and the implementation of hierarchies and 
centralisation to create a simplified and hegemonic system. This ‘hegemonic 
simplification’ is, however, only enabled by complex subsystems and nested systems 
which cost energy to create and maintain. 
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With these provisos in mind Chapter 3 then builds on the claim by historian Joseph 
Tainter (1990) that societies are problem-solving machines that meet the challenges 
they face by implementing increasingly complex socio-technological solutions. 
Tainter sees the interplay between energy use and related complexity increases as 
imposing a natural (if elastic) limit to the possible complexity of any socio-
technological system. His argument is based on two interconnected points: 
First (acknowledging the theory of FFE thermodynamics) any increase in 
socio-technological complexity requires a corresponding increase in available 
energy; 
Second the Law of Diminishing Returns applies to socio-technological 
complexity – the more complex societies or organisations get the less return 
they get for all their investment in that complexity. 
This thesis argues that Tainter’s approach echoes Gunderson and Holling’s concept 
(2002) of Panarchy in maintaining that, at some point, the complexity of systems 
becomes so costly in terms of energy inputs, and risky in terms of both the inherent 
fragility of this complexity itself and the dangers posed by possible disruptions to 
energy supplies, that an elastic yet nonetheless real limit to complexity exists. Either 
such increasing complexity undermines the resilience of the system itself, making it 
vulnerable to cascading failures and catastrophic collapse (Gunderson & Holling, 
2002; Buldyrev et al, 2010; Crutchfield, 2009; Resilience Alliance, 2010), or the 
benefits of that complexity are no longer greater than the costs involved in creating 
and maintaining it and the system ‘collapses’ (simplifies itself) (Tainter, 1990). Socio-
technological complexity is driven, as Tainter recognises, by its own historical 
success, but each new level of complexity involves, due to the tyranny of sunk costs, 
cultural values and technological path dependency, a reduction of current options for 
future action. 
The techno-utopian wish/hope is of course that new technological developments 
(along with accumulated physical, human, and social capital) open up new options 
and broaden the phase space again, and this is implied by the rise in potential 
(greater energy use and the corresponding increase in complexity). The problem 
however is that, for contemporary cities, this hope is subject to the dynamic of 
declining returns on complexity and the longer scale challenges of declining 
resources (including water, food or hydrocarbons) and climate change. The depletion 
of easily accessible and thus cheap hydrocarbons (‘Peak Oil’) is particularly 
problematic, given that the use of coal, and then oil and gas, has strongly guided the 
socio-technological pathway of development. Contemporary forms of industrial urban 
life have developed due to access to such hydrocarbon energy sources and the 
resultant path dependency has closed off alternative options. The further this trend 
continues the smaller the return on investment in technological complexity, while the 
harder it becomes to change development trajectories to build resilience to changing 
climates and depleting petrochemical resources.  
 
In Part B this thesis moves to a discussion of the resilience of cities to challenges 
such as Peak Oil, climate change or natural or manmade disasters. Chapter 4 opens 
with a brief discussion of the term ‘resilience’ (in particular ‘ecological resilience’) and 
its problematic ethical and political implications when applied to urban environments. 
In particular there is a worrying resonance between this concept of ecological 
resilience and competitive or individualist conceptions of human societies: the idea of 
‘the survival of the fittest’. This understanding of society and resilience is rejected. 
The chapter then provides a brief introduction to cities within the framework 
established in Part A: as complex and emergent thermodynamic systems. The 
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organising principle of this discussion is that there have generally been two 
approaches to the emergent complexity of the world. The first sees human ingenuity, 
technological prowess and the scientific method of enquiry as the drivers of a 
teleological Progress. The eventual outcome of such a trend is certainty: the 
unpredictable and chaotic nature of our complex environment, and the social 
systems which reside within it, will submit to human understanding and thus mastery. 
The divergent view is that the complexity of the universe, and the human societies 
within it, can never be overcome. Uncertainty and unpredictability is the human 
condition and any attempt to overcome this is doomed to failure. These two 
approaches to complexity (whether urban or otherwise) have been described as 
‘arrogant’ and ‘humble’ systems theory, and this tension constitutes a major theme 
running throughout the thesis. 
Starting with the work of Graham (2004; 2005; 2006; 2008) Chapter 5 then takes a 
cross-disciplinary excursion into the connections between the city and military theory. 
This diversion is valuable because military theory has to some extent straddled the 
divide between the importance of energy and resource availability and the socially 
constructed nature of urban reality. It has also both embraced and critiqued the 
‘arrogant’ approach to urban complexity, predictability and technology labelled as 
The Wall. This thesis examines the recent focus on urban warfare within the US and 
other militaries and its concern with overcoming the resilience of an opponent’s 
interconnected urban systems. Building upon theoretical understandings (going back 
to Sun Tzu) of war as a contest between emergent socio-technological systems in a 
complex and unpredictable environment (Clausewitz’ famous concept of ‘The Fog of 
War’), this ‘humble’ strand of military theory has a focus both on flexibility and 
responsiveness to changing circumstances and on the need to address the logistics 
of sustaining such complex dissipative systems as militaries or cities themselves 
(reflecting Napoleon’s dictum that an army “marches on its stomach”).  
One response to such a situation is a Hedgehog Defence strategy in which urban 
systems are decentralised and made self-sufficient in terms of both resources and 
agency. In this strategy, there is no single defensive element, tactic or planned 
centralised response but instead a focus on resilience through planned modularity 
and/or redundancy and a concern with keeping the system phase space (the array of 
possible futures) as open as possible to better respond quickly and effectively to an 
uncertain and changing environment in a decentralised manner. Implicit in such an 
approach is the willingness to accept losses or a level of unpredictability, inefficiency 
or error when responding to a rapidly changing environment. One example of such 
an approach was Hezbollah’s use of a decentralised ‘hedgehog defence’ strategy 
during the 2006 Lebanon War against a numerically and technologically superior 
Israeli force; another was the impact of the decentralised and localised disaster 
response measures of Walmart during Hurricane Katrina in 2005.  
This decentralised defence strategy stands in contrast to the traditional concept of 
defence in which the focus is on planning for all possible eventualities, through the 
hegemonic simplification of the environment via socio-technological complexity, while 
using resources as efficiently as possible. This traditional strategy, which this thesis 
refers to as The Wall, is demonstrated historically by the Maginot Line, the stated US 
military doctrine of ‘full spectrum dominance’, the reliance on technologies such as 
dams, tsunami gates or the Thames barrier for urban flood protection, or on a more 
general level the complex food and energy production and distribution systems 
making life in most developed cities possible. 
Building on these discussions Chapter 6 then argues for the promotion of a ‘real’ 
simplification of specific elements/components of urban systems, as opposed to the 
sort of hegemonic simplification outlined in the previous part. While such ‘real’ 
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simplification can never be more than a provisional and piecemeal approach to our 
complex urban systems, it involves:  
1. A rejection of the belief in absolute solutions through technological 
development (‘Progress’) 
2. Awareness of the Law of Diminishing Returns in terms of complexity 
3. The analysis and delineation of complex urban socio-technological 
systems according to the interests and/or viewpoint of specific self-
identified stakeholders 
4. Horizontal, localised or decentralised decision making processes 
5. Less reliance on system interconnections (modularity) 
6. More redundancy within systems. 
These six recommendations aim for the conscious simplification of targeted urban 
systems to increase their resilience at this point in time while changing the trajectory 
of their longer term development. The latter goal is important for providing greater 
urban resilience to longer scale trends such as climate change or Peak Oil. 
 
In Part C this thesis will acknowledge the very real challenges to such a program of 
targeted simplification. Chapter 7 starts with a broadly social constructivist 
understanding of social realities, based on Bourdieu’s theories (1995) of the 
persistence of social orthodoxy in the face of both disruptions and heterodox 
narratives and understandings. Through a social constructivist frame, the avoidance 
of urban collapse is a question of social (political, cultural and economic) change 
rather than technological advancement. The challenge is overcoming the orthodox 
technophilia and faith in progress (The Wall) that is a major driver of the development 
of contemporary cities. Their path dependency is therefore the result of a nexus of 
connected values and social and technological realities that include: 
1. The loss of the benefits of complexity 
2. Attitudes to the ideal of ‘Progress’ 
3. The mantra of efficiency 
4. The invisibility of properly functioning systems 
5. Path dependency 
This path dependency makes meaningful change difficult – but not impossible. If 
these orthodox conceptions of social and technological progress as linear and 
inevitable can be overcome, a qualified optimism about the possibility of urban 
system simplification is possible. 
However, there is no simple answer to the ‘wicked problem’ of our urban 
development, and therefore Chapter 8 outlines a number of approaches to 
overcoming the orthodox paradigm of Progress (ever-increasing socio-technological 
complexity). The first is the awareness that any orthodoxy can be challenged by 
interruptions to its normal functioning (Berger & Luckmann 1981; Bourdieu, 1995). In 
the case of contemporary complex cities, familiar certainties are naturally 
undermined by disasters or collapse, or even a widely acknowledged ‘close call’. 
What is necessary in such cases, however, is the ready availability of a suitable 
narrative through which new social realities can be established. 
At the same, there is also the possibility of incrementally challenging The Wall, or the 
orthodoxy of increasingly complexity, through a range of such heterodox narratives. 
Three possible subversive narratives are presented: 
Anthony Richardson THESIS: Dismantling the Wall 
 
8 
 
1. Living/lived examples of alternative models and narratives 
2. Representations of crisis or collapse and/or alternative narratives and models 
3. Narratives of systemic resilience as rational self-interest 
The first example comprises a wide range of social movements such as Transition 
Towns, Slow Food, Tiny Houses or radical squatter’s collectives. These all critique 
contemporary urban life and proposing solutions, whether incremental or radical, to 
its perceived shortcomings. They also provide a range of lived possibilities for 
responding to the disruptive effects of a disaster or ‘close call’. 
The second subversive approach is through the long history of dystopian science 
fiction narrative. Such narratives provide the possibility to ‘imagine the unimaginable’ 
in terms of social collapse and thus can be considered as clearly heterodox 
(Bourdieu, 1995). This section will include a brief review of dystopian science fiction 
narratives, concentrating on film and computer games as these are most influential. 
The final example focuses on individual self-interest as a motivator for questioning 
the orthodoxy of progress and socio-technological complexity. However, this does 
not imply a rejection of shared models of social change in favour of an atomised 
individualism. Instead, the argument is that self-preservation is a powerful driver of 
human action that should not be overlooked when promoting social change.  
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis and provides a brief summary of the argument. In the 
face of disasters and disruptions (and long-term challenges like Peak Oil or climate 
change) urban resilience can be improved by the conscious simplification of 
particular urban systems and subsystems. This is not a call for a blanket, neo-Luddite 
rejection of the advantages of socio-technological complexity. Instead it is a 
recommendation that, where the benefits outweigh the costs (and where technically 
and socially possible), fragile supply chains and complex organisational or 
technological systems be consciously simplified. Implementing such a program of 
simplification is not a straightforward matter, as it implies the loss of the benefits of 
complexity and an acceptance of the extra costs of system redundancy. However it 
will improve the resilience of contemporary complex cities. 
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Part A: Energy and complexity 
 
‘The Rectification of Names’ 
The Confucian doctrine of ‘the Rectification of Names’ refers to the need to 
determine, and apply, the proper designations of ‘things’ in the web of relationships 
to reflect their true essence and thus create harmony and meaning. Such a process 
is crucial to this thesis given that it is strongly cross-disciplinary and deals with the 
transference of physical science concepts like ‘entropy’ to the social science context 
– a situation which historically has created confusion due to a usage which shifts 
unclearly between a quantitative physical property and a qualitative social analogy. 
Part A of this thesis is therefore primarily concerned with setting the philosophical 
foundations for the practical approaches to the simplification of complex urban 
systems which will be proposed and examined in Parts B and C. As such it will focus 
to a large extent on a discussion and definition of the various terms and concepts 
which will be central to the thesis as a whole (and as such they will not necessarily 
be related to specifically urban contexts at this stage). Each of these concepts is 
contested and thus a brief overview of each debate will be provided along with a 
definition. 
Chapter 1 opens with a brief definition of the concept of entropy, including some 
common misconceptions which can arise when this concept from the physical 
sciences is applied (often as an imprecise analogy for other processes) to more 
clearly social science concerns. Due to these misconceptions the use of entropy as 
an explanatory term is rejected in favour of the more technically precise dissipation. 
This chapter then introduces the field of non-equilibrium or far from equilibrium (FFE) 
thermodynamics in which complex systems only maintain their existence through the 
continual dissipation of energy. This intersection between energy and system 
complexity is crucial to the argument of the whole thesis. 
Chapter 2 first defines socio-technological systems (a category which includes cities 
and the complex infrastructures and components which comprise them) as complex 
FFE systems. In doing so it introduces the concept of emergence and identifies such 
FFE complexity with weak emergence; its development is intrinsically unpredictable 
through time. It then provides a brief overview of some criticisms of such an 
application of thermodynamics within the social sciences before finishing with a 
discussion of the challenge of effectively defining or delineating the boundary of such 
interconnected complexity. 
Chapter 3 discusses the problematic concept (and definition) of complexity before 
introducing the work of Joseph Tainter on the declining returns on investment in 
complexity. It then provides a discussion of the resonances between declining 
returns, the heuristic of Panarchy and the possibility/probability of system collapse. 
The latter half of this chapter examines some further challenges energy supplies and 
interconnected complexity pose to system resilience, starting with an examination of 
the contemporary dynamic of Peak Oil and the implications of high- and low-gain 
energy. Part A then finishes with an overview of the further vulnerabilities of 
complexity; path dependency, the lack of diversity and thus flexibility and the 
tendency to cascading failures. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to energy and dissipation 
Mister Order, he runs at a very good pace 
But old Mother Chaos is winning the race 
Ravenhurst & Malaclypse (1979) Principia Discordia 
There has been a long philosophical, artistic and scientific interest in the related 
concepts of decay and the transitory nature of existence. Indeed the need to explain 
or justify these inescapable truths could be seen as the primary concern of the 
religious impulse. Thus the major religions of Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism 
and others all deal to some extent with impermanence of life and existence. 
Artistically this fascination with decay and ultimately death can be seen in the 
concept of memento mori in Renaissance and later Puritan American painting, 
literature and sculpture while Buddhist art is not surprisingly heavily concerned with 
the impermanence of human existence. Similarly the long tradition of historical 
studies, from Thucydides’ The Peloponnesian War and Ibn Khaldun’s Book of 
Lessons, to Gibbon’s The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire and 
Spengler’s The Decline of the West, has been heavily concerned with the study of 
the causes of the collapse of great cities, civilisations and empires. 
This trend has been continued in more recent times with works such as Kennedy’s 
The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1989) and Diamond’s Collapse: How 
Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (2005) – to name only two examples of many 
(Kunstler, 2005; 2008; Homer-Dixon, 2006; Brown, 2008; Slaughter, 2010; Butzer & 
Enfield, 2012; Butzer, 2012; Vairley, 2013; Alexander, 2013; 2015; Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 
2013). In all of these works the perceived struggle is between resilience and the 
tendency to greater organisation and growth, and the opposing reality of dissipation 
and collapse, although the causes in terms of social or urban collapse have been 
variously described as Divine Improvidence, economic shortfalls or stresses, internal 
social or external military conflict, environmental challenges, moral decay, imperial 
‘overreach’, lead poisoning… in the case of Rome alone 210 different causes of the 
Fall have been put forward since it occurred (Galinsky, 1992). 
 
Entropy 
One cause which has been persistently linked with the intrinsic vulnerability of 
societies and cities, however, is the inescapable march of decay: the tendency of 
organisations and systems to irreversibly break down over time. While this may have 
been originally conceived in a religious and philosophical sense, it has been in more 
recent times encapsulated in the Second Law of Thermodynamics and the related 
concept of entropy. While there is a common awareness of ‘entropy’ as an immutable 
scientific law governing the physical world it is often understood as a measurement of 
the progress of disorder or decay through physical, living and organisational systems 
and organisations. This concept of entropy is then applied to social systems such as 
cities or societies to explain what is seen as an inescapable trajectory towards 
dissipation and collapse. The deterministic nature of this application of entropy is 
perhaps best expressed by the economist Herbert Stein’s famous tautology that “If 
something cannot go on forever, it won’t”. 
However, there are serious problems in the uncritical and wholesale transference of 
physical science concepts such as entropy to the social sphere. Above all there is 
confusion over the nature of this concept of entropy; what exactly does ‘entropy’ 
measure? For the purposes of this thesis it is sufficient to identify two theoretical 
approaches (of many) (O’Connor, 1991; Mavrofides et al, 2011). 
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First there is the conception of entropy familiar to the physical sciences, based on the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics and concerning the interaction between energy and 
time. This states that, in a closed system over time, energy irreversibly dissipates 
across energy gradients and entropy is a measurement of such dissipation. 
Complete entropy therefore means the removal of any such energy gradient; energy 
can dissipate no further. Eddington’s concept of ‘the arrow of time’ (1928) 
encapsulates the inevitable and irreversible nature of this process. 
Second there is the use of the term in statistical mechanics. This is based on 
Boltzmann’s theorem which calculates/measures the irreversible diffusion of gases 
throughout an enclosed space/container over time. At some point the gases become 
evenly distributed and thus entropy reaches 100%; it can diffuse no further. It can 
also be considered as either the measure of disorder among the atoms making up a 
closed system, with the randomness of the distribution of these atoms increasing 
through time or the irreversible tendency for any closed system to shift from a less to 
a more probable state (in terms of statistical probability). This conception of entropy 
has been applied in information theory or cybernetics with regard to communication 
and/or information, and thus entropy has been seen as a measure of increasing 
incomprehensibility (Shannon, 1948). 
There are similarities between both these applications of the concept, not least due 
to the fact the formula for both is essentially identical2 and in all applications the 
process is irreversible. However there has been a great deal of confusion created by 
the wholesale importation of these concepts into the social sciences – particularly 
because of some confusion over the term disorder. Unfortunately this term has been 
used to (fallaciously) conflate the second law of thermodynamics (involving the 
relationship between energy and time) to the inevitable decay or disorder of complex 
systems such as societies or cities (Lambert, 1999; 2002; Floyd, 2007). An illustrative 
example of such a definition of entropy (as the development of disorder) from the 
field of urban studies is as follows: 
Any spontaneous change in an isolated system—a system that can exchange 
neither energy nor material with its environment—increases the system’s 
“entropy.” This is a technical way of stating that things naturally tend to wear 
out and run down (italics added). (Rees 2012, p 251) 
While ‘thermodynamic entropy = disorder’ may be an illustrative and useful analogy 
to discuss the tendency of systems to break down over time, such a usage is not an 
application of the immutable Second Law of Thermodynamics. The second law has 
one specific definition: the dissipation of energy across energy gradients, rather than 
the immutable increase of ‘disorder’ (however defined). The former concept of 
‘entropy’ is a measurable process: the dissipation of energy across gradients can be 
measured, as can the diffusion of gas within a closed container. However, ‘disorder’ 
is not a quantitatively measurable quality, nor is any increase in such a condition 
necessarily dependent on the irreversible ‘arrow of time’. Of course, entropy/disorder 
has been widely discussed in social science treatments of the decay and collapse of 
complex systems over time - but while such ’disorder’ may well be a trend towards 
which all complex systems such as cities are subject, the label of ‘entropy’ is 
incorrectly applied in such cases. 
This confusion can be explained by the historically imprecise use of ‘disorder’ in 
definitions and explanations of thermodynamic entropy (Lambert, 1999; 2002; Floyd, 
2007). This historical imprecision may have led to the tendency for thermodynamic 
entropy to be conflated with increases in system ‘disorder’ and thus applied 
erroneously to the eventual breakdown of order in contexts as diverse as 
                                                
2 Lambert (2002) sees them as identical as the diffusion of gas is actually the dissipation of molecular kinetic energy. 
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civilizational collapse, the inevitable breakdown of physical systems or the trend 
towards increasingly messy desks. As we shall see in the discussion of non-
equilibrium thermodynamics below, the removal of the energy required to maintain 
complex systems does lead to their inability to maintain form and function – but this 
does not mean an increase in ‘disorder’ or even ‘entropy’. The term disorder3 in 
particular implies some relationship between structure and function (in that the 
system experiences some loss of function which is in some way connected to 
structure) yet the two cannot be simply conflated nor is a reduction in available 
energy directly or necessarily connected with changes in system function (Wicken, 
1986; Morin, 1999). At the same time it is certainly not clear that the conception of 
‘entropy’ from statistical mechanics is directly applicable to social systems or 
contexts, let alone a deterministic factor in their eventual dissipation and collapse. In 
any case this thesis is not attempting to make any such connection. 
In conclusion, it is important to note that this thesis is concerned with the application 
of a clearly thermodynamic conception of entropy and the Second Law to complex 
urban systems: that, over time, energy irreversibly dissipates across gradients. As we 
shall see below this focus on energy as a resource still holds great implications for 
the development and maintenance of such complex systems but it is exclusively 
through the importance of energy to maintain them – not through some nebulous 
concept of increasing ‘disorder’. 
 
Non-equilibrium thermodynamics 
The original conception of the Second Law led to a paradox with regard to entropy 
and complex systems such as living entities, or social, technological or cultural 
systems: how can such systems become more complex over time (gaining in 
size/mass and structural/functional complexity) even though, according to the 
Second Law, they should be seeing an inevitable and inescapable increase in 
entropy (energy depletion)? 
The reformulated Second Law (or ‘non-equilibrium thermodynamics’) proposed by 
Prigogine (and for which he won the Nobel Prize in 1977) describes complex 
systems as open systems that process (dissipate) available or ‘free’ energy4 to 
maintain or increase their ordered structure in some sort of steady state, ‘far from 
equilibrium’ (Prigogine, 1978). They cannot be in complete equilibrium (equilibrium 
being complete entropy)5 but instead they exist in a stasis in which interactions with 
their environment cause both their structure/form and function to fluctuate.  
This stasis is dependent upon the continual dissipation of energy as “all self-
organising structures survive by continually degrading and dissipating available 
energy and matter” (Rees, 2012, p251) and then expelling the resultant entropy into 
their environment. This dissipated energy is used to construct more complexity - 
further subsystems which then better dissipate energy and thus allow the system to 
maintain its essential stability far from equilibrium (Schneider & Kay, 1994a/b; 
Schneider & Sagan, 2005; Raine et al, 2006; Brown et al, 2011; Rees, 2012). Finally, 
this continual intake of energy by complex dissipative systems and their 
corresponding ejection of entropy into the environment ensures that the overall level 
of entropy in the environment does increase in line with the Second Law (Schneider 
& Kay, 1994a/b). 
                                                
3 A term which is irredeemably subjective (Lambert, 1999; 2002). 
4 Odum (1996) labels such ‘free’ energy as ‘exergy’. However, this thesis uses the more commonly understood term 
‘energy’ to mean any such ‘free’ or utilisable energy (energy which is available for dissipation by any particular FFE 
system). 
5 An insight with some consequences for economic theories of self-balancing markets (addressed in Chapter 4). 
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A perfect example of such a system is a cyclone/typhoon/hurricane which draws 
energy from the warmth of the ocean and dissipates it into the cooler air above the 
ocean, which then warms and rises. The circular movement of air increases as cooler 
air is sucked into the vortex to, in turn, rise as it is warmed by this heat dissipation. 
Thus this complex structure is fed by the dissipation of heat energy across an energy 
gradient which breaks down once it moves over land and the thermodynamic cycle is 
interrupted. 
One consequence of envisaging the universe as composed of Far from Equilibrium 
(FFE) systems is that material reality is seen as contingent, eternally contested and 
impermanent. Rejecting the sort of essentialism encapsulated by Plato’s pure forms, 
FFE thermodynamics harks back to Heraclitus’ theory that ‘everything flows’ – the 
reification of ‘things’ is problematic in such a worldview as everything is fluctuating in 
a state far from equilibrium. Not for the last time are the resonances between FFE 
thermodynamics and Buddhism evident here: in Buddhist doctrine impermanence is 
one of the three conditions of existence. The material world is endlessly transient, 
with all things continually in flux (Gunaratne, 2008). One important consequence of 
this transience is a rejection of any form of reification or essentialism – nothing has 
an intrinsic or eternal nature.6 
At the same time the concept of ‘equilibrium’ is the antithesis of this contingent and 
contested existence: in terms of ‘far from equilibrium’ systems, equilibrium means the 
loss of the energy gradients that make system complexity possible. 
Thus ‘life’ (or the maintenance and growth of complex systems such as living 
creatures, ecosystems or storms) can be explained through reference to FFE 
thermodynamics. Over time the availability of energy (or energy gradients) within a 
system, or between such a system and its environment, leads to an increase in 
complexity. This increasing complexity better dissipates that energy and thus keeps 
the system in, or close to, its stasis. With reference to cyclones/typhoons/hurricanes 
this means that as the storm moves across the ocean the continual existence of a 
heat gradient between the warm ocean and colder air drives and strengthens the 
complex structure of the storm – the greater the heat differential the larger and 
stronger the storm (all factors considered). However there are different views as to 
the causal relationship between this energy and the increase in structural complexity 
(Wicken, 1986). On the one hand the existence of energy makes the increase in 
structural complexity inevitable; for example the very purpose of life, as an emergent 
phenomenon, is to dissipate free energy (Schneider & Kay, 1994a/b; Schneider & 
Sagan, 2005; Raine et al, 2006). In this view a life form or ecosystem7 is somewhat 
analogous to a tropical storm as the existence of energy gradients causes a 
blooming of complexity. On the other hand, as we shall see, others reverse this 
causality and see energy as the fuel for the complexity of life; life is driven by other 
concerns but the existence of energy reserves makes it possible. 
However, whatever the perceived answer to this ‘chicken and egg’ conundrum, there 
is a clear consensus that the further from equilibrium (ie the more complex) any such 
complex systems find themselves, the harder they will fight to regain some sort of 
steady state, and they do this by better dissipating energy. Furthermore, this tactic 
itself involves increasing complexity – that is, creating further subsystems for 
dissipating energy more effectively/completely (Tainter, 1990; Schneider & Kay, 
                                                
6 A similar philosophical understanding of reality as contingent is echoed in Part C of this thesis where a constructivist 
understanding of social reality is outlined. A deeper analysis of ther connections between FFE thermodynamics, 
philosophical systems like Buddhism and such social contructivism is beyond the scope of this thesis, although the 
connections have been noted by others (Ingram 2006, p106) 
7 This term is used throughout the thesis in both commonly understood senses: as both a biological community of 
interacting organisms and their physical environment, (the original understanding of the term from ecological science) 
and more generally as a complex network or interconnected system. The latter definition of course encompasses the 
former (more clearly specific) definition. 
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1994a/b; Schneider & Sagan, 2005; Raine et al, 2006; Brown et al, 2011; Rees, 
2012). 
In conclusion, the transference of concepts such as thermodynamics and entropy 
from the physical sciences to the social sciences has often been problematic, not 
least due to confusion over what these terms, and entropy in particular, actually 
means. To repeat, this thesis defines entropy as it is used in classical and non-
equilibrium thermodynamics, to the exclusion of its usage in statistical mechanics 
and related fields. That is, it is concerned with the dissipation of energy across 
gradients through time, rather than the problematic concept of disorder. At the same 
time it does not engage with the concept of entropy as providing the ‘ultimate limit’ to 
life, complexity or even the persistence of the universe (Georgescu-Roegen, 1970; 
Quilley, 2011).8 To avoid such areas of confusion it therefore rejects the term 
entropy9 in favour of ‘FFE thermodynamics’ and/or ‘energy dissipation’. This allows 
the thesis to focus on the existential importance of energy in the promotion and 
maintenance of cities as complex open thermodynamic systems. At the same time it 
can examine the related importance of easily accessible and utilisable energy 
sources without focussing on the problematic question of absolute energy depletion 
and the ‘heat death’ of the universe.  
The next chapter will provide a brief history of this transference of thermodynamics into 
the social sciences, and address some of the challenges this poses in more detail. 
                                                
8 The concept of the ‘heat death’ of the universe. 
9 The one exception is when ‘entropy’ is the term used by the particular texts being discussed. 
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Chapter 2: Energy dissipation and socio-technological systems 
…we have to go back to the other time, when the world was powered 
by the black fuel… Without fuel they were nothing. They'd built a 
house of straw. The thundering machines sputtered and stopped. … 
Miller (1981) Mad Max 2 
While energy has obviously been a crucial element of the physical sciences since 
their inception it has been a topic of only sporadic interest for the social sciences 
(Rosa et al, 1988). This interest has oscillated between grand narratives of progress 
involving the connections between energy use and social, cultural and technological 
development (Rosa et al, 1988; Adams, 1975); more limited context-specific 
analyses (often by anthropologists) of the role of energy in the relationships between 
societies and the environments in which they develop (Rosa et al, 1988); and silence, 
based on apparent disregard. 
A famous early example of the intersection between energy use and social and/or 
natural organisation was the work of Thomas Malthus (1985) on food supplies and 
population size – while not overtly based on a consideration of energy as such, it 
nonetheless recognised the primacy of energy inputs (ie food) to the maintenance of 
any human social system. However in terms of energy or resource studies it has 
been more influential in terms of its pessimistic outlook. Indeed the pejorative ‘dismal’ 
(first applied to Malthus by Thomas Carlyle)10 has been applied to his ideas (more for 
the overall pessimism than the serious flaws in his reasoning) up until the current day 
where ‘(neo-) Malthusian’ is still a dismissive label (Tierney, 2008) for what are seen 
as unfounded and unduly pessimistic concerns over resource depletion. 
However, the work of Soddy (1912; 1922; 1926) in the first quarter of the 20th century 
heralded a particular focus on energy in the social sciences which acknowledged the 
second law of thermodynamics, and which thereby saw energy, and the inescapable 
processes of entropy,11 as a limit to the unfettered growth and activities of societies. 
Ignoring or rejecting the inescapable connection between energy and the creation of 
wealth leads, for Soddy, to a problematic fixation on debt and all the attendant social 
problems this causes.  
While Soddy’s insights were not widely influential at the time, they did come back into 
fashion with the energy crises of the latter half of the century (a time which also saw 
Malthus regain, however briefly, some influence). For example, the later work of 
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1970; 1977), such as The Entropy Law and the 
Economic Problem focussed on the limits to growth implied by a finite planet and the 
resources therein (1970; Gowdy & Mesner, 1998). Similarly the work of Herman Daly 
(1974) and his concept of the "steady-state" (zero-growth) economy shares this 
concern with the constraints placed on orthodox economic activity by the reliance on 
finite sources of energy such as hydrocarbons (a closed system in that such 
resources are finite) rather than renewable sources such as solar or wind (part of an 
open system and one therefore able to maintain itself in FFE stasis).12 
Further attempts have since been made to apply these ideas to socio-economic 
systems,13 and socio-political development.14 A common thread among these 
approaches is their understanding that access to energy is a limiting factor on the 
                                                
10 In his 1839 essay Chartism. 
11 This term (rather than ‘energy dissipation’) is used here as it is in the original works by Soddy. 
12 The issue of the substitutability of energy resources will be addressed in chapters 2 and 3. 
13 See Proops (1983), Meadows et al (1972), Brown et al (2011) Foster (2011), Odum (1971), Raine et al (2006) and 
Tverberg (2012). 
14 See Gurr (1985), Diamond (2005), Adams (1975), Brown et al (2011), Rees (2012), Tainter (1990; 1995a/b; 1996; 
2000; 2003; 2012) and Klare (2004). 
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development or maintenance of urban socio-technological systems such as food 
production and distribution (Reader, 2004; Steele, 2008; Pfeiffer, 2006).  
This thesis’ contention that cities can be legitimately treated as FFE equilibrium 
systems, rejecting the human/nature division (discussed below as the fallacy of 
‘human exemptionalism’), places it within a tradition in urban studies that 
understands cities as FFE socio-technological systems that are existentially 
dependent on energy to maintain their form and function (Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977; 
SUME Project, 2011; Rees, 2012; Barthel & Isendahl, 2013).  
 
Socio-technological (urban) systems 
At this point in the thesis it is important to define what is meant by socio-technological 
(urban) systems: this label can be applied to both the myriad nested component 
systems that make cities possible, as well as to those cities themselves.15 Any 
consideration or analysis of the elements that comprise such systems is considered 
in the most open and catholic sense to include the technological, geographic, 
ecological/environmental, physical, cultural, social, economic and historical strands 
that together make such systems possible.  
Such a conception of cities and the systems which comprise them is not new; for 
example Actor Network Theory’s conception of a network of actors (‘actants’) and 
mediators which encompasses the inanimate and immaterial along with more 
traditionally defined social actors, seeks to blur the distinction between inanimate, 
animate and unquantifiable aspects of a network (Latour, 2005; Harman, 2007). 
Bugliarello’s concept of the biosoma (1973; 1998; 2006) likewise demonstrates an 
awareness of the importance of all the multifarious elements or strands of both the 
urban environment, and the nested systems that create and sustain it: 
the lines between people, social structures and various forms of technology 
meld together seamlessly. I call this kind of interaction a biosoma, because it 
is an indissoluble combination of biology, society and machines (1998, p230).  
An excellent example of such a treatment of a city is Cronon’s (1991) history of 
Chicago (Latour, 2005; Farías & Bender, 2010) which focuses primarily on the 
changing environmental and geographical context of the US Midwest and how this 
impacted upon, and was in turn impacted by, the social, economic, physical (built 
environment) and technological changes that were involved in the development of 
Chicago. 
While this thesis has a strong conceptual affinity with the ANT approach, and terms 
such as biosoma, it will use the term socio-technological systems to refer to such 
complex urban systems.16 This is primarily because the use of ‘technological’ better 
captures the importance of techn[olog]ical system elements (including the built 
environment) given the importance of energy to the development and maintenance of 
such complex systems. 
 
Criticisms of the application of thermodynamics within the social sciences 
At this point it is necessary to acknowledge and address a number of connected 
criticisms of the application of FFE thermodynamics to the social sciences before 
                                                
15 The problematic nature of the reification implied by such a discussion of ‘cities’ will be addressed in detail in 
chapter 2. It is enough here to acknowledge that the issue does exist. 
16 This should not be too closely identified with the field of research into socio-technical systems or STS, which dealt 
with the interaction between people and technology in workplaces. This theoretical approach to designing industrial 
work practices was originally developed at the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations in London at the end of WW2 
(Appelbaum, 1997) 
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moving on to a specific discussion of urban socio-technological systems and 
thermodynamics. Critics argue that such an approach: 
1. ignores the ability of technological progress and human ingenuity to 
overcome resource limitations; 
2. is essentially reductionist in nature; 
3. can mistakenly conflate structure with “the qualitative, functional character of 
organization” (Wicken 1986, p262) when discussing particular systems; and 
4. faces the impossibility of delineating either divergent temporal or spatial 
scales (such as individual human choices and actions versus global energy 
depletion) or system boundaries (ie how do we even define ‘the city’?) 
These criticisms will now be addressed in turn. 
 
Criticism 1: ignores technological progress and human ingenuity 
Hall & Klitgaard (2012) provide an excellent overview of this first criticism, which is 
informed by a belief in the ability of technological progress and human ingenuity (in 
many cases expressed through the operation of free-markets rather than coercive 
government action) to overcome resource limitations. While this cornucopian view is 
common (Tierney, 2008; Desrochers, 2015; Sagoff, 1997)17 a particularly influential 
proponent of this view was Julian Simon. His two works The Resourceful Earth 
(1984) (co-edited by Herman Kahn) and The Ultimate Resource 2 (1996) are taken 
as foundational works of the genre.18 His argument is based upon a denial of 
resource finitude, of any connection between human societies and the environment 
and of any relevance of thermodynamics to human socio-technological systems 
(Daly, 1985). The outcome is therefore that the limits to economic growth suggested 
by the neo-Malthusian environmental economics of Georgescu-Roegen, Daly and 
others (Jackson, 2009; Kallis, 2011. 2015; Kallis & March, 2015), or the concept of 
Peak Oil, are non-existent. Instead Simon extrapolates from current trends to argue 
that positive developments in terms of energy costs, human development indicators 
and technological advancements will continue indefinitely and uninterruptedly. 
Simon’s view of technological innovation on resource availability is correctly 
described by Daly (1985) as betting on Zeno’s tortoise in its race against Achilles: 
For example, an advance in knowledge that leads to a one percent decrease 
in the amount of copper that we need to make electrical outlets is much the 
same as an increase in the total stock of copper that has not yet been mined.  
And if we were to make such a one percent increase in efficiency for all uses 
every year, a one percent increase in demand for copper in every future year 
could be accommodated without any increase in the price of copper, even 
without any other helpful developments. (Simon 1996, p58) 
This assumes that an increase in efficiency, obtained through technological 
innovation driven by competition in unfettered markets, can be maintained 
perpetually in apparent defiance of physical limits. Such a claim is not defensible. For 
example Moore’s Law, the observation that the number of transistors on integrated 
circuits doubles approximately every two years, is increasingly recognised19 to be a 
                                                
17 Sagoff differs from Tiernan (2008) and Desrochers (2015) in that he is fiercely critical of economic and 
technological growth for its own sake. He argues that resource limitations will never be a check on rampant 
consumerism as they do not meaningfully exist. Instead he considers that moral and ethical arguments against such 
consumption should be the focus. 
18 Not least because his work is still widely referenced by contemporary Cornucopians - see Desrochers (2015). 
19 For instance by Linus Thorvald, (Linux creator in a forum discussion 19/09/13: see Brodkin, 2013)  
Anthony Richardson THESIS: Dismantling the Wall 
 
18 
 
model of exponential technological improvement which cannot transcend eventual 
physical limits (Krauss & Starkman, 2004).  
Simon further argues that, with regard to the possible limits to resource supplies, in 
particular oil, the impossibility of accurately assessing the amount of oil means that 
“the number of wells that will eventually produce oil, and in what quantities, is not 
known or measurable at present and probably never will be, and hence is not 
meaningfully finite.” (Simon 1996, p179). In other words, because we cannot 
accurately determine the limits to our possible reserves of oil then there are 
effectively no limits to our reserves (Simon generally refrains from using the term 
‘infinite’, most often using ‘non-finite’ or ‘not-finite’ throughout his work). This 
conclusion, in whatever semantic form, is far from convincing.20 
Building on these claims Simon also categorises resources as services, a definitional 
shift that allows him to argue for the infinite substitutability of resources, in that 
declining access to any particular resource or energy source can be addressed by 
the ability of human ingenuity to identify and implement a workable substitution. 
While he provides historical examples of such substitutions, made possible by 
technological innovation, there is a logical inconsistency here in that even a huge 
range of finite resources does not equate to an infinite supply of interchangeable 
resources (Daly, 1985). At the same time, with regard to energy, he does not 
acknowledge the issues of Energy Return on Investment (EROI) or the difference 
between high- and low-gain energy sources (topics which will be addressed in more 
detail in the next chapter) and which means that the substitutability of energy sources 
is not as straightforward as he makes it out to be. For example, there are strong 
reasons (again detailed in the next chapter) why solar power cannot be simply 
substituted for oil as a transportation fuel while providing users with the same return 
on energy investment and thus the same economic cost. His argument is predicated 
on a historical trajectory of declining energy costs from prehistory through the 
Industrial Revolution until the present day and which he then not only extrapolates 
into the immediate future but proposes as an immutable fact of human socio-
technological development. 
Simon similarly rejects any argument that energy extraction and use is subject to the 
Law of Diminishing Returns, based purely on the extrapolation of historical price 
trends as “it costs less today to get oil from the ground in prime sources than it cost 
fifty years ago to get it from the ground in prime sources” (Simon 1996, p171). Such 
cornucopian optimism would seem to ignore that eponymous banking maxim that 
‘Past performance is no guarantee of future results’. 
The second component of Simon’s argument is a discounting of any connection 
between human action and the ecosystems in which it is embedded. In doing this he 
is reflecting both a neo-liberal relegation of the environment to an externality and 
reflecting a more general Enlightenment mindset (itself rather ironically mirroring the 
Dominionist Christian attitude towards Creation) which sees both humans as “‘above’ 
the ecological nexus that defines the boundaries for non-humans” (Pearce, 1985, 
p440) and the environment primarily as a source of resources for exploitation. There 
is an immense body of literature from the ecological, social and economic sciences 
discussing the shortcomings of such a paradigm of human exemptionalism (Dunlap, 
1980; Catton & Dunlap, 1980; Buss et al, 1986; Harper, 2012). This includes the 
issue of human-induced climate change and the importance of the environment to 
                                                
20 He acknowledges that this section in the first edition of his book “elicited much criticism, and because it is not 
necessary to the argument I leave it out this time” (Simon 1996, p62). In fact as the quote above makes clear this is 
still a crucial component of his argument – and remains just as unconvincing in the second version of his book as in 
the first. 
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the functioning of human social, cultural and economic systems,21 the awareness of 
our inescapable impacts upon these same environments22 and the myriad challenges 
and costs (physical, biological, political, philosophical and psychological) of the 
maintenance of such a division.23 Finally FFE thermodynamics itself argues for the 
interconnections between open human socio-technological systems and the wider 
environment in which they are nested, and the crucial importance of energy for their 
maintenance. Therefore there is a contradiction in Simon’s argument which he does 
not acknowledge. He cannot maintain that human societies and technologies are 
somehow closed to the wider environment and its inputs while arguing (as outlined 
immediately below) that the earth is an open system. That is, if the planet is open to 
the wider environment in which it is situated (ie the solar system) he cannot (by the 
tenets of FFE thermodynamics) arbitrarily ‘wall off’ human lifestyles and actions from 
that same environment. 
Simon’s final claim is that the concept of energy dissipation, and above all the 
concern with resource limits which this implies) does not apply to human socio-
technological systems. This is due to the identification of the Earth as an open 
system, and thus one not subject to a total rise in entropy.24 Given the importance of 
solar energy for life on this planet this is an imminently logical stance to take, and 
one with which this writer agrees. However Simon’s focus remains entirely on the 
cosmic scale - “there is no reason to discuss any smaller entity in the present context 
of discussion” (Simon 1996, p79) - and this allows him to pour scorn on the concept 
of energetic limits as applied to human endeavours, given that the lifespan of our sun 
is estimated to be seven billion years and from this scale human concerns about 
resource depletion do seem vanishingly trivial. Yet this ignores the insight of non-
equilibrium thermodynamics that entropy can rise and fall within various elements 
and subsystems of larger complex (open) systems such as the Earth, ecosystems, 
cities or cars or computers (Wicken, 1986). Such localised entropy production is 
rendered meaningless if one accepts Simon’s claims for unending technological 
advancement and infinite substitutability of resources (both energy and matter). 
However if those claims are rejected the eventual collapse of societies, cities or 
physical structures, absent the inputs of energy necessary to sustain them, is not 
dependent upon the eventual heat death of our sun and remains a matter of concern 
for humans. 
Finally these strands of his argument are brought together by the ‘Infinite Resource’ 
of his second title, in which the twin powers of human ingenuity and the resultant 
technological innovation can overcome any physical limits of resource availability: 
One saving grace is improved techniques of use. Consider the steam engine, 
which when first invented operated at 1 percent efficiency. Engines nowadays 
operate perhaps thirty times more efficiently. That is, they use a thirtieth as 
much energy for the same result… When someone finds a way to increase 
the efficiency of using a resource, the discovery not only increases the 
efficiency of the energy we use this year, but it also increases the effective 
stocks resources that are known or are as yet undiscovered. And this process 
could continue a long time, perhaps indefinitely. (Simon 1996, p59) 
In thermodynamic terms this is plainly nonsensical as the theoretical concept of the 
Carnot heat engine places physical limits upon the possible efficiency of any heat 
engine such as a steam, internal combustion or jet engine. There can be no indefinite 
increase in the efficiency of such heat engines – nor can any achieve 100% 
                                                
21 See Brundtland (1987), Pearce (1985; 1998), Giddings et al (2002), Shiva (2005), Homer-Dixon (2001; 2006), 
Walker & Salt (2006), Adger & Brown (2009) and Harper (2012). 
22 See Brundtland (1987), Wackernagel & Rees (1996) and Harper (2012). 
23 See Catton & Dunlap (1980), Gurr (1985), Klare (2004), Shiva (2005), Homer-Dixon (2006) and Harper (2012). 
24 Again ‘entropy’ is used here (rather than energy dissipation) as that is the terminology used by Simon. 
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efficiency (Avery, 2007). At the same time it ignores the social aspect encapsulated 
in the Jevons paradox (Alcott, 2005) which states that increases in energy efficiency 
lead to increased energy usage, not energy savings. 
It is hard to escape the sense (particularly given the criticism25 of the human 
exemptionalist paradigm) that the rejection of physical limits by optimists such as 
Simon is essentially a faith-based argument. It is an extrapolation of a historical trend 
of increasing socio-technological innovation and improving quality of life indicators 
(‘past performance’) to infinity (‘future results’). This is the ‘parable of the turkey’ as 
described by Taleb (2007): given a regular and uninterrupted supply of food from the 
farmer over the months it is perhaps understandable for the turkey to see this as the 
natural state of existence. Unfortunately for the turkey the extrapolation of this trend 
into the future does not allow for the arrival of Christmas Eve… 
Ironically Simon’s criticism of the predictive reductionism seen as implicit in the 
application of thermodynamic principles to the forecasting of future human socio-
technological systems does not preclude his recourse to similar reductionist 
forecasts, particularly with regard to the power of free-markets to drive unending 
human advancement. In the end this is as much a clash of worldviews as a debate 
over verifiable facts, with the opposing camps variously labelled as (neo-) 
Malthusians or Finitists,26 Ecologists,27 Survivalists,28 Catastroph[ists],29 
Doomsdayers or Entropists30 versus Cornucopians,31 Exemptionalists,32 Utopian 
Capitalists,33 Economic Optimists34 or Entrepreneurs.35 This dichotomy will be 
addressed further in chapter 7 where the influence of ideas of Progress and human 
exemptionalism will be examined. At this point it suffices to say that this thesis 
acknowledges the cultural power of such worldviews and argues that their hold on 
our imaginations presents a very real challenge to the sort of simplification that it 
ultimately proposes. 
 
Criticism 2: Reductionism 
‘Sma’ the ship said finally, with a hint of what might have been 
frustration in its voice, ‘I’m the smartest thing for a hundred light years 
radius, and by a factor of about a million… but even I can’t predict 
where a snooker ball’s going to end after more than six collisions’  
Banks (1991) The State of the Art, p131 
The second criticism is that such an application of thermodynamics to human socio-
technological systems oversimplifies the complexity of such systems through 
recourse to reductionism: 
However, even accepting that entropy production is ineluctably associated 
with all developmental activity and change, it is not obvious that the particular 
courses of events, human historical or otherwise, can be explained 
deductively from thermodynamic principles. (O’Connor 1991, p113) 
                                                
25 See Dunlap (1980) and Catton & Dunlap (1980). 
26 Simon (1996) and Homer-Dixon (2001).. 
27 See Dunlap (1980; 1983a; 1983b) and Buss et al (1986). 
28 Richardson (1985). 
29 Buss et al (1986). 
30 Meader (1983). 
31 See Pearce (1985) and Buss et al (1986). 
32 See Dunlap (1980) and Buss et al (1986). 
33 Meader (1983). 
34 Homer-Dixon (2001). 
35 Richardson (1985). 
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This is not the same criticism made by Cornucopians such as Simon, who argue 
against the limits posed by resource depletion as a corollary of the Second Law while 
in Simon’s case making a strongly reductionist argument for individual competition 
within free-markets as the driver of endless growth. Instead O’Connor is criticising 
the reductionism which aims to predict future events and socio-technological 
developments (ie future limits to the latter) through recourse to thermodynamic 
resource depletion. However a rejection of any reductive impact of thermodynamics 
on human socio-technological systems should not be conflated with the concept of 
thermodynamic limits to their development. It is perfectly logical to reject a predictive 
reductionism with regard to the generation or maintenance of FFE systems while still 
proposing a limit to eventual developments of such complexity in the absence of 
sufficient energy inputs to drive or even sustain them. This is the viewpoint of this 
thesis and it will be further outlined by a brief discussion of the concept of emergence 
(or emergent complexity). 
 
Emergence 
It is useful to start this divergence with some examples of the phenomenon of 
emergence. One is the explosion of bacteria in an agar-filled petri dish, as it is never 
evenly distributed across the surface of the dish. Instead over time it forms 
agglomerations (colonies) which grow from simple principles of aggregate behaviour 
(Wimpenny, 1979; Czirok et al, 1996). Similarly, computer simulations of the dynamic 
behaviour of autonomous agents (such as Langton’s Ant), acting according to simple 
directive and reactive behavioural rules, can produce aggregate forms/structures 
which display characteristics unpredictable from these first causes (Langton, 1986; 
Resnick, 1999; Batty, 2005). A final example is the behaviour of insects such as ants 
or bees, which can produce complex behavioural systems of resource discovery, 
accumulation and exploitation from very basic rules of individual behaviour 
(Holldobler & Wilson, 1990; Johnson, 2001). 
These examples all match the general understanding of emergence which can be 
described as situations or systems in which even perfect knowledge and 
understanding of previous or current elements and states may give us no ability to 
predict future system states. The adjective ‘general’ is applied here because the term 
emergence has been and remains difficult to pin down and is highly contested. 
Above all there is the distinction between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ emergence. The former 
means the inability to deduce the principles of a higher-order system or phenomenon 
by looking at the lower-order phenomena out of which it grew; in a sense something 
really has ‘come from nothing’ (Bedau, 1997; Chalmers, 2006). Weak emergence, on 
the other hand describes an “interesting property that is unexpected, given the 
underlying principles governing the system” (Chalmers 2006, p255). Strong 
emergence thus differs from weak emergence by its insistence on the existence of 
some mysterious deus ex machina to explain the emergence of particular 
phenomena, and their relationship has been seen historically as a tension between 
‘top-down’ vitalism and ‘bottom-up’ reductionism: 
the one variable scientists fear is the mystical - that is, an external source that 
is fuzzy, that cannot be operationalized… vitalism, the belief that an elan vital 
somehow plays a role in our biological and social development. The reaction 
to this position has been reductionism, as per the work of ant theorist and 
sociobiologist Edward 0. Wilson, who believes that genetic causes are 
primary in understanding human behaviour. (lnayatullah 1994, p684) 
The British Emergentists of the 1920’s, such as Alexander (1920), Morgan (1923), 
and Broad (1925) posited just such a mysterious element as the explanation for the 
(strong) emergence in chemistry of higher-order complexity from simple antecedents 
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(McLaughlin, 1997), while one famous example from the social sciences was 
Spengler’s (1991) concept of rising or ebbing cultural ‘blood’ or lifeforce as the driver 
of either the progress or decadence of a culture. However the arrival of quantum 
mechanics provided a reductive explanation for what the Emergentists had seen as 
irreducibly emergent character of many chemical reactions and therefore it “has 
broadened our conception of mechanism - introducing a holistic notion of mechanism 
- and thereby of reductive explanation” (McLaughlin 1997, p10). Thus the discrediting 
of British Emergentism in particular, and strong emergence in general (such as 
Spengler), has seen a shift of focus onto weak emergence, particularly with regard to 
the study of complexity and complex systems. 
 
Weak emergence and the temptation of reductionism 
This thesis strongly supports a theoretical focus on weak emergence, yet it 
acknowledges that this is not incompatible with a broadly reductionist approach to 
emergent phenomena (whether physical, chemical or increasingly social). Weak 
emergence, unlike the ungraspable strong emergence, seems to place a tantalising 
‘Theory of Everything’ (Weinberg, 1994; Spariosu, 2004) almost within our reach.  
This tension between grasping for a totalising explanatory (and therefore predictive) 
reductionist framework, and the rejection of such reductionism, is as old as the 
scientific or philosophic method; together these approaches are currents running 
through the history of Western thought in particular (Wells, 2013a; Ogilvy, 2013; 
Morin 2007). The universalist ambitions of Plato’s philosophy were countered by 
Socrates’ admission that he knew nothing, while Hegel’s totalising System was 
rejected by Kierkegaard (Ogilvy, 2013). This tension exists in the debates over 
nurture versus nature, free will versus determinism, or in the undermining of the 
modernist worldview by postmodernist insights into the untenability of Grand 
Narratives and the rejection of objective Truth for a focus on the subject. The 
reductionist urge in Western scientific tradition has been described by Morin (2005) 
as being based upon three principles which taken together involve a rejection of 
uncertainty and complexity: 
universal determinism, …knowing all past events, but also predicting all 
events in the future; …reduction, that consists in knowing any composite from 
only the knowledge of its constituting elements; …disjunction, that consists in 
isolating and separating cognitive difficulties from one another, leading to the 
separation between disciplines, which have become hermetic from each 
other. (Morin 2007, p5) 
The rejection of the last of these principles has been one of the central tenets of the 
study of systems and complexity, yet this has not always involved a rejection of either 
determinism or reductionism. Thus the historical development of systems thinking 
and complexity theories (Wells, 2013a) has included both reductionist ambitions and 
the reactions against them - nicely encapsulated by Ogilvy (2013) as the tension 
between ‘arrogant’ and ‘humble’ systems theory.  
According to Gleeson (2013) such a ‘bottom up’ and ‘arrogant’ approach is 
increasingly influential within contemporary urban studies for a range of reasons 
including the influence of neoliberalism and the de-privileging of politics, the lasting 
‘after-effects’ of postmodernism, and 
[r]ecent interest in urban explanation from the physical sciences, including 
through the (re)deployment of naturalistic epistemologies and methods, and 
reflecting also the long rise of environmental and resource issues and 
responses in cities and in urban thought and practice. (p1843) 
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A prime example presented by Gleeson is the development by Bettencourt & West 
(2010) of a predictive formula for the growth of cities. They posit a direct correlation 
between city size and return on investment across a range of factors including 
infrastructure cost, economic dynamism and reduced carbon footprints per capita. 
They further consider this correlation is strong enough to be considered a 
determinative ‘law’: every doubling of city size (in terms of population) involves an 
85% increase in physical infrastructure, leading to increased cost effectiveness per 
head of population. This likewise applies to any number of socio-economic markers, 
whether positive (speed of pedestrians, wages, access to educational or research 
facilities, registered patents, establishment of businesses and city GDP) or negative 
(disease rates, traffic congestion, failure of businesses and crime); in all such cases 
these increase by 115% for every 100% increase in population size. They specifically 
discount the effects of history, geography and urban design as ‘secondary’ (p1839) 
although they do question the possibility of unlimited growth in city size due to 
resource constraints. 
While the Western scientific method has been wonderfully successful in a wide range 
of fields, this has often been dependent on a determined disjunction of both the fields 
of scientific endeavour and the elements of the interconnected world we now inhabit: 
No wonder scientists have to make such an effort to isolate any cause or 
effect. That’s what laboratories are for, and they tend to be expensive. (Ogilvy 
2013, p338) 
It has been one of the primary insights of complexity science, growing as it has out of 
the ‘subversive science’ of ecology (Wells 2013a, p100) that the complexity of 
systems in the natural or social worlds poses real challenges to the Western scientific 
model. Thus issues or problems in such complex adaptive systems have been 
described as ‘wicked problems’ (Rittel & Webber, 1973) in which any action has both 
intended and unintended consequences. This is because: 
…scientific models used to study and quantify real systems can only utilize a 
limited amount of information in their description, whereas natural hierarchies, 
because of their nature, contain a virtually ‘infinite’ quantity of information 
related to all their components and different spatiotemporal scales. 
(Giampietro 1994, p618) 
It is the very desire to map such complexity, to find the specific butterfly wings that 
caused the storm on the neighbouring continent, that leads to what Stewart & Cohen 
label ‘the reductionist nightmare’ (1994a; 1997). This drowning of scientific 
explanation under the weight of its own ambition to identify and explicate every 
causal factor of complex reality is the inevitable outcome of the Western scientific 
method’s drive (need?) to provide a universal ‘theory of everything’. At the same time 
this drive/need has been clearly connected to the history of European colonialism 
and the devaluing, demonisation and domination of the Other (Sardar, 1994). 
Quite apart from the historical and cultural consequences of such a scientific 
worldview and the difficulties and expense involved in such a quest there are 
numerous examples of reductionist approaches or solutions to complex issues, such 
as the disastrous introduction of cane toads into Australia, that demonstrate the law 
of unintended consequences in operation in complex systems (Gillon, 2001; Thiele, 
2011; Frank et al, 2012; 2014). 
However, it is possible to accept a ‘bottom-up’ yet ‘humble’ model of emergent 
complexity. There is a shared theoretical approach, as demonstrated by Morin (1992; 
1999; 2007), Maturana & Varela (1974; 1980), McLaughlin (1997), Stewart & Cohen 
(1994 a/b; 1997), Ogilvy (2013), Frank et al (2012; 2014) and Latour (1987; 2005; 
2012), which eschews both the quasi-mysticism of the Emergentists and the sort of 
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reductionism espoused by Wilson, Bettencourt & West and others. Instead, 
emergence remains a property of complex systems (it is not reliant on any external 
catalyst) while still being unpredictable across time. Such a view necessitates a 
jettisoning of the reductionist conceit, with regard to weak emergence as much as 
strong, and an acceptance of the unpredictability of interconnected complex systems. 
The image of the ant is apposite for such a paradigm; it is both the acronym of Actor 
Network Theory (and acknowledged by Latour (2005) as nicely illustrative of his 
approach) and Stewart & Cohen (1997) coin the phrase ‘ant country’ to label the way 
the relationship between first causes and final results cannot be explicated or 
predicted clearly in scientific terms, due to the simple complexity of the environment 
and its interactions with the process being considered. That is, the myriad wandering 
‘ant trails’ of causation are so complex and byzantine, whether seen through lens of 
top-down or bottom-up reductionism, that they cannot be followed after the fact, let 
alone predicted ahead of time.  
At this point one question arises: given such a ‘humble’ understanding of weak 
emergence, what is a useful theoretical approach to such complex emergent 
systems? Such an approach must provide some useful framework for understanding 
such systems, and their development through time, without falling into the 
‘reductionist trap’. This thesis seeks to work with the main ideas of Gunderson & 
Holling’s concept of Panarchy (2002): a theoretical approach that seems to straddle 
this humble/arrogant divide. While their stated aim was “to develop and test theories 
that explain transformational change in systems of humans and nature, theories that 
are inherently integrative” (p21) there is a clear rejection of the reductionist conceit 
and a wariness of applying this framework indiscriminately across disciplinary 
boundaries. A deeper discussion of the ideas of Panarchy will be undertaken in the 
next chapter where possible applications for urban resilience will be explored, but it is 
enough to note here their understanding of the natural environment as a FFE, weakly 
emergent system in which changes eternally occur at different rates across different 
spatial scales.  
The acknowledgement of emergent complexity in systems together with a rejection of 
reductionism might be a direct challenge to the traditional Western scientific model, 
but it has strong affinities to philosophical approaches and understandings of reality 
from other cultural milieux. For example Buddhist conceptions of the universe as fluid 
and eternally in flux, with no essentialist conception of ‘things’, and with 
consciousness emerging in tandem with physical matter are very similar to the ideas 
of emergent complexity introduced above (Macy, 1976; 1991). Similarly, writers have 
discerned complementarities between ‘humble’ (non-determinist) systems theory and 
Buddhist/Tantric ideas of causality (Macy, 1976; 1991; Kang, 2009) and Hindu 
conceptions of universal interconnectedness (Thiele, 2011) while there is likewise a 
discernible similarity across different schools of classical Chinese thought that 
Form is not some permanent structure to be discovered behind a changing 
process… Spatial forms – or ‘things’ – are temporal flows. ‘Things’ and 
‘events’ are mutually shaping and being shaped, and exist as a dynamic 
calculus of contrasting foci emerging in tension with each other… Rational 
explanation does not exist in the discovery of some antecedent agency or the 
isolation and disclosure of relevant causes, but in mapping out the local 
conditions that collaborate to sponsor any particular event or phenomenon. 
(Ames 2007, p40-41) 
This thesis will return to these ideas in Part B’s discussion of military ideas on the 
fragility or resilience of complex urban systems when the ideas of Sun Tzu will be 
more closely examined. That this brief treatment of emergent complexity should end 
with a discussion of philosophy should not be seen as surprising: in the face of the 
inescapable unpredictably of emergent complexity the ‘humble’ systems theory 
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outlined by Ogilvy (2013) provides a model for action reminiscent of Niebuhr's 
‘Serenity Prayer’:36 
God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, 
The courage to change the things I can, 
And wisdom to know the difference   
This brief diversion aims to make it clear that this thesis is not making a reductionist 
argument. Instead it argues that the sort of emergent complexity discussed in the 
next chapter is unpredictable from first causes and is as dependent upon the 
influences of culture, geography, geopolitics, historical trends, individual choice and 
sheer chance as it is upon the constraints of energy availability and the trajectory of 
thermodynamics. 
We can now return to the issue of reductionism with regard to the relationship 
between energy and FFE systems. For the bacteria discussed earlier the introduction 
of thermodynamics into their petri-dish universe means that as the food source is 
depleted and then exhausted the population crashes dramatically. For the bacteria, 
the Malthusian dynamic can be seen as inescapable, deterministic even, given that 
the petri-dish is, to all intents and purpose, a closed system in thermodynamic terms 
and the adaptive capabilities of the bacteria do not extend (as far as we know…) to 
self-awareness of the situation and the institution of alternative (self-limiting) growth 
tactics. Likewise with Langton’s Ant and similar automatons – the simple rules with 
which they operate and from which the higher complexity emerges do not include 
self-awareness. For both these examples the relatively simple rules of behaviour are 
not amenable to adjustment or transcendence through reference to any meta-rules 
which may change the actual parameters of the system, its environment or the 
relationship between the two. 
Here was Malthus’ error in applying his principle deterministically to human societies 
and populations: humans are not bacteria and human action is self-aware. In this 
sense the argument of Simon and other Cornucopians is absolutely correct in that 
human ingenuity does change the calculation with regard to thermodynamics and 
energy/resource depletion – but only through the conscious acceptance of this 
dynamic and the need to adjust human and social actions to reflect the reality of the 
challenges that FFE thermodynamics poses to our complex socio-technological 
systems (itself the purpose of this thesis). Thus, with the proviso that ‘business as 
usual’ is not possible, we shall see in the next chapter that the promotion of 
complexity in human societies is no more deterministic than the exploitation and 
inevitable depletion of resources and energy on which it depends. 
On the one hand it is clear that Schneider & Kay (1994a/b) and others (Schneider & 
Sagan, 2005; Kunstler, 2005) are making such a reductionist argument with regard to 
FFE thermodynamics and emergent complexity, as they argue that the development 
or collapse of any complex living system (such as an ecosystem or a city or wider 
society) can be determined on the basis of energy use. This could also be seen as 
an application of the Jevons Paradox (Alcott, 2005) as they argue that, with regard to 
complex human socio-technological systems such as cities, their growth and/or 
survival is deterministically driven by the exploitation of energy surpluses. 
On the other hand, this thesis agrees with those (Diamond, 2005; Tainter, 1990; 
2011b, Batty, 2005; Batty & Marshall, 2012; Wicken, 1986; Foster, 2011) who 
reverse the causality and argue that, with regard to human socio-technological 
systems in particular, increases in complexity are only made possible by the 
availability of energy to drive their implementation. Thus complexity is an emergent 
                                                
36 Recent scholarship has confirmed Niebuhr as the most likely author, with the first examples of the prayer 
appearing in print in the early 1930’s (Shapiro, 2014). 
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phenomenon driven by a range of social, cultural, economic, political, technological 
and geographic, as well as energy, considerations. The difficulty involved in 
untangling the causal relationship between energy use and structural complexity in 
human socio-technological systems is nicely encapsulated in the concept of the 
Energy-Complexity Spiral (Tainter & Patzek, 2012). 
To conclude this discussion of reductionism and/or determinism, this thesis 
approaches complex emergent systems like cities from a theoretical framework of 
‘humble’ weak emergence. FFE thermodynamics places constraints on such complex 
systems, but this is not at the expense other drivers of emergent complexity like 
human action: 
…we can never afford to ignore the decisions and actions of individuals. They 
are the principal triggers in human society, if not the only ones or the most 
important ones. Contrary to some notions, the ‘energy approach’ to social 
process is not an overwhelmingly deterministic model, but rather one in which 
we try to more accurately place the human decision-making process in its 
proper perspective. The cultural phases of evolution have at critical times 
been determined by individual decisions, and it is of utmost importance that 
analysts be aware of the conditions and circumstances that may again place 
such decision at crucial points of change. (Adams 1982, p124) 
 
Criticism 3: The conflation of structure and function 
The third criticism is that form/structure/organisation cannot be automatically 
conflated with “the qualitative, functional character of organization” (Wicken, 1986; 
Morin, 1999). Function is not organisation/structure nor is the obverse the case; the 
often unpredictable nature of emergent structures reminds us that they cannot be 
conflated. Thus as it is difficult to analyse the relationship between energy dissipation 
and system function we can only quantitatively analyse structure.  
At the same time codifying and analysing system structure/organisation can also be 
problematic given that it is not necessarily in a direct causal relationship with 
function. Changing form in one case may have no bearing on function, while in 
another the law of unintended consequences (Gillon, 2001; Thiele, 2011) will hold 
sway. In the end: 
[o]rganization is a notion that is dependent and at the same time independent 
of its constituents… We immediately see the importance of organization if it 
changes the qualities and character of systems or entities consisting of 
similar, but differently structured elements. (Morin 1999, p116) 
However, this is inevitable given the very nature of weak emergence, in which the 
eventual outcome is unpredictable from first conditions. Essentially it is only through 
developments in structure/organisation (the combination of different elements in 
particular ways) that new system properties emerge. 
On the other hand, while the disconnection between structure and function can be 
problematic when discussing the energy costs of complex socio-technological 
systems, it does also allow cities and/or societies to also consciously separate 
system form from system function. This will be addressed in detail in Part C, but it is 
enough to note here that this differentiation of form and function allows for the 
possibility of challenging the path dependency of urban development. To use the 
example of roads, cars and urban traffic congestion, a focus on the function of urban 
transport, rather than form, can help to allow alternative modes of urban transport to 
be imagined. 
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Criticism 4: The challenge of temporal/spatial scale and boundary delineation 
He only says, 'Good fences make good neighbors.' 
Robert Frost (1914), Mending Wall 
The fourth criticism is connected to the previous and relates to the challenges of 
integrating radically different temporal or spatial scales with regard to the effects of 
thermodynamics upon human societies. While the difficulties of doing this are 
perhaps made clear by Simon’s mockery (1996) of the ‘7 billion year’ timeframe 
which he identifies with the ultimate ‘endgame’ of the second law of thermodynamics 
here on Earth this issue of timeframes has connotations for the concept of 
emergence itself. That is because it is an inevitable outcome of attempts to once 
again provide explanations for such complex emergent outcomes which can 
encapsulate both the particular and the universal. 
Thus Maturana et al (1974) argue that 
[a]s a result, processes that are history dependent (evolution, ontogenesis) 
and history independent (individual organization) have been confused in the 
attempt to provide a single mechanistic explanation for phenomena which, 
although related, are fundamentally distinct. (p187) 
The tension here is the result of the same ‘reductionist nightmare’ of Stewart & 
Cohen (1997) outlined above and it is just as applicable to the study of complex 
urban systems and their development through time. With this in mind, this thesis 
argues that the fields of archaeology and anthropology have much to offer the study 
of energy dissipation in urban environments, particularly given they are concerned 
with the analysis of technological and cultural change across much longer periods of 
time than other social sciences (such as sociology). Archaeologists and 
anthropologists face the challenge of attempting to synthesise the hugely different 
temporal scales of individual lifespans (or even the immediacy of personal human 
decisions and actions) with the decades to millennia across which civilisations can 
emerge, develop and then shift into other forms. In the search for frameworks to 
explain such broad socio-cultural change across these larger timeframes they must 
either ignore or acknowledge the insights of psychology, broader social 
science/theory and the whole philosophical debate over individual will and action.  
Again, the Panarchy model provides a possible approach to complex systems 
(Gunderson & Holling, 2002). As part of a broader range of hierarchic approaches to 
complex systems (Simon, 2005; Giampetro, 1994), it acknowledges the existence of 
various hierarches, both containing and nested within other hierarchies and existing 
across the range of possible spatio-temporal scales. The very concept of scale(s) 
has been criticised however, particularly in the areas of urban theory influenced by 
ANT. For example Latour has consistently argued for a ‘flat’ ontology, in which there 
is no recourse to structural elements such as scale or power (political, economic or 
cultural) for explanatory purposes: 
The problem is that social scientists use scale as one of the many variables 
they need to set up before doing the study, whereas scale is what actors 
achieve by scaling, spacing, and contextualizing each other through the 
transportation in some specific vehicles of some specific traces. (Latour 2005, 
p183-4)  
Reflecting such a view, others such as Thrift (Farías, 2010) and Smith (2006), find 
the related concepts of scale and boundaries problematic, given that they can be 
used as an explanatory simplification of the complex contextual realities in particular 
urban situations. Instead of an often presumptive referral to such reified concepts 
there needs to be a focus on the specific and the contingent when examining 
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particular urban systems. Yet there is also a paradox at the heart of this radical 
rejection of reified boundaries: 
I think ANT does work best in strongly defined situations and I think that’s 
difficult to deny, truth to tell… I think it is more difficult for it to work when you 
are looking at, if you like, everyday life as a whole, or even when you are 
looking at political movements… which… don’t have bounded spaces. (Thrift, 
quoted in Farías 2010, p112-3) 
The care taken to avoid reductionist explanation therefore does not preclude the 
need for boundaries, if only provisional and imposed for methodological usefulness. 
Similarly with regard to this issue of scale an archaeological/historical work such as 
The Limits of Settlement Growth by Fletcher (1995) provides a possible approach to 
acknowledging and addressing the debate over unpredictable emergent complexity 
vs reductionism (or as he describes in the field of archaeology social vs biological 
explanations of cultural development through time):  
The divergent emphasis on our nature either as biological organisms in the 
long term or actors in an intersubjective life in the short term produce a 
serious logical quandary… At its most extreme the social view excludes 
generalised regularities and emphasises contextual uniqueness, while the 
large-scale aspect of the biological view is mistakenly regarded as 
determinative and is detached from its short term historical component. 
(Fletcher 1995, p14)  
The ‘biological view’ mentioned here is the broader ecological or evolutionary view of 
ecosystems/societies, in which the focus is upon species (‘polar bears’; ‘Romans’) 
and ecosystems/societies (‘the Arctic’; the Roman Empire’) rather than individual 
organisms (‘that polar bear’; ‘this Roman shopkeeper’). A focus on the former 
naturally needs to demonstrate a concern with larger forces of social or ecosystem 
change such as environmental constraints or challenges, resource availability and 
evolution at the expense of individual action. This is the same quandary implied by 
the application of far from equilibrium thermodynamics to the development of 
complex socio-technological systems such as cities (Connor, 1991; Gleeson, 2013). 
How can we acknowledge the importance of human agency in the development and 
maintenance (or otherwise) of urban environments if these are themselves entirely 
driven or constrained by their physical environment, their inescapable need for 
energy and the trajectory of thermodynamic energy dissipation?   
However Fletcher’s search for aspects of human culture that work at larger 
timescales, and thus provide a way of bringing together these varying temporal 
scales in “a hierarchy of explanation which will also act as a buffer between them, to 
prevent over extrapolation from either extreme of the continuum” (Fletcher 1995, 
p16), is both applicable to urban environments and rejects any predictive 
reductionism. His approach is to focus on the material components of society and/or 
culture, and in particular the physical and cultural inertia of the built environment and 
physical artefacts (the ongoing existence of socio-technological systems). He sees 
such elements as working on an intermediate temporal scale between the shorter 
time scales of human social interaction and the longer timescales of socio-
technological and cultural restraints posed by resource depletion, environmental 
change and thermodynamic dissipation.  
Thus the materiality of human urban conglomerations, from small villages to 
megacities, reflects both the individual choices of the myriad of actors within such 
complex systems as well as the path dependency constraining those choices; the 
environment, the imperatives of resource inflows and the existing choices of other 
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such actors (whether current or past) as manifest in the constructed urban 
environment (the material expressions of culture, in Fletcher’s words).  
Once more, there are resonances here with the theory of Panarchy, and its model of 
adaptive cycles working across a broad range of spatial and temporal scales 
(Gunderson & Holling, 2002). Such similarities will be addressed fully in the next 
chapter although it can be noted here that these cycles all progress through the 
same four stages from growing complexity to the final Release (or ‘collapse’) stage 
which heralds an abrupt fall in such complexity. Although Panarchy was originally 
conceptualised in terms of natural ecosystems it has been applied to a wide range of 
other system contexts, although studies applying the Panarchy concept to particular 
human systems demonstrate that a neat linear progression through Gunderson & 
Holling’s four stages is not clearly evident (Abel & Walker, 2002; Gotts, 2007). As the 
same time there are similarities between Fletcher’s focus on the materiality of human 
social life and Luhmann’s concept of ‘structural coupling’ which is also addressed in 
the following chapter: the connections of system and environment which must “limit 
the scope of the possible structures with which a system can carry out its 
autopoiesis” (Luhmann 2012, p55). Finally, all of these concepts, when applied to 
urban development, can be labelled as ‘path dependency’. This concept of path 
dependency will be addressed in detail in Part C of the thesis, where it represents 
one of the great obstacles to the simplification of urban systems which this thesis is 
proposing. 
However Fletcher’s focus on the material expressions of human culture in particular 
provides a specifically human/centred approach to the emergence vs reductionism 
debate which goes some way towards bridging the temporal divide between these 
explanatory frameworks (we will return to a focus on Fletcher’s claims about the 
limits to city size posed by the material components of human social life in the next 
chapter as a measurement of cultural complexity).  
 
Boundary delineation 
A clearly related challenge to the study of complex systems is posed by the issue of 
boundary delineation. The issue is that one cannot analyse or promote the resilience 
of any city or its constituent systems, identify its energy inputs and outputs, or 
measure the effects of thermodynamic dissipation upon it, without assigning some 
sort of boundary to it. A system must be defined, delineated, if it is to be considered 
as a discrete unit. 
However this runs counter to both the holistic worldviews of the philosophical 
traditions outlined earlier and the broad agreement within the literature on systems 
theory and/or emergent complexity that all complex systems are nested within other 
systems. These include the concepts of Panarchy (Gunderson & Holling, 2002), 
hierarchy theory (Giampetro, 1994; Simon, 2005), holons and Holarchy (Koestler, 
1967) and Beer’s Recursive System theorem: 
In a recursive organizational structure any viable system contains, and is 
contained in, a viable system (Espinosa & Walker 2011, p34). 
Not only are the systems described in all of these theoretical approaches at a range 
of scales, the dense interconnections between and across scales and spatial 
locations make it difficult to define where any particular system begins and another 
ends. The natural world for instance does not involve clear boundaries between 
ecosystems or environments (Odum, 1971; Fiscus, 2013) as energy, matter and 
living organisms all interact across such ecosystems. Thus the difficulties involved in 
separating the wasp from the orchid (Deleuze & Guattari 2004, p10) or the causal 
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relationships (trees causing rain or vice versa) within the hydrological cycle (Malhi et 
al, 2008). 
These challenges of system delineation are just as prevalent in the context of cities 
and urban conglomerations. This awareness is present, for example, in Latour’s 
radical deconstruction of Paris (2012), which dissolves the metropolis into its 
constituent elements to the exclusion of any comprehensively grasped totality. 
However, a less radically de-constructivist approach to the interconnectedness of 
urban or other systems is also now commonplace in the field of urban studies. For 
example there has been a long tradition of situating cities within broader regional, 
national or global networks (Friedmann, 1986; 1995) including the influential ‘Global 
Cities’ approach of Sassen (1991; 1994; 1995) which focuses on cities such as 
Tokyo, London or New York as control nodes within the network of the global 
economy (centralising the ‘Command and control’ functions of the global economy) 
and thus supplanting the nation state as the primary drivers of economic and social 
globalisation. Castells (1996) however essentially reverses this causality and sees a 
“space of flows” in which such cities are primarily the conduits for these global flows 
of information, money and people; the power resides in the flows themselves rather 
than the cities (Taylor et al, 2002; Allen, 1999). In all these cases the boundaries 
between the city, the region, the nation state and the globe are increasingly porous. 
The difficulty is only compounded by a consideration of thermodynamics and energy 
dissipation in the development of complex urban environments. For example, the 
concept of the ‘eco-footprint’ (Wackernagel & Rees, 1996) applies this concern with 
boundaries to the intersection of non-equilibrium thermodynamics and urban systems 
by demonstrating how the systems, effects and energy inputs of any particular city or 
household extend far beyond the commonly defined physical boundaries of such 
entities (many thousands of kilometres in the case of large developed cities). While a 
household for example may be easily bounded physically by reference to a specific 
dwelling on a particular piece of land inhabited by particular human beings, this is a 
description focussing particularly on structure. In terms of function such a literalist 
delineation of this household becomes untenable for it cannot continue without the 
various energy inputs (petrol, electricity, food) physical resources (clear water and 
air, transport) or social connections (employment, government services) which 
makes the functions of this household possible. Thus systems such as this 
household or a particular city cannot exist in functional (and to a lesser extent 
physical) terms without the nested hierarchy of other systems within which they 
reside.37 Here the difficulty of boundary delineation becomes obvious in any attempt 
to analyse complex socio-technological systems such as a particular city or the 
interconnected components which comprise it. It is pointless to escape the quagmire 
of reductionism to only get lost in an undifferentiated monism… 
One possible way out of this theoretical impasse is offered by recourse to systems 
theory in general (Wells, 2013a), and in particular the work of Luhmann (2012), and 
its focus on organisational closure, observer viewpoint and/or system purpose. By 
way of caution it needs to be stated here that while Luhmann fits within the systems 
theory tradition often traced to Bertalanffy’s General Systems Theory (Wells, 2013a), 
his stated aim is to provide an overarching and comprehensive constructivist theory 
of society as a complex autopoietic system. He thus falls clearly on the ‘arrogant 
systems theory’ side of Ogilvy’s ledger (2013). At the same time, this thesis rejects 
Luhmann’s controversial view of humans standing apart from the socio-technological 
systems within which they exist (2012). This is inconsistent with the strongly inclusive 
approach implied by the term ‘socio-technological’ and demonstrated by other 
theoretical frameworks such as ANT (which sees humans as active components 
                                                
37 An interesting treatment of exactly these issues is provided by Stephen King’s 2009 novel Under the Dome. 
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(actants) of such systems as much as geography, economics, history or technology). 
This thesis strongly takes the position that human beings are foundational elements 
of larger urban systems and no individual can stand outside the social context within 
she or he is situated.  
 
Organisational closure 
Luhmann (2012) sees complex systems as organisationally closed (he uses the term 
‘operationally closed’). That is, a system is fundamentally separate in terms of its 
organisation from its environment; in fact it can only be defined in opposition to this 
environment. The ontological reality of such a system is contained in this boundary, 
or in this act of delineation, so that “we speak no longer of objects but of distinctions” 
(p28). Thus a dichotomy between system and environment is conceived in which one 
cannot exist without the other but any objective reality of ‘the system’ is not accepted. 
Instead this difference between system and environment is continually renegotiated 
and restated by the internal operations of the system itself. Any system is therefore 
autopoietic (emergent) and self-referential in that it defines itself as existing apart 
from, and in opposition to, the environment in which it is nested: 
…only operationally closed systems can develop a higher level of inner 
complexity, which can then serve to specify the respects in which the system 
reacts to conditions of its environment (p34). 
However this does not in any way invalidate the existence of such systems as 
existing in a state far from equilibrium as per non-equilibrium thermodynamics: 
…there are systems not subject to the law of entropy but able to develop 
negentropy, and thus to reinforce the distinction between the system and its 
environment through the system’s openness and dependence on the 
environment (p31). 
Such systems are therefore both thermodynamically open and organisationally 
closed: 
If we consider a living system, from the perspective of its interaction with the 
environment; it is a complex adaptive system [CAS], and it is an open system; 
it exchanges energy and information with the environment it co-evolves with. 
So in terms of explaining the complexity of its dynamic interactions, we can 
observe them from the perspective of CAS. When we observe the same 
complex system from a cybernetic perspective, what we are dealing with is an 
‘organisationally closed system’. It is open to energy and information, co-
evolves with the environment, but is organisationally closed (Espinosa & 
Walker, 2011, p14-15) 
This explains the historical role of walls in a city siege – as a far from equilibrium 
system the city must remain open or energy depletion will be an issue (ie they will run 
out of food and water) and it will collapse, while in organisational terms it must 
remain closed or it will be subsumed (conquered) by an opposing socio-technological 
system. 
 
Observer viewpoint and system purpose 
At the same time the subjectivist nature of this focus on the boundary between 
system and environment, rather than on objective notions of the ‘system’ existing in 
and of itself, implies a multiplicity of systems definitions based upon observer 
viewpoint and identified (as opposed to objective or intrinsic) system purpose. 
Hierarchy theory in particular, at least as applied in the sociological context, 
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recognises the drawing of system boundaries as a contested and subjective process 
based upon the identification of system purpose as determined by observer viewpoint 
(Giampetro, 1994; Luhmann, 2012). Thus different stakeholders in any complex 
system such as a city will have different viewpoints or may even conceive the 
purpose of various urban subsystems, or even of the city itself, in radically different 
ways: 
The idea of multiple unit embodies two mutually exclusive notions. The 
concept of unit renders homogeneous and breaks up multiplicity; the concept 
of multiplicity divides unity into compartments and breaks it up. Hence the 
organized entity is one and homogeneous from the point of view of the whole, 
and different and heterogeneous from the point of view of the constituents. 
(Morin 1999, p116) 
At one level this is the long-recognised (Jacobs, 1961) reality of urban environments 
being sites of contested power between stakeholders: thus the long struggles over 
the expansion of airports or the development of freeways in cities around the world. 
To use again the example of roads and cars: political fights over the demolition or 
reconstruction of neighbourhoods to allow for freeway access manifest not only the 
power and ability of different actors such as governments, planning authorities, 
construction companies, motorists, commercial interests, local residents and media 
to influence outcomes but also their differing views of the purpose or value of 
particular neighbourhoods or the city itself. Such contested visions of the city are 
often connected to the different spatial or temporal scales at which each of these 
stakeholders operate: from concern with the character of a local street through the 
goal of an integrated road network to better facilitate traffic across the city as a 
whole, to the promotion of the city as a business or commercial concern at a national 
or global level (Davison, 2004). 
This contested view of city purpose, implying a radically intersubjective approach to 
system delineation and purpose, is not inconsistent with the concept of FFE systems 
relying on the continual dissipation of energy to maintain function.  This is above all 
because energy dissipation and related entropy can fluctuate within any complex 
systems, such as an ecosystem, with it increasing in some subsystems while 
remaining steady or falling elsewhere (Wicken, 1986; Odum, 1996). Thus it is 
perfectly logical to discuss the energy dissipation of a particular subsystem, such as 
a neighbourhood, household or individual, and its relationship to the energy 
dissipation of the city as a whole: 
…in terms of the balance between identified and closed input and output, in 
the context of a purpose ascribed by their observer… ‘Organisation is partly in 
the eye of the beholder’. (Espinosa & Walker 2011, p12) 
In fact in the physical sciences the measurement of entropy within complex systems, 
reflecting perhaps the need for the isolating laboratory mentioned above, is generally 
undertaken by taking measurements from delineated sections of the whole and then 
averaging the combination of them all. Thus “[a]s the first step in the process of 
measurement one has to select a phase space region in which measurements are to 
be performed” (Bialas & Czyz, 2008, p1). This demonstrates the inescapable need 
for delineation as a prerequisite for any concept of measurement to be meaningful: 
and the fact that this delineation is observer-specific. 
It is also important to note that this question of the boundary delineation of complex 
systems complicates the direct connection between complexity and energy 
dissipation, as this relationship is bound up with questions of scale and boundary 
delineation. In an insightful discussion, Wicken (1986) identifies the way that high 
complexity (in particular interconnectedness) in complex systems does lead to higher 
overall energy dissipation while, at the same time, allowing for less energy 
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dissipation on the part of certain individual components (subsystems/components, 
particular species, or individuals). This is due to the increasing connectivity of 
complex systems like ecosystems or human cities in which the tendency to build 
synergies and interrelationships between these elements allows them to develop 
specialisations that can subsidise their individual energy dissipation (offering them 
energy discounts, as it were). Thus the synergistic relationship between flowers and 
bees allows the flowers to forgo any need to provide systems for their own 
reproduction, while the bees gain a ready and easily obtained food (energy) source. 
Similarly the rise of industrial agriculture discussed in the next section has meant 
that, while the overall energy dissipation of our food production and distribution 
systems has risen hugely,38 there have been discounts in energy terms for the great 
majority of residents of the industrialised societies. They no longer need to spend 
backbreaking hours in agriculture and instead are free to specialise to become 
doctors, hairdressers and social science academics.39 
Wicken (1986) (primarily concerned with the connections between thermodynamics 
and evolution) discusses the difference between generalist and specialist species 
within complex ecosystems: generalists are highly energy-dissipative individually 
while specialists gain cost advantages in terms of energy dissipation due to either the 
highly connected nature of their interrelationships with other elements in the system 
or their colonisation of a specific system niche. Either characteristic allows the latter 
to gain energy ‘discounts’ due to their physical or behavioural specialisations. As 
ecosystems develop and become more complex (due to the availability of energy for 
dissipation) founder organisms (generalists) do continue to increase their complexity 
through increasing energy dissipation. However over time while the complexity of the 
ecosystem as a whole increases (leading to increased overall dissipation40) the 
energy dissipation of specific organisms/species may in fact decrease as generalists 
are replaced by niche or symbiotic specialists that gain economies of scale through 
the increase in mutualism and ecosystem interconnections. 
This thesis will return to these insights of Wicken in Chapter 3 (p60-62) when the 
heuristic of Panarchy (adaptive systems) (Gunderson & Holling 2002) will be 
discussed. Panarchy acknowledges the changing roles of generalist and specialist 
organisms within complex and interrelated ecosystems: generalists gain a greater 
resilience or adaptability through their increased energy dissipation while specialists 
lose the same due to their reliance on the complexity which makes their own 
specialisations possible. 
However none of this precludes or overrules the political dimensions of this 
acknowledgement of observer viewpoint/bias when identifying or discussing system 
purpose and boundaries. Which viewpoint is considered as authoritative when 
considering a complex urban socio-technological system is of course a political act – 
the concerns of the local can easily be subsumed by the consideration of the larger 
scale and this becomes crucial with the concept of radical localisation (which will be 
addressed in Chapter 4) for example. This involves a focus on the resilience of 
specific, smaller scale systems (such as a city, a neighbourhood or even a household 
or individual) and how this can lead to a greater resilience of the whole of which it is a 
part - but this of course presupposes that this concern with the local has agency. One 
consequence of this politically contested view of system purpose is that, when 
connected to the insights of FFE systems, it suggests serious problems with 
universalist ambitions to promote or conserve ‘whole city’ resilience.  
                                                
38 ‘Paid for’ both by hydrocarbon energy and increasing labor per amount harvested, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
39 In economics this is also known as ‘surplus’ – in agricultural terms the increasing amounts of food produced (due to 
higher complexity connected to higher energy dissipation) allow certain segments of the population to remove any 
need for involvement in agriculture (the surplus provides such specialists with an energy ‘discount’ with regard to 
food). 
40 Schneider & Kay, 1994a; 1994b and Schneider & Sagan, 2005.  
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Such a view of the city as “one and homogeneous from the point of view of the 
whole” (Morin, 1999, p116) (ie the governing authorities) ignores both the viewpoint 
of the smaller scale constituents and the way in which the rate of energy dissipation 
can fluctuate at a range of smaller scales. 
Similarly applying the Panarchy approach to such contested political questions of 
urban resilience is problematic in that the ‘destructive’ Release stage is also named 
as ‘creative’ by Holling. This is because for the system ‘as a whole’41 this destruction, 
mirroring Schumpeter’s concept of ‘creative destruction’ (Reinert & Reinert, 2006), 
might be a rejuvenating development, while those species, individuals or smaller 
social organisations and grouping might take a different view of their destruction for 
the ‘good of the whole’:  
For, as the early propagandists for Darwinism eventually realized, there is a 
fundamental difficulty in trying to base a vision of human society on a nature 
which is inevitably ‘red in tooth and claw’. In the terms that Silvio Funtowicz 
and Jerome Ravetz develop in their article, ‘emergent’ complexity involves 
purposes as a system property, and whose achievement is important to the 
scientists trying to understand the system. Whether destruction is ‘creative’ 
may depend, even more than complexity itself, on the standpoint of the 
observer. (Sardar & Ravetz 1994, p564) 
What is essential and needs to be made resilient, and what is extraneous to system 
purpose or is an acceptable trade-off to allow adaptability, is absolutely dependent on 
observer bias and is always a matter of political consideration. Thus the issue of 
whether or not to demolish a neighbourhood to build a freeway (for the good of the 
city ‘as a whole’) remains a political question and it not to be determined through 
appeal to some objective ‘truth’ of thermodynamics or overall ‘city resilience’. Given 
the nature of complex systems nested within, or sharing elements with and across, 
other systems, the point at which any particular one is delineated inevitably involves 
some level of reification. This will in turn be based upon arbitrary boundaries (often of 
spatial or temporal scale) reflecting the concerns of the boundary setter - if only the 
anthropocentric bias implied by the social sciences. 
 
Conclusion 
While acknowledging all these constraints on the uncritical application of the Second 
Law of Thermodynamics outside the field of physics, this thesis argues that FFE 
thermodynamics can usefully be applied within the social sciences (and in particular 
to complex socio-technological systems such as cities) provided a number of 
conditions are met. 
The first of these is the recognition of the dangers of uncritically importing concepts 
from the physical sciences into the social sciences: the tendency to increasing 
disorder in complex systems, leading to their eventual collapse, is not a manifestation 
of the physical process of entropy. 
The second condition is the acceptance that socio-technological systems (those 
which by definition include human beings and their concerns and motivations as 
crucial components) cannot be examined in terms of thermodynamics through a 
recourse to determinism or reductionism. This is because such determinism by its 
very nature involves an oversimplification of the trajectory such systems may take – 
such an approach encapsulates the reductionism which this thesis argues is not a 
realistic approach to a complex universe. Instead the value of any application of non-
equilibrium thermodynamics to such systems, including cities, is in the concept of 
                                                
41 As determined by the observer, of course! 
Anthony Richardson THESIS: Dismantling the Wall 
 
35 
 
temporal, spatial or energy limits beyond which such systems cannot continue or 
develop but within which their development is unpredictable and non-determinative. 
Finally such an approach must include an awareness of the need to balance the 
interconnectedness of such systems with both their own environment and other such 
nested or proximate systems (an inescapable component of non-equilibrium 
thermodynamics) on the one hand and the need for the analysis of any system to 
begin with an act of definition, of boundary delineation, on the other. Given this 
dichotomy, an acceptance of, and focus on, observer viewpoint (or bias, to use a 
more loaded term) is both inescapable and useful. 
With these constraints and conditions in mind, the relevance of Prigogine’s 
reformulated Second Law to the growth, complexity and continued functioning of 
urban (socio-technological) systems remains valid: 
An appropriate example (of a dissipative structure) would be a town that can 
only survive as long as it is a centre of inflow of food, fuel and other 
commodities and sends out products and wastes. (Nicolis & Prigogine 1977, 
n.p.) 
Such an approach has been used to identify the energy inputs and outputs of specific 
historical, contemporary and future urban environments, whether to reduce the 
environmental impacts of such cities (SUME Project, 2011) or promote their 
resilience in the face of disruptions to these energy inputs (Barthel & Isendahl, 2013; 
Rees, 2012). The latter is the primary concern of this research: how the concept of 
FFE thermodynamics, while not representing an inescapably determinist or 
reductionist trajectory, might offer insights as to how our resilience might be 
increased: 
One contribution [of applying the concept of thermodynamics to the social 
sciences] clearly is in furnishing concepts for analysis of modern societies as 
going concerns, their existing institutional forms, and the terms in which 
individual and collective choices are, and might be, cast. (O’Connor 1991, 
p118) 
The next chapter will build on these points by examining (and attempting to provide 
some definition of) the concept of complexity and its relationship to energy use. To 
do this it looks in particular at the work of Tainter on the collapse of complex 
societies. It will finish by outlining some of the challenges and advantages this 
concept of complexity, and related energy use, poses in regard to the socio-
technological systems that make life in contemporary cities possible. 
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Chapter 3: The challenges of socio-technological complexity  
Come and see bureaucracy make its final heave 
and let the new disorder through while senses take their leave. 
Jethro Tull (Anderson) (1979) 
Dark Ages 
This chapter builds upon the previous discussion of non-equilibrium thermodynamics 
by using the framework of Far From Equilibrium (FFE) systems to analyse complex 
urban socio-technological systems as subject to the dynamic of diminishing returns. 
To do this it will first provide an outline of the work of historian Joseph Tainter on the 
importance of socio-technological complexity as a problem-solving tool, the role of 
energy and the diminishing returns of such complexity. To do this requires a 
definition of the contested term ‘complexity’. It then reiterates the importance of 
energy to social systems and the resultant challenge of resource depletion (with 
particular reference to Peak Oil) to the maintenance of complex urban life. Finally a 
discussion of the theoretical connections between Panarchy and the work of Tainter 
and others with regard to urban complexity introduces the central argument of this 
thesis that such an approach of ever-increasing complexity is beset by inherent 
contradictions which ultimately undermine its effectiveness. 
While this central argument is encapsulated by the idea of The Wall, this concept will 
not be introduced in detail until Chapter 4. At this point in the argument, however, it is 
necessary to foreshadow that The Wall is a metaphor for a problematic faith-based 
reliance on never-ending teleological progress. It represents a belief in technological 
progress – a pervasive technophilia – as the solution to the challenges facing 
complex societies. Although this metaphor will be examined and defined in the next 
chapter, for the moment it is enough to see such a mindset as widespread and 
supported by the historical development of complexity up till this point.  
Tainter’s work The Collapse of Complex Societies (1990) is deeply subversive of 
such a worldview, as it identifies a universal tendency of complex socio-technological 
systems such as civilisations or cities to face increasing costs as they become ever 
more complex. At the same time the returns they gain from their investment in that 
complexity fall at an increasingly rate. Over time the discrepancy between these 
costs and the benefits gained intensifies until such systems face the prospect of 
collapse from either external or internal shocks (that once they would have 
weathered easily) or from the weight of their own complexity. 
For Tainter (1990; 1992; 1995a/b; 1996; 2011b) all human societies (whether at the 
scale of villages, cities or states) are problem-solving systems that meet the 
challenges they face by implementing increasingly complex solutions. Examples 
include the need to increase agricultural yields to feed growing populations (Boserup, 
1965; 1981), the response to the 911 attacks in New York (Tainter, 2011a) or the 
never-ending need for new medical advances to address disease (Tainter, 1990) 
This drive for increasing complexity, while not a deterministic characteristic of social 
history, has been an all-but universal element of the development of human societies 
primarily because it has been and remains a successful tactic for addressing the 
challenges (whether military, environmental, social, geographical, economic or 
political) which inevitably face societies as they persist through time. However, 
reflecting the primary insight of non-equilibrium thermodynamics, Tainter sees socio-
technological complexity as absolutely dependent on the existence of energy 
resources (energy gradients) which can be dissipated by such systems to both 
maintain and increase such complexity:  
Energy flow and socio-political organisation are opposite sides of an 
equation… Not only is energy flow required to maintain a sociopolitical 
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system, but the amount of energy must be sufficient for the complexity of that 
system. (Tainter 1990, p91) 
At the same time, and again acknowledging societies as FFE complex systems, the 
interplay between energy use and related complexity increases imposes a natural (if 
elastic) limit to the possible complexity of any such system as the returns on that 
increasing complexity inevitably diminish once a particular point is reached. Thus his 
argument (1990; 1992; 1995a/b; 1996; Tainter & Patzek, 2012) is based on two 
interconnected points: 
First (acknowledging the central insight of non-equilibrium thermodynamics as 
outlined above) any increase in socio-technological complexity requires a 
corresponding increase in available energy 
Second the Law of Diminishing Returns applies to socio-technological complexity – 
the more complex societies or organisations get the less relative return they get for 
all their investment in that complexity until a point is reached where the returns no 
longer match the investment.  
Before we examine these claims in more detail it is important to provide an 
understanding of the term complexity which reflects its relevance to complex socio-
technological systems such as cities. 
 
Defining complexity 
If someone does develop a grand, unifying definition-description of 
complexity, I predict that it will add very little to the tree of knowledge... 
But that shouldn’t deter us from trying; the very effort to do so will 
surely enrich our understanding. (Corning 1998, p199) 
Given that this thesis is proposing simplification as a prerequisite of increased urban 
resilience, and simple is (as we shall see) essentially taken to be the opposite of 
complex, it follows that defining complex or complexity is a crucial component of the 
overall argument. Defining complexity however is a challenging and somewhat 
circular task; in purely semantic terms there is the confusion over its relation to terms 
such as ‘complicated’ or ‘chaotic’ and this is only complicated(!) by differing 
understandings of these terms from a range of academic and professional fields. In 
the end the problem with attempting to define complexity is that its meaning is 
inescapably subjective, based (like the delineation of systems) as it is upon observer 
viewpoint; it is “a property of the observer, not of the observed system” (Corning 
1998, p197). It could be said that the field of complexity science/studies is a 
discipline in search of a foundational definition – but this is a situation that this thesis 
makes no pretence at addressing. Instead it is based upon a specifically defined 
understanding of this problematic concept of complexity and its application to urban 
socio-technological systems (in particular cities) which will be presented at the end of 
this discussion. 
Starting with the semantic distinctions, the social (cultural) anthropologist C. R. 
Hallpike nicely outlines the confusion in meaning that is evident: 
…let us reflect for a moment on the connotations of ‘simple’, ‘complex’, and 
‘complicated’. ‘Simple’ has at least three distinct, if related, connotations: (I) 
‘consisting of one substance, ingredient or element, uncompounded; (2) ‘free 
from elaboration’; (3) ‘easy to do or to understand’. The term ‘complex’ is 
defined as (1) ‘comprehending various parts connected together’, and equally 
(2) ‘consisting of parts involved in various degrees of subordination’; and 
correspondingly we often find that it has a third connotation (3) ‘difficult to do 
or to understand’. ‘Complex’ is however sometimes used as if it were 
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interchangeable with ‘complicated’, whose connotations are in fact rather 
different: (1) ‘folded, wrapped or twisted together’: (2) ‘combined intimately 
with’; (3) ‘mixed up with in an involved way’. (1986, p8-9) 
However also evident in the literature is a distinction between complex and 
complicated that mirrors the distinction between unpredictable emergence and 
predictable reductionism. Therefore the concept of complicated is taken to mean 
systems where a theoretical observer with complete knowledge of a current state and 
system behaviours (ie Laplace’s demon) would be able to predict future states 
(O’Connor, 1994). Similarly in an engineering context ‘complicated’ would apply to a 
system which is perfectly reducible to a number of subsystems which are 
independent in terms of their inputs and outputs (their future state is not dependent 
on the current or future state of other elements) (Noor, 2011). Such an understanding 
of complicated implies the possibility of reductive explanations for such systems 
while complex implies the opposite. 
Another way of expressing this dualistic understanding of non-simple systems is 
Morin’s dichotomy of restricted complexity vs general complexity (2007). For Morin 
as well the former concept is analogous to the reductionist definition of complicated 
outlined above while the latter concept of general complexity equates to emergent 
complexity. 
Given the rejection of reductionism in the previous chapter it should come as no 
surprise that this thesis agrees with the second notion of complexity as an emergent 
system process which goes beyond notions of mechanistic but ultimately predictable 
complication. In that sense it is part of the broad agreement in the literature 
(Rescher, 1980; Morin, 1992; 1999; O’Connor, 1994; Cilliers, 2002, Taleb, 2007; 
Wells, 2013a) that such a view of emergent complexity implies a rejection of the 
Newtonian scientific view. Thus Bradford (2006) argues strongly for complexity 
science as a paradigmatic shift towards a contingent and contested view of the world 
and labels such an approach deep complexity. Given such an understanding of 
complexity an elegant definition might be “the dynamic interactions of multiple 
elements engaged in self-organising systems” (Wells 2013a, p20).  
However there is a predictive or even teleological capacity implicit in Tainter’s 
application of the Law of Diminishing Returns to system complexity as he argues 
such complexity reaches a limit beyond which any system cannot either keep 
increasing complexity or even maintain itself at its current level. While we will discuss 
Tainter’s argument in more detail later in this chapter it is enough to acknowledge 
here that a definition of complexity needs to address more than the unpredictable 
emergence of macro-properties from micro-properties. This is in fact another facet of 
the dichotomy of social vs biological explanations (Fletcher, 1995) from the previous 
chapter: Tainter’s use of the Law of Diminishing Returns can accommodate the 
emergence of complexity (the unpredictable development of system behaviours from 
the interplay of constituent elements) while still acknowledging the central concept of 
far from equilibrium thermodynamics (systems need a continuous input of energy by 
which they maintain their form and function) as constituting an elastic upper limit to 
the development of such socio-technological complexity. 
This means that instead of complexity remaining a qualitative process it must also be 
a quantitative property: it must be measurable to some extent. There is in fact a more 
clearly structural conception of complexity from the fields of both system theory and 
archaeology/historical anthropology which implies the existence of both numerous 
elements in a system, differentiated by structure and function, and numerous forms 
of relationships (transactions or linkages) among these various elements. Systems 
theory in particular is concerned with such a structural definition of complexity; one 
way of describing the sort of functional differentiation mentioned above is through the 
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terms variety or integrality. The former term describes “a repertory of potential 
behaviours, which is normally fuzzier, more subject to interpretation and less 
predictable in social systems” (Espinosa & Walker, 2011, p12), while the latter relates 
to the number of elements in a system and the number of useful connections 
between them (Denbigh, 1975). At the same time such a concern with complexity as 
a measurable property of systems such as societies or cities has a direct relationship 
with their status as FFE systems as energy dissipation is intimately connected to the 
development of such socio-technological complexity (Tainter, 1990). 
Furthermore from an archaeological/anthropological perspective the material 
elements of human culture and social organisation (agricultural practices, the built 
environment and artistic works as well as tools and weaponry) are commonly 
considered as measurements of socio-technological complexity. The material detritus 
of the past is all archaeologists have to reconstruct cultural practices, particularly with 
regard to pre-literate cultures. What is therefore important is the evidence of 
functional differentiation in material culture42 as this then demonstrates differentiation 
in social roles and economic/class stratification and is a marker of both socio-
technological complexity and increased energy costs for system maintenance (see 
below) (Tainter, 1990; Fletcher, 1995; Hallpike, 1986). 
Yet any treatment of complexity as a measurable property of socio-technological 
systems must provide metrics of some sort to (even comparatively) measure 
complexity. In fact there are two which occur frequently in the literature: system 
component/role/element differentiation and the number or frequency of 
connections/relationships between them.  
 
System differentiation 
The first characteristic of complexity in social terms is heterogeneity as a 
measurement of social and technological differentiation. This is described by Tainter 
as the number of distinct components, whether human roles or technological 
artefacts, that comprise the social fabric (Tainter 1990, p23; Tainter & Patzek, 2012). 
As societies become more complex they display greater amounts of social and 
technological differentiation; thus hunter-gatherer societies are composed of no more 
than a few dozen social roles while industrial societies may comprise over a million 
(Tainter 1990, p23) while the number and variety of tools and other cultural artefacts 
also increase dramatically. Connected to this heterogeneity is inequality as the 
development of social complexity involves more social differentiation which 
historically has often been equated to more social inequality. Quite apart from the 
obviously political causes and ramifications of such developments, this rise in 
inequality is seen as being directly caused by the increase in social complexity (itself 
made possible by increased energy use) (Tainter, 2006). However while the causes 
and ramifications of social inequality remain perennial questions in the social 
sciences, and in economics in particular, such concerns lie beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
However it should be noted that such differentiation can be dependent on both 
system size and contextual constraints and may fluctuate within the same socio-
technological system. Size would appear to be directly connected to this 
differentiation, with systems developing more differentiation as they grow – a point 
addressed shortly in the discussion of hegemonic simplification.  
To provide an example of this dynamic in the context of US military organisation: 
there is a lot of social differentiation in evidence at the home base of a US military 
unit. Quite apart from combat personnel there are administration and technical 
                                                
42 Whether urban spatial organisation, built structures or tools, artwork, weapons and other artefacts. 
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support staff, cleaners and caterers, public relations and legal personnel, health 
professionals, and even military bands. However this differentiation within the unit will 
be greatly reduced at, for example, a forward ‘fire base’ in hostile territory. In the 
latter context the greatly reduced number of people present will be heavily weighted 
towards combat personnel and many of these will be expected to fill a number of 
roles as required.43 The changing complexity of social, cultural and technological 
systems due to system size or context is similarly explicable in terms of FFE 
thermodynamics: 
When ecological systems must adapt their functions and organs to survive in 
conditions that are physically severe for life such as extreme heat, cold or 
saltiness, energy is required for the process of adaptation and less energy 
remains to support complex network specialisations. There are fewer species 
and occupations… The large and concentrated flows of energy into an 
industrialised city support extreme specialisation of occupational functions not 
possible for the same number of people in an Eskimo village (Odum 1971, 
80).  
The crucial point here to note here is the relationship between heterogeneity and the 
environment within which complex adaptive systems like cities exist. While system 
(city) size generally means an increase in social and technological differentiation (or 
in other words, an increase in complexity), in more challenging environments there is 
a tendency for the social and technological differentiation within any system to fall. In 
other words, this one measure of complexity can fall when a system is challenged 
(and challenged above all by energy constraints). As the coming discussion (p40-45) 
will make clear, this aspect of complexity is clearly consistent with Tainter’s theory of 
energy use and social collapse.  
 
System interconnectedness or linkages 
The second characteristic of this quantitative understanding of complexity is a focus 
on the number of network transactions or linkages needed to produce a particular 
desired outcome or maintain a current state (this is directly analogous to far from 
equilibrium stasis). In terms of social or urban complexity this includes infrastructure, 
logistical networks and supply chains, trade regimes, modes of governance and 
economic systems, among other elements; and the institutional, technological, 
economic and socio-cultural frameworks in which they are embedded and on which 
they exhibit transformational influences.  
These two characteristics of complexity have been recognised by Homer-Dixon 
(2006) - “If we think of the eco-system as a network, both the number of nodes in the 
network and the density of links between the nodes rise” (p226) - and a number of 
other authors (Corning, 1998; Deleuze & Guattari, 2004; Friedmann, 1986; Holling, 
1994; Gunderson & Holling, 2002). At this point it would be useful to discuss the 
definition of complexity provided by Corning (1998), as this reflects both its qualitative 
emergent character and the quantitative metrics of component/subsystem 
differentiation and interconnection: 
I would suggest that complexity often (not always) implies the following 
attributes: (1) a complex phenomenon consists of many parts (or items, or 
units, or individuals); (2) there are many relationships/interactions among the 
parts; and (3) the parts produce combined effects (synergies) that are not 
easily predicted and may often be novel, unexpected, even surprising. (p199) 
                                                
43 To rephrase this in the terminology of Wicken (1986): such a challenging situation calls for generalists not 
specialists. 
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However this is still not the end of the difficulty of defining complexity, for complexity 
as thus defined paradoxically involves strong elements of simplification. As 
demonstrated immediately below, both archaeology and systems theory provide an 
explanation of this paradox and a way of resolving it. 
 
Paradoxical complexity: the Black Box 
Civilization advances by extending the number of important operations 
which we can perform without thinking about them. 
Alfred North Whitehead (1911) An Introduction to Mathematics 
The definitions of ‘complex’ and ‘complexity’ outlined above are still insufficient to 
fully describe the nature of urban socio-technological systems; and in particular the 
paradoxical nature of their complexity. For example, Tainter defines a modern 
hierarchic army with its immense energy requirements as ‘complex’ (and subject to 
the laws of diminishing returns); on more than one occasion (1990, Tainter & Patzek, 
2012) he uses the example of the US military’s landings at Casa Blanca in WW2 
(which involved over 500,000 distinct cultural artefacts) as an example of socio-
technological complexity. Yet paradoxically such a hierarchic structure as a modern 
industrialised army is also extremely ‘simple’ and organisationally predictable (in 
terms of command structure) when compared to the messy, dense and often hidden 
interconnections within guerrilla groups fighting that army.  
To usefully discuss ‘complexity’ in relation to Tainter’s theory of collapse, this thesis 
must acknowledge these two differing conceptualisations of the term. Therefore, it 
proposes an original cross-disciplinary approach which can integrate these 
contradictory understandings of complexity. More specifically, this approach to 
complexity accommodates both the quantitative assumptions of Tainter and a more 
clearly qualitative ‘social science’ understanding. 
What follows is a cross-disciplinary discussion of this contested concept of 
complexity, with various examples provided to illuminate conceptual points (rather 
than represent empirical case studies). For Tainter complexity involves the 
elaboration of structure and control, which then simplifies and channels behaviour. 
This understanding of complexity can also be explored through the image of the 
black box - the complex system which hides its complexity within itself to present a 
simple interface to the ‘user’. Latour (1987) sees the black box as a socio-
technological system whose complex inner workings are beyond discussion and thus 
generally invisible. Instead this internal complexity is supplanted by the 
understanding of the black box as a straightforward input-output system. This is 
immediately recognisable as a description of any one of the innumerable socio-
technological devices which populate our lives.  
The smartphone is a perfect example of such a ‘black box’. They are complex 
systems (inescapably reliant on energy use, as the endless need to recharge them 
continually demonstrates) which paradoxically create a simple interface which then 
overlays this complexity.44 Similarly an automatic car, while more socio-technically 
complex45 than a manual vehicle, is paradoxically easier to drive as the complexity of 
the gear mechanisms (and the decisions around gear changes) are ‘black boxed’. 
The systems theory of Luhmann likewise sees complex systems as paradoxically 
being "...islands of lesser complexity in the world..." (Luhmann 1970, p116) that 
reduce (simplify) the inherent complexity of their environment: 
                                                
44 Tenner (1996, pxii) uses the example of the remote control for a videocassette recorder – the process is identical. 
45 Not just in engineering terms – their maintenance for example requires better trained mechanics with more 
complex equipment, both of which involve more ‘upstream’ energy costs. 
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The environment of every system, including society, is invariably more 
complex than the system itself. In relation to the system, the environment may 
be regarded both as a complex web of other system-environment 
relationships and as unity. This unity is created by the system, it is relative to 
the system, and it corresponds with the unity of the system. But unlike the 
system, the environment is defined by unlimited horizons and not by 
boundaries. The system compensates for its relative lack of complexity by 
employing selective strategies that enable it to reduce the complexity of the 
environment. However, this does not mean that composite reality is reduced 
to simple units. Reducing complexity means transforming complex relations 
into less complex ones; this excludes any form of reductionism. (Schwanitz 
1995, p143) 
It is through the act of delineation that any system establishes its existence as 
separate from its environment and this delineation always involves some level of 
simplification of that environment within its own boundaries: 
Every open system is confronted with an overwhelmingly complex world 
whose complexity it must reduce in order to exist. The term "overwhelming 
complexity" refers to the fact that the world excludes no possibility. (Bednarz 
1984, p58-9) 
The randomness of the universe is excluded by the system, which creates and 
maintains within itself (like the pairidaeza or ‘walled garden’ of Persian myth46) some 
level of predictability and order. It does this by excluding, restricting and then 
suppressing the complexity of the world around it. At the same time the emergent 
nature of such complex systems means they generate their own unpredictable side 
effects or random variations to the extent that “…continuous novelty may be 
considered as a characteristic property of emergent complexity” (Funtowicz & Ravetz 
1994, p570). Such novelty is also rejected by the system in the interests of 
predictability and simplification. 
Thus the smartphone reduces the complexity of navigating global 
telecommunications systems to call a loved one from a complex process 
(finding/remembering the specific number; dialling it; communicating with the correct 
national or local phone exchange (itself now automated) to make the correct 
connection; providing payment for this service) to simply pushing one button or link 
on the screen.47 In and of itself this process is no less complex than the former 
description, yet for the user this complexity has been subsumed within the black box 
of the phone: it is truly reduced to an input-output relationship (push one button and 
talk to someone on the other side of the world). 
An interesting aside here is that this ‘internal invisibility’ of the black box is never 
seen or acknowledged while the system is working the way it should. Only when the 
system breaks down does the internal complexity becomes noticeable to us as an 
irritant or disruption (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Graham, 2006; Graham & Thrift, 
2007; Tenner, 1996). Only when the smartphone breaks (or more likely is out of 
power) do we need to actually remember the phone number we need; only when the 
car stops working do we open the bonnet and stare (for most of us 
uncomprehendingly and helplessly!) into the engine bay.48 Thus while our systems 
work we are reliant on them to reduce the inherent ‘messiness’ and complexity of the 
                                                
46 From which comes paradise. The importance of delineation is apparent in the etymology; it’s a compound of pairi- 
"around" + diz "to make, form (a wall)”. 
47 This is not even considering the trans-oceanic cables, satellites, electronic payment services, phone manufacturing 
and sales or electricity supplies that also comprise this global communication system. 
48 This applies as much to bureaucratic as technological systems and processes given that “[my] interest in the 
hidden workings of the passport-getting procedure will be aroused only if I fail to get my passport in the end” (Berger 
& Luckmann 1982, p57) 
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world without understanding (or caring) how they do so, while when they fail we are 
in many cases left unable to function as normal. This human tendency becomes 
important when addressing the issue of challenges to simplification in Part C, as 
arguments for the conscious simplification of urban socio-technological systems are 
likely to be met with the aphorism ‘If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’. 
To apply this concept more widely to larger socio-technological systems like cities, 
their increasing social and technological development, dependent upon a 
corresponding increase in energy use, is paradoxically used to implement a 
‘hegemonic simplification’ (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1994) of the complexity contained 
within them. In fact, to take this further, such a hegemonic simplification is essential if 
any city (or other complex system) is to increase in size. This is due to the dictates of 
information processing as, the larger a system becomes, the more varied and 
voluminous the information it must process and thus the more complex the systems 
of classification it employs49 to capture and process this increasing information. Thus: 
[i]n small-scale, face-to-face societies it is ‘easier’ to develop what are 
actually more complicated forms of association and classification but with the 
growth of size of society, and range of technology and culture, it is necessary 
to develop more generalizable forms of order that can transcend local 
idiosyncrasies and embrace larger numbers and more diverse types of 
people: that is, to ‘simplify’ in the classificatory sense. But this is difficult, or 
‘complex’, and will also involve an increasing number of categories, and 
elaboration (again, ‘complex’). (Hallpike 1986, p9) 
As our socio-technological systems become both larger in scale/scope and more 
complex the tendency is for this drive to hegemonic simplicity to make evermore 
heroic efforts to encompass and manage such complexity as “the need for order is 
proportional to the number, diversity, unfamiliarity, and rate of change of the 
materials to be ordered” (Hallpike 1986, p8). State bureaucracies are perhaps the 
preeminent examples of this drive to standardisation: 
The more static, standardized, and uniform a population or social space is, 
the more legible it is, and the more amenable it is to the techniques of state 
officials. I am suggesting that many state activities aim at transforming the 
population, space, and nature under their jurisdiction into the closed 
systems50 that offer no surprises and that can best be observed and 
controlled… State officials can often make their categories stick and impose 
their simplifications, because the state, of all institutions, is best equipped to 
insist on treating people according to its schemata. (Scott 1998, p82) 
For example, the Tax File Number assigned to all Australian taxpayers (and which is 
mirrored by similar reductive identification markers like vehicle licences or identity 
cards in all other industrialised societies) is a hegemonic simplification of the variety 
of the Australian population in terms of gender, age, ethnicity, place of residence etc. 
It is a necessary simplification to enable the information processing capabilities of the 
Australian state to manage and track the identity of the nearly 30 million citizens with 
which it is concerned.51 Similarly the techniques of state surveillance for security 
purposes (of the sort recently exposed by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden) 
involve the reductive categorisation of citizens to better observe, manage and control 
their unpredictable preferences, behaviours and beliefs. 
                                                
49 This has been outlined in the earlier quantitative definition of complexity as equating to the number of elements in a 
system and the number of useful connections between them (p38). 
50 This phraseology (‘closed systems’) is notable as it echoes Luhmann’s concept of ‘organisational closure’ (p31). 
51 Discussing the power of Facebook, Morozov (2014, p3) declares (less than enthusiastically) “There is power in 
standardisation!” 
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Therefore, in the black box, system complexity is overlaid with a hegemonic 
simplification, whether of bureaucratic standardisation/control or technological 
universalism/control. These tendencies, involving a paradoxical layering of system 
complexity to filter and compress the complexity of the unpredictable environment 
and thus simplify it,52 require the increasing dissipation of increasing amounts of free 
energy. At the same time they impose a hegemonic simplification upon both the 
system and its interactions with its environment by which efficiencies of scale are 
gained and the larger and more complex societal groupings are made possible 
(Cetina, 2005). 
Another example of hegemonic simplification is provided by modern monocultural 
agriculture. The history of modern forestry begins with the development of German 
scientific forestry from around 1765 to 1800. Echoing Tainter’s point that complexity 
is a problem-solving tactic, this new system of standardised forest management was 
introduced to address the challenges posed by forest depletion and falling 
commercial yields of wood in Europe at the time. To understand the advantages of 
this ‘hegemonic simplification’ of German forests it is worth quoting Scott’s history 
(1998) at length: 
How much easier it was to manage the new, stripped down forest. With 
stands of same-age trees arranged in linear alleys, clearing the underbrush, 
felling, extraction, and new planting became a far more routine process. 
Increasing order in the forest made it possible for forest workers to use written 
training protocols that could be widely applied… Harvesting logs of relatively 
uniform width and length not only made it possible to forecast yields 
successfully but also to market homogenous product units to logging 
contractors and timber merchants. Commercial logic and bureaucratic logic 
were, in this instance, synonymous; it was a system that promised to 
maximise the return of a single commodity over the long haul and at the same 
time lent itself to a centralized scheme of management. (p18) 
In more recent times the drive for complex technological methods of farming, 
dependent on more energy use, is (as we shall see below) a further problem-solving 
solution to the need for both more food to feed our burgeoning populations and for 
greater profits to drive economic growth. These complex energy-reliant solutions 
allow modern industrial farming to ‘work’ in a range of diverse/complex environmental 
contexts while providing standardised outputs which allow the benefits of scale and 
ease of handling.53 They have done this, however, by a simplification of the crop 
types grown (and a loss of genetic and/or ecosystem diversity with all that implies for 
resilience) and a massive increase in energy costs (Dahlberg, 1992).  
A final example specifically relating to cities is the comparison of Istanbul and New 
York provided by Tainter & Taylor (2014). The complexity of the winding and organic 
nature of the former city’s streets stands in contrast to the relentless grid pattern of 
New York’s urban layout. While this grid pattern is intrinsically simpler than the layout 
of Istanbul this is the result of a great deal of effort.54 Therefore the simplicity of New 
York is deeply hegemonic in nature as it involves the paradoxical suppression of 
natural or environmental complexity: 
                                                
52 In terms of complex technological systems like urban infrastructures “[t]he common strategy of building control 
systems in several hierarchical layers, proceeding from simple control of single variables in the bottom layer to 
refined control algorithms in the top layer, tends to build in more complexity than absolutely necessary.” (Wahlström, 
p355) 
53 Much as the introduction of the standardised shipping container revolutionised global shipping. 
54 “Costs come in such forms as taxes, increased government regulation, building codes and zoning, infrastructure 
expenses, and inflation of property prices. All such strategies inevitably reach diminishing returns.” (Tainter & Taylor 
2014, p171). 
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In urban systems, complexity exists at the level of planning and 
administration, where grids are designed and imposed. Complexity simplifies 
behaviour. A grid is the simplified outcome of complexity in institutions of 
planning and administration, as is the behaviour of people who use the grid. 
(Tainter & Taylor 2014, p171) 
Thus, in the end, this hegemonic simplification is really another facet of the 
reductionist simplification identified by theorists concerned with emergent complexity 
and systems. In the end, the need to control every possible contingency requires the 
systems of monitoring and control (whether taxation systems or electronic 
surveillance sensors) to move towards an unattainable absolutism and omnipotence. 
To conclude this discussion of the term complexity, a modern city or organisation 
uses more and more energy to implement increasingly complex technological 
solutions to solve the issues it faces (as per Tainter’s main thesis) but paradoxically 
those complex systems are often used to measure, categorise, homogenise and 
ultimately supress the complexity/randomness of the environment. This thesis 
introduces the concept of ‘hegemonic simplification’ to Tainter’s insights on 
complexity. While this aspect of simplification is implicit in the contrasting examples 
of Istanbul and New York (Tainter & Taylor, 2014), this discussion aims to provide a 
clear treatment of the paradoxical nature of complexity/simplicity within Tainter’s 
theory. 
 
The dynamic of declining returns on complexity 
With this definition of complexity in mind we can return to Tainter’s argument. The 
role of complexity within societies, reflecting the insights of FFE thermodynamics, is 
inescapably tied to the energy costs of that complexity: 
More complex societies are more costly to maintain than simpler ones, 
requiring greater support levels per capita. As societies increase in 
complexity, more networks are created among individuals, more hierarchical 
controls are created to regulate these networks, more information is 
processed, there is more centralisation of information flow, there is increasing 
need to support specialists not directly involved in resource production… 
(1990, p91) 
However this rising complexity, even though it becomes increasingly expensive in 
terms of the energy required, continues as it is the primary approach of human 
societies to solving the challenges that arise. When faced with challenges like a 
famine, the need for a better educated population, or even something as recent as 
the need for greater airline security following the 9/11 attacks, the orthodox response 
involves the creation of additional system complexity, such as the extended or 
increased distribution of food, the allocation of further resources to increase 
educational facilities or services, or new security and surveillance at airports. Further 
levels of complexity are added which may or may not solve the problem (or which 
may create yet more problems), yet these new systems will then need to be 
sustained and thus represent new cumulative costs to society. 
Tainter looks at a number of examples of societies that, he argues, have followed this 
development arc of increasing complexity to deal with challenges that they faced. 
Following the rational model of resource exploitation which has held sway throughout 
human history, the resources that are easiest to access and exploit are used first55 
and this tendency is applicable to the economic, organisational or information 
processing solutions employed by societies to address the challenges they face. 
                                                
55 A crucial element of the Peak Oil dynamic and one identified by Hubbert (1956). 
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While this is a logical response to challenges that arise, it does mean that later 
challenges or situations must be addressed using more costly strategies (ones that 
were originally rejected due to their cost or were not yet technologically possible). 
Thus even societies that are successful and secure do face this challenge of 
declining returns as the costs of maintaining current levels of socio-technological 
complexity keep rising due to resource depletion and the inevitable appearance of 
new problems and challenges that the old solutions can no longer address. 
However Tainter then applies the economic concept of declining (marginal) returns to 
the promotion of socio-technological complexity. This concept was first applied by the 
Dutch agricultural economist Boserup to returns on human labour in agricultural 
production (1965; 1981). Examining the development of agricultural practices through 
history, Boserup noted that although productivity (ie amount harvested) per unit of 
land increases dramatically as agricultural intensification increases, the productivity 
of the labour (per unit of labour) involved in that agricultural production actually falls. 
While this may seem counter-intuitive at first, it is clearly demonstrated by the 
evidence from a range of agricultural contexts.  
For example declining (marginal) returns on labour productivity have been 
demonstrated across a wide range of countries (from widely varying environments 
and climactic zones) and across a wide variety of crops (from rice in China and India 
to wheat in Nigeria and Yugoslavia) (Tainter 1990, p95-8). In all these cases the 
amount of food harvested per unit of land has risen, while the amount of labour 
required for that harvest has risen at a faster rate. 
To use a specific example, between 1850 and 1910 the US dairy industry 
experienced greater yields due to a number of relatively minor adjustments in 
practices (extending dairy production throughout winter and improving sanitation and 
feeding) which, however, required an increase in labour costs (Bateman, 1969; 
Tainter, 1990). This rise in productivity was less than the corresponding increase in 
labour, and this disparity was only amplified as the trend continued. Thus average 
yields per cow rose from 2371 lbs in 1850 to 3570 lbs in 1910 yet over the same 
period the amount of milk produced per hour of labour fell from 30.78 lbs to 25.39 lbs. 
Agriculture and the declining returns on complexity clearly demonstrate both Tainter’s 
ideas and the influence of FFE thermodynamics on complex socio-technological 
systems. The need to produce more food to feed growing populations (the challenge) 
has been solved by the techniques of increasingly intensive agriculture (in 
contemporary times the ‘Green Revolution’) (Evenson & Gollin, 2003). However the 
undoubted success of these increasingly complex systems has involved growing 
energy (and environmental and social) costs (Evenson & Gollin, 2003; Pfeiffer, 2006; 
Avery, 2007). Originally this energy was provided by human and animal power,56 
which, in Imperial Roman times for instance, fed the entire population of the Empire 
(by some estimates 60 million people). Given the labour–intensive nature of such 
agriculture it is not surprising that the majority of the population was involved in 
agricultural production (a significant portion in the Roman case being slaves). Tainter 
sees that such a high level of employment in agricultural production has been the 
case with all pre-industrial societies, whether historical or contemporary. To take his 
argument further, only the arrival of the Industrial Revolution, and the increasing use 
of steam power in food production and distribution, began the modern trend of the 
flight to the cities for employment in industrial production and the corresponding fall in 
the numbers of people directly involved in agriculture. 
Some further discussion of contemporary intensive farming demonstrates the 
ongoing relevance of Tainter’s central argument. Such farming is possible only 
                                                
56 Apart from the obvious importance of solar power which has continued to be a crucial input throughout the history 
of human agriculture. 
Anthony Richardson THESIS: Dismantling the Wall 
 
47 
 
because of hydrocarbon energy (originally coal but now petrol and gas) to replace 
the traditional inputs of human and animal energy and thus ‘pay’ for the increasingly 
complex systems. Such inputs include the fuel for farm machinery (such as tractors) 
and equipment, as well as fertilisers and pesticides (these last two inputs are 
increasingly based on hydrocarbons) (Pfeiffer, 2006). For US farms at the turn of this 
century (Figure 1) anywhere from approximately 80% to nearly 100% of energy 
consumed (depending on how the electricity is generated) came from hydrocarbons. 
 
Figure 1: Schnepf, R. (2004) Energy Use in Agriculture: Background and Issues, CRS Report for Congress,  
Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress 
This means however that, while the modern farm can produce much more food on 
the same amount of land, it needs twenty times as much energy (in this case 
provided by hydrocarbons) to produce the same amount of food energy (calories) as 
the traditional farm (Craumer, 1979; Bayliss-Smith, 1982). Indeed, by some 
calculations the US agricultural industry uses ten units of energy for every one unit of 
food energy it produces (Giampietro & Pimentel, 1993). Yet this is only the 
production side of the equation. Our modern food distribution system, global in scale 
and highly efficient, is incredibly expensive in terms of energy use. Only 20% of the 
energy used to put our food on our plate is actually used for agriculture, as 80% is 
used for transport, processing, packaging, marketing, and food preparation and 
storage (Brown, 2008, p35). We have produced a highly complex system to solve the 
issues of food production and distribution for our rapidly expanding populations - yet 
this complexity is absolutely dependent on massive injections of (hydrocarbon) 
energy. At the same time the global population keeps increasing and new and 
evermore complex agricultural solutions (themselves involving more energy) are 
continually proposed, such as the current Chinese research into sending seeds into 
space to use the increased radiation there to speed up genetic mutations and create 
larger versions of traditional vegetables (Azriel, 2012). 
Boserup (1965; 1981) posited population pressures as the driving force behind these 
developments in agriculture, although for Tainter this whole debate over the role of 
population pressures driving this trend is not important: what is relevant is that this 
trend exists. What is more, it can be widely applied across a wide range of human 
endeavours. Tainter provides examples of this dynamic in action in areas as diverse 
as information processing costs, returns (as measured by patents) on research and 
development and (as measured by life expectancy) on medical research and 
application (1990, p99-102). This dynamic has been named (after the original 
insights of the physician Max Planck) 'Planck's Principle of Increasing Effort: "...with 
every advance [in science] the difficulty of the task is increased" (Rescher 1980; 
Tainter, 1996). Such a dynamic is conceptualised by Homer-Dixon (2002) as an 
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‘ingenuity gap’: the problems facing our increasingly complex world are outstripping 
the ability of human ingenuity to solve them. 
Similarly, Tainter describes how the social returns on education decline as its 
complexity and cost increases: 
…the monetary cost to the nation of a year of education between pre-school, 
when the most generalized, highly useful education takes place, and college, 
when the most specialized learning is accomplished, increases by about 
284%... increasingly specialized training serves ever narrower segments of 
the system, at ever greater cost to the society as a whole. (1990, p102-5) 
Such trends are also strongly evident in the rise of modern bureaucracies. For 
example in the UK the numbers of British Colonial Office staff rose from 372 in 1935 
to 1661 in 1954 (a period when the Empire was actually shrinking considerably) 
(Parkinson, 1957; Tainter, 1990), while the number of ships in the Royal Navy shrank 
from 542 in 1914 to only 114 in 1967. Over the same time of course the number of 
support staff (dockyard officials and clerks) rose by 247% and Admiralty officials by 
769% (Parkinson, 1957; Tainter, 1990). A similar trend is demonstrated by the focus 
on security in the US following the 9/11 attacks. According to a 2010 investigation by 
the Washington Post (Priest & Arkin, 2010) into US security systems: 
• Some 1,271 government organizations and 1,931 private companies work on 
programs related to counterterrorism, homeland security and intelligence in 
about 10,000 locations across the United States. 
• An estimated 854,000 people, nearly 1.5 times as many people as live in 
Washington, D.C., hold top-secret security clearances. 
• In Washington and the surrounding area, 33 building complexes for top-secret 
intelligence work are under construction or have been built since September 
2001. Together they occupy the equivalent of almost three Pentagons or 22 
U.S. Capitol buildings - about 17 million square feet of space. 
• Many security and intelligence agencies do the same work, creating 
redundancy and waste. For example, 51 federal organizations and military 
commands, operating in 15 U.S. cities, track the flow of money to and from 
terrorist networks.  
• Analysts who make sense of documents and conversations obtained by 
foreign and domestic spying share their judgment by publishing 50,000 
intelligence reports each year - a volume so large that many are routinely 
ignored.  
A final example to demonstrate Tainter’s argument (and one particularly relevant for 
this thesis) involves the (marginal) return on investment in energy discovery and 
exploitation. This too has been falling over time; in 1960 every dollar (inflation 
adjusted) invested in energy discovery and exploitation produced approximately 
2,250,000 BTU,57 while this fell to 2,168,000 BTU in 1970 and 1,845,000 BTU in 
1976 (1990, p99). This is often explained through the concept of EROI, or Energy 
Return On (Energy) Invested. This measures the relationship between the usable 
energy we can get out of an energy source compared to how much energy it costs us 
to retrieve and utilise that energy source. Thus as seen in Figure 2, near the start of 
the Oil Age the US was gaining energy equivalent to 100 barrels of oil for every 
barrel of oil that was required to access and process that oil (an EROI of 100:1) 
                                                
57 British Thermal Units - the quantity of heat required to raise the temperature of one pound of water from 60° to 
61°F at a constant pressure of one atmosphere. 
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 Figure 2 (Hall & Day 2009, p236) 
This was primarily due to the fact that at this stage the US was still using oil that was 
relatively easy to access – it was close to the surface and on dry land (and not on the 
other side of the globe). The iconic (and historic) image of the ‘gusher’ – the fountain 
of oil shooting into the sky as the drill penetrated the oil field – represents this era of 
‘easy oil’ perfectly. However by 1970 the EROI of domestic US oil had fallen to less 
than 40:1 and by the turn of this century it was 15:1. This trend is explained by the 
increasing use of offshore and deep water drilling rigs to access oil as the production 
from older inland fields declined. Such offshore drilling is increasingly complex (thus 
costing more energy) and expensive, and more subject to disruptions from 
environmental challenges such as bad weather. 
Tainter subsumes these various examples of the dynamic of declining (marginal) 
returns on investment under the umbrella of (socio-technological) complexity and 
argues that this dynamic is applicable to social development as a whole. Figure 3 is a 
graphic representation of this dynamic; over time the returns on investment in ever-
increasing complexity level out before eventually (inevitably!) shifting into an inverse 
relationship.  
 
Figure 3 (Tainter 2006, p94)   
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After the ‘point of equilibrium’ between benefits and costs (C2) the benefits of socio-
technological complexity fall relative to its costs and it is from this point that system 
resilience begins to decline. This trajectory accelerates until collapse becomes a 
matter of time. For Tainter, such a collapse is defined as a voluntary or involuntary 
shift to a simpler state of technological, social and cultural organisation. 
This awareness of the dynamic of declining returns on complexity has been identified 
elsewhere. For example Fletcher (1995) outlines two limits to the growth and 
complexity of human settlement size: behavioural stress and the material 
management of community life. The former means the psychological limits to 
people’s ability to handle the ever-increasing amount of unwanted social interaction 
as settlement size increases and personal space and privacy increasingly vanish. 
The latter limit is directly analogous to Tainter’s declining returns on complexity as 
the costs of addressing both these psychological challenges (through structural/built 
techniques to mediate human interactions) and infrastructural requirements 
(including food and energy provision and waste removal) also rise as settlement 
population increases. In both these cases the increasing costs placed upon a 
settlement again place a natural, if elastic, limit to the size to which any human 
settlement may grow: 
The implication is that, while we are trying to reduce waste and consumption, 
attempts to mitigate the pressures of urban life in very large cities will exert 
ever greater demands on the preferred allocation and consumption of 
resources. If our resource supply becomes insufficient to sustain the material 
mechanisms and features which allow the cities to work, then presumably 
they will stagnate and perhaps even suffer a severe decline in their size. 
(Fletcher 1995, p22) 
For Tainter the eventual condition of negative returns on investment in complexity 
can result from a number of situations: 
1. Benefits (of complexity) constant but costs (of complexity) rising 
2. Benefits rising but costs rising faster 
3. Benefits falling but costs constant 
4. Benefits falling but costs rising 
Using the examples of the Maya and Chacoan civilizations and the Western Roman 
Empire (1990) he argues that the declining returns on their investment in social 
complexity, offset for some time by either innovations in agricultural production or 
military expansion, became so costly in terms of resources that they were brought 
undone by challenges that they would earlier have been able to overcome. This 
thesis, for considerations of space, will concentrate on the case of Rome. 
To provide an extremely brief summary of Tainter’s argument (1990; 2000; 2006): in 
the late Republic and early Empire the expansion of Roman territories brought 
immense benefits to Rome in terms of the wealth flowing into its coffers. However 
over time the costs of administering its growing territories grew (through the 
implementation of increasingly complex and thus expensive systems of tax collection, 
military defence and information processing) to such an extent that under the 
Emperor Hadrian the newly-acquired conquests of Mesopotamia and Assyria were 
abandoned and the borders were fixed. Once this happened Rome was locked into 
an inevitable dynamic of increasing complexity costs to deal with the challenges 
(barbarian incursion, civil war, high transport and military costs, depopulation and the 
falling cultivation of arable land, inflation and budgetary crises) it faced (1990, p128-
148). The tactics undertaken by various Emperors included currency debasement 
and the imposition of crushing taxation burdens (falling on those least able to pay) to 
support the massive increases in bureaucracy undertaken to better manage 
increasingly complex systems of taxation and military defence (the size of the army 
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rose inexorably while Imperial taxation became increasing burdensome). In effect the 
ever-increasing costs of the Empire’s own existence were placed first on the rural 
and urban poor and then on the middle classes while the benefits they gained from 
the Empire (social/physical security, access to Roman law and the benefits of trade, 
and the social mobility implied by military service58) shrank as the Empire’s hold over 
security, trade and agriculture weakened. In the end it was these classes who, in 
some cases, welcomed the supplanting of Imperial authority by the new barbarian 
tribal regimes as these could at least provide the benefits of security and trade at 
greatly reduced costs. In fact, for many life improved as Imperial control waned – 
economic prosperity in North Africa “rose under the Vandals, but declined again 
under Justinian’s reconquest when Imperial taxes were reimposed” (1990, p151). 
This history clearly exemplifies Tainter’s dynamic of a society implementing 
increasingly complex solutions to solve the challenges that it faces. This increasing 
complexity involves ever-increasing costs that the society must pay. Over time, falling 
returns on the investments in this complexity (as well as shrinking economic and 
resource surpluses) eventually reach a point where the society can longer support 
itself at that level of complexity. At this point the society collapses – or in Tainter’s 
terminology it radically simplifies.59  
 
One challenge to Tainter’s thesis – the problem of ‘the problem’ 
Tainter starts from the orthodox definition of sustainability as the ability of a system to 
sustain itself through time. However his focus on complexity as a problem solving 
technique leads him to depart from the further orthodox assumption that sustainability 
involves a reduction in energy dissipation (ie a reduction in consumption). For Tainter 
sustainability means the ability of any organisation or society to sustain itself in the 
face of the challenges that inevitably and endlessly arise. The way to address such 
problems, according to Tainter, is through the introduction of further complexity and 
this requires the dissipation of more energy. The logical (if somewhat heretical) 
conclusion of this reasoning is that sustainability requires the ever-increasing 
consumption of energy (Tainter, 2011b). The inability to secure such energy 
resources leads inevitably to collapse.  
However Alexander makes an important point in his critique (2012) of Tainter’s 
understanding of sustainability. While acknowledging the validity of Tainter’s logical 
reasoning, Alexander questions the proposition that ‘problem’ is a determinate or 
normative category. Instead the category of ‘problem’ is socially constructed: 
it can be seen that a ‘problem’ in Tainter’s sense is actually a radically 
indeterminate notion, requiring various value judgments in order to give it 
content. (Alexander 2012, p9) 
This means that what is a problem for one individual (or organisation, municipality or 
society) may not be for another. As Tainter recognises, the issue of determining what 
is and what is not a problem is a value judgement and therefore inescapably political: 
“We seek to sustain only what we value; yet values are variable, transient and 
mutable”. (2002, n.p.)60 For example the increasing transfer of the maintenance costs 
of the Roman Empire onto the rural and urban poor, while they were increasingly 
excluded from the benefits of the imperial system, demonstrates this political aspect 
of complexity as a problem solving technique. One can only surmise that for such 
stakeholders it was the Empire that was the problem and thus its collapse was the 
                                                
58 Increasingly these benefits shrank relative to the costs involved as per Tainter’s main thesis. 
59 Figure 5 (on page 59) displays this dynamic in a table form, while comparing Tainter’s dynamic of declining returns 
to the Panarchic theory of adaptive cycles. These will be compared at this later point in the current chapter. 
60 This can also be conceptualized by asking and answering the four questions of sustainability. These are: Sustain 
what? Sustain it for whom? Sustain if for how long? Sustain it at what cost? (Tainter, examiner report, 2016 
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solution.61 While societies (or more often influential elements of those societies) do 
continually address identified problems through the implementation of more complex 
solutions this very identification is socially constructed. It is possible for one social 
group to ignore or accept what for another group is an unacceptable problem that 
must be solved. 
This insight is important because the implementation of a conscious socio-
technological simplification is the main recommendation of this thesis. For Tainter 
this is all but impossible given the endless identification of problems and the need for 
societies to increase their complexity to deal with them. In fact Tainter acknowledges 
only one historical example of a society choosing (however provisionally) this 
approach: the Byzantine Empire during its 7th century administrative and military 
reorganisation (Tainter, 2006). However Alexander posits that the socially 
constructed nature of what is and is not identified as a ‘problem’ makes the likelihood 
of a conscious social simplification more likely. 
Part B will discuss the example of the Byzantine Empire in more detail when outlining 
the program of simplification being proposed. Similarly Part C will return to a 
discussion of Alexander’s critique of the indeterminate nature of the ‘problem’ when 
considering how to overcome the likely resistance to such urban simplification. It is 
enough to note here that while Tainter’s argument for a fatalistic dynamic of declining 
returns on complexity is clearly supportable there are grounds for some optimism. 
 
Exceptions to the dynamic of social collapse 
There are four acknowledged exceptions to Tainter’s dynamic of collapse due to 
declining returns on investment in complexity. The first two, if only provisional, are 
technological innovation and the discovery and/or exploitation of a new energy 
source while the third relates to the question of scale and boundary delineation 
acknowledged earlier. The fourth possibility, of a conscious socio-technological 
simplification, is (as stated immediately above) the main topic of this thesis. While 
this simplification will be considered in detail in Part B the first three exceptions will 
now be addressed in turn.  
 
Technological innovation 
The first exception, the role of technological innovation, is an expression of the focus 
on human ingenuity outlined in the previous chapter (Simon, 1996; Gurr, 1985; 
Brown et al, 2011). However, this thesis argues that this ability of human innovation 
to provide solutions for any challenges facing societies, is itself subject to the law of 
diminishing returns (Tainter, 1990; Tainter & Patzek, 2012). Over the long sweep of 
human history such innovation can only be only a provisional solution to the dynamic 
of declining returns on complexity. This argument does not discount the usefulness of 
such innovation, for it has led to great improvements in the quality of human life and 
solved innumerable challenges facing human societies. Instead, it acknowledges the 
eventual limits to such technological developments in the absence of sufficient 
energy requirements to enable such increasing complexity. Of course, such an 
argument is both deeply subversive of notions of technological progress and (for that 
reason) strongly resisted. This resistance will be examined and addressed in Part C. 
The invention of Newcomen’s steam engine is a perfect case of such technological 
innovation as it allowed the exploitation of larger seams of coal (those deeper 
underground and thus more difficult to access) by both pumping out water from these 
deeper shafts and pumping in air for the miners. This innovation thus made the rest 
                                                
61 In fact, not all barbarian incursions were feared or resisted by all sectors of Roman society (Tainter, 1990) 
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of the Industrial Revolution possible by making large reserves of hydrocarbon energy 
available to replace the declining reserves of wood (which until then had been easier 
to access and use than coal).  
 
The availability of new energy resources 
The second exception (the discovery and exploitation of new energy resources) was, 
according to Tainter (1990), the primary route taken by Rome throughout the late 
Republic and early Imperium to escape the trap of declining returns on socio-
technological complexity. As an overwhelmingly agricultural society its energy source 
was primarily solar and the availability of new energy sources was driven by 
conquest; each new province added to the Empire meant a new energy subsidy in 
two ways. First new land on which sunlight fell meant more agricultural production 
while the spoils of conquest (in particular gold and other treasure and slaves) were 
the accumulated solar energy reserves62 of the conquered people and represented a 
‘one off’ energy bounty for Rome. This worked well until the policy of conquest was 
curtailed (not least due to the rising costs of administering such immense territories) 
and depopulation63 and the falling cultivation of arable land led to increasingly severe 
energy (both wealth and manpower) shortfalls. These developments meant that the 
Empire was increasingly unable to pay the energy costs of its own ongoing 
maintenance let alone deal with recurring crises such as civil war or invasion.  
The counter-example of Newcomen’s steam engine above shows how the availability 
of a new energy source (deep-seam coal) allowed the UK, and then the world, to 
implement a whole new level of socio-technological complexity (steam-powered 
industrialisation and rapid urbanisation) to address the issues it faced. Turning here 
to contemporary times this possible exception to the declining returns on complexity 
only restates the importance of energy to our own socio-technological complexity: 
can we assume an unending increase in energy supplies irrespective of depletion 
and resource competition64 and which would indefinitely support the maintenance 
and development of our complex societies? Later in this chapter this question will be 
addressed through an examination of the resource depletion trend known as Peak 
Oil.  
 
Scale and boundary delineation 
The third exception relates to the question of scale and boundary delineation 
acknowledged earlier. In spatial terms Tainter (1990) argues that the collapse of 
societies only occurs when there is not a similarly complex society adjacent to the 
one threatened by this dynamic of over-expensive complexity; any civilisation that did 
collapse in such a situation would simply be subsumed by its more complex 
neighbour and thus any simplification/collapse would be merely an interregnum.65 For 
Tainter, collapse can only happen in a power vacuum: the Western Empire was 
bordered by simpler Germanic tribal entities and after their influx into its spatial 
territory the imperial social-military-economic complexity collapsed. In comparison, 
when the Eastern Empire/Byzantium did finally lose political and military control over 
its remaining territory there was no overall collapse in socio-political complexity – 
what remained was subsumed into the complex Ottoman state. However, given the 
previous chapter’s discussion of the difficulties involved in delineating complex 
                                                
62 Or as we shall see in chapter 3 the variable of potential in Gunderson & Holling’s model of Panarchy (2002). 
63 The population fell (for a range of debated reasons) while the regular influx of slaves from conquest dried up.  
64 Even if a quasi-imperial policy of resource wars in the major oil-producing regions of the world were continued… 
65 The contemporary situation in Somalia demonstrates that this is still dependent on issues of geopolitics as other 
geopolitical entities may well decide after some cost/benefit analysis to not get involved. 
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systems, could it not be argued that the Byzantine case should be considered as a 
complex system involving both of these cultural/political entities?  
The interplay between collapse and resilience is multiscalar and dependent on the 
viewpoint of the observer. For example, while it is true that from the point of view of 
both contemporary élites and later observers the Western Empire did ‘collapse’ in the 
Gibbonian sense, this led to new forms of social-economic organisation which were 
both more complex and resilient at other scales. For example, the lot of the 
independent farmer, the backbone of the army at the time of the early Republic but 
increasingly burdened by taxation to pay for the complexity costs of the later 
Empire’s defence (Tainter, 1990; Tainter et al, 2003), was greatly improved under the 
new Germanic tribal rulers that filled the imperial void – economic prosperity rose 
under these simpler systems due to the lower costs for less complexity (Tainter, 
1990). At the same time the increasingly complex political role for the Christian 
Church, in which the old imperial administrative centres were subsumed into the 
spatially coterminous organisation of bishoprics and archbishoprics (Fletcher 1997, 
p50) demonstrates increasing complexity in other areas of the new cultural milieu. 
In that sense then, the tendency to collapse due to complexity costs is a multiscalar 
and spatially delineated one, and one which should not be seen as determinist with 
regard to specific systems at particular scales: 
When closely examined, the overriding human story is one of survival and 
regeneration. Certainly crises existed, political forms changed, and 
landscapes were altered, but rarely did societies collapse in an absolute and 
apocalyptic sense. (McAnany & Yoffee 2010, p6) 
To conclude, there are four exceptions to Tainter’s dynamic of socio-technological 
collapse, with the fourth (a conscious simplification) representing the final 
recommended approach of this thesis to the challenges of emergent complexity. 
However, to broaden the theoretical scope of Tainter’s work this thesis next 
integrates his theory with the conceptual model of adaptive complexity labelled 
Panarchy (Gunderson & Holling, 2002).  
 
Panarchy and the possibility/probability of collapse 
It is now time to introduce Gunderson & Holling’s (2002) concept of Panarchy as it 
can provide a fuller understanding of the development of complexity in socio-
technological systems as discussed by Tainter.66 This attempt, to bring together 
Tainter’s concept of declining returns as a driver of collapse, and the model of 
adaptive cycles encapsulated by Panarchy, represents an important theoretical 
contribution of this thesis. It is an important synthesis as Tainter’s theory of socio-
technological collapse provides a deeper conceptualisation of the various stages in 
the Panarchic model. Above all, Tainter’s work is primarily focussed on the effects of 
energy on human societies as FFE systems and the conceptual similarities between 
his theory and that of Panarchy provide support for the application of the latter to 
socio-technological systems such as cities. At the same time the Panarchic concept 
of hierarchically nested temporal and physical scales which act upon each other in 
complex ways enriches the process described by Tainter. In the latter case, the 
adaptive cycles model can provide a way for Tainter’s dynamic of declining returns to 
addressing the emergent complexity of socio-technological systems (such as urban 
energy systems or food supplies) which straddle widely disparate spatial and 
temporal scales. 
                                                
66 A connection between the adaptive cycle and Tainter’s ideas has been made already by Abel & Walker (2002). 
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Figure 5 (found on page 59) outlines the similarities between Tainter’s theory and 
Panarchy, while the next section of this thesis will go through these in more detail. It 
must be noted here, however, that this thesis uses the concept of Panarchy primarily 
as a heuristic (to help conceptualise emergent changes in complex systems). It 
should not be seen as a predictive mechanism or even a prescriptive narrative 
framework for the intersection of energy, complexity and collapse. 
The concept of Panarchy (Gunderson & Holling, 2002; Resilience Alliance, 2010) 
grew out of the field of ecological science and was designed as a heuristic model for 
approaching the development of complex adaptive systems through time. The 
Panarchic model sees such systems as maintaining themselves in a state far from 
equilibrium, until some internal or external system shift, at some point in time, leads 
to their collapse. To explain such collapses, Panarchy focuses on the movement of 
complex systems within any particular stability region or phase space. Within such a 
phase space the adaptive capacity of the system is not exceeded and it can maintain 
its form and/or function in the face of challenges and disruptions from either 
environment or from within itself. However, if the adaptive fluctuations of the system, 
or some internal or external system shift, take the system outside its stability region 
then collapse is possible. More specifically, the Panarchic model of system change 
focuses on three system properties: potential, connectedness and 
vulnerability/resilience.  
Theoretically, Panarchy should be seen as growing out of hierarchy theory 
(Giampetro, 1994; Simon, 2005) as it sees systems existing in and across, and being 
impacted by, a hierarchy of both spatial and temporal scales which may be moving 
through the four stages at different points and speeds. Similarly, readers should note 
here the clear conceptual affinities with the idea of emergent novelty (as discussed in 
chapter 2). 
The theory of Panarchy will now be discussed in more detail. The three system 
properties listed above will now be introduced, followed by an outline of the four 
stages of the Panarchy concept and how these variables fluctuate depending on the 
stage within which the system finds itself.  
  
Resilience (and efficiency) 
The first of these variables is seen by Holling (1973) as having two distinct 
definitions, each based upon different approaches to the question of resilience, 
largely coming from different discipline areas and concerned with different criteria for 
its measurement or assessment: 
…between efficiency on the one hand and persistence on the other, or 
between constancy and change, or between predictability and 
unpredictability. (Gunderson & Holling 2002, p27)  
The former characteristics (efficiency, constancy and predictability) are the concern 
of engineering resilience: an approach which displays the reductionist concern with 
an absolute predictive understanding of any particular system. It is an approach 
predicated on the absence of emergence and thus incompatible with the 
assumptions which underlie the panarchic model of adaptive change. The latter 
characteristics, however, are those of ecosystem or environmental resilience: an 
approach which sees far from equilibrium systems as emergent and therefore 
intrinsically unpredictable (Gunderson & Holling, 2002).  
Another way of conceptualising the difference between these two approaches is to 
see engineering resilience as focussing on maintaining efficiency of function (the 
‘internal peace and productivity’ described by Funtowicz & Ravetz 1994, p29) - it 
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focuses on efficiency gains and thus on the energy savings.67 On the other hand 
environmental resilience focuses on maintaining existence of function (op.cit., p29). It 
is concerned above all with overall system survival; instability and fluctuations in 
internal form and function are acceptable in the interest of overall maintenance.68 
This existence of function accepts the possibility and value of redundancy to promote 
system resilience even though this implies a loss of efficiency (Helbing 2009, p4). 
The concept of ecological resilience is the one accepted by this thesis as the most 
realistic and useful, and chapter 4 (in Part B) explores the advantages and 
disadvantages of applying ecological resilience to cities. 
 
Potential 
The second variable is labelled as potential in the form of accumulated resources 
such as physical, human, and social capital which, together, represent the breadth of 
the stability region/phase space which a particular system is occupying. 
On the one hand this is the adaptive capacity of the system as measured by 
available resources (energy, human labour, food water, land, etc). However this 
potential can also be seen as complexity (as defined above) given that socio-
technological complexity is both dependent upon, and an expression of, previously 
dissipated energy. That is, over time, any socio-technological system like a city has 
been involved in an unending process of the dissipation of free energy to create 
complexity. As outlined in Chapter 3, this urban complexity includes infrastructure, 
agricultural and resource practices and trade/supply networks, the resident 
population (and attendant investments in housing, education or health), cultural 
(political, economic or religious) practices; and the larger scale geographical, 
technological, economic and socio-cultural frameworks in which the city is 
embedded.69 In that sense the dissipation of energy has resulted in the potential 
embodied in the infrastructure, knowledge and social systems that have been 
created. 
All of this socio-technological complexity can be seen as potential for adaptive 
change, and this is entirely consistent with Tainter’s model of complexity as a 
problem solving technique. Thus rich and technologically developed cities, for 
instance, can demonstrate a greater resilience and adaptive capacity to natural 
disasters. However this is not always the case, as this potential, and connected 
adaptive capacity, is dependent on access to sufficient energy reserves. The section 
entitled High- and low-gain energy and urban resilience (p66-69) discusses this 
dynamic in more detail. 
Finally, this connection between potential and complexity is also well-expressed in 
the concept of ‘sunk costs’ (an alternative method of expressing path dependency); 
every element of a socio-technological system like a city is the expression of a 
previous history of energy dissipation which both prefigures and constrains future 
action.70 The phase space or stability region of the system shrinks and as the 
adaptive cycle progresses this becomes increasingly problematic. 
 
                                                
67 The resonances with efficiency as an economic concept are no accident – Chapter 4 examines the fixation on 
efficiency inherent in free-market capitalism while Part C acknowledges the cultural power of this fixation. 
68 An interesting analogy from construction is the difference between metal and bamboo scaffolding in the 
construction of multistory buildings – although the latter appears much more flimsy and is inclined to flex 
disconcertingly it is actually more forgiving and resilient overall. 
69 This list also demonstrates Fletcher’s concept (1995) of the physical and cultural inertia of the built environment 
and attendant cultural artefacts outlined in chapter 2. 
70 Again this restates Fletcher’s claim (1995) that the built environment of cities involves a path dependency that 
constrains future action (whether individual or communal). 
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Connectedness 
There is a causal relationship between this potential and the third variable of 
connectedness. This latter term describes the tightness of interconnections among 
the various elements and subsystems which comprise a system. In that sense it is 
analogous to the definition of complexity outlined above in which such connections 
are seen as a quantitative measurement of complexity. For Holling such 
interconnectedness is a measurement of the relationships between systems 
elements such as species within an ecosystem and thus an increase in 
connectedness is seen in the shift from generalist organisms/subsystems to more 
synergistic relationships between them. Thus the connections between the honey 
production of bees and the pollination of flowering plants have tied these two groups 
of species closely together so that one cannot survive ‘as is’ without the other.71 
 
The four stages of Panarchy 
The ‘infinity loop’ model of Panarchy (see Figure 4) demonstrates the interaction 
between these three variables. 
 
Figure 4 (Gunderson & Holling 2002, p34) 
The Exploitation stage (r) is when there is plentiful energy and potential and 
connectedness are low but resilience is high. It is a stage of steady expansion as 
energy reserves start the growth of potential and complexity. 
This changes in the Conservation stage (K); growth slows as the focus shifts to 
increasing and consolidating complexity to better dissipate energy and maintain 
stasis). As a result, system potential and connectedness grow as resilience declines 
(the phase space, the range of potential options facing a system, shrinks as the 
system complexity increases and more subsystems become interconnected). 
Growing predictability in the Conservation stage is congruent with the system theory 
of Luhmann (2012) as the increase in system complexity (potential + connectedness) 
reduces the unpredictability of the environment to very low levels. In Luhmann’s 
terms the system is constructing complexity to better simplify and tame the 
unpredictable environment within itself (Bednarz 1984), while for Tainter it is 
constructing complexity as a problem-solving tactic to address the challenges of an 
unpredictable environment/world. Eventually the shrinking of the phase space leads 
to the ancien regime syndrome of Funtowicz and Ravetz (1994) in which system 
stability and survival is prioritised over adaptive capacity (addressed at the end of this 
chapter). 
                                                
71 This interconnectedness can itself be problematic for system resilience, as will be discussed in the section entitled 
The further vulnerabilities of complexity (challenges to system resilience) (p69-75). 
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Eventually in the Release stage (Ω) some internal or external event (whether an 
abrupt change in system or environmental conditions or the slower development of 
ongoing trends to a crucial point) triggers the rapid collapse of the current system as 
potential and connectedness (or in other words complexity) abruptly decline. At the 
same time unpredictability rapidly increases as all the black-boxed complexity of the 
system is unravelled and the connections between subsystems are broken. This is 
analogous to the moment of collapse (or abrupt simplification) in Tainter’s theory 
(1990) or the widely known concept of the tipping point (Gladwell, 2000; Korowicz et 
al, 2010; O’Riordan et al, 2013; Galaz et al, 2014). Due to its ubiquity (both within the 
sustainability/resilience literature and the wider culture) some explanation of this 
concept is necessary. The term and concept first originated with Schelling (1971) 
(see Boyd 2013) and has been applied to a wide range of social, economic, political, 
ecological and physical events in which systems changes or developments reach a 
point at which a fundamental change occurs within that system. Implicit in this 
concept is the idea of ‘thresholds’; points beyond the system cannot change without 
triggering a tipping point (Schelling, 1971; Korowicz et al, 2010; Boyd, 2013; Clarke, 
2013; Foden, 2013; Galaz et al, 2014). Finally, tipping points have also, in the face of 
the conceptual difficulty they involve, been defined as: 
…metaphors that help deal with uncertainty and complexity, wholeness and 
the unpredictability of the future. Tipping points are processes of 
discontinuous, and at times disruptive, change. (O’Riordan et al 2013, p3) 
However, it should be noted that even though such events might be widely 
unexpected (if not to all observers), they can still involve the development of existing 
trends as much as the ‘bolt from the blue’.  
Finally the Reorganisation stage (α) can also be quite abrupt. Energy released in the 
previous stage is available as free energy (such as the nutrients left by a forest fire) 
for the organisms/species/subsystems that have survived the Release stage to begin 
the Exploitation stage again. 
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Figure 5: Interrelated theories of energy use, complexity & resilience/collapse 
Tainter’s theory of collapse Panarchy Comparison and other 
theoretical approaches 
New energy source becomes 
available – allows the 
implementation of new forms of 
socio-technological complexity to 
solve challenges that arise. 
Resilience is high as such 
investments in complexity are at this 
stage highly successful – but they 
create later path dependency as they 
invite further similar developments. 
EXAMPLE:72 Roman expansion in 
late Republic/early Empire as 
conquests led to availability of new 
energy subsidies (land, slaves and 
treasure) to cover costs of Rome’s 
own ‘operating systems’. 
Exploitation stage (r) - plentiful 
energy and potential and 
connectedness are low but resilience 
is high. Growth is also high meaning 
a steady expansion of complexity 
(interconnections and variety) fuelled 
by these plentiful energy reserves. 
The system has a wide stability 
region at this stage and it can adapt 
to a wide range of disruptions 
including ‘Black Swans’. This is due 
to the energy surplus and lack of 
path dependency although early 
successful adaptations or strategies 
do make such dependency 
increasingly likely over time. 
The concept of the phase space or 
stability region is applicable in both 
cases here as the new energy 
reserves promote complexity and 
novelty but also lay down later path 
dependency as successful 
approaches are implemented and 
then recognised. 
Declining returns on investments 
in socio-technological complexity 
– the returns gained from the 
system’s complexity fall but past 
successes and the ‘tyranny of sunk 
costs’ means that this approach 
(increasingly complex solutions to 
problems) continues. Resilience falls 
as rising energy costs and the 
dangers of cascading failures means 
less ability to respond to serious 
challenges that arise. 
EXAMPLE: increasing costs and 
falling energy reserves in late Roman 
Empire led to crises that earlier were 
easily dealt with (ie Germanic 
incursions). 
Conservation stage (K) - growth 
slows but there is increasing 
complexity to better dissipate energy 
and maintain stasis. System 
potential & connectedness increase 
as resilience declines (the phase 
space, the range of potential options 
facing a system, shrinks as 
complexity increases and more 
subsystems become 
interconnected). 
However this fall in resilience is with 
regard to the unexpected Black 
Swan event; the system is still able 
to adapt to ‘predictable’ or ‘everyday’ 
disruptions although they may 
become increasingly costly. 
Again in both theories rising 
complexity (ie system differentiation 
and interconnections) is still 
successful but the phase 
space/stability region (adaptability) 
is increasingly shrunken (path 
dependency has in many cases 
determined future responses to 
challenges and difficulties). 
At the same time (and recognising 
the insights of FFE 
thermodynamics) system energy 
costs are rising while reserves are 
shrinking. 
Eventually this leads to Funtowicz & 
Ravetz’ concept (1994) of the 
ancien regime – stability and 
survival is prioritised over adaptive 
capacity. 
The tipping point – the moment of crisis and the start of collapse/simplification 
Some external or internal73 event (whether an abrupt change in system or environmental conditions or the slower 
development of ongoing trends to a crucial point) triggers the rapid collapse of the current system 
Rapid/abrupt simplification 
(whether willing or forced) - in 
which socio-technological complexity 
is unravelled. International or even 
regional connections (ie trade) may 
be broken as socio-technological 
systems localise (smaller in scale & 
focus) and overall energy costs fall.  
EXAMPLE: collapse of Imperial 
authority, replaced by simpler socio-
technological systems (Germanic 
tribal kingdoms). 
Release stage (Ω) - potential and 
connectedness (or in other words 
complexity) abruptly decline. At the 
same time unpredictability rapidly 
increases as all the complexity of the 
system is unravelled and the 
connections between subsystems 
are broken.  
In both cases the reduction in 
complexity means that the phase 
space/stability region is abruptly 
widened again and this (along with 
the freeing of energy that was 
previously bound up in system 
complexity) leads to an increase in 
system resilience. 
Opportunities arise for different 
models of socio-technological 
organisation (whether new or 
traditional) – smaller less complex 
social groupings begin to respond to 
the challenges that face them by the 
implementation of new and more 
complex approaches/solutions. 
EXAMPLE: the opportunities for the 
start of increasingly complex 
organisation & role of new socio-
technological systems (ie Christian 
church in Western Europe).  
Reorganisation stage (α) - Energy 
released in the previous stage is 
available as free energy (such as the 
nutrients left by a forest fire) for the 
organisms/ species/subsystems that 
have survived the Release stage to 
begin the Exploitation stage again. 
 
                                                
72 All examples from Tainter (1990) except the rise of the Christian Church in Western Europe from Fletcher (1997). 
73 For Tainter this can include either a society’s inability to pay the costs of its own complexity or the general 
awareness that the benefits gained no longer exceed these costs. 
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The contrasting resilience of generalists and specialists 
To further develop its original synthesis of the work of Tainter and Gunderson & 
Holling, this thesis returns to Wicken’s (1986) work (introduced in the previous 
chapter) on complexity and energy costs. His discussion of specialists and 
generalists is important because it both acknowledges, and explains, how the 
relationship between complexity and energy use is dependent upon the 
interconnectedness of each component of the complex system. The more 
interconnected the element, the less energy dissipation at that level is needed but the 
less individually resilient that element becomes. The integration of Wicken’s ideas 
provides a way to integrate these seemingly contradictory system properties, and 
represents a further theoretical contribution of this thesis. At the same time, the 
differences between generalists and specialists have important political implications 
which will be discussed in detail in chapter 4. Finally, the examples included in this 
discussion are designed to illustrate particular conceptual points and should not be 
considered as empirical case studies 
To summarise Wicken’s argument: generalists face higher individual energy costs 
than the latter yet, when viewed through the lens of the adaptive cycle, they are 
actually much more resilient. The perfect example of this apparent contradiction can 
be seen in the differences between mammals and reptiles. Mammals are generalists 
(at least in terms of body temperature regulation) that are highly resilient due to their 
ability to regulate their own internal body temperatures. This is because they can 
survive across a wider range of diverse and challenging environments (they have a 
much wider stability region/phase space) than reptiles that are (in this characteristic 
at least) niche specialists that must rely on their environment to regulate their body 
temperatures. Reptiles are dependent on environmental conditions in a way that 
mammals simply are not; but underlying this adaptability of mammals is the fact that 
their mechanisms for self-regulation of internal temperature cost 10 times as much in 
energy dissipation terms as the reptiles’ reliance on environmental warmth 
(Gunderson & Holling 2002, p50). Energy dissipation is connected to specific 
systems (for regulating temperature) that then provide a level of resilience and 
adaptability - at a cost. Other examples of such a dynamic include the niche-
specialised koala (facing the loss of its only food source and environment) as 
compared to the über-generalist rat. Symbiotic specialists, which are absolutely 
reliant on their interrelationship with other system components to survive, are often 
vulnerable to the sort of system/environmental perturbations described in the 
adaptive cycle model.74 A further example is the panda’s exclusively bamboo diet.75 
For a final possible example: by some interpretations76 the extinction of the dinosaurs 
can be read as an example of the differing resilience of generalists and specialists 
with regard to the adaptive cycle in action. According to the influential (although not 
unchallenged)77 ‘punctuationalism’ or ‘punctuated equilibrium’ theory (Niles & Gould, 
                                                
74 The research of Dakos & Bascompte (2014) demonstrates that populations of specialist species are much more 
likely to collapse (and collapse before more generalist species) in the face of environmental disruptions or 
challenges. They propose that, given the apparent fragility of specialist species, they may constitute ‘the canary in 
the coal mine’ in terms of tipping points. That is, monitoring such highly specialised species can provide an early 
warning system for any impending system-wide collapse. 
75 See Zhengsheng et al (2015): 
“Our large-scale comparative analysis also confirmed that the giant panda shows extremely low gut 
microbial diversity compared with other mammalian species… In theory, a high level of diversity provides 
“functional redundancy” that helps an ecosystem retain its resistance, resilience, and stability after 
environmental stresses. For the giant panda, whether the low diversity of its gut microbiota has any impact 
on its highly fragile lifestyle remains to be addressed.” (p6)  
76 This thesis does not attempt to become in any way involved in the debate between gradualist and punctuationalist 
theories of evolution, which are far beyond the scope of this work. Instead, this theory is presented as a possible 
example of the dynamic of specialists and generalists in action. 
77 Dennett (1995), to take one prominent example, is particularly critical of this concept: the chapter entitled Bully for 
Brontosaurus is devoted to a critique of ‘punctuated equilibrium’, and Gould in particular. For a more sympathetic 
treatment of the theory see Saylo et al (2011): they see value in both the punctuationalist and gradualist approaches. 
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1972) within evolutionary biology and palaeontology, perturbations in the 
environment (most likely caused by a meteor strike on the Yucatan Peninsula) were 
beyond the dinosaurs’ adaptive range,78 and this led to the Cretaceous/Tertiary (K/T) 
mass extinction event (Saylo et al, 2011; Renne et al, 2014). The most widely 
accepted cause was a ‘winter’ effect due to massive amounts of dust and debris in 
the atmosphere which led to a mass extinction event (Renne et al, 2014). To use the 
terminology of Panarchy: the rapid shift to the Release stage of the cycle meant that 
the generalist mammals (with their self-regulation of body temperature and thus their 
greatly expanded fitness environment) were in a perfect position to expand and 
develop to fill numerous niches within the various ecosystems. However over time 
the complexity of these new ecosystems as a whole increased, as generalist 
mammals (and birds etc) were replaced by niche specialists which gained economies 
in terms of their energy dissipation through that specialisation. Like the dinosaurs 
they replaced many become specialists as the Panarchy cycle moved into its 
Conservation phase; they only gained their energy efficiency at the expense of 
overall adaptability due to a) constrained phase spaces due to path dependency 
and/or sunk costs and b) a related loss in adaptability from this specialisation. In the 
words of Wicken (1986, p265-7): 
Young ecosystems, like young organisms, have developmental potential… 
But a mature ecosystem, with its energy-richness, tightly organized 
population relationships, and low homeostasis in the face of stress, is 
extremely vulnerable to perturbation and, hence, to evolutionary change. 
Therefore there is a definite connection with the Panarchy theory: 
The two interactive phases in evolution are (a) a developmental phase, 
proceeding toward maximum efficiencies within certain economic boundaries, 
and (b) an expansion phase brought about by innovations relieving previous 
kinetic constraints on energy utilization. Each Lotkan transition between 
economic regimes expresses itself in an increase in total flux and in a burst in 
specific dissipation. Once established, each new economic base or regime 
enters a developmental phase in which energy flows become routed through 
increasingly complex and mutualistic webs of decreasing specific dissipation. 
(p267) 
This is all crucial to the final recommendations of Chapter 6, as a focus on 
simplification means that the individual components of any complex city (in particular 
neighbourhoods, households or individual humans) face higher individual energy 
costs as the overall energy dissipation of the city falls. In a sense they must become 
generalists, incurring higher individual energy costs and thus forgoing the energy 
savings of increasing returns on scale available to specialists. This would mean that 
both the overall energy dissipation of the city could be reduced while at the same 
time its individual resilience or adaptability would be increased.  
But why would this be a necessary or recommended course of action? 
It is industrialised societies’ problematic reliance on high gain hydrocarbon energy 
sources (to maintain both their socio-technological complexity and the specialisation 
that it makes possible) that could make such a counter-intuitive change both 
necessary and (hopefully) possible: 
But a telling caveat is that these dynamics have promoted the evolution of 
more highly dissipative economies by exploiting the fossil fuels that resulted 
                                                
78 The long debate over whether dinosaurs were warm-blooded or cold-blooded must be acknowledged here. Recent 
scholarship, however, seems to suggest they were somewhere in between: not as warm-blooded as mammals, yet 
not entirely cold-blooded like reptiles (Grady et al, 2014). Whatever the eventual outcome of this debate, this has no 
intrinsic bearing on this thesis as the example is intended only as illustrative analogy. 
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from eons of 'surplus production' of autotrophic energy fixation. As future 
socioeconomic evolution becomes more energy-limited, selection for 
efficiencies will inevitably reverse the historical relationship between 
organizational complexity and dissipation. (Wicken 1986, p268) 
It is now time to look more closely at the role of energy in the development of socio-
technological complexity including the current issue of cheap hydrocarbon depletion 
(Peak Oil) and the important difference between high- and low-gain energy. 
 
The contemporary dynamic of Peak Oil and urban resilience  
The concept of Peak Oil, often misunderstood to mean that hydrocarbons (primarily 
oil and gas) are ‘running out’, was first outlined by geophysicist M. K. Hubbert in 
relation to US domestic oil production. Hubbert argued that the amount of petroleum 
produced (whether from an individual oil field, a country or the planet as a whole) will 
over time resemble a bell curve (1956). That is, it will increase at first, level off when 
approximately half the oil has been extracted, and then decline. With this dynamic in 
mind he predicted that overall conventional petroleum production in the US would 
peak sometime between the late 1960s and the early 1970s. While at first he was 
ridiculed for this prediction, he became famous when it was in fact proved correct in 
1970 (the year US conventional oil production peaked and started the decline which 
has continued to this day) (Hall & Klitgaard, 2012). 
Peak Oil does not mean oil is ‘running out’; the peak in production is determined 
relative to both oil discoveries and production (production always lags relative to 
discovery but both follow a bell curve) and can be seen as occurring when any given 
oil field or oil producing area has approximately reached the halfway point in total 
volume (Hubbert, 1956; Dunlop, 2010; Hall & Klitgaard, 2012). Thus after US 
conventional oil production peaked around 1970 that country as a whole had 
approximately half its oil left – but since that peak the amount of conventional oil 
produced across the US has fallen every year (Korowicz et al, 2010). Such 
production declines have been measured across nearly all the oil producing nations 
and theorised for global oil production as a whole (Greer, 2008; Homer-Dixon, 2009; 
Hall & Klitgaard, 2012; Tverberg, 2012). 
While a contentious concept from the time of Hubbert’s original predictions, the 
inevitability of a peak in oil production has become increasingly accepted by a wide 
range of influential organisations, including the French oil company Total Oil (Webb, 
2008) and elements within the US military (Amidon, 2005; Kraemer, 2006; Buchanan, 
2006). There is also debate over when such a peak may occur (Chapman, 2014), 
with optimistic forecasts suggesting it is some decades away (Sorrell et al, 2010) 
while others suggest the peak may be upon us (BITRE, 2009)79 or in fact already 
past (Inman, 2011; Melvyn & Ryan, 2008). 
The fall in oil production will not be a smooth bell curve, however, as fluctuations in 
price affect both oil consumption and demand (less oil is used during periods of 
economic recession). The period of peak production can therefore be characterised 
by wild swings in oil prices (the ‘bumpy plateau’) as the demand fluctuates due to 
swings in demand (Hall & Klitgaard, 2012; Tverberg, 2012). However the general 
trend is widely acknowledged to be one of increasing levels of demand for 
hydrocarbon energy, driven largely by the rapid industrialisation of emerging 
economic giants like China and India, and to a lesser extent Brazil, Indonesia and 
                                                
79 The BITRE Report (2009) claims “The outlook under a base case scenario is for a long decline in oil production to 
begin in 2017, which will stretch to the end of the century and beyond. Projected increases in deep water and non-
conventional oil, which are ‘rate-constrained’ in ways that conventional oil is not, will not change this pattern.” (pV) 
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others across the global South (Tverberg, 2012). The question is how this growing 
demand is to be met in the coming years. 
This brings us to the second facet of the Peak Oil challenge: the issue of oil prices. 
Given that the peak implies half the oil is still there to be used, why then should there 
be a problem? The answer is in the interplay between rising demand and falling (or 
even flat) supply – in such a situation a resource that is increasingly in demand, but 
for which supply cannot be increased, will rise in price as it becomes relatively more 
valuable. This then has negative effects on the economy as a whole.  
Another factor affecting prices is that of supply security. Now that the ‘easy’ oil is 
depleting, more and more of the world’s supply is coming from areas of 
political/military/ethnic tension and conflict (Klare, 2004; 2012), or from more 
technically difficult and thus risky sources (Capalino et al, 2014). As the competition 
for access to oil supplies between China, the US, India, Japan and other countries 
becomes more important and more intense a number of areas around the world face 
the possibility of armed conflict. As well as the perennial potential flashpoint in the 
Persian Gulf,80 there are other areas such as the Spratly and Senkaku/Diaoyu 
islands, East Africa and the gas pipelines from Russia through the Caucasus where 
military conflict has occurred or may well occur in the future (Klare, 2004; 2012). As 
well, as the global energy supply network grows more complex and more 
geographically dispersed the more inherently fragile these supply chains become 
(Korowicz et al, 2010; Guerroro et al, 2008; Feldhoff, 2011). All these connected 
issues again make disruptions more likely and thus could affect supply and prices. 
 
Peak Oil is dead… Long live Peak Oil! 
The current approach to the issue of oil depletion has been to focus ever more on 
exploration and on alternative sources (exactly as Tainter’s theory argues). These 
include drilling in ever deeper water, biofuels such as ethanol, or mining and 
processing ‘tight’ (difficult) oil such as tar sands and shale oil and gas. Such 
alternative sources of hydrocarbon energy have undoubtedly changed the nature of 
the energy industry, as there are estimated to be massive reserves of tar sand, shale 
oil and gas. This has led to claims that Peak Oil is no longer an issue, given that so 
much more oil and gas remains to be exploited (Blackmon, 2013; Wile, 2013; 
Chapman, 2014). Such arguments are given credibility by the current steep falls in 
the price of crude oil: at the time of writing, a barrel of the benchmark Brent crude oil 
is around US$33 per barrel (see figure 6).  
 
Figure 6 (from NASDAQ website http://www.nasdaq.com/markets/crude-oil-
brent.aspx?timeframe=5y accessed 16/02/16) 
                                                
80 20% of the world’s oil passes through the 2 mile wide Strait of Hormuz – a transit choke point that is heavily 
militarised due to tension among the surrounding countries. 
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However there are a number of issues with these new sources of energy and their 
ability to replace conventional hydrocarbon sources of energy. 
The first challenge is economic. There is such a low EROI for shale oil and tar sands, 
due to the energy needed for the extensive processing involved,81 that they have only 
been reconsidered due to the spike (pre-GFC) in the price of traditional oil. Plunging 
oil prices, and the challenge they pose to these new forms of energy, clearly 
demonstrates the ongoing importance of EROI to the oil industry. Recent steep falls 
in the oil price are placing the economic viability of ‘difficult’ hydrocarbon sources like 
tar sands or shale oil in doubt. For example, Figure 7 outlines the major new oil 
projects that are under development or have recently started production, organised 
according to the ‘break even’ oil price needed to make them financially viable. Thus, 
for example, the various Canadian heavy oil projects listed require oil prices from the 
mid US$50 per barrel up to nearly US$100 per barrel. At prices less than this it costs 
more to extract each barrel than can be made by selling it and therefore many of the 
listed current or future projects are completely unviable (Pope, 2014). Similar 
dynamics are in play in the Coal Seam Gas (CSG) industry in Australia (Slezak 
2016),82 Canadian tar sands (Meador, 2015), and shale oil in the US (Keane, 2015). 
 
Figure 7 (Capalino et al 2014, p9)  
As well, it is worth remembering that many of these new ‘solutions’ to Peak Oil are 
not new technologies. Shale oil in particular has been used since prehistoric times, 
although the mining and refining of oil shale on an industrial scale really began at the 
turn of the 20th century and during the inter-war years due to rapidly increasing 
demand for transport fuel. In the post-war years in many countries shale oil refining 
was discontinued due to the availability of increasing quantities of conventional 
‘cheap’ oil, only to be restarted during the OPEC embargo in the 1970’s (Andrews, 
2006). The fact that it is being revived should not perhaps be seen a cause for 
optimism. 
Quite apart from the question of financial viability, there are serious environmental 
concerns with the sources of oil and gas now being accessed. The Deep Horizon 
disaster in the Gulf of Mexico demonstrates what can happen when problems occur 
in a drilling operation in over one and a half kilometres of water. An explosion in the 
exploratory Deepwater Horizon rig killed 11 workers, destroyed the rig and led to 
massive oil pollution in the Gulf (Klare, 2010; Tainter & Patzek, 2012). The scale of 
this tragedy, the biggest oil spill to date, is however dwarfed by the potential dangers 
                                                
81 However, the exact figures remain controversial due to differences in calculation (Hall & Klitgaard, 2012). 
82 One company “cites low oil prices for decision to cease exploration and wind down or sell its gas fields” (Slezak 
2016, np). 
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involved in drilling in deeper water (as Brazil is planning to do, for instance). The 
dangers of climate change are also demonstrated by the potential risks posed by the 
Hibernia platform (Klare, 2010). This rig is the world’s largest and sits in Iceberg Alley 
of the coast of Newfoundland barely 100 miles from where the Titanic sank. While its 
owners claim it can withstand a direct hit from the largest icebergs, this does not take 
into account the dangers posed by the melting of the Greenland icesheet directly to 
the north and the possibility of ever larger icebergs being produced. The risk of such 
a disaster is real – on February 15, 1982 the giant drillship the Ocean Ranger sank in 
the exact same spot in a massive storm, killing all 82 crew (Klare, 2010). Similarly the 
environmental issues posed by the Alberta tar sands project in Canada (Rooney et 
al, 2102) and the side effects of gas fracking, such as the possibilities of poisoned 
water tables (Jackson et al, 2014), must be considered. That these sources of oil are 
currently being exploited is itself a result of the decline of ‘easy oil’. 
Finally, there is currently much debate around the ethics involved in growing biofuels 
to replace oil and gas. The biofuels industry in the US and Brazil in particular uses 
large tracts of productive land to grow crops for ethanol that could otherwise be used 
for food production (Hall & Klitgaard, 2012; Chapman, 2014). 
Thus pronouncements of ‘the death of Peak Oil’ may be somewhat premature. 
Indeed, the current situation, with oil prices in particular collapsing and projects being 
abandoned or wound up, has only raised concerns amongst some commentators 
and analysts (Gosden, 2013; Critchlow, 2015) that oil prices must, at some point in 
the future, return to $100 or more given that future production capacity is being 
abandoned due to the current low prices. This is the ‘bumpy plateau’. Peak Oil 
should be considered as the end of cheap (easily accessible and usable) oil. With 
regard to resource discovery and exploitation the natural human response is to 
collect the easiest (closest or easiest to access) resources first, before moving on to 
the more difficult resources. This dynamic can be seen in the history of human use of 
hydrocarbon energy as we have exploited the easiest oil first:83 that which was easy 
to access or process, or was in politically stable regions of the planet (Klare, 2004; 
Tainter, 1990; Hall & Klitgaard, 2012). Unfortunately it is this easy oil (or high-gain oil 
– see next section) which is now in the steepest production decline, and it is being 
replaced by oil supplies that are inevitably more expensive to access or refine. 
 
High- and low-gain energy and urban resilience 
Finally, it is necessary to introduce here the importance of energy gain (or energy 
quality) on socio-technological complexity. This concept has also been labelled 
emergy, or the embodied energy that gone into producing an energy source in the 
form in which it can be currently utilised (Odum 1971; 1996). A related idea is that of 
transformity, or the amount of energy used to transform energy into another form. 
Energy gain can be partly equated with EROI, as the latter refers to the overall 
energy available from an energy source once the cost of extraction, processing and 
storage/transport have been have been factored in. However, both energy gain and 
emergy also refer to the essential quality of a resource in terms of the heat that can 
be extracted from it and this is due to the form in which the resource is found (its 
transformity) (Tainter et al, 2003). Thus while all hydrocarbon energy sources can be 
considered as ‘frozen ancient sunlight’ (in that they have been formed by decayed 
organic matter which has been transformed through time) oil is a higher gain energy 
source than coal in that it can produce more heat (BTU) for the same amount of 
matter (it has a higher emergy - it is more highly concentrated). Finally it is important 
to note that the relative energy gain of various sources is a socially determined value, 
                                                
83 It is also evident in Easter egg hunts and firewood scavenging when camping; the resources that are easiest to 
identify and/or access are collected and utilised first. 
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not an absolute (physical) one. That is, it depends strongly on the portability and 
convenience of the resource, and the technological development, path dependency 
and cultural and physical context in which it is being exploited, and it can thus 
change through time: 
High energy gain can arise from using a resource that is of high intrinsic 
quality but untapped, or from technological development that allows an 
increase in the EROI of a previously used resource. (Tainter et al 2003) 
Human socio-technological systems, such as modern industrial societies, are high-
gain systems that have grown out of the availability of high-gain energy sources such 
as coal and then oil (Ferrão & Fernandez, 2013): a development made possible by 
the development of the technological and economic capability to access and exploit 
such a resource. Thus there are important implications for socio-technological 
development and complexity with regards to the energy gain of the resources 
underpinning that development. In particular the increased resilience of modern 
industrialised societies to disruptions such as disaster or war can be explained by the 
nature of the high-gain energy sources they are based upon. Tainter et al (2003) list 
twelve hypotheses about the effect of energy gain on both animal and human 
societies, with the most important to this thesis being numbers 2, 7, 11 and 12. 
These will now be outlined84 and examined in turn. 
Hypothesis 2: The use of a high-gain resource in a human socio-technological 
system is likely to instigate a high-gain phase as the socio-technological complexity 
expands with the increasing availability of energy for dissipation. The resonances 
with the Jevons Paradox (Alcott, 2005) are no accident: societies with access to high-
gain energy sources will naturally, when faced with challenges and problems, utilise 
that energy patrimony to create more complexity to address them. This trend is only 
accentuated by the implications of the next hypothesis… 
Hypothesis 7: A high-gain system can extract resources and organise itself with 
minimal explicit effort due to the quality (high emergy) of its energy sources. Low gain 
systems however are reliant on the aggregation of dispersed or lower quality energy 
sources which requires a level of organisation. Today this is increasingly 
demonstrated by the falling EROI of oil: at first it was easy to extract, while now we 
need deep-sea drilling or extraction from tar sands. 
Hypothesis 11: High-gain systems are self-organised by their history as their access 
to high-gain energy resources allows their development to ignore the vagaries of 
climate or geography. Low-gain systems, on the other hand, such as pre-industrial 
agricultural societies are dependent on energy quantity rather than quality and 
therefore they are always more closely tied to changes or fluctuations in their energy 
production/extraction systems. Climate change, natural disasters such as floods or 
droughts, or social upheavals such as disease or war can drastically upset the 
systems of energy aggregation with major flow-on effects to the society as a whole or 
cities in particular. High-gain systems like industrialised societies and cities, on the 
other hand, have been able to ignore such issues due to the nature of their energy 
patrimony. Examples include the replacement of traditional climate-appropriate 
housing in oil-rich Gulf states such as Kuwait or Bahrain where the easy availability 
of energy (for air-conditioning in particular) has made such considerations 
unnecessary (Khalaf, 2012; Ben Hamouche, 2004), or the progressive encroachment 
of suburban housing developments on agricultural land on the fringes of cities. In the 
latter case the loss of such productive land is overlooked by the use of hydrocarbon 
energy subsidies to produce and distribute food on less land and from farther afield. 
This leads directly into the final hypothesis below... 
                                                
84 What follows is a (paraphrased) summary of the relevant hypotheses from Tainter et al (2003). 
Anthony Richardson THESIS: Dismantling the Wall 
 
67 
 
Hypothesis 12: High-gain systems, particularly in their early stages of development 
before their complexity and resultant path dependency grows, are challenged by only 
the most extreme environmental disruptions or disasters as their access to high-gain 
resources allows them to quickly adjust to new realities. The richest of the modern 
industrial cities have access to high-gain energy reserves which enable them, as per 
hypothesis 7, to more easily direct energy to react to adverse events and conditions 
such as floods, fires or conflict. Low-gain systems on the other hand, particularly 
those reliant on human, animal and solar energy to drive subsistence agriculture, 
must marshal, organise and direct human muscle power to deal with such 
challenges. The former cities can call upon the high-gain technologies of the 
chainsaw, the excavator and the helicopter to respond to disasters; the latter must 
rely on aggregated (low-gain) human and horse/buffalo muscle. 
These hypotheses can help to explain why highly complex and energy-reliant 
systems, such as the modern industrialised city, are more resilient in the face of 
disasters than less intensive or complex systems like the pre-industrial city. The 
primary reason is that their resilience is largely dependent on their access to high-
gain energy sources such as hydrocarbons. Their access to such reserves both 
supports and drives the development of socio-technological complexity (potentiality) 
as a generally successful solution to challenges, and provides reservoirs of energy 
for rapid adaptation in the face of disruptions.85 This energy patrimony and high 
potentiality provides resilience for a higher proportion of citizens and constituent 
systems at the cost of a correspondingly higher reliance on such high grade energy 
sources (at current levels and then increasing into the future). 
The importance of energy gain is more clearly seen when contemporary cities are 
examined through the lens of the Panarchy concept. Thus the long-term resilience of 
wealthy developed cities can be problematic as their usual reliance on high-gain 
energy is itself a major source of vulnerability and fragility for such cities. The trends 
of cheap (high-gain) hydrocarbon depletion, long-term price increases and threats to 
supply are only exacerbated by the path-dependent nature of their development 
(increasing trajectories of complexity driven by increasing energy use) which has 
closed off other possible development trajectories.86 
While there is a stock of ‘positive’ sunk costs (again, potentiality) in terms of the 
various infrastructures which have been implemented over time to improve 
engineering resilience these could however be problematic in terms of the path 
dependency they have inculcated. As well at some point the dynamic of slow or 
abrupt change (tipping points) through time that is intrinsic to complex adaptive 
systems like cities can overwhelm such engineering resilience techniques: examples 
are provided by both the collapse of the New Orleans levees after Hurricane Katrina 
and the overwhelming of the defences of the Fukushima reactor.               
In comparison, less complex87 cities are ’earlier’ in the adaptive cycle and are less 
constrained by path dependency and sunk costs into the future. They have a wider 
phase space (or fitness landscape) in which to move in the long term and have a 
greater potential for the development of future complexity on any particular trajectory. 
                                                
85 This general hypothesis about the greater resilience of wealthy and/or developed societies and cities to disasters 
and disruptions is supported by the statistical analysis of Kahn (2005). 
86 “An important insight is that early adopters may well become entrenched in the lock-in of their existing technology 
choice, as with fossil fuels. Meanwhile, late adopters may have less sunk costs and be more nimble in adopting a 
subsequent option” (Araújo 2014, p119). The London Tube provides a perfect example; it was the first underground 
system ever established and the constraints of the original parameters for the ‘deep tube’ tunnels (the tunnels are 
constructed out of cast iron and some concrete tubes) has meant that any attempt to expand them to allow larger 
trains (or too allow for better air conditioning) would be prohibitively expensive. Thus London is ‘stuck’ with the 150 
km of deep tunnels that have been developed (Griffiths, 2006). 
87 Defined here as exhibiting less socio-technological complexity (including that involved in hegemonic simplification) 
connected to less energy dissipation. In that sense (reduced energy dissipation) they are also generally poorer than 
more complex cities.  
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However at the present time they are often less resilient than wealthier developed 
cities as they do not have either the ‘positive’ sunk costs of improved infrastructure or 
human capital which can provide a level of engineering resilience or the energy 
surpluses to implement policies for such infrastructural upgrading. At the same time 
they may not have the energy surpluses to better respond to challenges and 
disruptions which arise and thus they can provide much less security or 
adaptive/responsive capability for their citizens and constituent systems. To finish 
this point it is worth quoting Bugliarello (2004) at some length: 
‘Plasticity’, that is, the ability of a city to modify itself, is an important 
characteristic. It is less pronounced in the developed world, well set in its 
urban patterns. The very rapid expansion of cities in the developing world still 
makes changing their patterns possible; however, too often that rapid 
expansion overwhelms the resources available to do so. To have an impact 
on global sustainability, what are urgently required, with the assistance of the 
know-how and resources of the developed world, are different technologies 
than those of the developed world and, above all, fast actions in planning, 
infrastructure development, public health, and education. Time is not on the 
side of cities that wait. (p4)  
To conclude, the ‘gain’ of any particular energy source has crucial and inescapable 
implications for the resilience of any urban society dependent upon it. High-gain 
energy sources like hydrocarbons provide great adaptive capacity for those cities 
with easy and cheap access to them, while paradoxically reducing their future 
resilience by the growing systemic dependence their widespread use implies. 
 
The shortcomings of renewable (low gain) energy sources 
This difference between high-gain and low-gain energy will have dramatic 
consequences for highly industrialised societies in the face of oil depletion trends 
(absent the introduction of new hitherto unknown or currently impractical energy 
sources such as hydrogen fusion88). This is because alternative renewable energy 
sources such as solar or wind are low-gain by comparison and will involve great 
changes in the way both energy is harvested and utilised and thus in the attendant 
social organisation (Tainter et al, 2003, Tainter, 1995a; 1990; 1996; 2006; 2011a; 
Tainter & Patzek, 2012; Korowicz et al, 2010; Kunstler, 2005; Rees, 2012; 
Giampietro & Pimentel, 1993; Greer, 2008): 
One scenario for a postcarbon future is dispersed production of low-gain 
energy by small communities or even individual households. Energy would be 
captured by small, individual units scattered across the landscape. This is the 
green energy scenario that many think would be a desirable future, or even 
preferable today… Many people might prefer such a decentralized existence, 
but others would find it wrenching. It would require capital investment by each 
family or community. These investments would be largely redundant, with 
high energy-opportunity costs, and would not initially enjoy economies of 
scale.89 Living standards, as currently defined, would likely decline. (Tainter et 
al 2003, n.p.)  
While such a low-gain system would no longer be dependent on global oil supplies it 
would lose all the advantages that accrue from high-gain energy such as those 
outlined in hypotheses 7 and 12 above. The concept of high- and low-gain energy 
                                                
88 While the promise of cold fusion is immense “it is perpetually described as ‘30 years away’. No matter how much 
research is done and money is spent attempting to commercialise this "saviour" technology, it always appears to be 
stuck at least a generation away” (Hickman, 2011). 
89 As discussed in the previous chapter they would have to become generalists, rather than specialists (Wicken, 
1986). 
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thus means that the resilience or adaptive capacity of cities is inextricably tied to their 
energy sources. A goal of straightforward energy substitution, such as replacing 
hydrocarbon energy with solar technologies, cannot succeed without changing the 
nature of the complex socio-technological systems involved. At the same time it is 
highly unlikely that economic growth can be sustained at current levels without oil 
inputs (Hall & Klitgaard, 2012; Tverberg, 2012; Richardson & Mulligan, 2015; Floyd et 
al, 2014) given the lack of alternatives to oil which demonstrate similar energy gains. 
To summarise, our socio-technological systems, designed to make our complex 
urban lives possible, are on a trajectory of increasing complexity which is dependent 
upon a connected trajectory of increasing energy use. Given that this socio-
technological trend is challenged by growing energy constraints and increasing 
shortfalls on a global and local scale (Klare, 2004; Avery, 2007; Korowicz et al, 2010; 
Tverberg, 2012; Tainter & Patzek, 2012), surely the traditional approach of 
addressing these challenges through increasing complexity, itself reliant on 
increasing access to more energy, is unfeasible? 
 
The further vulnerabilities of complexity (challenges to system resilience) 
So far this thesis has concentrated on the nexus between energy use, complexity 
and declining returns and the implications for the resilience of complex adaptive 
systems. It has made an original contribution to knowledge through its synthesis of 
Tainter’s theory (1990) of declining returns, energy and collapse and Gunderson and 
Holling’s Panarchy (2002). 
However there are other aspects of complexity (in and of itself) which are problematic 
in terms of system resilience. This thesis therefore proposes a further cross-
disciplinary synthesis, drawing together a range of theoretical approaches, to 
summarise the five interrelated challenges complexity poses to the resilience of 
complex socio-technological systems: 
1. The cost of complexity and declining returns 
2. Increasing importance and yet fragility of high-gain energy supplies 
3. Path dependency  
4. The lack of diversity and thus flexibility 
5. The tendency to cascading failures  
The first two challenges have been outlined already in the discussion of Tainter’s 
work while the latter three will now be addressed in more detail. Any examples 
presented within this section are purely illustrative: it is the synthesis of theoretical 
approaches which represents a further original theoretical contribution. The empirical 
examples are provided to merely illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of key 
theoretical concepts of complexity, diversity, interconnectedness and path 
dependency. 
When these five challenges have been presented, the first outlines of the central 
image of The Wall will come into focus: the cultural orthodoxy that technology is (and 
will ever be) the solution to the problems facing contemporary societies and cities.  
 
Path dependency (‘The tyranny of sunk costs’) 
The Moving Finger writes: and, having writ, 
Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor Wit 
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line, 
Nor all thy Tears wash out a Word of it. 
Fitzgerald (trans) (1859) The Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám, Quatrain LI 
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Path dependency is the natural tendency of complex systems90 to continue (absent 
external irruptions or internal trajectories reaching a tipping point) with approaches 
which have been successful until that point (Tainter 1990; Fletcher, 1995; Feldhoff, 
2011). With regard to socio-technological systems such as cities there is a 
“decisional burden” implicit in both the ongoing maintenance of our complex systems 
(Graham & Thrift 2007, p3) and their increasing complexity in the face of challenges. 
This ‘decisional burden’ represents a form of system inertia in which the existing 
strata of past decisions and developments drives the tendency of systems to 
continue in a similar trajectory (as the Conservation stage (K) of Panarchy 
progresses). The motivations for such tendencies can comprise environmental, 
cultural/religious or political constraints, awareness of all the previous investments 
involved in producing or maintaining the status quo (‘the tyranny of sunk costs’), the 
projected economic costs of change versus stasis (and the concomitant concern with 
efficiency) or simply (as Tainter would argue) the conscious continuance of hitherto 
successful strategies (Tainter, 1990; 1996; 2000; 2006; 2011a; Janssen et al, 2002; 
Graham & Thrift. 2007). 
Path dependency can also involve the dynamic of increasing returns on investments 
and the existence of positive feedback loops or tipping points (Inayattullah, 1994; 
Gladwell, 2000; Walker & Salt, 2006; Korowicz et al, 2010; O’Riordan et al, 2013; 
Galaz et al, 2014). Random outcomes or particular innovations which offer success 
in facing current challenges are increasingly adopted by other actors or system 
elements, each incident of adoption building momentum and leading to the point 
where such adoption becomes irresistible. For Taleb (2007) this is an unavoidable 
element of emergent complexity (he labels this ‘Extremistan’) as positive feedback 
loops lead complex adaptive systems in particular directions. Bestselling novels91 
exhibit such tendencies, as word of mouth and the increasing awareness of such 
novels’ existence lead people to increasingly feel they should purchase and read the 
book in question. Passing this tipping point leads to an ever-increasing ubiquity: 
The new product then locks into positive growth cycles, until the product has 
huge advantages over other products. The VHS v Beta format for video 
recorders is one example. This was also the case with the QWERTY 
typewriter. It was designed to reduce type speed but eventually became the 
standard. As it was mass-produced, more people learned it, and thus more 
were sold and produced - until the industry became locked in. Microsoft’s 
operating system is another example. New products may or may not be better 
but if by chance a few people purchase it, it soon becomes the standard. 
(Inayattullah 1994, p691) 
In terms of energy, the oil dependency of contemporary industrial society is a result 
both of the unique and valuable properties of hydrocarbon oil and the “technological 
lock-ins” which led to oil becoming an increasingly crucial (indeed existential) 
element of industrial society (Szklo & Schaeffer 2006, p2514). 
However at some point (the tipping point) path dependency is such that any return to 
the previous condition (phase space) is either prohibitively costly/difficult or actually 
physically impossible (due to the often irreversible nature of emergent complexity 
through time) (Walker & Salt, 2006; Helbing, 2009; O’Riordan et al, 2013). 
While path dependency is here considered as one of the vulnerabilities of complex 
systems this dynamic can of course be either positive or negative in terms of system 
resilience. If it involves the uptake of a useful new technology or successful approach 
                                                
90 Whether natural systems such as ecosystems or tornadoes or socio-technological systems such as software or 
cities. 
91 50 Shades of Grey being a perfect example… 
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to a particular challenge, then it can be seen to be positive. However it can also ‘lock 
in’ both these successful innovations and less advantageous developments or 
tactics. In either case the phase space or fitness space of the complex system 
shrinks along with the range of future adaptive options. 
These differing drivers of path dependency become particularly important in Part C 
when the obstacles to any real simplification of urban socio-technological systems 
are discussed. 
 
The lack of diversity and thus flexibility 
The more prolonged the halt in some unrelieved system of order, the 
greater the crash of the dead society. 
Alfred North Whitehead (1979) Process and Reality 
The increasing connectivity that is one aspect of the growth of complexity seems to 
exist in an inverse relationship to system flexibility. In the adaptive cycle model 
outlined above the more interconnected a system becomes (as the Conservation 
stage (K) of Panarchy progresses) the greater the path dependency and the more 
constrained the fitness landscape/phase space of the system; complexity is a 
manifestation of sunk costs and thus involves disincentives to the implementation of 
other problem-solving strategies. 
At the same time the ongoing development of complexity as a problem-solving tool 
can in and of itself reduce the flexibility of our complex systems. There is a wide 
awareness across the ecological and sustainability literature that diversity (whether 
ecological, social, economic or physical) promotes resilience (Mulligan & Hill, 2001; 
Scott, 1998; Norberg et al, 2008; Walker & Salt, 2012; Biggs, et al, 2015). In terms of 
the Panarchy heuristic those systems demonstrating a level of diversity are still in the 
Exploitation stage (r) or just commencing Conservation (K) and thus they have the 
flexibility, the range of options and the energy surpluses to adapt to changing 
situations. 
However, to follow the trajectory of the Panarchy model, as complexity increases and 
more subsystems become interconnected, the phase space, the range of potential 
options facing such systems, shrinks. Thus system resilience declines as system 
potential and connectedness increase. This can seem counterintuitive, given that 
complexity can often be a promoter of resilience – one cannot argue that London for 
example is less resilient to the danger of flooding since the construction of the 
Thames Barrier. The Barrier is an example of socio-technological complexity (gained 
through the dissipation of energy) designed to address the problem of flooding in the 
Thames estuary and thus in London. It has to this date been successful at this task 
and is thus an expression of the Panarchic concept of potential through which a 
complex system can adapt to environmental stresses and challenges.  
However a complex system such as the Thames Barrier and the city it protects also 
involves (as recognised by Luhmann) a rejection of the fluidity of the environment in 
which it is situated. The Barrier involves a rejection of the unpredictability of the 
complex interactions of tides, storms and the physical environment of the Thames 
estuary, not to mention the longer-scale changes implied by human action or climate 
change. It thus represents a drive for predictability and stability which directly 
correlates to the concept of engineering resilience which will be outlined in Part B. It 
is enough to state here that this desire for predictability is thus unfortunately 
expressed through a repression of diversity and novelty which is the very definition of 
hegemonic simplification:  
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The design process, as a management of contradictions, can also apply to an 
ongoing system. Then the design criteria can include the optimizing of internal 
peace (along with productivity) over other attributes such as flexibility or 
response to challenges… it can be interpreted as an optimization of the 
management of internal contradictions at the expense of defence. (Funtowicz 
& Ravetz 1994, p573) 
The desire to ‘manage’ fluctuations and unpredictable influences leads to a loss of 
resilience, as these fluctuations are the very essence of the adaptive approach. 
Essentially these fluctuations provide the flexibility and thus adaptive capacity of such 
complex systems: 
We can speak of an ancien regime syndrome, characterized by 
underperformance in key attributes, by prohibition of diversity, and by 
prevention of novelty. The regime refuses to deal with or recognise its 
problems even when they have become obvious to everyone else. (Funtowicz 
& Ravetz 1994, p571) 
At some point there does not even need to be an unexpected disruption or 
convulsion that tips the ancien regime system into another state (which may well 
include system failure or collapse). Instead (and mirroring both Tainter’s focus on 
declining returns on complexity and the Release stage (Ω) of Panarchy) such a 
system collapses under the weight of its own existence: 
Emergent complex systems can also exhibit a more extreme version of the 
collapse of hegemony. This occurs even before the external threat is 
presented; the system simply grinds down and approaches paralysis in many 
of its functions. (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1994, p572) 
Whether the development of complexity (potential and connectedness) is 
unavoidably causally connected to a loss of flexibility or resilience remains a crucial 
question with regard to both the adaptive cycle concept and this thesis: 
The key test of the limits of the metaphor is not whether resources and 
potential increase from r to K, but whether rigidities inevitably do so as well. 
Are there designs and actions that allow growth without increasing rigidities to 
the point of collapse?  (Gunderson & Holling 2002, p40) 
Contemporary military theory provides some answers to this question, particularly the 
fields of counterinsurgency and the (contested) concept of Fourth Generation War. 
These ideas will be addressed in Part B in more detail, along with the problematic 
ethical connotations of such a conception of resilience, particularly when applied to 
cities. 
 
The tendency to cascading failures 
That's what interconnectivity is - the same f*ck-up replicated globally. 
Duncan & Knight (2010) Rake, ‘R vs Alford’, Series 2, Episode 6  
The final interrelated weakness of complexity has been identified by a number of 
theorists: an increase in the number of nodes and interconnections (by which this 
thesis defines complexity) can in and of itself be a cause of increasing fragility 
(Wahlström, 1992; Tenner, 1996; Buchanan, 2001; Graham, 2005; 2006; Homer-
Dixon, 2006; Boin & McConnell, 2007; Crutchfield, 2009; Helbing, 2009; Edwards, 
2009; Korowicz et al, 2010; Koerth-Baker, 2012; Frank et al, 2012; 2014). A complex 
socio-technological system like a multi-engine aircraft illustrates the most 
straightforward expression of this weakness: 
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Each additional engine not only increases the likelihood that the redundant 
engine will keep the plane in the air if all other engines fail but also increases 
the probability that a single engine will cause an accident, by blowing up or 
catching fire, and so destroying all the other engines. (Galaz 2012, p196) 
This can be also expressed through the common English saying ‘the more complex 
something is, the more there is to go wrong”.  
However a further complication is provided by our inability to grasp the underlying 
complexity of our own socio-technological systems in their entirety (and thus either 
identify weaknesses or manage them effectively). This is to be expected (and 
accepted) given that complex socio-technological systems such as contemporary 
cities are exemplars of emergent complexity; it is a definitional trait of such systems 
that they cannot be reductively understood in their entirety (Tenner, 1996; Frank et 
al, 2012; 2014; Wells, 2013a):  
The complexity of technological systems is emerging as a main contributor to 
the failures. The complexity makes it more difficult to design and operate the 
systems, and failures will therefore be more common. The increased costs of 
failures would require better control, but controls add to the complexity. Safety 
precautions rely on predictions of consequences of actions, but the increasing 
complexity makes such predictions more uncertain and difficult to obtain. 
(Wahlström 1992, p352) 
In the context of cities this means that any ‘absolutist’ regime of urban planning (in 
which every possible eventuality is identified and addressed) can never be achieved 
(Wahlström, 1992; Cilliers, 2002; Boin & McConnell, 2007; Crutchfield, 2009; Bunker, 
2015). 
At the same time such interconnected complex systems are susceptibile to the 
“exponential amplification of small effects” (Crutchfield 2009, p6) or cascading 
failures in which one localised failure may have unpredictable and amplified effects 
across the network(s) which are not immediately ameliorated by addressing the first 
failure (Tenner, 1996; Boin & McConnell, 2007; Guerroro et al, 2008; Edwards, 2009; 
Buldyrev et al, 2010; Korowicz et al, 2010; Tweed & Walker, 2011; Koerth-Baker, 
2012; Frank et al, 2012; 2014). Growing complexity means that interrelated system 
elements and subsystems “can innovate their own patterns which, in turn, lead to 
new fragilities. And, the patterns, having emerged and stabilized, can preclude 
mitigation” (Crutchfield 2009, p4).  
Such hidden fragilities only increase in tandem with increasing system complexity. 
Examples of such cascading effects can be found in financial markets (Crutchfield, 
2009; Helbing, 2009; Quiggin, 2010; Frank et al, 2012; 2014; Clarke, 2013), 
infectious disease epidemics (Galaz, 2012; Galaz et al, 2014), computer systems 
(Jianwei et al, 2014) and global manufacturing supply chains (OECD 2003, p77-8). 
Two specific examples of such cascading failures in contemporary complex energy 
distribution systems demonstrate such effects in the urban context. 
Example 1: UK gas supplies in March 2013 (Richardson, 2013). The failure of one 
water pump at operator Interconnector’s Bacton gas terminal on 22/3/69 led to the 
UK’s key import gas pipeline being offline for 9 hours before this particular pump was 
repaired and full flow restored (Reuters, 2013b). This disruption to a key node was 
only accentuated by unexpected wind and snow closing the Sellafield nuclear power 
plant and bringing down power lines, leaving over 1000 homes without power. It also 
came on top of disruptions in the supply of North Sea oil (Office for Budget 
Responsibility, 2013) caused by the leak and fire at Total’s Elgin North Sea Platform 
in March 2012 (the platform was offline for a year) (The Guardian, 2013) and a leak 
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at TAQA’s Cormorant Alpha oil platform in March 2013 (leading to two temporary 
shutdowns of the Brent crude pipeline system) (Reuters, 2013a). 
While this one critical system component was offline for only 9 hours, the effects 
were wide ranging (both spatially and temporally). They included the cost of gas to 
UK consumers jumping by up to 50% while national gas reserves at the time shrank 
to just 1.4 days of supply (Bawden, 2013). The financial effects included £4m in cold 
weather payments from the Department for Work and Pensions to assist the 
economically vulnerable cover heating costs in March 2013 and a .2% fall in GDP 
growth (out of a total fall of .3%) for the final quarter of 2012 which can be directly 
attributed to these disruptions in the oil and gas networks. 
Example 2: the November 4, 2006 blackout of the electrical power grid in Europe. 
This cascading system failure led to blackouts all over Europe (represented by black 
areas on Figure 8) but it was triggered by the need to temporarily disconnect one 
power line in Northern Germany (represented by *) to allow passage for one ship. 
The resultant (localised) overload situation triggered a cascading effect which 
brought down power subsystems and lines. 
 
 
Figure 8 (from: EU project IRRIIS. E. Liuf (2007) ‘Critical 
Infrastructure protection, R&D view’ in Helbing 2009, p3) 
A similar cascading blackout happened in New York and other cities on the north-
eastern seaboard of the US on August 14, 2003 which led to “economic losses 
estimated at between $700 million and $1 billion” (Bugliarello 2005, p291). 
 
There is a major difference however between socio-technological systems and 
‘natural’ ecosystems. This is the existence of intelligence and thus the interaction of 
often innumerable intelligent agents with the former complex systems. Ironically it 
appears that the presence of individual awareness and directed action only increases 
the chance of aggregated system failures, including cascading failures: 
At first blush, agent intelligence is good. It allows for increased memory and 
sophisticated strategies. The result though, is that, by anticipating each 
others’ moves, agents start to “chase” each other’s changing strategies. The 
group behavior starts to oscillate; when, in contrast, simpleminded agents 
would or could not adapt dynamically. Technically stated, dynamical systems 
consisting of adaptive agents typically do not tend to a mutually beneficial 
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global condition - they cannot find the Nash Equilibrium. The lesson is that 
dynamical instability is inherent to collectives of adaptive agents. (Crutchfield 
2009, p7) 
This has serious consequences for the resilience of the free-market (agent) model of 
system equilibrium, which will be critiqued in Part B. At this point it is enough to 
acknowledge that the choices of individual intelligent agents, based as they must be 
on insufficient information about the complex adaptive systems of which they are 
part, do not inescapably lead to optimal outcomes for the system as a whole. In 
short, the presence of human intelligence (‘human error’) makes cascading failures 
more likely. 
 
Conclusion 
While the development of complexity has been a problem-solving tactic since social 
life evolved, there is a tendency to see it as a deterministic linear progression through 
time. The loaded term ‘development’ is applicable here, but the concept of progress 
involves the imposition of a utopian teleology. That these FFE socio-technological 
systems need a regular throughput of energy to maintain themselves does not 
invalidate the happy teleology of progress – but both the concept of high- and low-
gain energy and the depletion of petrochemical resources do provide a serious 
challenge to it. At the same time Tainter’s application of diminishing returns to 
complex socio-technological systems does imply a rejection of this conception of 
progress (that the development of technology will provide solutions to all our 
problems – including those caused by that same increasing complexity). There is an 
elastic limit to such developments, and this limit is inescapably connected to energy 
supplies. With regard to the complex systems of contemporary cities at some point 
the costs (to citizens, taxpayers, the communication network etc) of the ever-
increasing complexity becomes too much and the system becomes less resilient and 
therefore more susceptible to ‘collapse’ (radical simplification) (Tainter 1990; 1992; 
1995a/b; 1996; Tainter & Patzek, 2012; Raine et al, 2006). 
This thesis therefore argues that the promotion of urban resilience must imply the 
recognition that at some point the complexity of urban systems becomes so costly in 
terms of energy inputs, and risky in terms of possible disruptions to energy supplies, 
that a simplification of these urban systems offers real possibilities in terms of 
increased resilience to disasters.  
Thus in Part B a discussion of military theories about the city, and in particular the 
decentralised/modular approach to defence known as the Hedgehog Defence (HD), 
will be introduced as a possible source of insight into ways to simplify these complex 
socio-technological systems. Following this the six characteristics of such an 
approach of urban simplification will be introduced and discussed. 
One final point to note is that increases in technological and social complexity are 
seen as driven by the need to address problems identified by specific societies but 
are only made possible by the available of energy to drive their implementation (such 
as the shift from firewood to coal in industrialising Europe (Tainter, 1990). Therefore 
the drive to complexity as a problem solving tactic is driven by social, cultural, 
economic, political, technological and geographic, as much as energy, considerations 
– rather than a form of biological determinism (Schneider & Kay, 1994a/b; Schneider 
& Sagan, 2005). In the end, societies have the ability to find a way out of this 
trajectory through shifts in political, social or cultural values away from a focus on 
increasing complexity. 
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PART B: Averting collapse through urban simplification 
 
Part B of this thesis aims to build on the discussion of emergent complexity and 
energy dissipation contained in Part A by arguing for the importance of purposeful 
action within the framework of consciously simplified and modular urban systems. 
Such an organisational form would improve urban resilience to a range of challenges 
and therefore what follows is a discussion of the dangers and likelihood of urban 
collapse that connects the above concepts with existing resilience literature and 
practice. There is already a body of literature and practice, including the field of urban 
metabolism (Niza et al, 2009; Ferrão & Fernandez, 2013; Chrysoulakis et al, 2015), 
examining cities as complex dissipative systems (Rees, 2012; Pickett et al, 2014). 
Marrying this approach with both Tainter’s work on declining energy returns and the 
Panarchy concept of adaptive cycles is a recently emerging frame for viewing urban 
resilience (Floyd et al, 2014; Pickett et al, 2014; Hassler & Kohler, 2014). However, 
this thesis provides a deeper analysis (based on the synthesis of these two 
approaches in Chapter 3) than has been so far provided.  
Chapter 4 aims to first provide a brief outline of current understandings of, and 
approaches to, urban resilience from a range of academic and professional fields. It 
is structured as a brief overview of tension between two opposing philosophical 
responses to the challenge of emergent complexity. The first is the absolutist or 
‘arrogant’ approach which Holling (1996) named engineering resilience. The Wall is a 
metaphor for particular historical and contemporary attempts to solve complex 
system problems through technological developments or bureaucratic centralism (or 
in other words hegemonic simplification). 
It then champions the alternative ‘humble’ concept of ecological resilience as it best 
addresses the challenges of complexity outlined in Chapter 3. Above all, it accepts 
that there cannot be any certainty with regard to complex adaptive systems. 
Therefore it rejects absolutist solutions to wicked problems and understands that in 
situations of emergent complexity all predictions and therefore plans must be 
provisional. 
The remainder of this chapter then acknowledges the political and ethical difficulties 
of such an approach to urban resilience with reference to some recent case studies 
of urban flooding. One particular issue is the problematic resonance between 
ecological resilience and free-market economics: the latter’s reliance on the 
emergence of order out of the disparate actions of self-interested actors is rejected. 
Instead the urban planning literature provides arguments for the importance of 
shared purpose and conscious action in the face of uncertainty and emergent 
complexity. 
Chapter 5 starts from this acceptance of the need for shared purpose and action 
within conditions of radical or emergent uncertainty and examines the attempts of 
military theory to grapple with the contradictions this implies. While acknowledging 
the problematic ethical implications of such a foray for the social sciences, this 
chapter argues that military approaches to cities can offer much to the analysis of 
urban resilience in general. Above all there is a very clear fit with ‘theories of 
collapse’ as the possibilities of urban or wider social collapse are routinely 
acknowledged in military planning while contemporary military theory has proposed 
such urban collapse as a political and thus military goal. This chapter provides a brief 
overview of historical and current military debates between the ‘arrogant’ belief in the 
ability of technology to address uncertainty and emergent complexity and an 
opposing ‘humble’ acceptance of the radical uncertainty inherent in all such complex 
systems. 
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The second part of this chapter then introduces a further original contribution of this 
thesis: proposing the military tactic of the ‘Hedgehog Defence’ (an example of the 
latter ‘humble’ approach) as a model for urban resilience. Commonly attributed to 
German forces operating on the Eastern Front in WWII, this defensive approach 
involves modular self-sufficient elements which react independently to changing 
circumstances while nonetheless sharing an overall purpose towards which such 
independent action is directed. Their simple decentralised structure forgoes the 
costly complexity involved in the hegemonic simplification of large scale and 
hierarchic systems while the redundancy implied by such a modular organisation 
addresses the fragility implied by extended networks. Finally, such a simplified 
structure is better able to respond quickly and effectively to either abrupt 
disturbances or slow changes as it possesses a wider phase space (there is less 
path dependency). Such an original approach provides a model for urban socio-
technological systems which bypasses the trend of increasing complexity while 
offering the redundancy and adaptive capacity to react to unpredictable 
environments. 
Chapter 6 completes Part B by using the concept of the Hedgehog Defence as the 
basis for six guidelines for promoting resilience in cities through an awareness of 
thermodynamics, emergent complexity and the resultant declining returns on such 
complexity. The use of the Hedgehog Defence as a conceptual framework for 
approaching urban resilience represents one of the primary theoretical contributions 
of this thesis. Implicit in these guidelines is the recognition that at some point the 
complexity of urban systems becomes so costly in terms of energy inputs, and risky 
in terms of possible disruptions to energy supplies, that a simplification of these 
urban systems offers real possibilities in terms of increased urban resilience.  
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Chapter 4: Urban resilience  
You cheer my heart, who build as if Rome would be eternal. 
Augustus Caesar to Piso, in Hoyt (1922) New 
Cyclopedia Of Practical Quotations, p. 677 
Current literature on urban resilience  
This chapter presents a brief overview of the literature on urban resilience from a 
range of perspectives including architecture and engineering, urban planning, the 
broadly defined ‘sustainability and localisation’ approaches and the fields of disaster 
management and/or recovery. It focuses on urban resilience, as opposed to 
sustainability,92 and is based upon Holling’s dichotomy of engineering versus 
ecological resilience (1996). This is not the only framework through which to 
approach urban resilience however. The implicitly political consideration of 
vulnerability (Eakin et al, 2009; Coaffee et al, 2009) is a crucial addition (this thesis 
acknowledges the concept of evolutionary resilience (Davoudi et al, 2013), but 
subsumes this into ecological resilience).93 These approaches will now be addressed 
in turn although it must be made clear that these divisions should not be overstated; 
they are broad theoretical and practical understandings of resilience which in many 
cases overlap within specific contexts/fields, policies or theoretical analyses of urban 
resilience. 
 
Engineering resilience 
This conception of resilience corresponds to the concept of adaptation (Eakin et al, 
2009) and it has also been conceptualised as specific, targeted (Alberti, 2013) or 
defensive (Parker, 2010) resilience. Whatever the terminology it is primarily 
concerned with pre-identified challenges, problematic trends or possible disasters 
and therefore “focuses on predicting and averting potential thresholds and system 
shifts” (Alberti 2013, np). Such a ‘risk management’ approach further demonstrates a 
concern with maintaining the ‘status quo’ by identifying and then implementing the 
most effective response to such predicted challenges, disasters or disruptions (Beck, 
1992; Pasman, 2015). This usually involves a trade-off between effectiveness, risk 
and cost and can presuppose a view of cities as stable or having an optimal resilient 
state which is independent. Furthermore, engineering resilience can assume that it is 
the current manifestation of any particular system, including contemporary cities, 
which must be made resilient.94 
One area which has been heavily influenced by the assumptions of optimal stability 
implicit in the engineering/adaptive resilience approach is the corporate 
resilience/contingency planning agenda (Barkham at al, 2014; Swiss Re, 2013). 
                                                
92 The following quote from Moffatt (2014) clearly explains why resilience is the more useful term: 
“The concept of sustainability often presumes a static view of the future. Although it is often expressed in 
utopian terms, sustainability is actually based upon a single slow-moving disaster scenario where humanity 
runs out of critical physical resources or overshoots the ecological carrying capacity. Learning to live within 
limits is the solution (Rees, 2009). Resilience represents a more nuanced and sophisticated view of the 
future where risk, uncertainty and surprises are the norm, and where the increasing complexity, size and 
interdependencies of the built environment produce an increasing diversity, frequency and severity of 
disaster scenarios. In this dynamic future, quality of life – even survival – may depend upon foresight, 
proactive policies, and the inherent capacity of built environments and their socio-economic systems to 
adapt and recover from change and loss” (p202) 
93 Davoudi (2012a) conceptualises evolutionary resilience as incorporating the Panarchic model of adaptive change 
and applied to social systems such as cities. This thesis accepts such a approach as valuable, but, given that it 
attempts its own synthesis of Panarchy and Tainter’s theory of collapse through declining returns on complexity, it 
instead uses the terminology of ecological resilience to refer to Holling’s original insights around Panarchy. 
94 ‘Arrogant’ military approaches to urban defence (as discussed in the next chapter) also display these assumptions 
of engineering resilience. 
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While not always specifically relating to urban resilience as such, it is in many cases 
concerned with the (often corporate-owned) infrastructures, technologies and 
resource supply chains that make contemporary cities possible. Thus there is a wide 
body of literature on planning for and managing supply chain disruptions (Nurthen, 
2003; Guerroro et al, 2008; Maliszewski & Perrings, 2011; Waters, 2011), damage to 
facilities (Nurthen, 2003; Butler, 2012) and timely decision-making under challenging 
conditions (Nurthen, 2003; Guerroro et al, 2008; Maliszewski & Perrings, 2011). 
What these have in common is the implicit understanding that ‘resilience’ means the 
ability to ‘bounce back’ from challenges or disasters with minimal disruption and cost 
and in the shortest possible time (Maliszewski & Perrings, 2011). 
The orthodox approach95 to risk assessment and management, not unreasonably 
predicated on the perceived expertise of risk management practitioners, is that the 
possibility or frequency of an event, usually calculated through reference to 
recognised precedents, is weighed against both the projected negative effects and 
the costs of implementing preventative or reactive measures (Beck, 1992; 2006; 
OECD, 2003; Waters, 2011; Cabinet Office, 2011; Dionne, 2013; Sidortsov, 2014). 
The resultant concern with efficiency96 (and thus the reduction of financial costs) 
married to a focus on bounded uncertainty means that drastic ‘Black Swan’ and/or 
‘tipping point’ challenges97 can be overlooked. The near-collapse of the global 
banking system in 2008-9 (Dionne, 2013) provides a perfect example of such 
oversights: 
“The private sector, composed of organisations that make things or provide 
services as a group, simply do not invest in avoiding system tipping points. 
The recent banking crisis has demonstrated this. Banks as global 
organisations that should have seen system failure points, did not do so.” 
(Clarke 2013, p220) 
Risk management (itself strongly driven by the assumptions of engineering 
resilience) is still an influential component of the urban disaster management field, 
particularly with regard to government policy documents or approaches. It is all but 
impossible to provide a comprehensive outline of governance approaches to urban 
resilience from around the world, least of all within the constraints of this thesis. 
Instead what follows is a small representative sample of differing contemporary 
philosophical approaches to the challenge of supporting and promoting urban 
resilience. 
There has been a recent focus among governments on the concept of national (and 
thus urban) resilience which has been seen as growing out of the heightened sense 
of urban fragility or danger since the September 11 attacks on New York and natural 
disasters such as Hurricane Katrina (Coaffee, 2009; Coaffee et al, 2009). This has 
led to a focus on Critical Infrastructure (CI) as the elements of national infrastructure 
(including food, transport, energy, IT/communications, hospitals etc) which are 
existentially crucial to the functioning of these societies (Boin & McConnell, 2007) 
and a tendency to the defensive ‘militarisation’ of urban environments98 (Graham, 
2004; Scranton, 2007; Coaffee, 2009; Coaffee et al, 2009). However, at the same 
time the traditional focus on disaster or crisis management as “as a holistic process 
involving prevention, planning, acute response, recovery and learning” (Boin & 
                                                
95 “For example, the narrow understanding of risk as “probability multiplied by severity of an adverse effect” often 
leads to the equally limited cost-benefit analysis solution… In my seven years of studying, teaching, and practicing 
environmental law and consulting on environmental issues in the United States, I have never encountered a different 
definition or model of handling risk.” (Sidortsov 2014, p172) 
96 As outlined in chapter 3 this is one of the characteristics of engineering resilience. 
97 Identified by Sidortsov (2014) and Dionne (2013) as the concept of ‘systemic risk’. 
98 Given that urban disaster management and planning was originally the province of the military and was heavily 
based on military theories and approaches this trend will be addressed more clearly in the next chapter’s discussion 
of military approaches to the city.  
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McConnell 2007, p50) is increasingly being challenged by the growing awareness of 
the dangers of complex systems such as cascading failures and the inability to 
completely understand or predict their behaviour into the future (Perrow, 1984; 
McConnell, 2007; Schlosser, 2013). These developments are an ongoing process, 
however. 
For example, in the US the most recent policy documents on Critical Infrastructure 
Resilience (CIR) (Department of Homeland Security, 2013a; 2013b) demonstrate an 
awareness of the dangers of cascading failures and recommend that any new critical 
infrastructure that is built take into account the interconnected fragilities posed by 
complex and interconnected systems. However, the overarching environment in 
which critical infrastructure resilience is situated is one of bounded uncertainty. That 
is, the strategy repeatedly calls for ever more effort (including consultation and 
technological developments) to accurately measure and predict risk – as opposed to 
demonstrating any awareness that achieving such targeted resilience is a Sisyphean 
task. Therefore the overall approach remains one of engineering resilience: the 
search for the technological or organisational Wall which can ‘solve’ these potential 
problems.  
Meanwhile, in 2011 the UK released a national policy99 on the resilience of CI to 
natural disasters (Cabinet Office, 2011). It similarly clearly acknowledges the 
vulnerabilities posed by that country’s complex and interlocking infrastructures in light 
of the 2007 and 2009 floods, the ‘Big Freeze’ of 2010 and the 2010 eruption of 
Iceland’s Eyjafjallajokull volcano. The policy describes the resilience of CI as 
comprising four elements (as outlined in Figure 9 below). 
 
Figure 9 (Cabinet Office 2011, p15) 
Resistance, Reliability and Response & Recovery are aspects of engineering 
resilience (improving both the defensive and operational capabilities of critical 
infrastructure and response planning to allow CI to continue functioning in the face of 
disruptions or be restored as soon as possible). However there is a clear awareness 
of the shortcomings of such targeted resilience approaches: 
The tendency of a reliability strategy is to focus only on the events within the 
specified range, and not events that exceed the range. This can lead to 
insufficient awareness or preparation for events outside of the range, and 
hence significant wider and prolonged impacts can occur. (Cabinet Office, 
2011, p15) 
On the other hand, the element of Redundancy clearly demonstrates aspects of 
ecological resilience as “[t]he availability of backup installations or spare capacity” 
(Cabinet Office 2011, p16) represents the adaptive capacity of such systems. It also 
involves a focus on shifting response to the lowest (localised) stakeholder scale 
possible. Finally, such redundancy directly contradicts the concern with efficiency as 
                                                
99 Based on the recommendations of the 2008 Pitt Review into the 2007 floods: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100807034701/http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/pittreview/thepittreview
.html (accessed 6/11/15)   
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it is recognised that “[t]he resilience of networks reduces when running at or near 
capacity” (Cabinet Office 2011, p16). 
To provide a final example, in Australia the latest policy on CIR, the eponymously 
named Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy (Australian Government, 2010), 
attempts to move away from the ‘predict and protect’ (targeted) model of resilience: 
…there have been enhancements to the approach and the addition of an 
important new strategic imperative, organisational resilience. A resilience 
approach to managing the risks to our critical infrastructure encourages 
organisations to develop a more organic capacity to deal with rapid onset 
shock. This is in preference to the more traditional approach of developing 
plans to deal with a finite set of scenarios, especially in the context of an 
increasingly complex environment. (Australian Government 2010, p5) 
Thus as well as the more traditional focus on planning for identified risks there is a 
clear focus on providing adaptive capacity (the Potential of Panarchy) at the level of 
specific infrastructure providers to allow them to respond effectively to unexpected 
risks. 
In a similar vein the rationalist-modernist-positivist tradition in urban planning 
(Portugali, 2012; de Roo, 2010; 2012; Wilkinson, 2012b; Davoudi. 2012b) has seen 
complex urban environments as subject to essentially linear cause-and-effect 
relationships in which sufficient planning and correct implementation can lead to 
predictable and desirable outcomes. Often such outcomes have been envisaged as 
the maintenance of cities in a positive or optimal equilibrium, or of managing 
identified trends such as population growth, urban sprawl or climate change while 
maintaining current urban realities ‘as given’ (Hollnagel, 2014; Pickett et al, 2014). 
Given such a focus on essential stability the logical corollary has been a concern with 
engineering resilience. This has meant that resilient systems (such as cities) are 
conceptualised as ones that can quickly ‘bounce back’ to this optimal equilibrium 
state (Zolli & Healy, 2012; Hollnagel, 2014; Alberti, 2013; Pickett et al, 2014). 
At the same time even where there is an acknowledgment of essential and 
inescapable uncertainty the idea that better outcomes can be planned for is still 
evident (Abbott, 2005): 
The challenge of planning for complex metropolitan regions remains how to 
develop plans that deliver a better future with more certainty  (Abbott 2005, 
p515). 
Such a view essentially rejects the emergent unpredictability of complex socio-
technological environments. This tendency has been described by van Asselt & Vos 
(2012) as the ‘‘uncertainty paradox’’: 
an umbrella term for situations in which uncertainty is present and 
acknowledged, but the role of science is framed as one of providing certainty 
(p1123). 
Another strand of thinking on urban resilience, that sits firmly within the engineering 
resilience paradigm, involves a focus on the materiality of cities. Not unsurprisingly 
connected to the fields of physical and materials engineering and architecture it is 
concerned with material, design and construction techniques for preserving physical 
infrastructure in the face of challenges such as disasters or terrorist attacks (Bosher, 
2014, OECD, 2003; Bugliarello, 2008). The value of such innovative architectural and 
engineering techniques100 is clear, and they are crucial to any implementation of the 
‘hedgehog defence’ approach which will be introduced in the next chapter. Such 
architectural or engineering elements as levees and flood barriers, earthquake-
                                                
100 Subject to the dynamic of decreasing returns on complexity, of course. 
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resilient buildings or tsunami refuges (Nakaseko et al, 2008) can all make specific 
elements or nodes of the built urban environment more resilient.101 In terms of the 
Panarchic cycle this is the system potential that exists and grows as the result of the 
dissipation of energy in the development of complexity throughout time and as such it 
is most often evident in the richer cities of the developed world where there has been 
access both to such energy reserves and the organisational capacity to utilise them. 
However the undeniable value of such techniques is scale-dependent: we cannot 
make entire cities resilient in such a manner. The most obvious issue with any desire 
to preserve a city ‘in aspic’ is that of the energy, financial and time costs involved in 
re-engineering entire urban environments; the ‘tyranny of sunk costs’ is real and 
inescapable. But at the same time such an aspiration can lead to the reification of 
cities themselves which is neither possible (as FFE thermodynamics makes clear) 
nor in many cases desirable. Should conditions of social and economic deprivation 
be preserved as a matter of course? Should components of a city that can be seen 
as unjust, unsustainable or even economically inefficient instead be changed? 
Questions such as these involve, as we shall see, the ‘messiness’ of politics and 
demonstrate the importance of the vulnerability approach. 
In the end the application of the concept of engineering resilience to cities as a whole 
is in direct conflict with the understanding of cities as far from equilibrium systems in 
which a natural equilibrium does not actually exist and any essentialist conception of 
the city is unrealistic (Pickett et al, 2014).  
 
The concept of The Wall 
I said maybe 
You're gonna be the one that saves me 
And after all 
You're my wonderwall 
Oasis (Gallagher) (1995) Wonderwall 
This is the point in the argument at which to introduce the concept of The Wall. The 
literal meaning of the word ‘wall’ is a physical (most often built) feature which 
“encloses or divides an area of land” or is “a protective or restrictive barrier”.102 
However while this meaning is clearly associated historically with cities and defence 
(as the next chapter will make clear) this thesis uses the concept of The Wall in a 
specific metaphorical and philosophical sense. 
In terms of system theory, a wall is above all a manifestation of the system boundary 
(‘enclosing or dividing an area’) as conceptualised by Luhmann through which the 
system (whether a city or a larger socio-political or spatial unit) delineates itself from 
its environment. As outlined in Part A, the central insight of FFE thermodynamics and 
systems theory is that such boundaries are only organisationally closed or 
impermeable; in all other ways they are permeable. Nestled as every such system 
inescapably is within larger scales of system or environment there must be 
exchanges of energy and waste across such boundaries. Any system that is 
completely closed must inevitably decay and die. 
Yet the conception and utilisation of walls can often be overly focussed on their 
second descriptive capacity as ‘a protective or restrictive barrier’. For purposes of this 
thesis, a different constellation of attributes is associated with the metaphor of The 
Wall. The Wall is used here as a shorthand for a philosophical and cultural approach 
to complexity and uncertainty which encompasses a range of beliefs which have 
                                                
101 Again, until the logic of declining returns or the rise of path dependency makes them counter-productive into the 
future. 
102 Oxford English Dictionary: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/wall (accessed 17/11/14). 
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been addressed already in this thesis. Used in this technical sense, The Wall 
comprises three main elements: 
1. A belief in a linear and universal Progress which is irreversible and 
encompasses an ongoing search for an absolute certainty 
2. A focus on scientific and technological advancement (through human 
ingenuity) as the expression of this Progress 
3. A faith in the ability of such Progress to address all the challenges which 
currently face, or will face, our complex socio-technological systems. 
 
There’s an app for that… 
At no time does such a worldview have to be consciously adhered to by any 
individual: this is an orthodoxy that is all the more influential for its unconscious 
ubiquity.103 This thesis takes a clearly social constructivist view of social reality, with 
Chapter 8 discussing Bourdieu’s concept (1995) of the doxa, being the practices and 
unconscious beliefs that comprise social orthodoxy, in particular. For Bourdieu, 
individuals are generally too embedded within this doxa (being both creator and 
participant) to be aware that it exists as such. At this point in the thesis (and with this 
theoretical discussion to come) it is enough to provide some examples of the often 
non-reflexive nature of our relationship with technology. 
A prime example is provided by the complex and interconnected global networks that 
supply contemporary urban dwellers with food. For most of us they are invisible: even 
the idea that providing with cities with food is a complex challenge could not be 
further from people’s minds. At most, we are conscious that wanting to eat oranges in 
Australia in winter is a problem and the availability of Californian oranges in 
Australian supermarkets is the solution (Gaballa & Abraham, 2007). The specific 
techniques of refrigeration and global logistics that make this happen are again, 
however, generally invisible. This invisibility, in turn, only strengthens the expectation 
that those Californian apples will always be available: only when they are not do we 
move beyond a hazy awareness that this is due to advances in technology (and long 
may those advances continue…)   
The contemporary digital manifestation of this techno-hubris (Homer-Dixon, 2002), 
from smartphones to social media, has been aptly labelled ‘solutionism’ (Morozov, 
2014). Ubiquitous (and thus largely invisible) digital technology is seen as the 
solution to any number of social or technological problems, from searching for 
extraterrestrial life,104 through the endless parade of apps to solve specific life 
annoyances (Shatté, 2015; Johnson, 2016), to the rise of clicktivism and/or 
slacktivism.105 
In both cases the existence of such complex socio-technological systems is largely 
taken for granted, as is the expectation that our technology will continue to address 
all the problems we may face in the future by growing ever more complex. This is the 
essence of The Wall. 
 
                                                
103 Chapter 8 discusses social constructivism in general, and Bourdieu’s concept of the doxa as a non-reflexive 
condition in which the prevailing social reality is ’self-evident’. 
104 The SETI@home distributed computing program, for example, uses individual home computers to help search for 
alien life by searching the vast amounts of data received from radio telescopes around the world for anomalous 
signals. http://setiathome.ssl.berkeley.edu/ (accessed 13/02/16) 
105 The tendency to ‘like’ and share social media campaigns and posts as a proxy for actual physical or financial 
involvement in the corresponding real world campaigns. The social media ‘campaign’ against Joseph Kony (Ugandan 
head of the Lord’s Army militia group/cult) provides the premier example of this trend (Jenkins, 2012; Haski-
Leventhal, 2012). 
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Consequences 
The philosophical and cultural worldview labelled here The Wall leads to three 
problematic misconceptions: 
1. System boundaries (as per Luhmann) can be made impermeable and 
thus the system can be preserved indefinitely (the tendency to reification) 
2. Through progress and the growth of ever-more complex technology 
(hegemonic simplification) certainty and predictability can be obtained in 
the face of unbounded uncertainty 
3. The intersection of these trends of reification and technological progress 
lead to a focus on efficiency (efficiency of function) over resilience 
(persistence of function) 
In the end the approach labelled The Wall is static, efficient and brittle – it is an all-
or-nothing approach which provides system protection right up until the 
(possible/eventual) moment when it does not. As outlined in Chapter 3 there are 
serious challenges to The Wall’s goals of certainty, absolute security, and teleological 
Progress, however culturally and philosophically seductive they may be. Given these 
shortcomings, this thesis sees ecological resilience as a more useful approach to 
urban resilience and so the discussion now turns to the advantages and 
disadvantages of such an understanding of cities. 
 
Ecological Resilience and the Vulnerability approach 
As outlined in Part A, ecological resilience accepts that emergent complex systems 
such as cities do not have an optimal state towards which they must be moved or 
within which they must be kept. Furthermore it is impossible to accurately predict 
their future states: they are subject to the unpredictable events intrinsic to 
environments of unbounded uncertainty and which Taleb (2007) labels ‘Black 
Swans’. This inescapable uncertainty undermines the more reactive adaptation or 
‘disaster management’ approach and its basis in specific, targeted or defensive 
resilience (Perrow, 1984; Schlosser, 2013). Instead the focus is on a more general 
(Carpenter et al, 2012) or strategic-offensive (Parker, 2010) resilience which is more 
holistically concerned with the overall adaptability of systems than the prediction and 
amelioration of specific possible events.  
However the uncomfortable truth about such an understanding of urban ecological 
resilience (particularly for the social sciences) is that the resilience of any system (its 
adaptive capacity) is predicated upon the possible collapse or destruction of 
particular components of that whole (Holling, 1973). As outlined in Part A, ‘adaptive 
capacity’ implies the loss of various elements to maintain overall system function and 
this dynamic also applies to cities. Thus civic or national authorities, when dealing 
with the possibility or reality of urban disasters, must often prioritise which system 
elements or geographical areas they must focus their resources upon: the discussion 
of urban flooding on pages 91-93 will address this in more detail and with regard to 
specific examples. 
It is enough to acknowledge here that this implies serious ethical dilemmas. The 
majority of people adversely affected by disasters and other disruptions, and/or those 
who are most affected, are the poor (Kahn, 2005; Beck, 1992; 2006; Fussell, 2015). 
It is for these reasons that the Vulnerability approach of Eakin et al (2009) is crucial 
as it presupposes a concern with exactly such questions of power and the distributive 
aspects of inequality. The next sections will provide first a brief overview of 
treatments of urban ecological resilience in the literature and then an 
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acknowledgement of the political/ethical (vulnerability) implications of such an 
approach. 
 
Cities and the idea of ecological resilience 
It is not surprising, given their recognised basis in ecological science (Holling, 1973; 
Pickett et al, 2014), that the broad sustainability and/or localisation/localism 
movements106 are predicated upon an understanding of human societies and cities 
as complex socio-technological systems and therefore their focus is on a broadly 
ecological resilience approach. The numerous and fragmented nature of such 
movements and their wide range of philosophical beliefs does make them hard to 
encompass or categorise. However what does unite them is firstly a broad 
understanding that current manifestations of urbanity are fundamentally fragile and/or 
unsustainable: they are, to a greater or lesser extent, concerned with urban collapse. 
Secondly there is often (if not universally) a concern with a ‘bottom up’ models of 
organisation. These two shared characteristics will now be addressed in turn. 
The understanding of contemporary urbanism as inherently fragile leads such 
movements to reject the contemporary urban status quo (and by extension any 
engineering concept of resilience which seeks to preserve the city ‘as is’) and change 
is seen as morally, ethically, economically, politically or environmentally desirable. 
However, while this general criticism is shared there are a whole range of specific 
reasons or trends given for such a pessimistic outlook on current urbanity.107 For 
example there is a shared grouping of broadly environmental concerns including the 
challenge of environmental degradation in terms of both the quality and sustainability 
of urban life (Brown, 2008; Sage, 2012; Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2013) and the more 
specific focus on climate change and its particular amplificatory effects on urban 
environments (Hopkins, 2008; Beddington, 2009; Brockhaus & Kambiré, 2009; 
Bulkeley, 2013). 
At the same time there is a broadly ‘neo-Malthusian’ understanding of contemporary 
urban life which is concerned with the depletion of (or disruption to) resource supply 
networks whether water (Brown, 2008; Beddington, 2009; Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2013; 
Floyd et al, 2014), food (Steele, 2008; Brown, 2008; Hopkins, 2008; Beddington, 
2009; Sage, 2012; Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2013) or hydrocarbons (Kunstler, 2005; 
Hopkins, 2008; Brown, 2008; Beddington, 2009; Slaughter, 2010; Korowicz et al, 
2010; Klare, 2004; 2010; Sage, 2012; Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2013; Blackburn, 2013; 
2014). 108 
In particular, criticisms of contemporary urban food systems (including concerns over 
food security, ethical food production and the negative environmental, socio-cultural 
and economic effects of industrialised food systems) have prompted a wide range of 
approaches. These include the Slow Food (Murdoch & Miele, 2004; Petrini, 2005; 
Steele, 2008) and food localisation (a concern with the concept of food miles) 
(Gaballa & Abraham, 2007; Sage, 2012; Robin, 2014; Mulligan, 2014) movements. 
Along with the growing interest in urban farming (Fox, 2011; Sage, 2012; Richardson, 
2012), these approaches seek to renegotiate the spatial and temporal relationships 
                                                
106 (Re)localisation is a more clearly left/environmental approach which suggests that “globalisation has gone too far 
and that people should seek to satisfy their needs and aspirations by turning more to the local context” (Mulligan 
2014, p280) while the more libertarian/free-market approach of Localism can be defined as “rather than attempt to 
impose one set of rules on all persons, Localism aspires to set free-market principles to work so that governments 
everywhere build the sort of legal structures desired by their populations – and no more” (Moore 2014, np). 
107 These are themselves, of course, not mutually exclusive. 
108 As discussed in Part A, the concept of Peak Oil has led to interconnected lay and academic communities 
concerned with the trend of declining hydrocarbon reserves. These range in focus from from the eschatological 
(http://www.dieoff.org/) to the academic (Association for the Study of Peak Oil: http://www.peakoil.net/) (both 
accessed 27/11/14). 
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between food, individuals and cities as a whole. At the same time the more radical 
‘dumpster diving’ (Ferrell, 2006; Edwards & Mercer, 2007) movement and food banks 
and waste food redistribution organisations (White et al, 1978; Hawkes & Webster, 
2000; FareShare et al, 2011; Lambie-Mumford, 2013)109 focus on questions of 
poverty and equitable access to food.  
Other social movements and theorists are similarly focussed on increasing socio-
economic inequality as a whole within cities and its effects in terms of social cohesion 
or personal and social wellbeing (Brown, 2008; Hopkins, 2008; Slaughter, 2010; 
Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2013). Specific concerns include housing/homelessness and urban 
sprawl (driven by the hegemony of the car): the Tiny House110 and radical squatter 
(Squatting Europe Kollective, 2014; van der Steen et al, 2014) movements and the 
concept of New Urbanism (CNU, 2000) respectively being illustrative. 
Finally, the perceived inability of governing institutions to cope with growing 
urbanisation (and the population and resource pressures it entails) (United Nations, 
2014; Buhauga & Urdal, 2013; Satterthwaite, 2007; Davis, 2004) is another reason 
given for the fragility of contemporary urban life.  
The second commonality among such movements is their focus on bottom-up rather 
than top-down solutions. Echoing Schumacher’s famous book Small is Beautiful 
(1989), many of the movements outlined above champion decentralised, localised or 
horizontal organisational structures (Petrini, 2005; Steele, 2008; Brown, 2008; Fox, 
2011; Sage, 2012; Mulligan, 2014). 
To provide two specific examples demonstrating a focus on urban fragility and 
‘bottom up’ structures: firstly the Transition Town (TT) movement (Hopkins, 2008; 
Shaw, 2012) is perhaps one of the best known of these (re)localisation approaches. 
It argues that individual towns and cities must begin to address the twin challenges of 
Peak Oil and climate change themselves at the local scale. Doing this requires a 
systems analysis of both municipal inputs (resources) and outputs and thus the 
position of any particular town within larger scale ecosystems and networks of 
energy, economic activity, finance and human interaction. Only then can a gradual 
modularisation be implemented – the increasing self-sufficiency of each local town 
and community through a conscious localisation of resource inputs and knowledge 
(Hopkins, 2008).  
At the same time, while the survivalist movements (active largely in the US) 
acknowledge both the concern with resource (energy and food) self-sufficiency and 
the small/localised community as the social ideal there are key differences with the 
approaches outlined up to this point. US survivalism is a complex social and political 
milieu which contains significant elements of white supremacism, anti-government 
libertarianism111 and Christian millenarianism (Barkun, 1989). However there are 
some shared cultural elements within the US survivalist/militia movement including a 
rejection of the multicultural and pluralist cities in favour of rural communities 
(Graham, 2011); values/traditions of individual or local self-sufficiency as an 
expression of freedom; distrust of large and centralised institutions such as 
governments or corporations; and gun ownership (Barkun, 1989; Freilich, et al, 
2001). To a significant extent, this broad and interconnected nexus of survivalist 
                                                
109 Food Not Bombs is a particularly noteworthy example of such NGO’s http://foodnotbombs.net/new_site/ (accessed 
6/11/15) 
110 The Small House Society http://smallhousesociety.net/ (accessed 10/12/14) 
111 This is often expressed in explicitly constitutional terms (small ‘sovereign’ republican farmer-citizens against the 
intrusive tyranny of the state) (Freilich, et al, 2001). However it can also be constructed in racist terms such as the 
‘Aryan race’ against the ‘Zionist Occupation Government (ZOG)’ (Barkun, 1989). Whatever the ideological 
expression, such libertarianism is closely bound up with the US gun rights movement (Freilich, et al, 2001). 
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movements diverges from the environmental/ localisation/sustainability movements 
over these cultural, religious and political values.112 
This brief overview of the broad sustainability and/or localisation/localism movements 
aims to demonstrate two common characteristics: pessimism about the fragility of 
contemporary urbanism, and the promotion of ‘bottom up’ economic, political and 
urban forms. An original contribution of this thesis is to situate these two 
characteristics within the defensive military tactic of the ‘hedgehog’. While this 
Hedgehog Defence is explained in detail in the next chapter, in brief it involves a 
decentralised and modular structure with a horizontal and localised, rather than 
vertical, organisation. 
 
Approaches to ecological resilience in the academic sustainability literature 
At this point it is important to also briefly address the treatment of resilience, whether 
urban or otherwise, in the academic literature around environmental and social 
sustainability. Many of the themes that, so far, have been examined through a ‘FFE 
thermodynamics’ or ‘Complex Adaptive System’ (CAS)’ frame are of course matters 
of concern or consideration across a range of disciplinary approaches. It is necessary 
to acknowledge these contributions and their theoretical connections with the 
framework being utilised in this thesis for two reasons. The first is to support the 
overall frame (CAS and/or FFE thermodynamics) through which urban resilience is 
being approached as there are many resonances with this ‘social sustainability’ 
literature.   
The second reason to acknowledge this broad ‘social sustainability’ literature is that it 
introduces particular social approaches to such complexity that argue for the 
usefulness of decentralised or modular organisational structures. These 
organisational concepts, and the supporting arguments behind them, are crucial to 
the Hedgehog Defence model which the next chapter will introduce. In particular, this 
Hedgehog Defence model is based on specific military ideas around decentralisation 
and/or horizontal ‘network’ organisations, and a diversity of localised responses and 
structural approaches across such networks while retaining an overall shared 
purpose or goals. This extremely brief outline therefore aims to show that the military 
theories to be outlined in the next chapter have strong resonances with this academic 
literature. 
There is a widespread focus within the broad ‘social sustainability’ literature on the 
interconnectedness of complex social and environmental systems and thus of any 
solutions to identified challenges (Mulligan & Hill, 2001; Gunderson, 2002; Walker & 
Salt, 2006; Behm, 2010; Cork, 2010a; Nixon, 2011; Broderstad & Eythórsson, 2014). 
This unwillingness to separate the social (and thus the urban) from the environment 
in which it is nested demonstrates both a rejection of exemptionalism (discussed in 
chapter 2) and the understanding of FFE thermodynamics that all complex systems 
are open (in terms of energy) with their environments. At the same time there is an 
acceptance of the non-linearity of change (tipping points) and the radical uncertainty 
of complex adaptive systems (Gunderson, 2002; Foden, 2013; Dakos & Hastings, 
2013; Lenton & Williams, 2013; Broderstad & Eythórsson, 2014; Dakos & 
Bascompte, 2014). 
To deal with such challenges the broad ‘social sustainability’ literature is strongly 
focussed on the promotion of ‘bottom up’ organisational structures (Schumacher, 
1989; Edwards, 2009; Barton et al, 2010; Hartz-Karp & Meister, 2011; Nixon, 2011; 
                                                
112 There is also a significant strand of anti-environmentalism among some groups, given that environmentalism 
(often perceived as urban and left-wing) is seen as destroying traditional rural industries/ways of life and thus cultural 
and personal identities (Freilich, et al, 2001). 
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Wells, 2013b). This shared concern reflects both the rejection of hegemonic 
simplification discussed in Part A and the structural assumptions of many of the 
social movements outlined above. A common characteristic of the literature is 
therefore the rejection of centralised hierarchic models of social governance in favour 
of polycentric (Marshall, 2010; Batty 2001) or modular (Walker & Salt, 2006; 
Edwards, 2009; Cork, 2010b) models. Another way of describing such an approach 
is subsidiarity (or devolving system responsibilities and/or agency to lowest possible 
level) (Edwards, 2009; Marshall, 2010; Nixon, 2011; UNISDR, 2012). Such ideas 
inform both the concept of a Global Parliament of Mayors through which ‘mayors 
[could] rule the world’ (Barber, 2013), and the UN’s global campaign Making Cities 
Resilient.113 The latter has a major focus on devolving the implementation of urban 
resilience with the focus on the agency of mayors, local authorities and local 
communities in making their own city more resilient (UNISDR, 2012). 
There are two reasons behind such a focus on ‘bottom up’ organisational structures. 
The first is that they increase the ‘tightness of feedback loops’ (Edwards, 2009; Cork, 
2010b) and thus the responsiveness and adaptability of such complex systems. That 
is, they can respond more quickly to disruptions or slower cycle shifts (like climate 
change) as the distance (whether temporally, physically or organisationally) between 
‘disuption’ and ‘system consequence’ is much reduced. Taleb (2012) labels such 
challenges ‘stressors’, and argues they are, above all else, a source of information. 
For Taleb, successful adaptive systems (those that are ‘Antifragile’) use the 
information provided by such stressors to react in a way which makes them better 
able to handle such challenges in the future.  
The second reason such ‘bottom up’ strategies are important is that they 
demonstrate the intrinsic value of diversity in approaches – a concept first elucidated 
in ecological science (Mulligan & Hill, 2001; Cork, 2010b; Wells, 2013b). This 
diversity allows a range of both proactive approaches, and reactive responses to 
disruptions and challenges, to be implemented. Mistakes will of course be made, but 
being localised they will not threaten the stability of the overall system. Furthermore, 
such a ‘trial and error’ approach “encourages sustained engagement and feedback to 
create learning opportunities that enhance the adaptive capacity of [complex 
adaptive systems]” (Frank et al 2014, p17360). 
The focus on ‘bottom up’ approaches is inextricably linked to an awareness of the 
importance of the knowledge and agency of relevant local stakeholders (Prugh et al, 
2000; Woodin & Lucas, 2004; Hopkins, 2008; Edwards, 2009; Barton et al, 2010; 
Nixon, 2011; Hartz-Karp & Meister, 2011; UNISDR, 2012): not only with regard to 
questions of equity and social justice (Prugh et al, 2000; Woodin & Lucas, 2004; 
Nixon, 2011) but also for the efficacy of planning processes and eventual outcomes 
given the intrinsic uncertainty inherent in any complex adaptive system (Barratt et al, 
2010; Newell et al, 2011). 
Taleb (2012, p103-4) argues that the example of Switzerland provides some 
empirical evidence for the greater stability and resilience of such decentralised and 
localised governance models. It is precisely the lack of a centralised and hierarchic 
government that has made Switzerland so stable and successful: 
It is not quite true that the Swiss do not have a government. What they do not 
have is a large central government, or what the common discourse describes 
as “the” government - what governs them is entirely bottom-up, municipal of 
sorts, regional entities called cantons, near-sovereign mini-states united in a 
confederation. There is plenty of volatility, with enmities between residents 
that stay at the level of fights over water fountains or other such uninspiring 
                                                
113 Implemented by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) in How To Make Cities More 
Resilient - A Handbook for Local Government Leaders (2012). 
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debates. This is not necessarily pleasant, since neighbors are transformed 
into busybodies - this is a dictatorship from the bottom, not from the top, but a 
dictatorship nevertheless… 
…A cluster of municipalities with charming provincial enmities, their own 
internal fights, and people out to get one another aggregates to a quite benign 
and stable state.  
Mirroring this focus on decentralised governance is the concern with resourcing such 
decentralised/polycentric structures (Marshall, 2010) through the localisation of 
resources (Woodin & Lucas, 2004; Newman, 2010), distributed infrastructure 
provision (Woodin & Lucas, 2004; Ramirez-Lovering, 2008; Newman, 2010; Newell 
et al, 2011) and the resulting redundancy of resource provision (Walker & Salt, 2006; 
Cork, 2010; Newell et al, 2011). Such redundancy involves a rejection of the tyranny 
of ‘efficiency’ (Cork, 2010b) and ‘just-in-time’ models of resource distribution 
Finally, through this literature there is an awareness of need for broad cultural 
change in terms of public awareness and acceptance of the challenges that such an 
approach to urban resilience implies (Prugh et al, 2000; Woodin & Lucas, 2004; 
Dunlop, 2010; Cork, 2010b). 
This thesis is firmly situated within such understandings of urban resilience and as 
such considers ecological resilience, particularly as encapsulated in the Panarchy 
heuristic, as the most useful resilience framework for urban contexts as a whole. 
However, it is a contention of this thesis that there are strong resonances between 
these ideas and elements of military theory. As the next chapter will demonstrate, 
such concerns with ‘bottom up’ or decentralised organisational structures, 
organisational diversity and subsidiarity are reflected in military concerns with 
adaptive decision-making and responsiveness.  
 
The challenges of applying an ecological concept of resilience to cities 
Likewise the television pictures of the Tsunami disaster brought the first law 
of world risk society into every living room, which goes: ‘catastrophic risk 
follows the poor’. 
Beck (2006), p339 
However it must be acknowledged that there are serious economic, ethical and 
political challenges in applying an ecological concept of resilience to the urban 
context due largely to its intellectual trajectory from the physical sciences (Gunderson 
& Holling, 2002). This section will briefly outline and examine these challenges. 
Davoudi (2012a) usefully outlines some crucial issues with the application of such a 
concept of resilience to any social context such as cities – issues which all 
demonstrate the importance of traditional social science concerns with power, ethics 
and identity. These challenges include: situating the intentionality of human action 
within deterministic system change; identifying the purpose or outcome of resilience; 
and the difficulty of system boundary delineation. This thesis, following Davoudi’s 
final point, stresses the importance of politics when addressing these three previous 
issues. While these interconnected challenges all mirror, to a large extent, the 
theoretical challenges outlined with in Part A, it is worth looking briefly at these issues 
again in the context of this thesis’ specific focus on cities. 
The first issue identified by Davoudi (2012a) is that the application of a concept such 
as ecological resilience (further identified by this thesis with the heuristic of 
Panarchy) can imply a reductionist/deterministic model of system change through its 
four stages with no allowance for human agency. If the theory of Panarchy is to be 
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granted any validity, then the movement of complex systems through the four stages 
must be, to some extent, deterministic which (in socio-technological systems) can 
only be at the expense of human agency. On the other hand, if human agency is to 
be recognised, then the possibility that the adaptive cycle can be reversed or even 
broken must be allowed. However it must be acknowledged that this tension between 
human agency and system change (to which this thesis adds energy dissipation in 
the maintenance of system complexity) across physical and temporal scales 
(Davidson, 2013) is clearly another example of the philosophical debate between 
agency and structure which remains an area of theoretical and political contestation. 
To provide two examples: in philosophical terms, it is encapsulated in the dichotomy 
of free will versus determinism, while, in economics, it exists in the opposition 
between the autonomous individual and the ‘greater good’ (encapsulated in larger 
structures such as class, gender or the state). This tension is therefore nothing new 
and its eventual resolution should not be expected any time soon. However, as 
discussed in chapter 3, Fletcher’s approach (1995) to the tension between social and 
biological explanations of cultural development through time demonstrates that the 
application of the Panarchic adaptive cycle to cities need not be derailed by this 
debate. Instead the potential of the built or constructed urban environment operates 
on the intermediate temporal scale between the immediacy of human sociality and 
the longer-scale constraints of the Panarchic cycle. 
Davoudi’s second criticism concerns the conflicting conceptions of resilience which 
are evident in the literature on differing elements of cities such as personal and/or 
community resilience, urban planning and the engineering of the built environment. 
One of the dangers is that the latter field’s focus on engineering resilience is 
problematic when applied to the former fields. For example Reid & Botterill (2013) 
make the important point that a focus on individual resilience invites the same 
fetishisation of the status quo outlined earlier – the sort of engineering resilience 
which concerns itself with returning as quickly as possible to the natural order of 
things. Yet it is also a natural human desire (across a range of scales from the 
personal to the institutional/governmental) to return to the ways things were after any 
disaster or disruption. In fact from the perspective of psychological resilience 
(Bonanno, 2004) this is both understandable and crucial to eventual recovery and 
thus the resonances with engineering resilience (the system returns as quickly as 
possible to the status quo after disruptions) are clear (Reid & Botterill, 2013). A 
conception of cities as permanent is, in many cultural contexts, borne out by the 
trajectory of historical development and therefore a strong precondition of human 
psychological health (Proshansky et al, 1983; Atkinson et al, 2012).114 It is, however, 
not a helpful approach to the resilience of cities in the light of slow cycle system shifts 
such as climate change which act through temporal scales far beyond that of 
electoral cycles or human lifespans (Gunderson & Holling, 2002; Moffatt, 2014). 
Davoudi’s third and fourth issues are intimately connected and have already been 
examined with regard to complexity and prefigured in the vulnerability approach to 
urban resilience. Any discussion of urban resilience inevitably raises the question of 
the resilience ‘of what’ and ‘for whom’ (the primacy of observer viewpoint) as well as 
the challenge of the boundary delineation of complex systems. Both these issues are 
again inherently political in nature, given the negative effects of poverty and 
deprivation (whether social or economic) on the resilience of communities or 
individuals. 
For example, the critical issue of the boundary delineation of systems (Reid & 
Botterill, 2013) is inescapably political in its implications. Is it the resilience of the 
individual unit (ie person, animal/plant, business) or the whole (ie society, ecosystem, 
                                                
114 Rural or nomadic societies are the obvious exception to such a generalisation. 
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economy) which is important? For Holling it is the ecosystem, rather than the 
individual lifeform (or even species) which is resilient.  The survival of both is not 
possible as the extinction of individuals or even species is often necessary for the 
ecosystem as a whole to be resilient. This all brings us back to the image of the 
natural world ‘red in tooth and claw’,115 or alternatively, Schumpeter’s concept of 
creative destruction - is the essential instability and vulnerability of various elements 
within any system integral to the overall resilience of that system? 
The political implications of such a worldview must be acknowledged. The ongoing 
survival of the economy as a whole is of little comfort to workers made redundant in a 
time of recession or structural economic change, particularly when other socio-
economic groups are determined (primarily due to the primacy of observer viewpoints 
privileged by economic or political power) to be crucial and ‘too big/important to fail’ 
(Porter & Davoudi, 2012). It is important to recall here Alexander’s critique of 
Tainter’s view of societies as problem solving systems and the contested nature of 
‘the problem’: 
when a society invests energy and resources to solve certain problems we 
are entitled to ask questions about whose interests are being served by 
addressing those particular problems as opposed to other problems. 
(Alexander 2012, p10) 
All of this means that the issue of defining the goal of resilience (what is to be made 
resilient, to what ends… and who gets to decide?) is not a technical but a political 
question (Attoh, 2011; Shaw, 2012; Porter & Davoudi, 2012; Davoudi 2012a; Cote & 
Nightingale, 2012; Vale, 2014): it is a question of power and vulnerability. 
 
Examples 
The political and economic difficulties of applying an ecological resilience framework 
in cities are demonstrated by some recent case studies of urban flooding. Given that 
concreted or asphalted areas such as roads or drainage networks do not allow water 
to drain into the water table (Pickett et al, 2014) the water has to ‘go somewhere’ and 
thus floods can be seen as somewhat analogous to the policing of illegal street 
prostitution: the saving of one area of a city from flood waters involves the ‘moving 
on’ of the water to other areas. In both cases the determination of whether the 
problem needs to be moved, and to where, is largely determined by the political and 
economic influence of the various areas/communities concerned. 
This occurred quite clearly in the 2011 Bangkok floods. The Thai capital Bangkok is 
prone to flooding, with the city situated on low-lying land near the mouth of the Chao 
Phraya River and built on islands separated by river channels and canals. The 
monsoon rains of 2011 coincided with five successive tropical storms to cause 
massive flooding along both the Mekong and Chao Phraya river basins in Thailand, 
leaving 884 people dead and millions adversely affected. The floodwaters reached 
Bangkok in October 2011 and persisted until January 2012. Certain areas of the 
capital (such as the central business districts) were protected by levees to the 
                                                
115 Of course, this line from Canto 56 of Tennyson’s poem In Memoriam A.H.H. (1849) predates Darwin, although it 
has long been used by both opponents and supporters of Darwin’s theory of natural selection. However, Tennyson 
was greatly influenced (Altholz, 1976) by Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation by Robert Chambers (1844), 
which predated Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859) by 15 years. The Vestiges clearly influenced Memoriam, in 
particular the tension between the divinely ordained plan for Creation, and the turmoil of an impersonal and amoral 
nature (Altholz, 1976). Thus: 
Are God and Nature then at strife, 
That Nature lends such evil dreams? 
So careful of the type she seems, 
So careless of the single life  (In Memoriam A.H.H. , Section LV) 
The relevant point here for Tennyson is that the individual may be sacrificed for the overall survival of the species – 
echoing the same criticism of ecological resilience made by Davoudi (2012a). 
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detriment of other, largely residential, areas of the capital (Impact Forecasting, 2012) 
although many industrial parks (and thus a significant proportion of the Thai 
economy) were adversely affected (see Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10 
(Impact Forecasting 2012, p13) 
The political nature of such ‘resilience’ to the flood waters within Bangkok was 
demonstrated very clearly by both the response of the media and the residents of 
those excluded areas who engaged in acts of civil disobedience to sabotage the 
levees (Hirunard, 2011). The argument of the Yingluck Shinawatra administration 
that protecting central Bangkok meant protecting a significant proportion of the 
nation’s GDP, and was thus in the interest of the nation as a whole, was of little direct 
comfort to those residents whose houses and business remained under water for 
weeks while the waters slowly receded. From the viewpoint of a depoliticised urban 
resilience it is perfectly logical to argue that the protected areas of Bangkok survived 
simply due to their higher levels of resilience as they had both the political and 
economic resources to survive and hosted the particular urban subsystems which 
were crucial to the resilience of the city as a whole. A depoliticised resilience agenda 
could similarly support the actions of the wealthier suburbs of New Orleans (which 
used their resources and social cohesion to organise barriers on the access roads 
into their neighbourhoods to deny egress to those attempting to flee that ruined city) 
(Eggler, 2007) or the increasing numbers of wealthy US communities retreating 
behind their privatised walls (Cashin, 2001). Such communities are extremely 
resilient individually (their primary concern) however detrimental their actions may be 
to the resilience of the city as a whole. 
The inherently political implications of ecological resilience as a model for urban 
resilience mean there is a pressing need for the ethical dimensions of such a model 
to be more widely and clearly acknowledged and discussed. According to Davoudi,  
there is a very real likelihood that the ‘resilience turn’ in urban studies will only 
support to a rapprochement with the dominant free-market focus on reducing the role 
of the state and placing the burden onto local municipalities, neighbourhoods, 
families and individuals (Davoudi, 2012a; Porter & Davoudi, 2012). That is, the very 
focus on ecological resilience can imply an ‘every (wo)man for himself’ mentality 
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where the responsibility for personal, neighbourhood/community or municipal 
resilience becomes a matter of localised responsibility. 
This ‘every man is an island’ approach is nicely exemplified by research comparing 
the role of corporate and government actors during the approach and aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina (Horwitz, 2008). The US government response to that disaster was 
a fiasco, with citizens waiting within the ruined city for days without any meaningful 
response from the Federal Emergency Management Authority (FEMA) (Block & 
Cooper, 2007). Horwitz draws the unsurprising conclusion that the responses of 
Walmart and the US Coast Guard were vastly superior to that of the US Federal 
Emergency Management Authority (FEMA). Of course the failures of FEMA are 
widely acknowledged (Burns & Thomas, 2006; Block & Cooper, 2007; Klein, 2007), 
and it is further unsurprising that Horwitz blames the failures of FEMA on the 
shortcomings of a centralised bureaucratic response to the disaster and compares 
this unfavourably to the decentralised and localised responses of the former two 
organisations. Furthermore Walmart’s excellent response in particular is attributed to 
the market discipline to which all private commercial organisations are subject. Given 
such a diagnosis, he makes four recommendations which are all focussed on the 
decentralisation and privatisation (as much as is possible) of disaster response 
(2008, p2). The smaller and more local the responders, the more attuned they will be 
to local realities and the more adaptive to rapidly changing realities – as long as they 
have the surplus/adaptive capacity to do so successfully.  
The ‘survival of the fittest’ connotations of urban ecological resilience are also evident 
to some extent in progressive models of localised social and economic change such 
as the Transition Towns (TT) movement. Chatterton & Cutler’s critique (2008) 
identifies a crucial assumption of the TT model, which is that the participating 
municipalities have a level of agency and resource availability to make themselves 
resilient. That is, successful Transition towns can, to a large extent, develop their 
own self-reliance without assistance from larger scales of organisation (state, 
national or extra-national). This is a problematic assumption if the TT movement has 
any pretensions to be a universal solution to the poor resilience of regional towns in 
the countries in which it is active. The concern of the Transition Towns movement 
with promoting the resilience of local communities in the face of climate change and 
Peak Oil must be commended – but what happens to the communities which cannot 
demonstrate such agency? Is a localised model of simplicity like TT globalyy relevant 
without broader change at larger scales of social and spatial organisation (Kallis 
2015)? Therefore, what becomes the role of the state in such a model – should it 
therefore simply retreat from such service provision (‘every man for himself’ again) or 
should it centrally distribute resources to less advantaged communities? What should 
therefore be the purpose of national taxation? What of the political challenges 
involved in all such changes? Chatterton & Cutler (2008) are correct in arguing that 
such questions undermine the implied TT focus on individual/local change 
In a similar vein the increasing popularity of farmers’ markets, food localisation and 
the slow food/whole food movements discussed earlier cannot mask the problematic 
socio-economic assumptions underlying them. Such movements are promoted as a 
solution to the environmental and social costs of industrialised food, including the 
issue of ‘food miles’, yet such localised food is more expensive than that provided by 
the mainstream food production and distribution industries116 and is often situated 
squarely in higher socio-economic areas. This means such environmentally ethical 
                                                
116 In terms of energy and time, rather than purely financial, costs. Thus while it is almost certainly financially cheaper 
(not to mention healthier) to grow your own vegetables rather than purchase industrialised equivalents from a 
supermarket this presupposes you have both the land/space and time to be able to do this. Without access to these 
resources you must purchase such locally produced or organic food and this can entail a higher financial cost than 
mass-produced supermarket food. This discussed in more detail in the next section entitled The energy costs of a 
localisation agenda: the issue of generalists vs specialists once again (p95-97). 
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food does nothing to alleviate the phenomenon of ‘food deserts’ (Banwell et al, 2006; 
Dixon et al, 2007; Winne, 2009; Burns, 2014): poorer socio-economic areas with little 
or no access to nutritious food.117 
Urban farming likewise has been identified (in a range of countries) as problematic 
with regard to the class and racial divisions around who farms - and for whom 
(Banwell et al, 2006; Passidomo, 2014; Burns, 2014). For example, in Atlanta a 
number of urban farms are located in the poorer areas of the city (due to lower land 
values) - yet the food grown at such farms is primarily sold at farmers’ markets 
located back in the more affluent areas of the city (Burns, 2014). It is therefore 
perhaps not surprising that for some residents of these poorer suburbs the urban 
farms are a middle class, neo-colonial118 imposition from which they gain no 
advantage. Even when urban farming is widely seen as socially and environmentally 
positive, the important role of governments and municipalities in supporting such 
local initiatives is acknowledged (Rose, 2014). 
In the end such radically localised approaches are both laudable and valuable, in that 
they can reduce the overall energy and environmental costs of certain contemporary 
urban systems such as food production and distribution. Their common ‘bottom-up’ 
approach critiques and rejects the complexity which, through the dissipation of high-
grade hydrocarbons, makes the hegemonic simplification of our cities possible. 
Instead they focus on the fostering or promotion of diversity which is in turn (as 
outlined in Chapter 3) a source of urban resilience (Mulligan & Hill, 2001; Norberg et 
al, 2008; Walker & Salt, 2012; Biggs, et al, 2015). 
However, such movements, while offering potential for the ecological resilience of the 
overall city, only demonstrate that such an approach to resilience cannot be universal 
- they do not support claims that resilience can be increased across all the socio-
economic or spatial gradients within any complex urban environment at any one time. 
This therefore implies ethical and political questions around whose resilience they 
are supporting or promoting - questions which the next section will address. 
 
The energy costs of a localisation agenda: the issue of generalists vs specialists 
once again 
This thesis makes an original contribution to debates over the political and ethical 
issues outlined above by examining them through a thermodynamic frame. Such an 
approach, in particular Wicken’s (1986) discussion of generalists and specialists, 
allows for a clearer outline of the ethical challenges facing the urban ecological 
resilience (as exemplified by decentralised and ‘bottom-up’ movements such as 
Transition Towns). This is because FFE thermodynamics, and the interplay of 
generalists and specialists within complex systems like cities, demonstrates exactly 
why there is a need for assistance from higher scales of organisation (most 
commonly higher tiers of government) in any attempt to (paradoxically) create a 
decentralised and/or localised organisational model. This claim will now be examined 
in detail. 
Radical movements to decentralise the systems of urban life, like Transition Towns 
or Slow Food, attempt to undermine the systems of hegemonic simplification and 
allow for a diversity of local approaches to flourish. The uncomfortable truth, 
however, is that such hegemonic simplification has also provided both the economies 
of scale and the socio-technological systems which deliver the essentials of life at a 
                                                
117 It has also been criticised on environmental grounds as the food at famer’s markets in affluent inner-city areas 
often involves a small quantity per vehicle which is often driven a great distance (Banwell et al, 2006). 
118 The residents of the poorer areas are predominately black, while those running the farms and purchasing the 
produce are more likely to be white (Burns, 2014). 
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greatly reduced individual cost. This means that there are socio-economic 
implications to dismantling these systems. To continue with food as an example: it is 
the highly complex, industrialised and global production and distribution of food which 
provides the regular and cheap supplies that allow contemporary urban 
conglomerations (and the poor within them) to survive. Such systems are incredibly 
efficient119 at providing great numbers of non-farmers with a diverse diet at the lowest 
individual cost (Reader, 2004; Steele, 2008). 
It needs to be stated strongly here that at no point are the immense environmental 
and social costs of such food excused, or its negative impacts on communities or 
health. The purchasing cost of such industrialised food, based on hydrocarbon 
consumption and ignoring such environmental or social externalities, is artificially 
cheap. The true costs are not passed on to the consumer: this is both their 
advantage and disadvantage. Asking or expecting the poor to forgo such sources of 
food through some form of voluntary simplification, absent subsidies or other 
governmental assistance, is not a straightforward proposal.  
To rephrase this in the language introduced in Part A, radical localisation and 
sustainability movements ask participants to become, at least to some extent, 
generalists who must (also to some extent) forgo the energy subsidies hitherto 
provided by these complex urban systems. Such approaches prioritise resilience 
(persistence of function) over efficiency. While this is possible (and often emotionally 
satisfying) for those who have the resources (whether financial, energy or time), skills 
and location to participate in such programs of localisation (growing their own food, 
building their own house or using public transport or a bicycle as their primary mode 
of intra-urban transport) those who lack these advantages are unable to participate. 
In terms of FFE thermodynamics, a program of simplification and localisation 
involves increased energy costs at lower levels in the scalar hierarchy to provide the 
services originally provided by large-scale socio-technological systems and these 
increasingly must be borne by local communities, families or individuals. This 
becomes extremely problematic if these radical ‘bottom up’ movements promote 
themselves as comprehensive solutions to the urban problems they have identified. 
Even more problematic is a belief that simplifying foundational elements of 
industrialised urban life, such as food production and distribution or housing, will 
necessarily leave the rest of the contemporary urban lifestyle unscathed. This is of 
course recognised by many of those suggesting such a change (indeed for many 
authors120 such a change in lifestyles is the point). Yet others (Kunstler, 2005; 
Quilley, 2011) are less optimistic about the social effects of a widespread 
simplification of contemporary industrialised life. If nothing else, the massive increase 
in the population working in agriculture, and the loss of globalised trade and 
communications that would result from a sudden and widespread collapse of socio-
technological complexity, could pose an existential challenge to liberal and/or 
Enlightenment values. Can we sustain ‘liberalism in one village’ in the face of 
massive reductions in energy use? (Quilley, 2011). What might the social effects of 
even a more localised or partial simplification? In any event, while this thesis mirrors 
much collapse literature in attempting to prevent such a unplanned and apocalyptic 
collapse in socio-technological complexity, the clear connection between energy use 
(and the resultant complexity) and lifestyles cannot be ignored. A comprehensively 
simplified lifestyle will always involve falling standards of living for the great majority 
of people – the reality of hard agricultural labour for a hugely increased segment of 
the population will no doubt result in reactions ranging from disbelief and grief to 
anger and violence (and the strong probability of illiberal modes of political 
organisation). 
                                                
119 They prioritise efficiency of function over resilience of function… 
120 See Alexander (2009; 2013; 2015) and Greer (2008; 2013). 
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All of this means that the most important consideration when attempting to apply a 
resilience frame to urban environments in the face of disasters, war or slow-cycle 
disruptions such as climate change is to acknowledge that the questions of power, 
vulnerability, equity and participation (let alone the dynamic of energy dissipation and 
complexity) are not somehow subsumed or transcended. Public debate is crucial to 
establish some consensus as to what may or may not be lost as part of the adaptive 
cycle (Barratt et al, 2010; Wilkinson, 2012a) and thus politics and the essential 
‘messiness’ of human desires and agency must remain part of the ‘resilience turn’ in 
urban planning (Vale, 2014). With this is mind, the next section will therefore provide 
a more detailed rejection of the de-politicised urban resilience implied by free-market 
economics: an economic approach which rejects, or at the least devalues, the sort of 
political engagement just discussed. 
 
Urban systems resilience and the concept of self-correcting markets 
One common criticism of the ‘resilience turn’ in urban sustainability relates to its 
perceived resonance with the concept of the free self-balancing market. This has led 
critics to argue that the former merely opens the door to a general free-market 
doctrine which has clear social implications including the de-privileging of politics 
(acknowledged in the previous section) in favour of the invisible hand of the market 
(Porter & Davoudi, 2012; Reid, 2012; Welsh, 2014). 
This thesis acknowledges that the concept of the free market has certain qualitative 
characteristics that mirror those of ecological resilience, and these will be explored in 
detail in this section. While this section does not propose either an exhaustive study 
or a definitive critique of these economic ideas, an engagement with them is a 
necessary task given these clear resonances with the concept of ecological 
resilience. In particular, there are similarities with the military tactic of the ‘Hedgehog 
Defence’ which will be proposed in the next chapter as a model for urban (ecological) 
resilience. To briefly foreshadow: the Hedgehog Defence is a horizontal network 
model of organisation without any centralised or hierarchic control. In that sense it is 
at least superficially similar to the free-market model. 
However, the argument that ‘the market’ could already provide the kind of 
decentralised resilience being advocated here is strongly rejected. This is due to the 
ethical questions of power and poverty, and the need for political debate around 
these, encapsulated in the Vulnerability approach to resilience. As the discussion 
which follows will demonstrate, the rejection of any centralised organisation in favour 
of aggregated individual self-interest results in logical and ethical shortcomings which 
this thesis cannot overlook. 
To briefly outline the similarities between free-market economics and ecological 
resilience: it is clear that there is a shared awareness in both ecological resilience 
and free-market economic theory121 of the difficulties inherent to both planning and 
action in environments of emergent complexity. For both approaches, any planned 
interventions (in complex adaptive systems such as ecosystems or markets) have 
extended and often unintended consequences beyond their immediate effect. For 
free-market approaches the answer is therefore to reject any such intervention and 
                                                
121 A term which is used to denote a wide range of classifications of economic theory including free-market 
(liberalism) (Quiggin, 2010; Berry, 2014), Friedmanite (liberalism) (Munck, 2005), Thatcherism (Berry, 2014), market 
fundamentalism (Colander & Kupers, 2014; Berry, 2014), the Chicago School (Quiggin, 2010; Klein, 2007), 
‘freshwater’ (Krugman, 2009; Quiggin, 2010), neoclassicism (Krugman, 2009; Quiggin, 2010; Taleb, 2007; Shutt, 
2005), economic rationalism (Berry, 2014), monetarism (Shutt, 2005), neoliberalism (Berry, 2014; Munck, 2005; 
Shutt, 2005; Steger & Roy, 2009; Patel, 2009) or simply ‘conventional theory’ (Ormerod, 1999). There are of course 
differences between these labels, whether theoretical, contextual (in terms of how and in which fields they have been 
acknowledged or applied) or geographical (in the sense of where in the world such labels have been used), and this 
term implies a level of (acknowledged) simplification. 
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rely on the market alone: markets are seen as self-correcting and thus resilient 
(finding equilibrium) providing external (usually government) intervention is kept to 
the barest minimum. They are further seen (Horwitz, 2008) as more quickly and 
effectively responsive, through ’the wisdom of crowds’ (Surowiecki, 2005), than 
sclerotic bureaucracies and hierarchic government departments to the changing 
dynamics of a complex and unpredictable world. 
Furthermore, the self-balancing nature of such markets is predicated on the 
necessity of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. Thus the failure of individual companies (or other 
markets actors such as individuals, countries or cities) can be seen in clearly 
Schumpeterian terms as being for the ‘greater good’: ‘creative destruction’ 
(Schumpeter, 1976) weeds out the weaker or less efficient elements and allows for 
new adaptive growth. This regenerates the overall market/economy and over time 
makes it more resilient to changing circumstances. While the resonances with 
ecological resilience are clear, above all the understanding that overall system 
resilience is only possible through the loss of smaller elements or subsystems, the 
political and ethical implications are profound. Why protect the weaker social 
elements of a complex system like a city if a) this only subsidises unproductive or 
fragile elements that negatively affect overall system resilience or b) their failure will 
make the overall city more resilient? Such a mindset is directly counter to the 
Vulnerability approach’s122 concern with inequality, poverty and power. 
Of course, there is an immense body of literature (from both Marxist and Social 
Democratic viewpoints) criticising the social and political consequences of orthodox 
economics on ethical or human rights grounds (Klein, 2002; 2007; Clarke, 2005; 
Shutt, 2005; Munck, 2005; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009; Harvey, 2010; Rudd, 2010; 
Standing, 2011; Callahan, 2012; Oxfam International, 2014). Although these 
critiques are beyond the scope of this thesis, it is content to acknowledge them as 
both insightful and necessary. Nonetheless, simply acknowledging these ethical 
concerns does not address the apparent and significant overlap between free-market 
models of social organisation and the characteristics of ecological resilience. 
However, the focus of this thesis on non-equilibrium thermodynamics in complex 
adaptive systems (CAS) does provide a way of addressing these concerns. The next 
section will therefore provide a brief outline of the social and political implications of 
free-market economics before moving on to the fundamental incompatibility of these 
ideas with an ecological resilience approach.123 
 
Self-correcting markets as a model for urban system complexity 
The smooth working of this great distributive machine is due to the principle of 
competition, which so nicely adjusts all the various conditions of life, and which, 
in serving itself, does the best possible service to the community at large, and 
accomplishes more than the cleverest system of centralisation which any 
individual mind could devise.  
Anon, The Quarterly Review (1854) (quoted in Reader 2004, p132). 
This section aims to briefly outline the characteristics of the free-market model of 
economic (and social) organisation before moving on to the criticisms of this concept. 
It must begin by acknowledging that the economic concept of self-correcting markets 
is another manifestation of historical attempts to address emergent complexity in 
                                                
122 Discussed on pages 84 and 85. 
123 This thesis makes no pretension to address in any detail the large and diverse body of economic literature around 
these debates over market equilibrium, instead relying on the excellent critical overviews provided by Quiggin (2010), 
Ormerod (1997; 1999), Berry (2014), Munck (2005) and Clark (2005) as well as critiques from outside the field of 
economic theory (Taleb, 2007; 2012; Gunaratne, 2008; Gunderson & Holling, 2002; Holling, 1973). 
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adaptive systems. Behind the longstanding dichotomy of Market vs State are the 
same concerns with bounded and unbounded uncertainty, and the challenges of 
planning and action in environments of complexity, outlined in the earlier parts of this 
chapter. Historically, the idea of the free market has had important consequences for 
the management of complex social, political and technological systems like cities and 
these will also be briefly acknowledged.   
Although the concept of self-correcting markets is evident in Mandeville’s The Fable 
of the Bees (1988), Adam Smith (2008) was the first to clearly articulate this as a 
theory of emergent complexity in markets. A view of markets as self-correcting has 
clear social implications in terms of an identified compact between free Individuals 
and a (generally coercive) State which have then been explored through a libertarian 
literature which can be traced from Mandeville (1988) and Smith (2008) through von 
Mises,124 Hayek (1944; 2008) and the anarcho-capitalism of Rothbard (1970) to 
Friedman (1962), Nozick (1974) and, in contemporary terms, Casey (2012) and 
Huemer (2013). Central to this tradition is a view of government action (and 
collectivist political action more generally) as a distortion of both markets and 
individual freedom which creates more problems than it solves. Therefore individual 
freedom is held up as the logical counterpoint to the fundamentally and inevitably 
coercive (and incompetent) nature of the state (Byrne, 2012).125 
In terms of cities and the lived urban experience, this has implied a ‘hands-off’ 
treatment of cities as emergent systems that are best left to the unrestrained and 
rational individual choices of their residents. While such a ‘hands-off’ approach has 
most obviously been applied to the purely economic development of cities (De Long 
& Schleifer, 1993), it has also been applied to other elements of the urban 
experience. For example, the issue of food and the provisioning of large and growing 
cities is one area in which the benefits of the market have been particularly praised. 
In large cities the immense inflows of food and the equally immense outflows of both 
human and materials waste are a perfect example of the never-ending necessity of 
thermodynamic energy dissipation to maintain complex systems. At the same time, 
however, the food consumed in wealthy contemporary cities is incredibly diverse, 
available 24/7 and delivered according to the dictates of efficiency (‘just-in-time’ 
supply chains reduce storage overheads and maximise profit) (Reader, 2004; Steele, 
2008; Edwards, 2009; Korowicz et al, 2010). The fact is that contemporary urban 
food systems are generally organised according to the dictates of the free-market 
with only minimal interference from governments (Steele, 2008; Brown, 2008; 
Reader, 2004). 
There are many other examples, however, where self-organising markets are seen 
as the optimal method for the organisation, development and maintenance of the 
complex socio-technological systems which make cities possible. To provide specific 
examples from the Australian context: there is criticism of urban planning (as both a 
process and a profession) in terms of its pernicious effect on housing prices and 
availability (Moran, 2006a/b; Moran & Nahan, 2006). Moran in particular has argued 
(2006a/b) that attempts to prevent urban sprawl in the city of Melbourne through the 
imposition of growth boundaries (beyond which the city cannot grow)126 have only 
restricted individual freedom and choice and led to a shortage of new housing 
developments. There is also an Australian history of public transport privatisation 
                                                
124 von Mises makes the point explicitly: “The question is: whose planning? Should each member of society plan for 
himself or should the paternal government alone plan for all? The issue is not automatism versus conscious action; it 
is spontaneous action of each individual versus the exclusive action of the government. It is freedom versus 
government omnipotence.” (1974, p45) 
125 Hayek’s jeremiad against ‘planners’ in the Road to Serfdom (1944) provides a clear and famous example of such 
a view. 
126 A growth boundary for Melbourne was set forth in the Melbourne 2030 plan (Department of Infrastructure 2002, 
p60-62).  
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proceeding in tandem with a valorisation of the car (and thus freeways) as a symbol 
of individual freedom and choice (Davison, 2004; Allsop, 2007; Mees, 2010). Thus 
any attempt to replace suburban car use with public transport, for example, is “a futile 
exercise in social engineering” (Allsop 2007, p22) while “[t]he problem from which 
public transport has suffered for decades is lack of exposure to market forces” 
(Allsop 2007, p22). 
Similarly market-based approaches (in particular the privatisation of formerly state-
owned utilities and services) are seen as the solution to a range of possible urban 
problems (Berry, 2014). One example of particular relevance to this thesis is the 
reliance on the market to address the possible fragility of Australia’s liquid fuel 
supplies as local production declines. A report by industry group the Australian 
Institute of Petroleum (AIP, 2013) argues that:  
Fundamentally, Australia will continue to be able to access crude oil to meet 
its refining needs, as well as imported petroleum products for customers, as 
long as we support efficient and open global markets and pay prevailing 
market prices for crude oil and petroleum products. (p3)127 
Finally a belief in the discipline of the market leads to the privatisation of publicly-
owned urban infrastructure and service providers such as electricity and public 
transport. The argument is that, while entrepreneurial market actors will be more 
efficient and responsive to customers, leading to lower costs, they are also able to 
quickly exploit opportunities arising from market failures, shortages and unforeseen 
exigencies and are thus more resilient (Quiggin, 2010; Berry, 2014). 
 
Criticisms of self-correcting markets as a model for urban resilience 
Economics is a science of thinking in terms of models joined to the art of 
choosing models which are relevant to the contemporary world. It is 
compelled to be this, because, unlike the typical natural science, the material 
to which it is applied is, in too many respects, not homogeneous through time.  
Keynes, J. Letter to Harrod, R. 4 July 1938 
There is a long history of criticisms of the concept of a self-correcting market 
equilibrium from both the Marxist (Harvey, 2010; Kotz, 2009; Shutt, 2005) and 
Keynesian (Keynes, 1921; 1936; Minsky, 1992; Quiggin, 2010) traditions. While 
much of the above analysis is informed by an understanding of the inherent 
unpredictability and instability of markets, there is also criticism that such a system of 
production and distribution generates consequences that are unjust, inequitable and 
profoundly anti-democratic (Klein, 2002; 2007; Munck, 2005; Simon, 2005; Wilkinson 
& Pickett, 2009; Quiggin, 2010; Reid, 2012; Oxfam International, 2014).  
However, more importantly, there is also a strand of ecological economic thought 
which criticises the concept of the self-correcting market. It not only does so through 
the prism of ethics and ungraspable complexity (mirroring the Marxist and Keynesian 
critiques listed above), but also through an awareness of thermodynamics: the 
constraints of temporality and resource limits (Georgescu-Roegen, 1970; 1977; 
Meadows et al, 1972; Pearce, 1985; 1998; Brown et al, 2011; Daly, 1974; Faucheux 
& Froger, 1995; Faucheux et al, 1995; Vercelli, 1998).  
Chapter 2 has already outlined the clearest criticism of free-market economics by 
ecological economists, which is of course their identification of a limit to growth due 
                                                
127 This complacency, however, is strongly criticised by two recent reports into Australia’s fuel supply vulnerability 
(Blackburn, 2013; 2014) and this criticism will be acknowledged on p102-103. 
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to resource depletion. However, there are a further four specific criticisms of the free-
market approach to social complexity and these will be addressed below. 
The first criticism is that any naive concept of equilibrium (as a state to which any 
particular market may actually trend) is challenged by the understanding of complex 
systems as existing in continuous flux in a state far-from equilibrium. A more ‘humble’ 
understanding of markets as beyond mathematical calculation128 was lost in the 
‘mathematical turn’ that economics took as part of the field’s pretensions to be 
considered a science (Hayek, 2008; Perelman, 2006; Davies, 2004; Taleb, 2007; 
Ormerod, 1997). Thus economics drifted from a ‘humble’ to an ‘arrogant’ systems 
theory (or at the least to one with pretensions to such arrogance) due largely to a 
search for an equilibrium (relevant only to closed systems) that has been largely 
superseded in the physical sciences (Davies, 2004). Thus, Taleb (2007) can discuss 
the work of the Nobel laureate Robert Merton as an example of extremely ‘arrogant’ 
systems theory which aims to render the operation of markets predictable, starting 
“from rigidly Platonic assumptions, completely unrealistic… the math (sic) is tight and 
elegant… The beastly word equilibrium is always present…” (p282). 
Such theoretical frameworks display elements of pure ‘scientism’: the belief 
(characteristic of the hard sciences) that the interrelated complexity of the natural 
world, human societies and individual realities can be neatly captured in 
straightforward mathematical or physical laws. The search for the ‘Theory of 
Everything’ (Duff, 2011), for example, clearly demonstrates such an approach. A side 
effect (or primary purpose, according to Perelman (2006, p23-24)) of such ‘scientism’ 
has been the jettisoning of the clearly ‘political’ element of ‘political economy’; the 
messy unpredictability of human nature and system complexity have been subsumed 
into the rigid ‘Platonic’ beauty of mathematical formula (Davies, 2004). The 
consequence has been the downplaying of traditional social science concerns with 
human subjectivity. However this theoretical arrogance is challenged within the 
economics field by both the traditional Keynesian perspective (Quiggin, 2010) and 
the insights of systems theory as they become more widely accepted (Ormerod, 
1997; 1999; 2012; Davies, 2004; Quiggin, 2010; Colander & Kupers, 2014). 
Beyond these points are further criticisms that a free-market faith in the rational 
decision-making of economic actors based on the assumption of perfect knowledge, 
is simply untenable (Shackle, 1972; Vercelli, 1998). Three specific conditions of 
rationality, uncertainty (the impossibility of perfect knowledge) and irreversibility 
(Vercelli, 1998) together undermine the primacy of rational individual choice in 
achievement of optimal outcomes through unimpeded markets. 
Therefore the second criticism is that hard (as opposed to soft) uncertainty 
undermines any basis for substantively rational calculation on the part of market 
actors. ‘Substantive rationality’ has been defined by Simon (1976) as informing 
behaviour which is “appropriate to the achievement of given goals within the limits 
imposed by given conditions and constraints” (p66). This understanding of rationality 
is context specific, particularly so with regard to randomness or uncertainty. The 
dichotomy of hard vs soft uncertainty, acknowledged by both Keynes (1921) and 
Hayek (1988; 2008), is not the same as that of weak/strong emergence as neither 
form of uncertainty presupposes the deus ex machina of strong emergence. Instead 
in terms of economics soft uncertainty describes the bounded randomness inherent 
in games of chance (Taleb, 2007; Vercelli, 1998) through which players can compute 
                                                
128 Hayek is explicitly criticial of the ‘mathematical turn’: “It has led to the illusion, however, that we can use this 
technique for the determination and prediction of the numerical values of those magnitudes; and this has led to a vain 
search for quantitative or numerical constants. This happened in spite of the fact that the modern founders of 
mathematical economics had no such illusions… the mathematical price, depended on so many particular 
circumstances that it could never be known to man but was known only to God. I sometimes wish that our 
mathematical economists would take this to heart.” (Hayek 2008, p41-2) 
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the probabilities of outcomes and then rationally decide on courses of action. Hard 
uncertainty however is qualitatively different. It implies a radical inability (whatever 
the rationality of market actors) to predict the future outcome of current actions or 
events due to the prevalence of Stewart & Cohen’s ‘ant country’ (1997) of complex 
and unidentifiable causation (Shackle, 1972; Vercelli, 1998; Faucheux & Froger, 
1995; Faucheux et al, 1995; Kyriakou, 2002; Taleb, 2007; Ball, 2012). Such hard 
uncertainty acknowledges that neither current conditions nor cause and effect cannot 
be clearly calibrated in complex evolutionary/adaptive systems and thus the concept 
of perfect knowledge as the basis for substantively rational individual decision-
making is similarly untenable (Shackle, 1972; Vercelli, 1998; Faucheux & Froger, 
1995; Faucheux et al, 1995; Ormerod, 1999). Once again the connections with both 
Buddhist and classical Chinese philosophy (Macy, 1976; 1991; Gunaratne, 2008; 
Kang, 2009) are no accident; this will be addressed more fully through a discussion 
of Sun Tzu’s Art of War (2007) in particular in the next chapter. 
Third, the concept of irreversibility acknowledges the nature of energy dissipation and 
the forms of resulting complexity as encapsulated in the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics. That is, Eddington’s arrow of time exists and choices can neither 
be unmade or made independent of those that have preceded them (“The Moving 
finger writes…”). Future decisions or choices are constrained by the path 
dependency of past ones (Ormerod, 1999). In purely thermodynamic terms: “[I]n the 
very long run it implies a gradual reduction of the set of productive options due to the 
progressive degradation of energy” (Vercelli 1998, p264). This tendency of system 
phase spaces to shrink is reflected in the Panarchic cycle (the Consolidation stage) 
and leads, not to equilibrium, but to an eventual and inescapable tipping point and 
collapse in system complexity.129  
The final (and most important) criticism of free-market economics is encapsulated by 
the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem, which undermines assumptions that 
individual behaviour (whether rational or not) cannot be logically considered as 
predictive of aggregate behaviour: 
SMD theory means that assumptions guaranteeing good behavior at the 
microeconomic level do not carry over to the aggregate level or to qualitative 
features of the equilibrium (Rizvi 2006, p230). 
There is therefore no automatic or universal causal relationship between individual 
action and social (aggregated) outcomes (Rizvi 2006; Quiggin, 2010). A similar point 
is made by Ormerod (1999) with regard to the overall outcome of aggregated 
decisions taken by individual ants – the logical flaw remains the same. In terms of 
emergence in complex systems, outcomes are at the least unpredictable and 
aggregated self-interest provides no universal empirical basis for predicting (or 
justifying) large-scale decisions. It neither overrules nor discounts the importance of 
unpredictable or emergent environmental130 factors which may radically shift complex 
emergent systems into new phase spaces. In this sense the ‘Invisible hand’ of the 
market is the hand of a blind idiot God; innumerable unconstrained transactions 
motivated by self-interest may well trend towards a stasis far-from-equilibrium for 
some unpredictable period of time. However in a complex adaptive universe the 
belief (faith?) in the inevitable movement of this complex system towards some 
optimal point (some equilibrium however defined) is indefensible. 
                                                
129 The resonances with Schumpeter’s concept (1976) of ‘creative destruction’ and its Marxist intellectual heritage are 
no accident – the adoption of the concept in free-market theories jettisons the original Marxist understanding of the 
possibility of complete economic collapse to instead see it as a mechanism of system resilience (a Darwinian 
competition leading to individual failure or loss but overall market/economy resilience).
 
130 Used here in the broader sense (as per Luhmann) of ‘that which is outside the boundaries of the system’ rather 
than the strictly environmental/ecological sense – although trends such as climate change would certainly constitute 
a significant element of that. 
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None of these criticisms invalidates Hayek’s criticism of the ‘fatal conceit’ of 
rationalist planning in the face of the hard uncertainty and ungraspable complexity 
outlined above. His rejection of the totalising simplification implicit in a central planner 
assuming that they have perfect knowledge about all elements of a market131 is a 
valid warning of the dangers of striving for omniscience and omnipotence. 
However, while it does not logically follow that, in the face of emergent complexity, 
the only possible answer is to let actions be determined by the aggregated decisions 
of innumerable rational and self-interested market participants, this is one of the 
prime conclusions of both Hayek and current free-market economics. In the free-
market view, the inability of humans to grasp the complexity of the world means that 
the only answer is the rejection of central state/government interference in markets 
and society. Questions of politics and power are then simply replaced by a focus on 
unimpeded individual action, which will, whatever course is taken, trend towards 
some sort of equilibrium. Inequality or failure are simply the consequences of free 
individual choice and are thus no concern of government: such failures rebalance the 
market by trimming ‘dead wood’. 
This focus on the freedom of individual action in the face of emergent complexity is 
the basis of the facile similarity between such free-market utopianism and the 
characteristics of ecological resilience outlined above. Both see the individual as the 
basis for action/reaction and see the survival of ‘the whole’ (the market, society or the 
city) as sometimes requiring the failure or loss of individual elements.  
Applying all these criticisms to the examples of urban food distribution and Australia’s 
liquid fuel supply mentioned above (p99) in no way discounts the resilience of 
contemporary urban systems to shocks which can be predicted, such as temporary 
supply chain failures or sudden price changes for commodities. In such cases the 
existence of unpredictable stochastic variables is accepted and can likely be met 
within the adaptive framework of the complex system ‘as currently existing’. However 
existential system shocks such as the collapse of oil supply routes to Australia due to 
war, terrorism (Aston, 2014) or other disruptions in either the Gulf or the Indonesian 
archipelago, or the slower-scale effects of climate change or Peak Oil, requires the 
acceptance of hard uncertainty132 and the possibility of rapid and irreversible shifts in 
complex systems into new stasis states. In such cases the free-market faith in 
individual and a-temporal self-interest as a basis for aggregate action is not suitable 
response and an exclusive reliance on ‘the market’ is quite simply an abdication of 
any cohesive social or political responsibility to prepare for such possibilities. Thus 
the vulnerability of Australia’s oil supply, blithely dismissed by the AIP report (2013) 
(mentioned on page 99), is the concern of two reports commissioned by the 
Australian National Roads & Motorists’ Association (Blackburn, 2013; 2014). These 
critique the assumptions of bounded certainty on which the market approach of the 
AIP Report is founded: 
Our Government seems to have made a decision to leave market forces and 
global supply chains to provide for us in supply emergency… 
The Government has responded to recently announced reductions in 
Australia’s oil refining capability in a blasé fashion and has not defined any 
minimum level of refining capacity for Australia…. 
Our Government appears unlikely to act on the loss of Australian oil refining 
capacity and is content to rely on market forces to assure our fuel security… 
                                                
131 It is no coincidence that his acceptance speech on the occasion of receiving the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in 
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel was entitled ‘The Pretense of Knowledge’ (1974). 
132 The Black Swans of Taleb (2007) 
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In essence, we have adopted a “she’ll be right” approach to fuel security, 
relying on the historical performance of global oil and fuel markets to provide 
in all cases. Unfortunately, as a result of our limited and decreasing refining 
capacity, our small stockholdings and long supply chains, our society is at 
significant risk if any of the assumptions contained in the vulnerability 
assessments made to date prove false. (2013, p21) 
In the end, and given all these criticisms of the market-based approach to emergent 
complexity, the issue therefore becomes one of positioning shared rational action 
within systems and environments of emergent complexity.  
 
The dilemma of urban resilience summarised  
At this point it is useful to take stock of the discussion thus far. This thesis argues 
that contemporary cities are complex systems existing in a state far from equilibrium 
and utterly dependent on energy inflows to maintain their non-equilibrium state. No 
aggregated rationality or self-interest can conjure a reified state of equilibrium out of 
their stasis/flux; instead such individual strivings are constrained by ‘the arrow of 
time’ and lead to ever-growing complexity, consolidation and path dependency until 
either energy constraints or the inherent contradictions of this trajectory result in their 
eventual collapse and resultant energy release. To restate the central argument of 
FFE thermodynamics – open systems dissipate free energy to maintain or increase 
their ordered structure in some sort of steady state, ‘far from equilibrium’. The model 
of Panarchy and the tendency to declining returns on complexity mean that such 
complexity follows a trajectory of both increasing energy costs and falling resilience. 
Once again, however, this grim determinism can be overruled by human direction – 
but only through an acknowledgement of the centrality of purpose and conscious 
action. Such purpose and direction can only be determined through a process of 
political deliberation which acknowledges and addresses the various constraints on 
that action. These constraints include the reality of social, political and economic 
inequality and vulnerability, the impossibility of perfect knowledge in situations of 
emergent complexity, and the path dependency of all complex systems as they 
develop through time. 
The challenge is therefore to find a way of promoting the ecological resilience of 
cities while acknowledging our inability, within situations of emergent complexity, to 
assess the consequences of our plans and actions until it is too late. Hayek’s ‘fatal 
conceit’ is real, yet letting the free-market determine the future development 
trajectories of any city is also problematic. At the same time, the localisation 
approaches discussed earlier also propose agendas for action which are predicated 
on action by either communities and individuals while rejecting planning or action at 
larger scales (municipal, state or national government) due to the political or 
economic shortcomings they argue this inescapably involves. This thesis argues that 
such ‘bottom up’ approaches are, due to the differing energy costs of ‘generalists’ 
and ‘specialists’, neither a universal nor equitable approach to urban resilience. 
Action by larger scale (municipal, state, national or extra-national) actors is 
necessary: and therefore the problem of planning and implementing action while 
constrained by hard uncertainty must be addressed. 
To summarise the dilemma facing our complex urban systems (and thus the 
argument of the thesis so far), any approach to promoting urban resilience in the face 
of current and possible future challenges must accept the following seven 
assumptions:133 
                                                
133 Assumptions 1, 4 and 7 are also present in the concept of the femtorisk (Frank et al, 2012; 2014). 
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1. The existence of hard uncertainty: all complex socio-technological 
systems, including cities, are far-from-equilibrium systems exhibiting an 
emergent complexity which can neither be grasped in its totality at any 
point in time nor predicted in the future. 
2. All such complex socio-technological systems are existentially dependent 
on continuous energy dissipation at sufficient levels to maintain their 
current and future complexity. 
3. The boundary delineation of all such systems is a contingent and political 
act – and thus any promotion of the resilience of such systems is likewise 
inescapably political. 
4. All (ecological) urban resilience is scale-dependent and never universal 
across a whole urban area or every connected subsystem. Resilience 
involves trade-offs across scales as the resilience of the whole depends 
upon the possible collapse of individual constituent elements (with all the 
problematic ethical or political implications this implies) and thus an 
overall or universal resilience of the reified ‘City’ is impossible. 
5. The dynamic of decreasing returns on complexity makes clear the 
inescapable correlation between socio-technological complexity and 
energy dissipation. Thus any promotion of resilience which involves 
increasing complexity (whether technological or bureaucratic) 
necessitates an increasing energy cost. 
6. This same dynamic applies to current systems of energy exploration, 
exploitation and distribution: increasingly complex energy supply systems 
mean a declining energy return on the energy invested with problematic 
connotations for the maintenance of current urban systems. 
7. Even within such constraints the necessity of political action to promote 
urban resilience cannot be escaped: to maintain themselves societies and 
cities can neither trust to the timeless continuance of current situations nor 
rely on ‘the market’ to determine optimal outcomes. 
In the end, any program attempting to promote urban (ecological) resilience cannot 
shirk from the challenge of determining and implementing purpose and action in 
systems of emergent complexity, while under the constraints of imperfect knowledge 
and the irreversibility of time. This thesis does address this challenge in Chapter 5 by 
suggesting the Hedgehog Defence as a model of urban system organisation – but at 
this point it turns to the importance of purpose and conscious action within 
environments of emergent complexity. 
 
The role of purpose and conscious action in ecological (urban) resilience 
…we must accept, in the language of systems theory, that macroeconomic 
phenomena are emergent, arising from complex interactions of behaviours 
we do not fully understand, but must nevertheless respond to. 
Quiggin (2010) Zombie Economics, p83 
The issue thus becomes what to do about the development of complex cities in a 
state of hard uncertainty and unpredictable emergence. A focus on ‘bottom-up’, 
rather than ‘top-down’, solutions remains crucial (and mirrors many of the insights of 
complexity and environmental science regarding the resilience of complex systems). 
However, it is the position of this thesis that an awareness of thermodynamics, and 
the role of energy dissipation in the creation and maintenance of socio-technological 
complexity (and the costs this involves across different scales), means that the 
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importance of political action at larger scales of social organisation cannot be 
overlooked or rejected.  
 
Urban planning and resilience 
With the importance of purpose and shared action in mind this thesis thus turns at 
this point to the field of urban planning as it is concerned with “rationalized choice 
and decision-making relating to interventions within our living environment” (de Roo 
et al 2012, p13). Implicit in such an understanding is the inescapability of human 
direction (or at the least awareness) of the development of urban environments. 
Portugali (2006; 2011; 2012) has outlined a narrative in which the field of urban 
planning oscillates between quantitative and qualitative approaches to urban 
complexity. Such a conceptualisation is particularly germane to this thesis as it is 
another example of the major theme running through it: the tension between ‘humble’ 
and ‘arrogant’ approaches to complexity and systems theory. In the planning context 
this dichotomy has been described as the opposition between positivist and 
interpretative planning (Davoudi, 2012b), or between Romantic and Baroque 
complexity (Hillier, 2012). In Portugali’s narrative (2012), urban planning has shifted 
through three distinct ‘eras’ which are distinguished by their understanding of 
complexity and the role of the urban planner within it. The clear ‘cause and effect’ 
relationship between plan, implementation and outcome which characterised the first 
technocratic (quantitative) era of planning was discredited (Graham & Marvin, 2003), 
most famously by Jacobs’ (1961) trenchant critique of modernist urban planning in 
the US. This was followed in the 1960’s and 1970’s by a focus on urban studies 
through a social science lens. This included the deconstructive analysis of urban 
complexity from either “a Structuralist Marxist perspective [or] from a 
phenomenological idealistic perspective” (Portugali 2012, p119). However, the 
shortcomings of the qualitative turn lay in its inability to match this theoretical analysis 
to a program of urban planning practice (Portugali, 2012). Finally there has been a 
shift back to Romantic or interpretative approaches, with the contemporary 
quantitative stream broadly concerned with the agent-based modelling of emergent 
complexity (Batty, 2005; Davoudi, 2012b; Torrens, 2012; Crooks, 2012). This 
quantitative or Romantic turn, however, has not been unchallenged and therefore a 
contemporary ‘humble’/Baroque approach to urban planning is also evident. 
As discussed in Part A, this thesis clearly supports the Baroque/’humble’ approach to 
urban complexity.134 In doing so, it can draw on recent planning literature135 which 
acknowledges the realities of disequilibrium136 and hard uncertainty. The latter means 
planners are fundamentally unable to comprehensively comprehend the (wicked) 
complexity of complex systems ‘as existing’137 or predict their state into the future 
(the concept of emergence).138 This literature similarly accepts that many changes in 
complex adaptive systems are irreversible139 and thus path dependence is a major 
constraint on current and future action.140 What the Baroque approach to this 
irruption of complexity into the field of urban planning implies is a philosophical 
acceptance of the inapplicability of Newtonian mechanics to the ungraspable 
complexity of contemporary cities: 
                                                
134 For example, Gleeson’s criticism (2013) of the ‘arrogant’ tendencies evident in such quantitative/mechanistic 
approaches to cities (as outlined in Part A) is again relevant here. 
135 This thesis relies here on the excellent outline of contemporary influences of complexity on the field of planning 
edited by de Roo, Hillier & Van Wezemael (2012). 
136 See Graham & Marvin (2003), de Roo (2012) and Hillier (2012). 
137 See Hillier (2012), Cilliers (2002), Wilkinson (2012b) and de Roo (2012). 
138 See van Wezemael (2012) and Hillier (2012). 
139 See Hillier (2012) and de Roo (2012). 
140 See Inderberg & Eikeland (2009) and de Roo (2012). 
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standard social science methods are not particularly well adapted to the 
realities of global complexity. What worked well to enact nineteenth century 
realities, works much less well at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
(Law & Urry 2003, p403) 
The challenge for the Baroque approach (as with the social science approaches of 
the 60’s and 70’s) remains the need to marry such an understanding of emergent 
complexity to a program of urban planning action. The next section therefore turns to 
some recent attempts to situate urban planning within environments of emergent 
‘Baroque’ complexity. 
 
Suggestions for situating shared purpose and conscious action within complexity 
There are many contemporary suggestions from both planning theory and economics 
to address the undermining of purpose and conscious action by the conditions of 
uncertainty and irreversibility (temporality) within which urban planning finds itself. 
There is a need for strategic learning which “involves a revision of the structural 
parameters of the model” (Vercelli 1998, p264). To use the analogy of the game of 
chance from earlier in this chapter, instead of identifying and accommodating new 
stochastic variables (such as newly drawn cards) this concept of strategic learning 
accepts that the ‘rules of the game’ may themselves change (Taleb, 2007). No 
totalising or ‘arrogant’ plan, however well drawn up or implemented, can survive 
shifts in the very structural parameters within which it was designed. Alberti (2013, 
n.p.) has already called for just such a concept of strategic learning with regard to 
urban planning, arguing that it must “create options for learning through experiments, 
and opportunities to adapt thorough flexible policies and strategies that mimic the 
diversity of environmental and human communities”. 
One field of theoretical inquiry into these challenges is that of adaptive or network 
governance, which examines the challenges of organisational structure and decision 
making in environments of unpredictability and multiscalar complexity (Boyd, 2013; 
Boyd & Folke, 2012; Galaz, 2012; Sørensen & Torfing, 2008). While a full 
examination is beyond the scope (and scale) of this thesis, the overview by Galaz 
(2012) demonstrates an awareness of the constraints of complexity, unbounded 
uncertainty and irreversibility and the challenges of decentralisation vs centralisation 
and hierarchy vs horizontal organisational structures. Galaz, in particular, argues that 
these latter dichotomies are not mutually exclusive, and indeed resilient 
organisations can (and must) shift between them as context demands. He provides 
examples of ‘high-reliability141 organisations’ (HROs) as: 
air traffic control, nuclear submarines, nuclear aircraft carriers, nuclear power 
plants and large hospitals. One of the most interesting features of HROs is 
the fact that the organisation and decision-making structure is dependent on 
changes in the surrounding environment. Incremental change and ‘normal’ 
events are usually steered by regular and often hierarchical structures, while 
rapid, unexpected, change triggers a reconfiguration of decision-making 
structures and information flows. This structure is based on ad-hoc groups, in 
which strict hierarchy is temporarily left aside and response is secured by 
self-organised networks closest to the problem. (Galaz 2012, p200)  
It is worth noting here that nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers are military socio-
technological systems, while hospitals142 largely exist in their current forms due to the 
influence of the military or wars. This is important because the connections between 
                                                
141 Or in other words ‘resilient’. 
142 The work of Florence Nightingale and the establishment of the first modern military hospital during the Crimean 
War had a massive influence on the development of modern nursing (Baly, 1997). 
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this general approach of adaptive governance and/or organisational structure and 
military theory will be addressed in the next chapter. 
The approaches outlined above resonate with the previously outlined 
sustainability/resilience literature on decentralised planning and/or governance 
(Finan & Nelson, 2009; Marshall, 2010; Batty 2001) diversity (Cork, 2010) and 
modularity (Cork, 2010b; Walker & Salt, 2006) as these all provide the opportunities 
for such policies and strategies to be trialled. They also imply the conscious 
application of temporality to planning (for example through scenario planning) (de 
Roo et al, 2012) so that planners become ‘managers of change’ rather than 
implementers of static plans: 
A suitable metaphor depicts this process as that of an ‘explorer who has a 
sense of direction but no clear route’ (Clarke & Stewart, 1997), instead of a 
traveller who knows the exact route to a destination. (Fünfgeld & McEvoy 
2011, p15) 
However, the trend of declining returns on socio-technological complexity and the 
resultant rise in path dependency presents a challenge to urban resilience which is 
not addressed by these approaches. What is needed is an approach to decision-
making in conditions of hard uncertainty which, while acknowledging the importance 
of decentralisation and temporality, can address the possibility of collapse due to 
Tainter’s dynamic of increasing complexity as a problem-solving tactic. 
Therefore, this thesis turns to a strand of thought on decision making within complex 
adaptive systems which acknowledges that a conscious simplification of socio-
technological systems is required. In the field of urban planning this has been 
conceptualised as the promotion or preservation of ‘spaces of possibility’ (van 
Wezemael, 2012) which are directly analogous to the system ‘phase spaces’ or 
‘stability regions’ of Panarchy. Similar ideas have been expressed in economics 
including the theory of ‘sequential option values’ (Vercelli 1998, p265) which argues 
that decision makers should leave as many options for future choice open for as long 
as possible. This has also been described as preserving the ‘option set’ for future 
generations (Kyriakou 2002, p911). 
However described, such approaches argue for the necessity of ‘pausing’ 
development and/or growth to avert (or at the least postpone for as long as possible) 
the onset of path dependency implied by increasing complexity and the closing of 
future options. In other words they propose pausing the onward march of the 
Consolidation stage of the Panarchy cycle to keep the phase space as open as 
possible - the consciously ‘stalling’ of the development of system complexity or even 
its conscious simplification in Tainter’s terminology. 
Are there any specific examples of approaches which involve such a conscious 
simplification of socio-technological complexity to preserve future adaptive capacity? 
This thesis argues that there are, and provides examples in the next chapter where it 
turns to the field of military theory which has a long history of addressing the 
challenges of planning and decision-making within the constraints of hard 
uncertainty, system complexity and energy costs. There are clear reservations 
(Graham, 2004; 2005; 2006; 2008; 2011) about the influence of military concepts and 
theories (not to mention funding) (Ahmed, 2014) within areas which are more clearly 
the purview of the social sciences and these must be acknowledged. However it will 
also discuss the clear advantages to such a partial synthesis, especially the intimate 
awareness displayed by some theoretical military approaches to the gulf between 
intention (planning) and outcomes implied by hard uncertainty. 
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Chapter 5: Military theory and urban collapse 
 War is one of the great tests that separate planning from execution. 
Durschmeid (2002) p3 
This chapter involves a diversion into the realm of military theory, particularly as it 
applies to urban resilience. There are four clear reasons why this focus on military 
theory and history is relevant to this thesis’ discussion of urban resilience. 
The first is the systems focus of much contemporary military theory, concerned as it 
is with analysing cities as complex socio-technological systems to find the weakest 
point (the point which will lead to cascading failures or paralysis/collapse) and then 
attacking that point (Warden, 1995; Felker, 1998; Thomas, 2002). Such approaches 
build upon the same conceptualisation of cities as FFE systems as the 
urban/planning literature discussed in the previous chapter. In particular, there has 
been a focus on energy as the crucial component of complex urban environments as 
well as an awareness of other systems theory concepts such as path dependency, 
tipping points and unpredictable consequences. Implicit within such understandings 
is the possibility of complete urban (systems) collapse. 
The second reason is with regard to the issue of uncertainty; there has long been a 
‘humble’ system theory approach (going back as far as Sun Tzu) to the uncertainties 
of war which is in direct conflict with the ‘arrogant’ mindset which sees technological 
complexity as the best way to address such uncertainties. The latter approach 
encapsulates this thesis’ concept of The Wall while the former accepts the radical 
impermanence of complex systems such as cities and thus accepts an ecological 
view of urban resilience.  
The third value of a brief focus on military theory is that the issue of the governance 
of complex systems across scales and in an environment of radical uncertainty has 
long been an area of debate and innovation within this field. In particular it was the 
military that first developed the technique of scenario mapping.143 This has been 
variously attributed to the general staff of the Prussian military (and von Moltke and 
von Clausewitz (1976) in particular) in the mid 1800’s (Bradfield et al, 2005; Raspin & 
Terjesen, 2007) or to the RAND corporation and the US military during and after 
WWII (Raspin & Terjesen, 2007; Scearce & Fulton, 2004). While these techniques 
have been widely adopted since then, their genesis within the military demonstrates 
a longstanding willingness among the military and security communities to engage in 
‘thinking the unthinkable’ (Sontag 1979, p209),144 and this makes them prime 
candidates for envisaging possible crises and their possible outcomes.  
Finally the military has long shown a focus on shared purpose145 (introduced in the 
previous chapter) and its intersection with decentralised decision-making and action 
rather than hierarchic and centralised organisational structures. To put it more 
bluntly, military theory can demonstrate both an awareness of the radical uncertainty, 
vulnerability and energy implications of maintaining complex adaptive systems in an 
unpredictable environment and a range of tactics and strategies for directing 
purposeful action within such contexts of unbounded uncertainty. 
                                                
143 “The military are trained to work through many scenarios, not so that they will pick ‘the most likely’ (as business 
usually does) but to make them able to react well to unanticipated ones” (Linstone, quoted in Phillips 2008, p4). 
144 An interesting aside here (and one which prefigures Chapter 8’s discussion of the role of media and entertainment 
in paradigm change) is that in the movie World War Z the Israeli state is the only one to have demonstrated any 
effective response to the growing zombie outbreak. As one character (an Israeli military planner) describes this is 
only due to the fact that the Israeli military prepared a response to a range of outlandish scenarios – including a 
zombie outbreak. In other words they acknowledged the possibility of such a Black Swan, however outrageous the 
possibility seemed. While this example is obviously from a highly fictional (!) scenario the general point still stands: 
militaries are generally tasked with anticipating and preparing for a range of scenarios outside the normally accepted 
range of possibilities. 
145 This thesis will reject the term Will and stick with the less emotionally loaded term Purpose. 
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This chapter first briefly looks at the history of ‘arrogant’ military ideas around 
technology and the city. It then examines the opposing strain of military thought 
which embraces (hard) uncertainty and contingency and thus echoes the ideas of 
ecological resilience. It examines how both approaches demonstrate a systems focus 
with regard to urban resilience. Finally from the latter ‘humble’ tradition it takes the 
concept of the hedgehog defence: an encapsulation of this thesis’ ideas of urban 
resilience. 
 
Military technophilia and tactical/strategic distance 
Whatever happens, we have got 
The Maxim gun, and they have not. 
Belloc (1898) The Modern Traveller 
The purpose of this section is to acknowledge and outline the deep-seated focus on 
technological development as a problem-solving tool within the history of warfare. 
Graham (2004; 2011) in particular has outlined the connections between warfare and 
the city, especially the intersection of a belief in the power of technological complexity 
(2008) and increasing urbanisation (2005). A discussion of this history of military 
technophilia provides the counterpoint to the ‘humble’ military approach to complexity 
from which the Hedgehog Defence arises. 
One overarching trend in the development of military technology has been the 
ongoing search for distance, whether tactical or strategic.146 This drive has led from 
the spear and the sling to the bow and then the crossbow; from the introduction of 
firearms through artillery to the machine gun; from the invention and militarisation of 
flight to the aircraft carrier and then the drone; from the atomic bomb through the 
ICBM to the eventual militarisation of space. This growing complexity of military 
technology in the search for tactical and then strategic distance has both driven, and 
been driven by, developments in the wider societies which have embraced such 
technological developments (Unger, 2004). At the same time it is merely another 
facet of the increasing reliance of developed societies on technological solutions to 
the problems they face. 
Historically the one brake on this drive for distance has been the opposing cultural 
belief in the morality of face-to-face combat (Coker, 2004; Rabb, 2006).147 Seen as 
variously a test of bravery, an expression of personal or group honour, a test of moral 
righteousness or a rite of passage into adulthood, this valorisation of the warrior 
‘ethos’148 has been placed in opposition to the ‘cowardly’ refusal to engage in such a 
test. However, historically it was the classical Chinese, culturally unburdened by this 
cult of the morality of personal combat,149 who most clearly demonstrated a focus on 
tactical distance. Chinese warfare of this period: 
illustrates a cardinal feature of Chinese technology and science, the belief in 
action at a distance. In the history or naval warfare, for instance, one can 
show that the projectile mentality dominated over the ramming or boarding, 
with its close quarters combat. Smokes, perfumes, hallucinogens, 
incendiaries, flames and ultimately the use of the propellant forces of 
                                                
146 ‘Distance’ in this context refers to the ability to project power and influence a particular situation or contest at some 
remove – whether spatial or temporal. 
147 The literary and visual/audio-visual examples are legion: from Achilles and Homer in the Illiad and Macaulay’s 
Horatius on his bridge, through the individual heroism of Beowulf, Sigismund and the romanticism of Malory’s Morte 
de Arthur to more modern examples like the defenders of the Alamo, Rorke’s Drift, Stalingrad and Tobruk. A 
particularly notable example of the overt lauding of war and combat as ennobling is that of Junger (1929). 
148 The contemporary US Army demonstrates the persistence of such an ethos: 
http://www.army.mil/values/warrior.html (accessed 10/11/15) 
149 Evidence for this claim is provided in the discussion of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. This is included in the section to 
come entitled Radical (hard) uncertainty and Fourth Generation War (pages 120-124). 
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gunpowder itself, form part of one consistent tendency discernible throughout 
Chinese culture from the earliest times to the transmission of the bombard, 
gun and cannon to the rest of the world around AD1300. (Hallpike 1986, p52) 
However in the West the history of the development of military technology is replete 
with examples of technological developments (leading in most cases to increases in 
tactical or strategic distance) revolutionising not only military tactics but the cultural 
values and connected structures which underpinned them. The most well-known150 is 
the introduction of the crossbow and then the handgun undermining the central 
importance of the mounted knight on the battlefield at the same time as the cannon 
rendered traditional castles obsolete. Both technical developments were major 
factors in the decline of the feudal knight (and their corresponding valorisation of 
combat) as a social class in Europe as other classes were coming to prominence 
(Rabb, 2006). Similarly the introduction of the machine gun in the late 19th century 
led to lopsided European victories in colonial battles like that at Omdurman, the 
Sudan, in 1898 (Featherstone, 1993; Jordan, 2002) which were seen as exemplars 
of European technological (and thus cultural and moral) superiority.151 However when 
the tactical and strategic lessons of this new technology152 were studiously ignored 
the use of the machine gun led (along with poison gas and the industrial mass 
production of artillery and ammunition) to the cataclysm of WWI. While not a ‘war to 
end all wars’ this was most definitely ‘a war to end old ideas of war’. 
Industrial and impersonal (dehumanising) mass warfare seemed to have destroyed 
both the incidence and supposed nobility or honour of individual combat (the writings 
of Ernst Junger (1929) notwithstanding). While WWII has been widely recognised (on 
the Allied side at least) as the last ‘good war’ in terms of any widely supported moral 
casus belli (Fussell, 1989),153 it was one in which increasing technological and 
organisational complexity were widely seen as crucial to the eventual outcome. 
Above all it was the development of aircraft, and the strategic bomber in particular, 
which provided the tactical and strategic distance that made the doctrine of ‘total war’ 
possible; the divide between warrior and non-combatant was erased and the civilian 
city became a strategic target (Graham, 2004; 2006). In such a situation the 
individualist focus on the moral excellence of the warrior became increasingly hard to 
sustain.154 
This dehumanising character of such industrialised and technologically complex war, 
with the concomitant devaluing of notions of human valour or individual combat and 
the loss of grand narratives of the Just War, have only accelerated a concern among 
industrialised nations and militaries with force protection. This in turn has only 
                                                
150 The old view of the stirrup as an epoch-defining military technology (ie the technical superiority of the mounted 
Normans at Hastings) which led to the establishment of the social class of knights (‘One cannot be chivalrous without 
a horse’) and the structures of feudalism has been challenged by more recent scholarship (Lewis, 2008). 
151 However the sense of moral superiority was shaken by the behaviour of the victorious Kitchener after the lopsided 
massacre (Green, 2007). Churchill, then a war correspondent, reported on the plight of the 16,000 Madhist wounded 
(the “valiant warriors of a false faith and a fallen domination”) (p265) who were left on the battlefield with no medical 
treatment or even water. The unease was only compounded by the later destruction of the Madhi’s tomb by 
explosives and the presentation of his skull to Kitchener who, unsure what to do with it, placed it into an old kerosene 
tin for storage. The incident led to an inquiry: Queen Victoria commented icily that “[i]t savours too much of the Middle 
Ages not to allow his remains to be buried in private… The remains of our people have been respected, and those of 
her foes should, in her opinion, be too” (p268). Technological superiority did not, apparently, yet guarantee moral 
superiority: modern firepower, however effective, still conflicted with old ideas of the morality of combat. 
152 Such as: don’t send massed infantry or cavalry in charges against machine guns… 
153 90% of respondents to a Gallup poll in the US (conducted 21-23/4/04) agreed that WWII (for that country) was a 
Just War (with a precipitous drop in support for the idea that later wars such as the Gulf War or the Vietnam War had 
been just) (Newport, 2004). 
154 The Allied bombing campaign over Germany in WWII caused immense numbers of civilian deaths, quite apart 
from Dresden, and led to a historical understanding of this element of the war that was ambivalent at best. Thus 
Churchill’s end-of-war speech conspicuously did not mention the aircrew who served in the Royal Air Force’s Bomber 
Command, or their contribution to the war effort (nearly half died in action). Similarly, a memorial to their sacrifice was 
not unveiled in London until 2012 (Renzetti, 2012). 
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reinforced the concern with tactical and strategic distance through technological 
progress. 
For Shaw (2005) the US trauma of the Vietnam War, especially its military casualties, 
not only sustained but witnessed nightly on the news, have led the US and UK to 
focus almost exclusively on force protection of their own personnel during any 
conflict. The political consequences of military casualties, especially in the absence 
of any strongly supported ‘moral’ war such as WWII, have led to a number of clear 
trends. 
First there is an overriding concern with controlling media narratives about any 
conflict, along with a clear aversion to long or costly military entanglements (the 
‘quagmire’ effect) or the use of ground forces (‘boots on the ground’).155 Second, 
while there is, above all, a focus on ever more complex technology to allow for the 
effective projection of force at a distance without the danger of ‘collateral damage’, it 
is however well understood that the lives of one’s own soldiers or airmen are 
privileged over any possible civilian casualties.156 Thus there has been the clear 
media fixation on the use of ‘smart’ weaponry such as missiles and bombs which can 
be launched from planes or even ships many hundreds of miles from the target. 
While the stated goal of such weaponry is to avoid civilian casualties, when they 
inevitably occur it is apparently either because of intelligence deficiencies (whether 
on the part of such weapons or those firing them) or the lamentable tendency of 
urban civilians to fraternise with those designated as military targets. Such 
developments are clearly demonstrated in the recent history of ‘interventions’ by 
NATO members or Israel including Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Gaza (Pweterson, 
2002; Kaplan, 2003; Makuch, 2014). 
Ever since the invention of powered flight the military implications of this technology 
have been recognised (often far in advance of the actual contemporary technical 
capabilities). Since WWI proponents of air power have claimed that it is (or would 
soon be) possible to achieve increasingly grand military objectives through the use of 
airpower alone (Warden, 1995; Douhet, 1998; Felker, 1998; Thomas, 2002).  
The most obvious advantage to airpower is that bombing operations can be 
undertaken at no risk to one’s own troops (apart from air crews of course). However 
the main strategic advantage is the ability to project power over extremely long 
distances with no regard to military fortifications or geographical features. This allows 
the whole of an enemy to be attacked, including the full logistic and command 
networks that support the frontline fighting forces as well as civilian infrastructure, 
manufacturing capabilities and population centres to destroy morale. Thus the city 
has increasingly come under the shadow of the bomber, with wide-ranging 
consequences in terms of military strategies or urban planning (Graham, 2004). 
This trajectory of technological and strategic development eventually led the WWII 
policy of strategic bombing to its grimly logical conclusion with the infernos of 
Dresden and Tokyo, and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The 
experience of the massed bombing campaigns of WWII157 has only enabled and 
reinforced the contemporary fetishisation of airpower as a tool of statecraft on the 
part of the former WWII Allies the US and the UK (Shaw, 2005). The ‘smart’ missiles 
                                                
155 In 2003 US Army chief General Eric Shinseki was marginalised by the Bush administration (retiring soon after) for 
suggesting the invasion of Iraq would need significantly more ground troops than then Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld was willing to commit (Shanker, 2007). 
156 An attitude only reinforced by the very nature of waging war in civilian cities – the divide between combatant and 
non-combatant is impossible to determine. 
157 This campaign was only made possible through the application of modernist management techniques including 
statistical analysis and Fordist production systems. For a concise discussion of this history see the section ‘Lesson 
#4: Maximize Efficiency’ (interview with Robert McNamara) in the documentary The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons 
from the Life of Robert S. McNamara (Morris, 2003). McNamara was part of the influx of citizen analysts (many 
trained in the Harvard Business School) that brought the techniques of statistical analysis to the bombing campaign. 
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of the 1990’s and then the current generation of drones have only accelerated this 
trajectory with the strategic distance of airpower now matched by a similar tactical 
distance; instead of the possible danger to aircrews the ‘pilot’ of such drones may be 
sitting at a monitor on the other side of the world (Turse & Engelhardt, 2012). Such 
technologies - and proposed developments such as space-based weapons (Shainin, 
2006) - thus take the perceived strategic and tactical advantages of the aircraft to its 
logical extreme. This is the ‘vision’ of surgical warfare, in which political objectives 
can be achieved through the application of technically superior (above all accurate) 
air power with minimal (friendly) or civilian casualties. Such a vision, with its focus on 
technology as both the expression of teleological progress and the solution to the 
challenge of emergent complexity, is another facet of The Wall. 
 
 
Surveillance and omniscience in the ‘battlespace’ 
Concealed within his fortress, the Lord of Mordor sees all - his gaze 
pierces cloud, shadow, earth and flesh. You know of what I speak, 
Gandalf - a great Eye… lidless… wreathed in flame. 
Jackson (2001) Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring 
While one strand of the historical development of military technologies has focussed 
on ‘strategic distance’, there has long been a related goal (never more than 
aspirational) of fully perceiving, processing and controlling the emergent complexity 
of any environment. While historically this trend has included a prosaic focus on 
scouting and reconnaissance (usually through the use of cavalry forces) as a 
precondition of military success, it has also led to more exotic battlefield surveillance 
technologies, such as man-lifting war kites.158 More recently, there have attempts to 
develop increasingly complex information technologies (such as robotics and 
surveillance systems) to address the complexity of warfare (or urban environments) 
through situational omniscience and thus consequence-free action.159 Such 
technologies represent another facet of absolutist systems thinking (Mills & Huber, 
2002) in which emergent complexity can be overcome both in the present and into 
the future. 
Graham (2011) provides numerous examples of contemporary “military dreams of 
high-tech omniscience and rationality” (pxii) including the US Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA). This approach envisages all the branches of the US military as one 
linked network, with information from innumerable sources (remote sensors, phone 
and email surveillance, drones, satellites, battlefield cameras etc) processed in real 
time and thus accessible by friendly units and actors.160 This allows an almost 
omniscient awareness of the ‘battlespace’ while the enemy’s own communications 
and intelligence are disrupted and degraded. 
Similar dreams of hegemony infuse the US military’s (as yet) aspirational doctrine of 
Full Spectrum Dominance (FSD) in which the goal is an effectively absolute control 
over any and all spaces of military conflict from the ground (including underground 
and inside structures) to the skies, the online world and even space (United States 
Department of Defense, 2000). While “[a]ttaining that goal requires the steady 
infusion of new technology and modernization” (p3) the basis for such control is 
“information superiority [as] a key enabler of the transformation of the operational 
                                                
158 In the 1890’s Captain B.F.S Baden-Powell (brother of the ‘Scouts’ founder) created a manned surveillance kite for 
the British Army he called the Levitor (Stoff, 2001). 
159 Consequence-free (in terms of unwanted side effects) for the actor, of course. The ‘Other’ remains to be acted 
upon.  
160 Increasingly this means the robotic or remote technologies mentioned above such as drones or robots. 
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capabilities of the joint force and the evolution of joint command and control” (p3). 
Here the blending of tactical distance and situational omniscience is explicit. 
Much as the Maxim gun provided an overwhelming advantage to Kitchener’s forces 
at Omdurman, the attraction of such approaches lies in the absolute hegemony such 
technological sophistication promises (United States Department of Defense, 
2000).161 Another primary (generally unspoken) goal remains the reduction of US 
casualties162 and thus the political complications such casualties163 pose to all military 
operations (Graham, 2011; Shaw, 2005; Matthews, 2007) although a risk-free and 
zero-cost war is recognised as impossible (United States Department of Defense, 
2000). 
Overall, this concern with both tactical/strategic distance and situational omniscience 
displays the same three constituent elements as the Wall: 
1. A belief in a linear and universal Progress which is irreversible and 
encompasses an ongoing search for an absolute certainty. 
2. A focus on scientific and technological advancement (through human 
ingenuity) as the expression of this Progress. 
3. A faith in the ability of such Progress to address all the challenges which 
currently face, or will face, our complex socio-technological systems. 
Military technophilia is a long-standing approach to the immense complexity of 
warfare which manifests an ‘arrogant’ desire to remove doubt and unpredictability 
from military operations. Such military ‘solutionism’ (Morozov, 2014) can never 
overcome the inescapable reality outlined in the previous chapter: situations of 
emergent complexity, like warfare, are ungraspable in their entirety and therefore all 
plans of action must be provisional. As the next section makes clear, however, this 
has not stopped the drive for just such certainty in urban warfare. 
 
 
Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) 
 
The worst policy in war is to attack the walled cities. Attacking cities is 
the last resort when there is no other alternative. 
Sun Tzu (2007) 
For proponents of the military panacea of technological complexity, one looming 
tactical and strategic challenge is runaway urbanisation. The US and Israeli 
militaries, in particular, are aware that urban combat, or Military Operations in Urban 
Terrain (MOUT), will become increasingly prevalent in the future (Taw & Hoffman, 
2004; Graham, 2011), and will pose immense challenges to the twin goals of 
distance and situational omniscience (Graham, 2011). This is because the intense 
spatial and social complexity of a Planet of Slums (Davis, 2004) makes the 
identification of tactical,164 let alone strategic or political, goals extremely difficult 
(Warden, 1995; Felker, 1998; Thomas, 2002).  
However, for the enthusiasts, this does not mean the reversal of the historical focus 
on technological progress. Instead the answer is, as always, to gain absolute control 
over even these increasingly complex urban environments through increasingly 
complex technology (Graham, 2004; 2005; 2006; 2008; 2011; Shaw, 2005). There 
                                                
161 There are arguments that technology is the only military or geopolitical advantage left to ‘the West’ (Graham, 
2011). 
162 Or remove the need for human soldiers at all…  
163 And to a lesser extent ‘collateral damage’ such as friendly fire or civilian casualties. 
164 To take an obvious example: who are the insurgents in an urban insurgency and how can they be identified?  
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are two main elements to this, with the first being a focus on gaining information 
hegemony over complex urban environments. A wide range of techniques are listed 
by Graham (2011) including leaving airships filled with radio-frequency monitoring 
equipment over target cities for up to a year, installing centrally controlled and 
aggregated CCTV cameras in every urban nook, developing sensor technology that 
can penetrate buildings, or even flooding a city with swarms of minute radio-sensitive 
‘tags’ or autonomous nano-tech drones with audio-visual capabilities. This deluge of 
data would then feed into the second aspect below. 
The second interrelated response to complex urban environments is an ‘arrogant’ 
systems theory approach to cities in which their complexity is rendered simple and 
predictable. To do this requires the establishment of a benchmark ‘normality’ for any 
particular city, created through the aggregation of data-mined information from that 
city across time. Thus patterns of human movement (whether pedestrian or 
vehicular), energy or media use (TV, radio, mobile phones and internet) can all be 
classified as ‘normal’ so that any deviations can be identified as abnormal and thus 
possibly threatening. This reduction of urban complexity, including the actions of 
millions of individual residents, reorganises the city as predictable and stable. Order 
is created out of urban chaos. Like the use of identity numbers (whether through 
licences, passports or identity cards) by national governments, this represents the 
‘hegemonic simplification’ of unpredictable complexity outlined in Part A. The radical 
complexity of the urban environment (a physical environment and population both 
multi-layered and contextually determined) is fixed in place, categorised 
(‘enemy/terrorist; ‘civilian’) and thus converted to a simple Manichaean duality. The 
action that follows after such a simplification is then refreshingly straightforward… 
Such an ‘arrogant’ systems approach to urban combat can often involve a network 
analysis of the myriad socio-technological subsystems and components of any city. 
For example US military doctrine regarding cities has been heavily influenced by the 
strategic ring theory (Graham 2005; Warden, 1995) and its later adaptation by Felker 
(1998). These are conceptual frameworks through which to encapsulate complex 
urban realities and implement an approach to urban conflict which focusses on 
targeting and destroying key components or nodes of the city infrastructure, rather 
than directly attacking civilians. The goal is to provoke a technological or social 
capitulation and break the will of the population to resist. Such tactics, described as 
‘effects-based operations’ or the more dramatic ‘Shock and Awe’ (Graham, 2005),165 
represent a hegemonic simplification of urban complexity to allow the (supposedly) 
painless capitulation of cities without resorting to the massed ‘carpet-bombing’ of 
WWII or the Vietnam War.166 Furthermore, the implementation of such plans is 
absolutely dependent on the development of complex technologies for both 
situational omniscience and tactical distance. Finally, such tactics demonstrate the 
direct connection between military theory, technophilia, and urban collapse. 
Criticism of this focus on further socio-technological complexity to overcome urban 
resilience is provided later in this chapter. In the next section this thesis turns to the 
increasing influence of such technophilia in the promotion of urban resilience. 
 
                                                
165 Graham (2005) has clearly noted the tactical and strategic resonance between this contemporary US air war 
doctrine and terrorism. Leaving apart the debate over moral justifications, in operational and strategic terms there are 
strong similarities between the 911 attack on New York from the stated US strategy of Shock and Awe during the 
bombing of Baghdad in 2003. Both were highly planned attacks on urban nodes chosen for their importance within 
the socio-technological, cultural and psychological networks within each city and the state in which they were hosted; 
both were highly orchestrated media effects in which the psychological effects, amplified by the expected media 
coverage, would have a shattering effect on the morale of each city’s population. In both cases the intended effects 
were in fact psychological with an aim to changing the overall direction of state policy and both were to a greater or 
lesser extent successful. 
166 The death of many thousands of civilians as an indirect result of these tactics is either ignored or rationalised 
(Graham, 2011). 
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Walls, both physical and metaphorical 
No wall exists, however thick, that artillery cannot destroy in a few days. 
Machiavelli (1519) Discourses on Livy 
While this trend of military technophilia has only been discussed so far with regard to 
attacks on cities, there is of course another strand of such thinking which concerns 
itself with the defence of cities and urban resilience more generally. What this thesis 
has labelled The Wall is a metaphor based upon the reality of physical walls and their 
historical purpose and development. Therefore a brief discussion of walls in general 
is warranted before moving on to their central role in the history of both the physical 
development and conceptual understanding of cities.  
At the most basic level walls have two interrelated purposes: to enable the defence of 
territory; and to denote and make possible administrative control over such territories. 
In other words, walls provide a mix of care (protection) and control (Coaffee et al, 
2009). The most obvious function of walls is that of protection or care; they provide a 
barrier to prevent the entry of external enemies while ensuring the necessities of life 
can continue for those within their circuit.167 To return to the discussions of boundary 
delineation in Part A, it is obvious that walls imply a level of system delineation and 
thus reification reflecting the views on territorial integrity of those who built them. This 
reification implies an engineering conception of resilience and thus the defensive role 
of walls can absolutist in nature; their purpose is to provide an ‘all or nothing’ barrier 
to the incursion of enemies. Military walls such as the Theodosian Walls (the famous 
triple land walls of Constantinople) or the Maginot Line (the French fortifications built 
along the border with Germany in the inter-war years) are examples of such an 
absolutist approach to defence: both were built to be impermeable barriers to the 
passage or entry of enemies. 
     
 
However, at the same time as protecting the inhabitants and space it encompasses 
the wall also functions as a method of administrative or social control. Thus the Great 
Wall of China, Hadrian’s Wall, the Berlin Wall or the current US border fence with 
Mexico function(ed) as much as bureaucratic, philosophical or cultural boundaries 
dividing the Self from the Other as much as they have been/were conceived as 
physical barriers.168 What was within the wall169 was legitimate (and thus subject to 
                                                
167 The connection with warfare is evident in the etymology of the word – according to the Oxford Dictionary ‘wall’ is 
Old English, from Latin vallum 'rampart', from vallus 'stake'. Two valli were carried by each Roman legionary to form 
field fortifications. 
168 The first two examples in this list were not erected to be impermeable physical barriers (creating closed systems) 
but as technologies for marking political and cultural borders while monitoring, regulating and possibly taxing the 
human and economic traffic. For Hadrian’s Wall see Pham (2014); for the Great Wall see Langerbein (2009). 
The Theodosian Walls in Constantinople - the 
second military gate (Deuterou or Belgrade 
Gate). 
(Image credit CrniBombarder!!! (accessed 3/12/14) 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Car_bed_kap_deu2.jpg)  
 
Cross-section of the Maginot Line 
(image copyright Bowring Cartographic 1997) 
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legitimate control by the governing authorities) while what was without remained 
‘beyond the pale’.170  
             
 
 
Physical city walls 
For the great majority of its history walls have provided the primary method of 
defence of the city.171 There has long been debate over the causal relationship 
between cities and warfare (Coaffee et al, 2009). For example Tilly (1982) argues 
that city development was driven by warfare, while Mumford (1961) instead reverses 
the causality, arguing that warfare was the result of city formation. Others dispute any 
direct causal connection between the two (Reader 2004). Whatever the relationship 
between warfare and cities, it is clear that cities have always been worth defending 
due to the concentration of value that they represent. Before the invention of effective 
siege machinery or artillery, city walls protected crucial resources such as the 
municipal or state leadership, economic, religious and status infrastructure and 
energy reserves (whether food or people – the latter being a crucial energy source 
for pre-industrial societies). At the same time cities themselves were defended as 
markers of status (gained through conquest or ownership/control) or strategic centres 
of spatial/geographic control (Coaffee et al, 2009). 
However the rise of socio-technological complexity has always meant a rise in 
energy dissipation and thus resources and increasingly cities (as much as states) 
have therefore needed openness and permeability with their environment (Coaffee et 
al, 2009; Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977). Such openness is in direct conflict with the need 
for political or military delineation encapsulated in walls. Therefore siege warfare, 
before the introduction of effective siege engines or artillery, often involved a battle of 
attrition in which the besieger attempted to outlast the energy reserves (food water, 
ammunition or manpower) of the defender. This need for openness has only 
continued to accelerate, with the contemporary developed city relying on energy and 
resource footprints extending for hundreds or thousands of square km) (Castells, 
1996; Wackernagel & Rees, 1996). In terms of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, 
the contemporary city is inescapably an open system and must remain that way if it is 
to maintain itself. 
At the same time, the advances in military technology outlined in the previous 
section, and in particular with regard to strategic distance, have historically presented 
a challenge with regard to the defence of cities. The challenges posed by the hugely 
                                                                                                                                       
169 Within Paradise or the Dar al-Islam (the House of Islam). 
170 The outer fallen world of corruption and sin or the Dar al-Harb (the House of War) 
171 In ancient Chinese for example the character for city, cheng, also means wall (Coaffee et al 2009, p25). 
The US-Mexico border fence  
Image credit Rev Sysyphus (accessed 3/12/14) 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexico%E2%80%93United_States_barrier#m
ediaviewer/File:US-Mexico_Fence_Mexican_family_on_US_side.jpg   
 
The Berlin Wall 
Image credit Thierry Noir (accessed 3/12/14) 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berlin_Wall#mediaviewer/File:Berlinermauer.jp
g  
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increased army size and gunpowder artillery of the late 16th century led to the 
development of the complex star fort (the trace italienne) which for a time made the 
tremendous costs of building urban fortifications significantly less than the costs of 
assaulting them (Coaffee et al, 2009). Such fortifications were soon superseded by 
further advances in artillery, however, and the city wall became obsolete.172 
By the time of Guernica, the possibility of ‘urbicide’ (Graham, 2004) by aerial assault 
had made perceptions of urban vulnerability inescapable; a process culminating in 
the iconic (and absurd) image of school children sheltering from atomic weapons 
under their wooden school desks. The search for The Wall, the ever more 
technologically complex solution which promised absolute protection from both doubt 
and uncertainty, seemed to be over. Instead there was the absurdity of Mutually 
Assured Destruction (MAD) and the focus on evacuation of cities – no longer the 
protectors of populations they were now seen as potential mass graves. The focus 
thus shifted to escaping the city173 or ensuring the survival of a privileged few in 
underground bunkers (Coaffee et al, 2009). 
To conclude, physical city walls are both a means of delineating particular urban 
spaces, and a (now obsolete) technology for defending those same spaces. In the 
latter sense they can be considered as ‘arrogant’ technologies, given their ‘all-or-
nothing’ defensive character. However, even with the obsolescence of physical walls 
the search for ‘arrogant’ urban defensive technologies has continued. 
 
Metaphorical city walls 
The brutal but inescapable conclusion we must draw is this: in face of 
the technical development of aviation today, in case of war the 
strongest army we can deploy in the Alps and the strongest navy we 
can dispose on our seas will prove no effective defense against 
determined efforts of the enemy to bomb our cities. 
Douhet (1998) The Command of the Air, p10 
While physical city walls have long been superseded as a military defensive 
technology,174 the search for urban security has resulted in a wide array of defensive 
technologies that can be considered as metaphorical city walls. For example, with the 
collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the end of the Cold War the spectre of nuclear 
annihilation has by and large receded in both the public and government 
consciousness and the possibility (dream?) of security and safety has returned to the 
forefront again. This has meant that the search for The Wall has resumed - 
technological ‘solutionism’ is not dead. Both Coaffee et al (2009) and Graham (2011) 
provide excellent overviews of these more recent developments, with the latter 
describing three approaches to urban resilience from the late 1990’s until the present 
day: 
1. Fortification 
2. Surveillance 
3. Risk management 
                                                
172 The fall of Constantinople in 1453 to the army of the Turkish sultan Mehmet II is the preeminent example of the 
cannon overcoming city fortifications. 
173 The US interstate highway system for example was partly designed to allow the evacuation of urban populations 
in case of war (Coaffee et al 2009, p64). 
174 Obviously this is not the case with natural disasters. A number of Japanese tsunami walls were successful against 
the 2011 tsunami (Suppasri et al, 2013). Likewise the World Heritage-listed trace italiene fortress of Galle in Sri 
Lanka protected the old town within from the effects of the 2009 Boxing Day tsunami while the modern city of Galle 
was extensively damaged. 
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All three interconnected approaches aim to fulfil the two roles of ‘Care’ and ‘Control’ 
and are predicated on an engineering understanding to urban resilience. They can 
therefore be read as the contemporary manifestation of metaphorical city walls. The 
third approach of risk management has been addressed in Chapter 4 but the other 
two will now be briefly outlined.  
The first trend towards the fortification of urban environments is symptomatic of the 
loss of the city as a shared experience (discussed in Part A). It is expressed in trends 
as diverse as the rise of gated communities, the militarisation of policing or security 
(especially in unfavoured neighbourhoods and communities)175 and the growth of 
corporate/privatised urban space at the expense of public space (Graham, 2011; 
Coaffee et al, 2008). 
However the fortification of the entire city as an approach is encapsulated in the 
search for successful missile protection systems such as the US’s Star Wars or 
Patriot systems or Israel’s Iron Dome (Shapir, 2013). These aim for the defence of 
‘the whole’, in a sense echoing the traditional concept of the city wall. While there has 
never been a defence against ballistic missiles (early warning is the best to be hoped 
for) this has not stopped the search for fortifications to render the city inviolable.  
The second focus on surveillance is aims for control of urban complexity through the 
same situational omniscience (Graham, 2011; Laidler, 2008) sought by the urban 
military technologies outlined above. Techniques such as surveillance of physical 
and digital spaces through CCTV, biometric scanning, and online monitoring and 
data retention and analysis (Laidler, 2008) attempt to encompass the emergent 
complexity of the urban environment in the same way as the Full Spectrum 
Dominance sought by the US military. In fact, in the great majority of cases these are 
essentially the same technologies just transposed from ‘without’ to ‘within’ the ‘home’ 
city (Graham, 2011). 
However, none of these approaches can offer the guarantee of complete security for 
the simple reason that any such certainty is intrinsically unachievable in an 
environment of emergent complexity.176 At the same time such increasingly complex 
socio-technological systems involve declining returns on investment and surveillance 
in particular involves the hegemonic simplification of social urban complexity. In the 
end these three approaches invoke the imposition of the ancien regime of Funcowitz 
and Ravetz (1994) with the risk of eventual collapse such a system state involves: 
When policies aim to stabilize the ecological system or eliminate its variability, 
the inevitable outcome is collapse. (Carpenter & Gunderson 2001, quoted in 
Alberti 2013, np) 
A final note must be made here regarding the issue of vulnerability and (urban) 
environmental resilience. It could be argued that the fortification of cities into ‘green’ 
and ‘red’ zones, whether gated communities, heavily policed urban ‘blights’ or 
securitised corporate and government enclaves, is in fact at least partly an 
environmental resilience approach to cities - that is, an approach which accepts that 
the overall resilience of the city depends upon its adaptive capacity, which is in turn 
predicated on the loss of some system elements to allow the overall system to 
maintain itself.177  
However what is relevant here are questions of vulnerability, politics and the 
delineation of system boundaries according to observer viewpoint. For example the 
                                                
175 A perfect demonstration is provided by the fragmentation of post-invasion Baghdad by occupying Coalition forces. 
Huge concrete barriers separated neighbourhoods, with the preeminent example of a protected or fortified element 
being the Green Zone (Scranton, 2007). 
176 As demonstrated by both Wikileaks and the case of Edward Snowden. 
177 This harks back to the discussion of resilience in chapter 4 – the contrasting experiences of rich and poor 
neighbourhoods in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina being a particularly illustrative example. 
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development of gated communities178 in the US particularly is due more to the 
increasing tendency of the urban wealthy or middle classes to no longer identify with 
the broader city of which they are part. In that sense this is more a redefinition 
(shrinking) of system boundaries to encompass one’s local area and thus the 
concern is with the ongoing maintenance of that neighbourhood’s standard of living 
and services (engineering resilience) without the cost or concern of what happens 
elsewhere in the city. There is a loss of concern with the poorer citizens of such cities 
given a shrinking sense of identification179 with them as inhabitants of the same 
shared urban system. 
At the extreme edge of such developments is a shift from the physicality of the city 
protecting its inhabitants to the inhabitants protecting (whether willingly or not) the 
physicality of the city. For a prison-city such as Gaza the only defence for the 
physical city itself is the physical presence of its inhabitants and the international 
outrage provoked by their deaths180 – an approach also exhibited during the Kosovo 
war when residents of Belgrade stood at various points around the city to prevent its 
destruction in air raids (see Figure 11 below). 
                       
This briefly outlines some of the more clearly ‘arrogant’ elements of military theory 
and the city, in particular the longstanding focus on technological sophistication as 
the solution to uncertainty and the emergent complexity of urban environments. The 
resonances with the more ‘arrogant’ strand of urban planning should be noted here, 
in particular the focus on explanatory certainty and the resultant control of complexity 
through technology. However, it is now time to acknowledge and examine a more 
‘humble’ strand in military systems thinking (including with regard to cities). 
 
 
 
 
                                                
178 Also noteworthy are the related US trends of gated communities or Common Interest Developments (CID’s) 
(Cashin, 2001) and ‘white flight’ to the outer suburbs (Avila, 2006). 
179 Such loss of identification may also be expressed in terms of racial, religious or cultural, as much as socio-
economic, difference. 
180 This international outrage is only a defence due to the identification of external observers with those within such 
cities as fellow humans – the intersection of vulnerability and politics with urban resilience once again. 
Figure 11: Target? 
 
A resident of Belgrade during the 1999 NATO airstrikes; from 
an exhibit of 1999 Serbia/Kosovo war photos taken by 
German photographers Anneliese Fikent and Andreas 
Neumann 
 http://art-for-a-change.com/blog/2007/02/jasper-johns-target-with-body-
parts.html  (accessed 28/11/14) 
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Radical (hard) uncertainty and Fourth Generation War 
No campaign plan survives first contact with the enemy 
von Moltke The Elder (Hughes 1993, p45-7) 
However an opposing theoretical tradition of warfare rejects the drive for ever more 
complex technological weapons or defensive systems. Instead this contradictory 
worldview accepts the (radical/hard) unpredictability of war (Clausewitz’s Fog of 
War), the unavoidable reality of danger or loss, and the futility of searching for some 
technophilic vision of Full Spectrum Dominance to provide certainty (O’Neil, 1990; 
McKenzie, 2001; Nagl, 2002; Robb, 2007; Matthews, 2007; Lowther, 2007; Kilcullen, 
2010).181 Thus, like the cheerleaders of military technological superiority, this tradition 
can be placed within a complexity/systems approach to warfare, yet it is married to a 
‘humble’ understanding of such complex adaptive systems (CAS) as armies, cities or 
military operations in general. Such systems can never be fully understood or their 
future states predicted, and thus can never be fully planned for or controlled. What 
follows is not the history of some linear development of military theory, but instead an 
extremely brief outline of this more ‘humble’ theoretical approach to the emergent 
complexity of war. What is important to note in this overview is that the acceptance of 
such uncertainty and complexity has not precluded the need for conscious action 
within such conditions; one form that such action has taken (the Hedgehog Defence) 
provides a model for this thesis’ approach to urban resilience. 
Such a humble view of warfare can be traced back to Sun Tzu’s famous The Art of 
War (Ames, 2007) and the cultural and philosophical milieu (the Warring States 
Period of Chinese history between 475 and 221 BC) in which it was written. While 
there is an abiding concern with warfare among the early Chinese philosophical 
works, as outlined earlier there is less focus on the moral excellence (honour, duty, 
bravery) implied by military contest and therefore, unlike the general Indo-European 
tradition, there is little valorisation of individual combat and no image of the warrior as 
hero.182 Instead there is a general philosophical concern with the need for harmony 
(ho), evident both in Confucian and Taoist thought, which informs classical Chinese 
ideas on warfare as another area of philosophical inquiry and action. Warfare is 
merely another field within which this harmony is to be created and/or maintained 
and thus warfare becomes a field for philosophically informed action in the service of 
this future harmony (Ames, 2007). 
Similarly, such harmony is contingent, constructed and immanent within the world 
itself; it is neither eternal, transcendent or absolute like some Platonic Pure Form: 
Form is not some permanent structure to be discovered behind a changing 
process, but a perceived intelligibility and continuity that can be mapped with 
the dynamic process itself… Rational explanation does not lie in the discovery 
of some antecedent agency or the isolation and disclosure of relevant causes, 
but in mapping out the local conditions that collaborate to sponsor any 
particular event or phenomenon… Without an assumed separation between 
the source of order in the world and the world itself, causal agency is not so 
immediately construed in terms of relevant cause and effect. (Ames 2007, 
p40-41) 
At the heart of Taoist and Confucian thought is an acceptance of the emergent 
complexity of the world, and the need to focus action within such emergence to 
shape it to a positive outcome.183 At the same time this harmony, or ho, is intrinsically 
                                                
181 This is mirrored by Davidson (2013) in the field of planning and Taleb (2007; 2012) more generally. 
182 “To win a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the highest excellence; the highest excellence is to subdue 
the enemy’s army without fighting at all” (Ames 2007, p62)  
183 Although the latter focus, on the role of the wise statesman or general in bringing such harmony into being, is 
more clerly connected with Confucian doctrine (Chalmers Cain 2012, p178). 
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diverse: “Whereas harmony (ho) is fecund, sameness is barren” (Ames 2007, p45). 
This implies a rejection of the sort of ‘hegemonic simplification’ discussed in Part A in 
favour of accepting current diversity ‘as is’.  
Such a view of the world and the place of human action within it lead to the 
awareness in The Art of War that the general must adapt action to conditions as 
actually existing – rather than conceiving and following grand plans. What is crucial is 
shih or strategic advantage which is ever-changing and inescapably tied to spatial, 
temporal, social and political context: 
In the business of war, there is no invariable strategic advantage (shih) which 
can be relied on at all times. (Ames 2007, p59) 
Therefore what is crucial to any commander is the possession and control of as 
much information as possible about current conditions and the capacity and ability to 
respond quickly to fluctuations in such conditions: “War is such that the supreme 
consideration is speed” (Ames 2007, p63). The influence of The Art of War has been 
immense, above all in its insistence on the emergent unpredictability implied by war, 
the focus on contingency over the absolute and the resultant importance of 
contextual knowledge and speed in action. 
These considerations are evident in European military theory of the 19th century, in 
particular in the ideas of Clausewitz (1976) and von Moltke (Hughes, 1993). In all 
three cases the hard uncertainty of war is accepted as fundamentally 
unsurmountable by any technological or organisational means (planning) and thus 
the focus of the commander must be on flexibility to changing circumstances as they 
become apparent. Thus Clausewitz notes that: 
the general unreliability of all information presents a special problem in war: 
all action takes place, so to speak, in the twilight, which like fog or moonlight, 
often tends to make things seem grotesque and larger than they really are. 
Whatever is hidden from full view in this feeble light has to be guessed at by 
talent, or simply left to chance. So once again for the lack of objective 
knowledge one has to trust talent or luck. (1976, p.140)  
In the inter-war years such ideas found focus in the ideas of the British theorist B. H. 
Liddell Hart (1954) and the German theorists of the soon-to-be-implemented 
blitzkrieg such as Guderian (2007).184 This was the approach, based primarily around 
the relatively new technologies of the tank and the airplane, which became known as 
Manoeuvre Warfare (Leonhard, 2009). This is predicated on a focus on speed in 
attack to unsettle and upset the opponent and destroy the logistical and command 
support which underlies the frontline forces. Thus the German Blitzkreig exemplified 
Manoeuvre Warfare by: 
avoiding head-on assaults, seeking to find 'soft spots' through which to 
infiltrate along the line of least resistance… While the Allied commanders 
thought in terms of battle, the new German commanders sought to eliminate it 
by producing the strategic paralysis of their opponents using their tanks, dive-
bombers, and parachutists to spread confusion and dislocate 
communications. (Liddell Hart 1954, p305) 
                                                
184 Likewise for Guderian the focus was on speed and coordination – he proposed that all elements of the armed 
forces be as mobile as possible (hence armoured infantry in vehicles which could keep up with the tanks they were 
supporting) and that all German tanks have their own radio (this allowed German tank units to react faster to events 
on the ground as each individual tank was in direct contact with all others). 
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In such a concept of war static defences (The Wall) become a liability as they are an 
expression of path dependency (sunk costs) which limit the defender’s flexibility of 
response.185  
At the same time there was a focus on the analysis of war as the struggle of complex 
adaptive systems that could never fully grasp the complexity of any environment. For 
example an important element of the military strategy that came to be popularly 
known as Blitzkrieg was the identification of the schwerpunkt. Building on Clausewitz’ 
concept of the ‘centre of gravity’ this was the focal point or ‘weak link’ in an enemy’s 
line of defence. Once identified, a concentrated application of force at this point could 
allow attacking forces to penetrate as quickly and deeply as possible to disrupt the 
lines of supply and command and cause a general collapse (Frieser & Greenwood, 
2005). Implicit in such an approach is the understanding that the opponent’s collapse 
is driven by their inability to fully grasp a rapidly changing situation and either decide 
upon a coherent response or marshal the resources to do so; the blitzkrieg approach 
and its rapid drive to the rear of the enemy’s line is designed above all to throw that 
opponent off balance. In short they become unable to keep up with the rapidly 
emergent complexity of the environment in which find themselves. To make this 
possible the attacker must be able to grasp and react to the fluid situation more 
quickly than their opponent. In France in 1940 this was made possible by the speed 
of the German motorised armour and infantry and their focus on communications 
(Frieser & Greenwood, 2005): 
[the] speed and directness of German signals (as opposed to the fixation with 
security and encoding signals evinced by the British and French) [which] 
meant that the Germans were much more able to react to events and thus 
gain the initiative. (Alexander 2013, p348) 
This understanding of the importance of contextual awareness and speed of 
communication and action was further developed in the 1950’s by the US military 
theorist John Boyd (1976; 1992). A former fighter pilot, his OODA (Observe, Orient, 
Decide, and Act) loop is a conceptualisation of a constructivist process of iterative 
adaptation and learning in an environment of hard uncertainty. Boyd argued that the 
overreliance on advanced technology (air-to-air missiles) by US pilots during the 
Korean War made them over-reliant on this one technological ‘fix’186 and came at the 
expense of flying and tactical skills. True to its original application as a model of pilot 
decision-making in fighter combat the OODA loop (see Figure 12) focuses on the 
ability and need to complete the iterations of the loop faster than an opponent to 
thereby gain the initiative and act in the most advantageous way at that moment in 
time. Deeply influenced by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (1976; 1992; Osinga, 
2007), Boyd accepted that complete knowledge or absolute control of every situation 
was a chimera.187 In other words he accepted the reality of irreversibility and 
unbounded uncertainty (and therefore the impossibility of perfect knowledge) 
(Vercelli, 1998). Instead of the ‘arrogant’ search for certainty (through the 
technological complexity of missile systems, for example), what mattered was to 
respond more quickly and effectively than your opponent to the emergent complexity 
of the combat environment.  
                                                
185 Hitler dismissed the Maginot Line by claiming that “I shall manoeuvre France right out of her Maginot Line without 
losing a single soldier” (in Liddell Hart 1954, p304). 
186 In other words a path dependency was being established. 
187 He also based his ideas on systems theory and thermodynamics, stating that “… entropy must increase in any 
closed system - or, for that matter, in any system that cannot communicate in an ordered fashion with other systems 
or environments external to itself” (Boyd 1976, n.p.). However, it must be noted that his attitude towards ‘entropy’ 
(this term is used here as it appears in Boyd’s work) appears to be influenced by the ‘entropy = disorder’ fallacy 
outlined in Chapter 1. 
Anthony Richardson THESIS: Dismantling the Wall 
 
123 
 
 
Figure 12, Patrick Edwin Moran, Creative Commons 3.0 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OODA_loop#/media/File:OODA.Boyd.svg (accessed 12/05/14) 
The crucial element in this OODA loop is therefore shortening or simplifying the 
processes that underlie each stage of the cycle to increase the speed at which each 
iteration is completed and suitable action is implemented. This is clearly connected to 
one element of complexity outlined in Part A: system interconnectedness or linkages. 
As discussed on pages 40 and 41, the more linkages or connections comprising a 
system the more complex it is. These linkages may be any number of human or 
technological interactions, but together they make a particular system process 
happen. To use a simple example: the more complex a recipe, the more ingredients 
it will require and the more cooking ‘steps’ it will involve to complete the finished dish.  
For Boyd, the more ‘steps’ required in any system process, the harder it is to 
complete the decision making cycle and thus the more time it will take. Complexity 
slows down system responses to internal or external changes.188 Even more 
importantly, in terms of systems resilience, the more linkages involved in any system 
the less resilient that system will be in the face of disruptions. This mirrors the 
insights around the ‘tightness of feedback loops’ from the ‘social sustainability’ 
literature discussed in chapter 4 (Edwards, 2009; Cork, 2010b). 
Boyd’s ideas remain influential in military and business circles (Osinga, 2007; 
Lowther, 2007; Borum 2010, p39) although he never published any works of length. 
Boyd’s ideas have also been one of the major influences on the current debate over 
the perceived challenges facing ‘traditional’ national militaries since the end of the 
Cold War. The increase in warfare involving non-state actors, variously described as 
insurgency, asymmetric warfare or "war among the people" (Smith, 2007) has not 
only led to the ‘arrogant’ focus on technology and strategic distance outlined in the 
previous section. Instead the ‘humble’ aspect of military theory has also addressed 
these challenges and in so doing provoked a strong debate over the best way to 
approach them. 
 
Fourth Generation War 
This debate has been encapsulated to some extent by the use of the term Fourth 
Generation War (4GW) (Lind et al, 1989; Hammes, 2006; 2008; Terriff et al, 2008) to 
describe the sort of insurgencies, or asymmetric or ‘new’ (Kaldor, 1999) wars (in 
which at least one combatant is a non-state actor), that are increasingly common. 
The proponents of such a concept argue that the sort of high-tech and large-scale 
                                                
188 Hence the informal concept of bloatware from the field of software programming: the more any piece of software 
has had subroutines, patches and fixes incorporated (another example of Tainter’s concept of complexity as a 
problem solving tactic) the slower and more unwieldy that program becomes – and the more susceptible to crashing. 
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war which modern militaries are designed to fight is increasingly unlikely, and what 
has replaced it are protracted low-intensity wars against irregular forces which hide 
within their constituent populations and make as much use of media, cultural and 
political tactics as military ones (Lind et al, 1989; Hammes, 2006; 2008; Borum, 
2010; Mele, 2013). In doing so, such non-state military actors play to their obvious 
strengths while negating those of their traditional military adversary. As the recent 
conflicts in southern Lebanon (2006) and Gaza (2008/9, 2012 and 2014) 
demonstrate, every use of military force involves the risk of civilian casualties (given 
that the insurgents are often fighting from within urban areas) which then weakens 
the political legitimacy of the national or multinational military forces. At the same 
time the increasing ubiquity of technologies like IT, video production capabilities and 
drones and rockets allows the fourth generation opponent to wage ‘propaganda war’ 
through sophisticated media campaigns and with an element of strategic distance. At 
the same time while they are not bound by considerations or restrictions such as the 
Geneva Convention any abandonment of such principles on the part of their state 
adversaries leads again to a loss of legitimacy. 
Building on these understandings, 4GW theory also argues that simple, decentralised 
insurgencies will always outperform traditional hierarchical militaries. The work of 
Boyd on the decision-making/implementation process (particularly in times of stress 
or competition) argues that traditional ‘command and control’ hierarchical structures 
can be overwhelmed by the speed of events while more horizontal organisations 
(assuming response capabilities are likewise horizontally distributed) are better able 
to adapt and respond (Boyd, 1992; Borum, 2010). At the same time, decentralised 
4G opponents have a much wider stability region, or phase space, within which to 
adapt to changing circumstances as they are not bound by the same moral,189 
organisational (Burke, 2004; Trafton, 2007; Mele, 2013)190 or logistical191 constraints 
as more traditional military forces. 
In terms of the overall argument of this thesis, this discussion of military tactics in 
light of radical uncertainty makes two important points. The first is that the more 
complex a system becomes (measured by the criterion of increasing system linkages 
needed to maintain or perform any function), the slower and less flexible that system 
is to unpredictable disruptions or challenges. On the other hand, more modular or 
horizontal (as opposed to hierarchic) organisational structures are correspondingly 
faster to react and more flexible in their responses: providing of course that their 
response capability is likewise decentralised (redundancy). To again return to the 
language of ecological science: the tighter the feedback loops, the more responsive 
the system to shocks and disruptions in a timely fashion (Edwards, 2009; Cork, 
2010b). These insights (modularity, horizontal interaction between nodes, and 
redundancy) comprise characteristics of the Hedgehog Defence, which will be clearly 
outlined in the coming pages. 
 
Declining returns on investment in military complexity 
Strike hard who cares--shoot straight who can-- 
The odds are on the cheaper man.... 
With home-bred hordes the hillsides teem.  
The troopships bring us one by one,  
                                                
189 Such as the Geneva Convention or the moral imperative to avoid civilian casualties as much as possible. 
190 A radical 4GW group such as al Qaeda is not merely decentralised; it does not ‘exist’ in the traditional 
organisational sense and may be better described as a ‘loose affiliation’ or ‘network of networks’. Burke (2004, p8) 
describes al Qaeda as consisting of “three elements: a hardcore, a network of co-opted groups and an ideology”. 
191 Above all because in the great majority of cases such groups use much less sophisticated weaponry than a 
traditional nation-state military, and thus have no need for the sort of extensive (in many cases global) supply 
networks their opponents require. 
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At vast expense of time and steam,  
To slay Afridis where they run.  
The "captives of our bow and spear" 
Are cheap, alas! as we are dear. 
Kipling (1886) Arithmetic on the Frontier 
A further criticism of the RMA approach by 4GW proponents such as Hammes 
(2008) and Lind et al (1998) is over cost; ballooning military budgets (with regard to 
the US Pentagon in particular) are an inescapable effect of the RMA/FSD 
approaches to military strategy. For example the US has until recently been 
embroiled in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in which billions of dollars have been spent 
on socio-technological systems to protect US/Coalition troops against their biggest 
killer - $10 IEDs.192 For the proponents of the 4GW approach to modern combat the 
drive to greater socio-technological complexity on the part of the US military is 
ultimately self-defeating as the costs of the complexity eventually overwhelm any 
benefit gained from it. Thus Tainter’s dynamic of declining returns on complexity is 
still applicable: 
Arms races are the classic example of diminishing returns to complexity. Any 
competitive nation will quickly match an opponent’s advances in armaments, 
personnel, logistics, or intelligence, so that investments typically yield no 
lasting advantage or security. The costs of being a competitive state 
continuously rise, while the return on investment inexorably declines. (Tainter 
2006, p98). 
At the same time the development and implementation of such technological 
complexity costs energy and thus the increasing size and complexity of armies and 
the technological complexity of the weapons they use has driven the ever-increasing 
focus on logistics in the former case and energy supplies in the latter: 
Soldier for soldier… the modern U.S. Army uses about 10 times as much fuel 
as did Gen. Patton’s troops in World War II. And Patton’s army used about 10 
times as much fuel per capita as did the American Expeditionary Force in 
France under Gen. Pershing in World War I. (Wiggin 2010, n.p.) 
The most recent Coalition campaigns in Afghanistan and the attendant costs of 
maintaining military forces in that country only reinforce the 19th century ‘arithmetic’ of 
Kipling. In 2010 75% of total supplies came more than 1000km overland from 
Pakistan (Wiggin, 2010). The 2010 closure of the Khyber Pass following Taliban 
attacks on convoys and US airstrikes on Pakistan (Wiggin, 2010; Felbab-Brown, 
2012) only demonstrates the importance of logistics and the rising energy costs of 
increasing military complexity. It took more than seven months of negotiations to 
reopen the Pass and this delay cost the US hundreds of millions of dollars in extra 
costs involved in shipping supplies through Central Asia (Felbab-Brown, 2012). 
Estimates put the total cost of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars at somewhere between 
$4 and $6 trillion US dollars (Bilmes, 2013), making them the most costly in history.  
 
Counterinsurgency (COIN) and simplicity 
Given these challenges to traditional national armies, the proponents of 4GW echo 
the central argument of this thesis that the only way out of such a dilemma is to 
simplify such militaries in a manner similar to their opponents. Instead of the massive 
technological and financial efforts involved in the ultimately fruitless drive for Full 
                                                
192 The Victorian-made Bushmaster vehicle used in Afghanistan is a case in point – at time of writing each cost AUS 
$670,000 (Pyke, 2011). 
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Spectrum Dominance the field of counterinsurgency (COIN) has demonstrated a 
more ‘humble’ attitude to system complexity. 
In fact this awareness of the essential unpredictability of war is one constant among 
theorists in this field (Nagl, 2002; Galula, 2006; Lowther, 2007; Borum, 2010; 
Kilcullen, 2010) along with a corresponding focus on local awareness (intelligence), 
specific context and thus adaptability of response instead of extensive and complex 
planning or technological ‘fixes’. This has led to an awareness of the limitations of 
technology (and firepower in particular) (Nagl, 2002; United States Army and Marine 
Corps, 2007; Robb, 2007; Mele, 2013) and the need for local knowledge and 
decentralised/local and swift decision-making (Nagl, 2002; Galula, 2006; United 
States Army and Marine Corps, 2007; Kilcullen, 2010; Borum, 2010; Arquilla, 2011). 
Even given the mixed reception to the concept of four ‘generations’ of warfare 
(Barnett, 2010; Terriff et al, 2008), there are many resonances between this 
conceptualisation of asymmetric warfare and ‘traditional’ COIN. Of great relevance to 
this thesis is the recognition (whether labelled COIN or 4GW) of the need to simplify 
technologically (and logistically) for two reasons. The first is to reduce the financial 
and energy costs of this style of warfare. For example, Galula (2006) implies an 
awareness of FFE thermodynamics and the costs of complexity in his section headed 
Insurgency is cheap, Counterinsurgency costly: 
…disorder – the normal state of nature – is cheap to create and very 
expensive to prevent… Because the counterinsurgent cannot escape the 
responsibility for maintaining order, the ratio of expenses between him and 
the insurgent is high. (p6-7) 
The second reason for simplicity is to increase adaptability and resilience. As Galula 
again argues, in the section Fluidity of the Insurgent, Rigidity of the Counterinsurgent, 
counterinsurgency: 
is complicated for the counterinsurgent, who has to take into account 
conflicting demands (protection of the population and the economy, and 
offensive operations against the insurgents) and who has to coordinate all the 
components of his forces – the administrator, the policeman, the soldier, the 
social worker etc. The insurgent can afford a loose, primitive organisation: he 
can delegate a wide margin of initiative, but his opponent cannot. (2006, p7) 
This quote nicely outlines the cost of hegemonic simplification: the cost of 
maintaining the socio-technological complexity necessary for the functioning of an 
industrialised society. For many theorists of COIN (Nagl, 2002; Galula, 2006; 
Kilcullen, 2010) the imperative for successful counterinsurgency is to simplify 
systems and organisational structure like the insurgents. For a final example: 
You will be weighed down with body armour, rations, extra ammunition, 
communications gear, and a thousand other things. The enemy will carry a 
rifle or RPG, a shemagh,193 and a water bottle if he’s lucky. Unless you 
ruthlessly lighten your load and enforce a culture of speed and mobility, the 
insurgents will consistently outrun and outmanoeuver you. (Kilcullen 2010, 
p33)194 
Another key point is that although such an understanding of COIN can take a clearly 
systems theory approach to fighting insurgencies,195 this does not approach the 
                                                
193 Head scarf or keffiyeh. 
194 Burke (2004, p254-6) describes a similar dynamic during Operation Mountain Lion in 2002 in Afghanistan, where 
Coalition soldiers, backed (or hampered) by the use of advanced (and heavy) technology (in some cases carrying 
140lb packs up the mountainsides) were unable to capture a single Taliban or al Qaeda commander. 
195 This can include an understanding of them as FFE systems: “A key factor in the systems dynamics of 
insurgencies – and another feature they share with organic systems – is that given a sufficient, stable energy flow 
over time these systems eventually become self-sustaining” (Kilcullen 2010, p205) 
Anthony Richardson THESIS: Dismantling the Wall 
 
127 
 
‘arrogance’ of the FSD approaches. Above all, the focus is less on the killing or 
capture of enemies, or even the prevention of attacks, than on the disruption of 
system dynamics (including the energy flows that allow such complex adaptive 
systems to maintain themselves): 
As the organic systems model of insurgency shows, disrupting this network 
demands that we target the links (the web of dependencies itself) and the 
energy flows (inputs and outputs that pass between actors in the jihad) as the 
primary method of disrupting the system. An exclusive focus on attacking the 
boundary interactions of the system – that is, attempting to stop terrorist 
attacks or catch the terrorists themselves – simply imposes an evolutionary 
dynamic that causes the insurgent system to develop better methods of 
attack. (Kilcullen 2010, p217). 
The rejection of what this thesis labels The Wall by such theorists of COIN can be 
seen in the current US debate over the scrapping of the A10 Thunderbolt ground 
attack aircraft (a relatively technologically simple aircraft nicknamed the Warthog) in 
favour of the more advanced F35 (Campbell 2003, p188-202). This debate is a 
microcosm of a broader debate over the drive for superiority through technological 
complexity (Nagl, 2002; United States Army and Marine Corps, 2007; Robb, 2007; 
Arquilla, 2011; Mele, 2013). 
However, a more clearly COIN approach to asymmetric warfare can be politically 
problematic as it implicitly rejects the assumptions around strategic distance and 
force protection (or even the pursuit of absolute protection from terrorist attacks) 
which comprise The Wall. Such a ‘humble’ approach to military complexity and 
uncertainty involves the recognition that one’s own casualties will inevitably rise; the 
focus shifts from strategic distance and force protection to close engagement with the 
complexity of local situations. In a world in which consensus about war goals and 
aims is not guaranteed and militaries (for the related political challenges connected 
with conscription) are generally voluntary, this is often too unpalatable to be 
considered.196 In the end an ever-increasing technological complexity is basically 
unavoidable if such offensive or neo-colonial urban military operations are to be 
undertaken (leaving aside the obvious question as to whether they should be 
undertaken at all…). 
At this point the discussion of military theory returns to the issue of urban defence 
and resilience by examining one possible way of applying the adaptive capacity and 
resilience of the 4GW insurgency to the complex socio-technological systems of 
contemporary cities. To do this it will introduce and examine the military tactic of the 
Hedgehog Defence (HD). 
 
An alternative model of resilience: the Hedgehog Defence (HD) 
He who would defend everything defends nothing. 
Sun Tzu (2007) 
The Hedgehog Defence (HD) is a defensive strategy in which defending military 
forces are organised in modular and self-sustaining nodes. At the same time, such 
                                                
196 This explains Lind’s obsession with ‘cultural Marxism’ (Lind, 2000; Wilson, 2015) and the loss of legitimacy and 
grand narratives it implies. For any modern state actor such as the US to win a Fourth Generation war there must be 
shared purpose - easier to achieve in a close-knit and often clandestine insurgency than a pluralist liberal democracy. 
Given Lind sees the engagement of the US in such wars as a matter of ‘life and death’, and 4GW as necessitating 
longer timeframes and greater casualties than techno-focussed warfare, he expends great effort bemoaning the 
‘crippling’ effects of the moral relativism he sees infecting the US in particular. However, if one has less concern with 
either the existential or moral need for liberal democracies to wage such wars, it is possible to accept his insights 
regarding the nature of asymmetric war while safely ignoring the reactionary conservatism of his cultural theories. 
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modular ‘hedgehogs’ are largely autonomous in their responses to attacking forces, 
as there is no centralised or hierarchic command structure or overall defensive plan. 
While the general outline of the HD approach is well understood, the provenance of 
this decentralised approach to defence is contested. What follows is a brief historical 
overview of the development of this defensive tactic – this is important for the overall 
argument of the thesis as the organisational context in which the HD tactic was most 
fully developed (the German Wermacht in WWII) was one in which the challenge of 
planning and acting in environments of extreme uncertainty was openly considered. 
In that sense the history of German military theory clearly demonstrates an 
awareness of one of the overarching concerns of this thesis. 
Historically, the HD model of modular defensive nodes, as opposed to a linear 
defensive line or wall, has resonances with both the Roman testudo formation197 and 
the 19th century infantry squares used by the British at Waterloo and later in the 
Sudan to repel cavalry. However, the first references to defensive ‘hedgehogs’ 
appear in the inter-war period. 
For example in the 1930’s the defence of Hong Kong was based originally on the 
evocatively named Gin Drinkers Line (a static defence-in-depth system of hardened 
pill boxes, trenches, observation posts, tunnels and gun emplacements) which was 
also named ‘the Maginot of the East’ (Lawrence et al, 2009). However by 1940 this 
had been superseded by the concept of a ‘Hedgehog Defence’ (so named). This 
meant that the defensive approach was adjusted to focus instead on fortified 
‘hedgehogs’ or defensive nodes that were more clearly modular and self-reliant 
(Lawrence et al, 2009). 
At the same time the system of pillboxes built throughout south-eastern Britain during 
the ‘Phoney War’ of 1939-1940 followed a similar approach to defence. Faced with 
the strong possibility of German invasion given events on the Continent, the UK 
authorities first started construction of a number of static defensive lines198 across the 
south-east: 
Over 18,000 concrete pill-boxes were constructed, together with hundreds of 
miles of defensive ditches, hundreds of airfields, and tens of thousands of gun 
emplacements, radar stations, air-raid shelters, tank-traps, bombing decoys, 
nissen huts and other structures great and small. (Denison 1995, n.p.) 
While constructed at great cost a shift in military thinking led the authorities to 
abandon such static defences, instead adopting 
a more fluid strategy, in which the invasion would be allowed to happen. A 
strong line of coastal defences would remain, to give the enemy a bloody 
nose, and to hold them up just long enough to allow the mobile field army to 
pick a good place for a pitched battle. (Denison 1995, n.p.) 
While the direct cause for such shifts are unknown it is not unreasonable to conclude 
that they may have been due to the British experience of German Blitzkrieg and 
lightning Japanese advances in the first years of the war. Almost at the same time 
(after the evacuation of Dunkirk), the French general Weyrand ordered his troops to 
convert numerous villages of the Somme and Aisne into hedgehogs (so named): 
mined, sandbagged and barbed-wired strongpoints (Alexander 2013, p359). 
However this fluid and modular approach to defence has most commonly been 
attributed to the German Wehrmacht during the Barbarossa campaign in Russia 
(Historical Division, European Command, 1951; Wray, 1986) and it is this example of 
                                                
197 The Tortoise - a formation in which a small unit would use their interlocking shields to provide protection on their 
sides and from above. 
198 The best preserved of these defensive lines has been described as “the Hadrian’s Wall of the 20th century” 
(Denison, 1995). 
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the HD approach which will be examined in more detail (not least due to the clear 
philosophical and practical development of German defensive doctrine over the 
course of the two world wars). The German invasion of the Soviet Union began in 
1941 and the campaign lasted for four years, by which time the exhausted and 
decimated German forces began a general withdrawal which led all the way to 
Germany and ultimately to the outskirts of Berlin.  
Interestingly the theoretical and tactical/strategic trajectory which led the German 
Army to this defensive system was different from that of the British Army. The 
innovation of HD was driven by the vastness of the Russian terrain, which meant that 
both energy logistics (food, equipment and above all fuel) and shortages in men and 
material were prime concerns for the invading forces. Traditional Russian scorched-
earth tactics199 only exacerbated such difficulties. It was simply impractical to assume 
that optimum defences could be provided along entire fronts which were thousands 
of kilometres in length, while every successful advance meant that supply lines grew 
longer. In such a situation the German defensive doctrine of ‘elastic defence’, borne 
out of WWI and used in throughout the first half or WWII was simply impractical 
(Wray, 1986). 
To provide some historical context to these developments, the German doctrine of 
elastic defence (defence in depth) relied on multiple defensive lines which were to be 
defended, abandoned and then reclaimed according to the strength and momentum 
of the adversary’s attacks. Such flexibility involved the recourse to tactical 
withdrawals when necessary followed by counterattacks when the opponent lost 
momentum or the local tactical situation changed. The greater part of the defender’s 
military strength (which by WWII meant the armoured tank units) were kept in the 
rear to launch such timely counter-attacks (US War Department, 1945; Smith 2007, 
p129). The focus of this approach was on flexibility. As such it implied that both the 
time and resources were available to set up such defences and that German 
defensive forces retained the coordination and mobility to respond effectively and 
quickly to attacks at any point along the line. Finally it relied on the ability of local/low-
level German commanders to display initiative without the need for hierarchic 
directives (including the confidence to disobey such central orders if they determined 
local circumstances demanded a different course of action). Such a culture of 
decentralised decision-making and initiative was actively encouraged by the German 
military from WWI onwards through investment in both training and a military culture 
which accepted the possibility of failure at the local level (Grint, 2014).200 The 
difference in military culture required by such tactics is demonstrated by a 
comparison with the British Army of the time, with its focus on discipline, rigid 
hierarchy and complex, centralised military operations (Grint, 2014). The importance 
of these three preconditions for elastic defence (time and resources/energy; 
coordination and mobility; and initiative at the level of localised/decentralised 
command) to both the development of the hedgehog defence and this thesis’ view of 
urban resilience will now be explained in some detail.  
First, as outlined above, it was precisely a lack of time and resources (relative to the 
spatial scale of the Russian theatre) which led to the abandonment of the orthodox 
defensive tactics. There were simply not enough men and materials to hold ground in 
such situations (particularly given the speed of the German advances at the outset of 
the campaign) and attempts to do so merely led to unacceptable losses among the 
German infantry in particular (especially given the huge numerical advantages the 
Russians held) (Wray, 1986; Curtis, 2005). This is analogous to the point (outlined in 
the previous chapter) that it is the resource (energy) surpluses of developed cities 
                                                
199 Napoleon’s Grand Armee was subjected to similar tactics during its invasion of Russia in 1812.  
200 That is, junior officers were not punished for failures which were the result of informed individual responses to 
local conditions (as opposed to rank incompetence or stupidity). 
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which provide them with the adaptive capacity (the flexibility) to react to disasters and 
contingencies – but this capacity is dependent upon this surplus. Once this surplus 
dissipates such an approach to defence or urban resilience becomes untenable. 
Thus, for example, the defence of Hong Kong failed in 1941 due to a dearth of troops 
and other military resources (Lawrence et al, 2009). 
Second it was the initiative of local commanders that led to the innovation of 
defensive hedgehogs (so named by the troops themselves). The first recorded 
implementation of the hedgehog defence by the Wehrmacht was in the first week of 
the 1941 Barbarossa campaign: 
Several hay barns in a major clearing were selected as the location for the 
divisional command post. Covered by thick underbrush, the tanks were 
placed in a wide circle around the barns with their guns ready to fire at the 
edge of the woods. In front of the tanks was an outer ring of infantry in 
foxholes and ditches and behind embankments which enabled the tanks to 
fire over their heads. Security patrols and outposts formed an outer cordon. 
The Russians recognized the strength of these protective measures and did 
not dare carry out the surprise attack they had planned. They resigned 
themselves to harassing the hedgehog area with tank and machine gun fire 
and a few rounds of artillery shells. (Historical Division, European Command, 
1951, n.p.)  
Such defensive innovations201 were not originally designed to hold front lines; they 
were not manifestations of the Wall. Instead they were designed as defensive tactics 
for isolated units acting within a fluid and unpredictable military environment. In such 
contexts these innovations were highly successful – at least until attrition led to the 
loss of the well-trained local commanders which had made such an approach 
possible (Wray 1986, p47; Curtis, 2005). These tactics worked because they met all 
three preconditions outlined above (time and resources/energy; coordination and 
mobility; and initiative at the level of localised/decentralised command), especially 
since the ability of the Luftwaffe to both maintain air superiority and supply such 
pockets by air meant that resources were provided and a level of coordination and 
mobility could be expected. 
Eventually however the hedgehog approach became a stop-gap and improvised 
measure for attempting to hold large front lines within drastic and shrinking resource 
constraints. This development was driven primarily by resource constraints, but also 
by Hitler’s insistence that German forces hold ground at all costs (Historical Division, 
European Command, 1951; Wray, 1986; Curtis, 2005) - a mindset which transformed 
the elastic approach of German defensive doctrine into a static and ultimately brittle 
defensive wall. Therefore the basis of German defensive doctrine (flexibility and the 
willingness to concede ground before decisively counterattacking)202 was no longer 
possible. On the one hand implacable political directives transformed the concept of 
flexible defence into a static wall, while on the other there was not a sufficient number 
of armoured units (tanks) to provide the concentration of forces203 for effective 
counterattacks across such large lines. The defensive situation became once again 
untenable, especially in the context of Russian winters and overextended supply 
lines. Eventually the horrendous losses taken by the infantry defending the 
hedgehogs (who were ordered to not give any ground) led to conflict with the tank 
commanders; the former pleaded for tanks to be deployed in a static manner 
alongside the hedgehog defenders, while the latter argued that they needed to be 
kept for concentrated counterattacks (Curtis, 2005). 
                                                
201 At no time were such tactics listed in German military manuals (Historical Division, European Command, 1951). 
202 The same understanding underpinned the later more fluid model for the defence of the UK described above. 
203 Especially in light of the casualties and loss of equipment the German Army had taken by this time. 
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This leads into an acknowledgement of the third group of related preconditions for 
the successful implementation of a hedgehog defence – coordination, mobility and 
local agency. The hedgehog model implies that the holding of ground is not the prime 
consideration, as there is no continuous defensive ‘wall’ to stop the passage of 
enemy forces. Instead the modular hedgehogs (or nodes) ‘bog down’ any attack (in 
particular by threatening the supply lines of any attack which successfully penetrates 
the defensive lines) while the mobile reserves can counterattack at a time and place 
which is most effective. However the vast distances involved in the Russian 
campaign and the losses incurred by that point meant that the individual hedgehogs 
(often based on commandeered and fortified Russian villages) were too widely 
spread to either offer effective resistance to incursions (agency) or in many cases 
(given winter conditions and/or night time) even identify such incursions (a lack of 
coordination). At the same time there was not enough of a mobile reserve to 
effectively provide a counterattack function while the strength of the Luftwaffe was 
falling (the loss of mobility). The response on the part of German commanders was to 
start building a network of trenches and other defensive works to try and ‘close off’ 
the gaps between the hedgehogs. Thus the focus shifted even further towards the 
model of the Wall; the static holding of ground and force protection rather than elastic 
or responsive defence (Wray, 1986; Curtis, 2005). In the end the collapse of such an 
immobile Wall, given resource constraints and the vastness of the territory to be 
defended, was inevitable. 
To summarise, the Hedgehog Defence comprises an organisational structure of a 
loose network of modular ‘nodes’ which are self-contained and self-reliant and 
organised horizontally rather than vertically (hierarchically). This means they react 
independently to changing situations without the need for instructions from a higher 
authority (instead they are horizontally linked in terms of communication to the other 
nodes in the system). Furthermore, in terms of Boyd’s OODA loop, they can do this 
more quickly than hierarchical or centralised systems due to the localised nature of 
both their command structure and adaptive surplus (of energy and other resources).  
However it is crucial to acknowledge that organisation at a higher scale still exists, 
and is responsible both for the provision of the energy and resource surpluses that 
make the modular hedgehogs self-reliant and the maintenance and direction of a 
mobile reserve to respond as needed. Practically speaking, a world in which every 
city, or every component of those cities, was completely modular and/or simplified, 
would not be possible. 
The Hedgehog Defence is predicated upon a rejection of the conceit of perfect 
understanding of complex systems (ie to predict what disasters will happen, or how) 
and the resultant misplaced confidence in the ability of complex socio-technological 
systems (The Wall) to provide protection. Indeed if such disasters overwhelm the 
preventative or protective measures that exist, then the investment involved will have 
been wasted. Instead the goal of a Hedgehog Defence is to not attempt to predict 
future events or situations, but instead focus on the resilience of the system and its 
ability to react quickly to changing events. The HD approach fully accepts that 
elements of the system will be lost in times of stress/disaster - the focus is on 
maintaining response ability for the system as a whole (again as defined by the 
observer). In WWII the Wermacht’s defensive doctrine (Historical Division, European 
Command, 1951) was not focussed on force protection (the contrast with current US 
military doctrine is stark) but on maintaining the flexibility and rapidity of response. 
The proposed model of the Hedgehog Defence should be seen as incorporating a 
similar understanding of complex adaptive systems – the focus is not on protecting 
every inhabitant or system of a particular city, but on the adaptive capacity of the 
whole. 
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In that sense there is no defensive plan with a hedgehog approach to defence; the 
‘plan’ is to react to circumstances as they occur and then respond quickly and locally. 
From all the individual responses of each node to its immediate environment grows 
an overall response to the situation:204 the various nodes of the network share a 
common goal without following a centralised approach to achieving that goal. They 
are neither subordinate components in a centrally and hierarchically organised and 
directed organisation or free agents within a self-organising market whose 
untrammelled pursuit of individual self-interest magically leads to optimal outcomes 
for the whole. 
 
The characteristics of the Hedgehog Defence 
The HD approach to defence demonstrates the following six interconnected 
characteristics: 
1. Modularity - to counter the tendency to cascading failures each node 
demonstrates individual agency in terms of determining their own 
response to disruptions without the need to wait for hierarchic instructions 
or centralised plans, plus… 
2. Horizontal interaction between nodes - to allow for knowledge of both 
local situations and the implementation and outcome of individual nodal 
actions to be disseminated across the network as quickly as possible, 
and… 
3. Redundancy - the localised reserve capacity (of energy capabilities or 
logistics) to both implement those (re)actions without delay and allow 
each node to maintain itself for as long as possible, in the interests of a… 
4. Common purpose - a common overarching purpose exists across the 
network towards which the individual survival of particular nodes can be 
subsumed (they are not driven by self-interest), yet there remains… 
5. A focus on allowing and even promoting diversity - in nodal structure 
and decentralised responses (thus rejecting any hegemonic simplification 
and its attendant energy costs), although…  
6. Higher scale organisational complexity - still exists, and it has three 
purposes: 
• to determine and implement205 the overarching goal(s) of the 
whole network 
• to provide or assign the energy, logistics or other resources 
that will allow each individual node to become a ‘generalist’206 
• to provide the mobile reserve capacity to respond to fluid 
situations as best determined through awareness and 
monitoring of the horizontal interactions. 
                                                
204 While this could be read as an example of swarm intelligence this thesis has not worked with this concept to 
describe such adaptive decentralised systems. This is partly due to debate over the definition of ‘swarm intelligence’, 
in particular over whether such an entity or aggregation would display a sense of overall system purpose (direction is 
obviously excluded in such a concept). An answer in the negative would then imply the same criticism this thesis has 
made of the free-market concept of rational self maximsers. Given this confusion this thesis has chosen to avoid 
using this terminology. 
205 Whether through fiat, formal democratic participation or consensus. 
206 This was identified by Rose (2014) as a crucial element of successful urban farming projects or movements. The 
government is needed to provide resources and organizational support to those implementing these examples urban 
farming: without taking a centralised leadership role. Kallis (2015) likewise acknowledges the necessity of global (in 
concert with localised) action to address global challenges such as climate change. 
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Similarities of the HD approach with other models of resilience 
Of course, the HD approach suggested by this thesis demonstrates similarities with, 
and echoes the recommendations of, other approaches to complexity and emergent 
risks. For example, the approach to femtorisks recommended by Frank et al (2014) 
directly mirrors the characteristics of modularity, redundancy and diversity which the 
HD aims to promote: 
In any complex system, robustness (often termed resilience in the ecological 
literature) depends upon the balance among three interrelated aspects: (i) the 
diversity of the units within the system, which encodes its adaptive capacity; 
(ii) the extent to which the system contains functional redundancies, providing 
insurance against the loss of key elements; and (iii) the degree of modularity 
with respect to the coupling between components. (p17360) 
Another organisational model, growing out of the COIN field and closely related to 
the military concept of Fourth Generation Warfare, is that of the network organisation 
or netwarrior (Arquilla et al, 2001). This concept describes a highly resilient military 
opponent with a flexible, non-hierarchic model and strong interlinkages within its 
organisational network. Thus it mirrors the HD characteristics of horizontal interaction 
between nodes and common purpose: 
The most potent netwarriors will not only be highly networked and have a 
capacity to swarm, they will also be held together by strong social ties, have 
secure communications technologies, and project a common story about why 
they are together and what they need to do. (Arquilla et al, 2001) 
While the six characteristics of the Hedgehog Defence are present in other 
conceptions of resilient organisations, as the examples demonstrate, this thesis 
argues that the Hedgehog model is an original proposal which is unique in bringing 
together all six of these characteristics. In doing so, the HD approach to resilience 
addresses the five interconnected vulnerabilities of complexity outlined at the end of 
Chapter 3 (pages 69-75). These will now be outlined in turn. 
 
Addressing the five interconnected vulnerabilities of complex adaptive systems 
1) The cost of complexity and declining returns 
The Hedgehog Defence represents a rejection of the increasing complexity which is, 
for Tainter, a problem-solving technique and, for the Panarchy theory, the result of 
energy dissipation in situations of emergent complexity. Instead it proposes a model 
of system simplification which forgoes absolute ‘solutionism’ (Morozov, 2014) and, in 
accepting organisational diversity, rejects the sort of hegemonic simplification which 
relies on a complex and costly system of standardisation and control. On the other 
hand each modular node in the system faces higher energy costs (redundancy) as it 
is forced to become a ‘generalist’, losing the energy discounts and thus individual 
specialisation that were provided by higher scale systems. 
2) Increasing importance and yet fragility of high-gain energy supplies 
The redundancy implicit in the HD approach at least provisionally addresses this 
fragility through both the promotion of decentralised energy reserves and the 
corresponding reduction in reliance on fragile or extended energy supply lines. 
3) Path dependency 
The lower socio-technological complexity of the overall system, connected with the 
HD approach, means a reduction in path dependency and sunk costs, and thus the 
possibility of wider ‘phase spaces’ for future action to respond to unforeseen 
circumstances. Of course, at the same time, the tension is always for such socio-
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technological complexity to keep rising in response to identified problems – and 
indeed the desire to keep the options open implies the need for exactly such a 
development in the future.  
4) The lack of diversity and thus flexibility 
The diversity of the HD approach, in which individual nodes organise themselves and 
react independently to disruptions without central direction, provides the diversity and 
flexibility of response from which successful adaptations can arise (Arquilla et al, 
2001; Frank et al, 2014).  
5) The tendency to cascading failures  
Again the modularity of the Hedgehog Defence and the corresponding reduction in 
reliance on network connections can, at least partly, ameliorate the danger and 
damage of cascading failures (Gunderson & Holling, 2002; Buldyrev et al, 2010; 
Crutchfield, 2009). 
 
Some further military examples of the ‘Hedgehog Defence’  
Tainter provides only one example (Tainter 2006, p97-8) of a society as a whole 
successfully implementing a HD approach to increasing its overall resilience. This 
was the Byzantine empire of the 7th century CE which, in the face of existential 
military and economic challenges, survived by radically simplifying its organisational 
structure in just such a way. Throughout the preceding centuries the empire had 
addressed the challenges (primarily military) it faced through the dynamic of 
increasing complexity (a larger bureaucracy and army and increased regimentation 
of the population) and thus found itself subject to the concomitant trend of decreasing 
returns on this complexity. In time the ever-increasing taxation (to pay for the 
complex Imperial bureaucracy and military needed to maintain such a system) led to 
the abandonment of farmland by peasant farmers, a shrinking population and tax 
base and the inability of the Imperial administration to pay for its troops. 
However the introduction of the Theme system represented a systematic 
simplification of the economic, military and social organisation of the empire. It was 
based on a conscious devolution by the central administration in Constantinople of 
economic and political power to locally administered regions called themes. The 
grants of land to soldiers in return for hereditary military service represented a 
conscious distribution of energy reserves to lower scales of organisation as land was 
the one manifestation of (solar) energy the state still possessed.207 Increasingly the 
localised/modular military forces of each theme (under its strategos or military 
governor) could support themselves and the peasant-soldiers were increasingly 
effective as they were fighting to protect their own lands. In essence each theme 
became a self-sufficient node with the energy (food and manpower) surplus and 
military capacity208 to provide agency in the face of challenges: 
The transformation ramified throughout Byzantine society. Both central and 
provincial government were simplified, and the costs of government were 
reduced. Provincial civil administration was merged into the military. Cities 
across Anatolia contracted to fortified hilltops.209 The economy developed into 
its medieval form, organized around self-sufficient manors. There was little 
education beyond basic literacy and numeracy, and literature itself consisted 
                                                
207 Although the Empire was much reduced in size by this date, due to the rapid conquests of the new Muslim armies. 
208 With the remaining military forces directly (centrally) controlled by the Imperial administration in Constantinople 
and used to respond to invasions (or magnate rebellion!) as needed. 
209 A ‘hedgehog’ – each node was responsible for its own military defence with garrisons drawn from the local 
residents, rather than organised and dispatched centrally from Constantinople. 
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of little more than lives of saints. The period is sometimes called the 
Byzantine Dark Age. (Tainter 2006, p97-98) 
The negative effects of this simplification, in particular in terms of the arts and 
education, were an inescapable consequence of the loss of cultural complexity 
connected to the weakening of network connections (trade in particular declined) and 
the refocussing of energy on other more pressing concerns. However the increased 
return on their most important investment (military defence) allowed the empire to 
regroup and eventually rebound: 
The Byzantines went from near disintegration to being the premier power in 
Europe and the Near East, an accomplishment won by decreasing the 
complexity and costliness of problem solving. (Tainter 2006, p98) 
A more recent example of the Hedgehog Defence (in a more purely military context) 
is provided by the strategies and tactics of Hezbollah during the 2006 Lebanon War, 
Unable to face the Israeli army in open combat the Lebanese Shi’ite militia planned 
extensively for a HD approach in the event of an Israeli attack. As illustrated in Figure 
13, this included a network of fortified hedgehogs or nodes, often based on villages, 
which were connected by sophisticated communications (Lindemann, 2010; 
Matthews, 2007). Their approximately 4000-strong force was divided into small 
modular units, including 40-50 troops to defend each village and anti-tank groups of 4 
to 5 troops (Erlanger & Oppel, 2006; Gabrielsen, 2014; Lindemann, 2010). 
 
Figure 13 (Matthews 2007, p20) 
These were granted autonomy to act within their local area without any need for 
central direction and did so in the context of local events and situations (Gabrielsen, 
2014; Lindemann, 2010). Furthermore Hezbollah’s military supplies, including 
ammunition, were distributed across the battlefield in small caches that were 
themselves hardened against attack and convenient for the units acting in that 
immediate area (Erlanger & Oppel, 2006; Gabrielsen, 2014; Lindemann, 2010; 
Matthews, 2007). Tactically Hezbollah’s fighters were not focussed on the holding of 
territory, instead waiting in ambush to attack only when the advantage was theirs; 
one of their 13 principles states clearly they should “Keep moving, avoid formation of 
a front line!” (Gabrielsen 2014, p258). 
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The transposition of this military tactic of the Hedgehog Defence to contemporary 
urban systems represents one of this thesis’ original contributions to knowledge. 
While this particular configuration of a modular, horizontal and localised 
organisational form in tandem with a shared purpose has a military pedigree, it is the 
contention of this thesis that the HD approach is applicable to complex adaptive, FFE 
systems such as cities. In particular the HD model can increase urban resilience 
across a range of contexts beyond that of military conflict, including natural disasters, 
complex system disruptions, resource depletion or climate change. The next section 
explores how an HD approach to urban resilience would work in more detail. 
 
The relevance of the Hedgehog Defence for urban resilience  
The Hedgehog Defence (HD) approach assumes ecological resilience to be the only 
realistic way to envisage and promote urban resilience. It likewise rejects the 
universalist Wall to instead argue for the promotion of a ‘real’ simplification of specific 
elements/components of complex FFE systems to address both unpredictable 
environments and the prime importance of energy for the maintenance of such 
complexity. 
A HD approach applied to cities would involve particular urban infrastructures or 
networked systems/subsystems being organised as modular ’nodes’ which are as 
self-sufficient (both in terms of energy supplies and agency) as possible, while still 
being linked by both common goals and horizontal network connections (whether 
communications, transport infrastructure, electricity, political systems etc). In other 
words they are as self-sufficient as possible without being either centralised or 
hierarchically structured or, at the other extreme, completely disconnected. Possible 
examples of such simplified urban systems/subsystems might include localised food 
production (urban and/or vertical farming) (Plantagon, n.d.; Venkataraman, 2008), 
distributed energy production, (Onoue et al, 2012) or a modular response to the risks 
of urban flooding. (NLÉ, 2012; Room for the River (n.d.) 
The energy and/or logistical self-sufficiency of local nodes or subsystems is one 
outcome of the HD approach. This focus on modularity is an acknowledgement of the 
importance of energy for the maintenance of FFE complexity, as each modular 
component or node must be as self-sufficient (in terms of food, water, skills, energy, 
communications) as possible to remove any need for fragile (ie easily disrupted) 
supply chains: 
And because our supply-chains are so complex and globalised, we may not 
be able to import important (sic) even if we had something to exchange. For 
our supplier may have lost some critical inputs into its supply-chain, or lost its 
operational, social, or informational capacity locally. So localised supply-chain 
failures quickly become globalised. (Korowicz 2010, p38) 
However, this understanding goes beyond the widely recognised value of network 
redundancy as a component of resilience. Instead it acknowledges the central insight 
of the OODA loop that any system becomes increasingly less able to react in a timely 
or effective manner to changing situations the more complex (the more 
interconnected or linked into other networks or systems) it becomes. This is further 
exacerbated by the existence of crucial hubs – network nodes with a manifestly 
higher degree of interconnectedness than others and which would create even worse 
disruptions were they to fail. 
The vulnerability of such urban complexity is most obvious with regard to disasters or 
other disruptions to normal operations. The computer hardware industry, which 
supplies the crucial infrastructure that makes our current socio-technological 
complexity possible, is one component of a highly complex and globalised system of 
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infrastructure with innumerable network linkages. It also exhibits scale-free 
properties, in which certain regions have a dangerously high concentration of crucial 
component manufacturers. For example, the 2011 floods in Thailand had a serious 
effect on world hard drive production as Thailand produces about 50% of global 
output and this is itself concentrated in the industrial parks around Bangkok. Many of 
these were affected by the flooding (Arthur, 2013). Similarly an earthquake in ChiChi 
Taiwan on 21 September 1999 significantly disrupted the global production and 
supply of computer memory chips (raising prices by 400-500%). Although the 
earthquake only lasted for 40 seconds, it affected a number of manufacturing centres 
producing memory chips and: 
[s]ince these facilities were a crucial part of the supply chain to the worldwide 
computer manufacturing industry,210 the earthquake and subsequent 
disruption in production had repercussions for major computer companies in 
Silicon Valley and elsewhere, and further downstream for suppliers of 
computer hardware in corporate and public infrastructures all over the world. 
(OECD 2003, p77) 
A final example is provided by the intertwined complexities of oil supplies and food 
production and distribution in developed cities. Such system complexity is not only 
more fragile in itself, but in the event of disruptions the sheer number of system 
connections can make the restoration of normal operations more difficult: 
The more complex a product and production process the more tightly 
integrated it is into the global economy. There are far more direct and indirect 
links in the supply-chains upon which they are dependent. Its production 
process is also dependent upon the inputs of more specialized suppliers with 
fewer substitutes... the more technologically advanced a process the greater 
risk it faces from supply-chain breakdown. (Korowicz et al 2010, p25) 
Yet the simplification211 of urban systems through increased modularity also supports 
the maintenance of our complex urban systems in times of normal operation. With 
regard to complex urban systems the OODA loop can be read as a schematic 
representation of the generally hidden ‘decisional burden’ (Graham & Thrift 2007, p3) 
our constructed world carries within it. There is a never-ending iterative struggle to 
maintain our complex urban systems through the passage of time and in the face of 
inevitable breakdowns, ‘glitches’ and supply chain interruptions: “a continuous dying 
that can only be fended off by constant repair and maintenance” (Graham & Thrift 
2007, p6). The process of maintenance or repair, however minor the incident, 
nonetheless calls upon ingenuity, rooted in the specifics of each particular situation, 
to improvise solutions within temporal constraints and thus is analogous to the four 
steps in the OODA loop. In a race against time and the danger of cascading failures 
the loop must be completed and system linkages restored to recreate the world 
anew. 
Given that each disconnection within the flow of an urban system represents the 
chance for “learning, adaptation and improvisation” (Graham & Thrift 2007, p4) the 
ongoing loop of maintenance can be deeply creative. These shortcuts and fudges212 
to reconnect system linkages represent not only a provisional victory against the 
‘continuous dying’ of our systems but the ingenuity of human and technological 
actors within them. Yet the increasing complexity of our urban systems works against 
such processes, as demands of technical knowledge and resources extend beyond 
                                                
210 OECD (2003) makes the point that this disruption would have been even worse had the earthquake been a mere 
110km away in Hsinchu as the concentration of manufacturing plants producing crucial computer componentry there 
is much higher (including the percentage of global production of these components in this area). In that sense even 
though there was loss of life and property this was a ‘lucky escape’. 
211 Again as defined in Part A of this thesis – a reduction in system interconnectedness or linkages. 
212 Also called ‘subroutines’ in the lexicon of programming. 
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the ability of any one actor to comprehend fully and any one locale to supply. To use 
the language of environmental sciences from the previous chapter: the ‘feedback 
loops’ are much ‘looser’ and thus the responsiveness to disruptions or slow scale 
changes and shifts is much reduced (Cork, 2010b). Any process such as a globally 
interconnected system of food production and distribution thereby becomes 
increasingly less able to maintain operational integrity in the face of changing 
situations the longer or more complicated it becomes. 
Thus as the time and energy costs of system maintenance rise in tandem with the 
complexity of the city, we once again return to Tainter’s declining returns on 
complexity (1990; 1992; 1995a/b; 1996), Funtowicz & Ravetz’s ‘ancient regime’ 
(1994) and the Consolidation stage of Panarchy (K) (Holling, 2004). The modularity 
of the HD approach, when applied to particular complex systems involved in the 
maintenance of urban life (such as the food supply), is a (real) simplification of such 
systems and increases their self-sufficiency and resilience.213 This because the the 
loss of system connections, or other particular elements of the system, will not be an 
existential crisis for the other modular elements that survive. Their modularity, and 
resulting individual resilience, represents a ‘brake’ on cascading system failure: the 
failure of particular nodes can be contained, and surviving nodes can maintain 
themselves without system connections. Such self-sufficiency does not have to be 
maintained indefinitely (ie each node is still part of a wider system which can and 
does supply it) but it should last long enough for the node to survive disruptions until 
system connections are re-established. 
 
Examples of the HD approach to urban resilience 
There are a number of examples of the hedgehog approach being used as an 
effective method for promoting the resilience of urban areas. As noted earlier in this 
thesis, during the lead up and response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans the US 
retailer Walmart214 demonstrated many of the effective elements of the Hedgehog 
Defence in its preparation for, and response to, the hurricane (Boin & McConnell, 
2007; Horwitz, 2008). 
Above all, each Walmart store was a modular component (or ‘hedgehog’) of the 
corporation’s massive distribution network and had the resources for immediate 
disaster response (fuel, tents, generators, bottled water etc) and there was a robust 
communication system (both horizontal and hierarchical) provided by a network of 
satellite phones. These resources had obviously been distributed by the organisation 
as a whole and more resources were distributed to individual stores as the storm 
approached. In the immediate aftermath of the hurricane (in the period of greatest 
need post-disaster) Walmart’s response was based upon decentralised action by 
each store. This meant that there was no centralised organisation (or pre-planning) of 
which resources should go where – instead those with the most knowledge of 
currently existing (and presumably rapidly changing) local needs were able to assign 
those resources as needed. Connected to this decentralised approach was a reliance 
on the initiative of individual store managers and staff in a similar way to that 
expected of the lower ranks of the German Army: 
As the storm approached, CEO Lee Scott provided a guiding edict to his 
senior staff and told them to pass it down to regional, district, and store 
managers: “A lot of you are going to have to make decisions above your level. 
Make the best decision that you can with the information that’s available to 
                                                
213 Although at a cost of course, due to the need for redundancy and modular energy supplies (rather than distributed 
supplies). Thus the modular HD approach was rejected as a strategy for the defence of Western Europe during the 
Cold War (Bolton 1975, p39) 
214 And to a lesser extent other ‘big box’ retailers such as Home Depot and Lowe’s. 
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you at the time, and, above all, do the right thing.” In several cases, store 
managers allowed either emergency personnel or local residents to take store 
supplies as needed. They did not feel the need to get pre-approval from 
supervisors to do so. (Horwitz 2008, p4) 
It is important to note that the importance of a higher scale or complex organisation 
(the Walmart head office and senior management) remained, as this is where the 
decisions to distribute further resources ‘down’ the scale of the network originated 
and were implemented. At the same time the quote from the CEO above makes it 
clear that there was an overall approach to the situation within which each individual 
store or Walmart employee responded; it is just that it was deliberately vague enough 
to allow for local initiative and agency. Horwitz discusses the importance of local 
knowledge to Walmart’s successful response through reference to Hayek:  
The people closest to the situation at hand make the best decisions with the 
information they have from that local context. Distant managers or 
government officials do not possess the same depth of knowledge or 
familiarity with nuances. (2008, p5) 
However, as discussed in the previous chapter, this does not invalidate the 
importance of shared organisational goals (a point clearly demonstrated with regard 
to Walmart) nor is there any intrinsic reason why a government or other traditionally 
centralised organisation could not respond in such a way. The history of the German 
military’s use of the Hedgehog Defence clearly demonstrates that a traditionally 
centralised and bureaucratic organisation can devolve planning and response 
functions to lower organisational scales. The challenge is for those higher 
organisational actors to allow the allocation of resources and agency to such 
localised modular elements while relinquishing a level of control: such military 
approaches illustrate that this challenge is not insurmountable. 
Another contemporary example of the HD approach is the currently proposed 
approach to concerns about the safety of French nuclear plants in the wake of the 
Fukushima disaster. It is worth quoting the relevant article in Nature at length: 
“In France we’re saying imagine the unimaginable”, says Jorel. “The current 
basis of nuclear safety is ‘defense-in-depth’, in which multiple levels of 
protection and redundancy are intended to guard against a serious accident”, 
he adds. “But at Fukushima, all those lines of defence collapsed. The 
accident has thrown into question all of our safety rules, our ways of thinking”. 
(Butler 2012, p121) 
Here can be seen the clear awareness of the uncertainty of complex systems, 
coupled with the resultant inability to accurately predict all the challenges the power 
station may face. This leads to a philosophical rejection of the current ‘defence in 
depth’ model, predicated as it is on the establishment of sufficient defences or 
subsystems (redundancies) to meet any predicted emergency or incidence. To 
continue: 
The bunker concept is different, however, because it short-circuits the 
traditional approach to safe-guarding against estimated levels of risk. 
Irrespective of their perceived vulnerability to external threats, plants will need 
to be equipped with this ‘hard core’ of protected control rooms, generators 
and pumps, as well as hardened reservoirs of coolant. 
This circumvents the delays and compromises inherent in setting new 
estimates of seismic, flood or other risks, which requires years of discussion 
between the regulator, industry and expert advisors, says Jorel. Predicting 
risk is an imperfect art, and the bunker concept should protect against any 
other unforeseen, low-probability event. ‘It’s far easier to design and build a 
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system of last resort than to try and address every potential problem,’ he 
says. (Butler 2012, p122) 
This model of the bunker (directly analogous to the ‘hedgehog’) thus involves the 
conscious devolution of redundant response capacity (generators, pumps and 
reservoirs of coolant) to each reactor. While this will be less economically efficient, 
given the redundancies involved, it will address the deficiencies of the Fukushima 
response. These included slow response times by national or corporate authorities 
due to infrastructure damage and the resultant inability to move resources to the site 
of the reactor, and a lack of any local ability to cool the reactor cores in the crucial 
period after the tsunami and earthquake hit (Hayes et al, 2011). At the same time 
such bunkers will avoid the delays inherent in any (ultimately fruitless) attempt to 
predict all possible challenges each reactor could face. They reject the model of 
targeted resilience (The Wall) to instead focus on a general resilience. Finally, and 
most importantly: 
[t]he new measures are part of a shift in the emphasis of nuclear safety in the 
wake of Fukushima, from preventing a nuclear accident to stopping one from 
spiralling out of control – and mitigating the damage should the worst occur… 
(Butler 2012, p122) 
Here is the crucial acknowledgement of the radical uncertainty (the Black Swan) 
which lies at the heart of this thesis’ rejection of The Wall – at no point is a disaster or 
accident completely unavoidable, and if/once it has occurred all investments in 
prevention are pointless. Instead, what matters is the local response ability of those 
most affected. 
Similarly, one proposed model for resilient energy supply and distribution 
infrastructure in Japan in the aftermath of Fukushima makes a similar argument for a 
modular energy supply network, in which: 
the basic concept is to establish energy supply bases on a regional basis or 
by commercial/ industrial districts. The role of the bases is to be assumed by 
“Regional Power Center (RPC)”. RPC plays a comprehensive part in 
absorption, storage and preservation of electric power generated by 
renewable energy, and in responding to system power outage at the time of 
disaster or caused by accidents as well as in reducing the burden and 
dependency on the system power at the same time. RPC, in essence, is not 
simply equivalent to emergency power system currently installed at hospitals, 
etc.  (Onoue et al 2012, p8130) 
Similarly decentralised energy generation and distribution networks have been 
proposed by Lovins & Lovins (2001) and Kahn (1980, p360); in both cases as a 
strategy for improving their resilience. 
 
Conclusion 
Proposing that the organisational model of the Hedgehog Defence be applied to 
elements of cities should not be seen as supporting or justifying the militarisation of 
such cities (Graham, 2011). The ongoing militarisation of cities is to be neither 
celebrated nor promoted, and this is not a call for the involvement of the military in 
the democratic processes of city government or in political processes more generally. 
Instead it is an acknowledgement that ancient and influential strands of military 
thought are critical of the narratives of Progress through technological development 
and the rejection of government in favour of self-organising markets. Instead they 
accept the reality of hard uncertainty, the radical non-reification of cities and therefore 
assume an ecological resilience approach. Uncertainty and change are to be 
Anthony Richardson THESIS: Dismantling the Wall 
 
141 
 
expected and the dictates of the market do not lead to resilience. Such 
understandings may help promote a wider societal understanding of cities as ever 
changing and politically contested complex environments fundamentally dependent 
on energy flows for their own existence. 
To conclude this chapter, the Hedgehog Defence is here presented as an approach 
to the organisation of the complex urban socio-technological systems which make 
contemporary urban life possible. By its very nature it does not offer absolute 
solutions to the disasters or other disruptions which inevitably afflict contemporary 
cities, nor does it imply that every urban conglomeration on the planet could employ 
this tactic at the same time. However it does however provide a philosophical frame 
through which to approach the question of urban resilience. The next chapter 
completes Part B by examining the six recommendations for implementing such an 
approach to urban resilience in more detail.  
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Chapter 6: Recommendations for the promotion of urban 
resilience 
This chapter returns to the concept of urban and/or social collapse as it provides both 
a summary of the main argument of this thesis and a model for theoretical analysis 
and, hopefully, action (as outlined in the six recommendations to follow). 
To restate the overall argument of this thesis: when faced with problems, the general 
tendency of societies (or social groupings such as cities) is to devise and implement 
solutions that rely on increasing socio-technological complexity. This involves 
increasing energy costs at the larger scale (of cities, or nation states) while gaining 
economies of scale at smaller scales. This dynamic applies both to ecosystems and 
cities and societies. However, this increasing complexity involves disadvantages and 
challenges as well as advantages, including path-dependency, increasing system 
opacity and unpredictability and the dangers of cascading failures. 
At the same time, Far From Equilibrium thermodynamics, the adaptive cycle and 
declining returns on investments in complexity, mean that there is no equilibrium 
towards which complex systems such as cities can aim, attain and then maintain 
themselves. In other words, the absolute ‘solutionism’ of The Wall (and the 
concomitant urban reification) is illusory and oscillation and eventual collapse is the 
always-provisionally-postponed urban reality.  
At some point, the trend of increasing returns on problem-solving complexity slows 
and goes into reverse. This falling return on complexity (only exacerbated by the 
rising energy requirements such complexity requires in and of itself) equates to a 
falling resilience. The range of future options shrinks as the existential importance of 
high-grade energy supplies grows. Both trends lead to the increasing vulnerability of 
the complex systems which make contemporary cities possible. What matters is 
determining this ‘tipping point’ – beyond which increasing complexity becomes 
increasingly inimical to system resilience. 
The optimal condition for such systems is therefore a stasis with minimal oscillations, 
as close as is possible to optimal levels of system complexity as determined by the 
relationship between energy sources, rates of dissipation and system functionality. Of 
course such a condition is achievable through the development of further energy 
supplies thereby allowing the development of further system complexity, and 
onwards through time… This ‘more of the same’ approach is overwhelmingly the 
preferred solution, yet the challenges posed by the depletion of high-gain 
hydrocarbon energy sources in the absence of a similarly high-gain source make it 
problematic. The other option is ‘pausing’ the adaptive cycle through conscious 
attempts to simplify socio-technological systems: this is only possible through human 
agency. 
The challenge with the first approach is technological – can science develop an 
inexhaustible energy source that is both as high grade and convenient as 
hydrocarbons to usefully maintain our current levels of socio-technological complexity 
and allow its trajectory to continue into the foreseeable future? For example will cold 
fusion become possible and then technologically, socially and economically feasible? 
If it does, then Tainter’s dynamic of decreasing returns on complexity can be 
overturned or at least postponed indefinitely as such an energy patrimony could allow 
any society to maintain the dynamic of increasing technological development 
indefinitely. Such hopes and predictions involve an element of faith that continuing 
the forward trajectory of scientific and technological development will lead to some 
teleological singularity where we emerge into the sunlit uplands beyond all energy 
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constraints.215 Unfortunately this element of faith is the great blind spot of social and 
technological development. 
The difficulty with the second approach is philosophical. Above all it involves massive 
changes in social attitudes towards progress and technological development; 
challenges which will be addressed in Part C. However, this thesis rejects the 
assumptions which underpin The Wall, and therefore recommends a policy of 
targeted and specific socio-technological simplification. Such a program would need 
to be implemented through the following recommendations. 
 
Six recommendations for urban resilience 
The following recommendations provide a checklist for a program of socio-
technological simplification to promote urban resilience. Of course, such a ‘real’ 
simplification can never be more than a provisional and piecemeal approach to our 
complex urban systems given the challenges of boundary delineation and energy 
dissipation across differing system scales. 
These characteristics are all interconnected and in many cases the boundaries 
between them are porous (ie recommendations 1 & 2 and 5 & 6 could each arguably 
be combined as single recommendations). The implementation of these 
recommendations is however conceived as generally sequential, as explored further 
in Figure 14 (#1 and #2 are preconditions for #3, which is a precondition for the last 
three recommendations).  
 
                                                
215 Science fiction has already described such a social condition in both the Federation of the Star Trek universe and 
the Culture of Iain M. Banks’ Culture novels. 
Figure 14 
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Finally, while the recommendations are listed in the following table, they are outlined 
in more detail immediately below it.  
1 A rejection of the belief in absolute solutions through technological development (‘Progress’) 
2 Awareness of the Law of Diminishing Returns in terms of complexity 
3 
The analysis and delineation of complex urban socio-technological 
systems according to the interests and/or viewpoint of specific 
self-identified stakeholders 
4 Horizontal, localised or decentralised decision making processes  
5 Less reliance on system interconnections (modularity) 
6 More redundancy within systems 
 
Recommendation 1: A rejection of the belief in absolute solutions through 
technological development (‘Progress’), instead accepting the emergent nature of 
complex systems, the inability to fully grasp their workings at any point in time 
and the impossibility of predicting their future state (Maturana & Varela, 1974; 
1980; Langton, 1986; Stewart & Cohen, 1994 a/b; 1997; Morin, 1992; 1999; 
2007; Latour, 1987; 2005; 2012; Resnick, 1999; Gillon, 2001; Batty, 2005; Thiele, 
2011; Ogilvy, 2013). Instead the focus is on building adaptive capacity while 
accepting that risk can never be removed and damages or losses will always 
occur. 
Part C of this thesis (chapter 8) includes a treatment of some of the issues 
around promoting or implementing social change, given that it examines the 
challenges facing any attempt to undermine or challenge these beliefs in 
Progress. 
 
Recommendation 2: Awareness of the Law of Diminishing Returns in terms of 
complexity implies a concern with cost-benefit analyses in terms of the energy 
requirements of particular socio-technological systems or subsystems with regard 
to the benefits they provide. 
While this recommendation obviously implies the provision of specific metrics to 
make such cost-benefit analyses possible, a discussion of specifics is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. The incredible complexity of our contemporary urban 
systems implies a multiplicity of specific metrics although there is already a body 
of research into energy inflows and outflows (‘energy accounting’ or 
measurements of city ‘metabolisms’) in contemporary cities (Niza et al, 2009; 
SUME Project, 2011; Ferrão & Fernandez, 2013; Chrysoulakis et al, 2015).216 
Over time (the temporal aspect is crucial to such metrics) this could form the 
basis for a range of metrics comparing the energy flows in such complex systems 
over time to the benefits such complexity has provided in the past and may 
provide into the future. The examples provided by Tainter and discussed in 
chapter 3 (such as Boserup’s work on declining returns on agricultural 
                                                
216 One contemporary example (still under development) is the University of Melbourne’s MUtopia Spatial Platform 
http://mutopia.unimelb.edu.au/spatial-platform.html (accessed 27/11/14) 
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production) are examples of how such metrics would make recommendation 3 
possible. 
 
Recommendation 3: The analysis and delineation of such complex urban socio-
technological systems according to the interests and/or viewpoint of specific self-
identified stakeholders  
This recommendation is the most important element in this thesis’ approach to 
urban resilience. It involves both a system analysis of a particular urban 
environment, and the political217 debate over the delineation of this system. 
Therefore it involves two particular processes; a comprehensive ur-systems 
analysis in terms of both energy inputs/outputs and possible challenges and then 
a political process through which elements (scales) of that overall system are to 
be identified by stakeholders. These two processes have been conflated here as 
it is assumed that the natural tendency would be for the former to involve 
primarily the input of technical experts and analysts while the latter is more 
perhaps more naturally seen as the province of local actors and communities. 
However this divide is unhelpful as multiple stakeholder inputs can only 
strengthen the original systems analysis while expert input is necessary 
throughout the political negotiations over scale. 
This allows space for the imagination and implementation of localised/modular 
approaches to urban resilience. Acknowledging the primacy of observer 
viewpoint allows for the possibility of local action in the face of interconnected 
complexity across a range of spatial and temporal scales (as per 
recommendation 4). Just as importantly it allows for the political challenges of 
vulnerability, risk and resilience across socio-economic and spatial divides to be 
taken into account. 
In terms of cities this does not however mean an exclusive focus on the local. 
While organisation and implementation is predicated on a local modular 
organisation (as per recommendations 5 and 6), based on neighbourhoods or 
households, the inescapable energy costs of such a modular/redundant 
arrangement require the mobilisation of resources at larger (ie municipal, state or 
national) scales to enable the necessary redundancy to be built/implemented. 
Again, this is where variations in vulnerability and resilience across a city can be 
acknowledged, considered and some attempt at consensus over resource 
allocation can be attempted. 
Thus actors need to exist that can make this larger delineation of systems 
boundaries to include city regions, nation states or regional groupings while 
nonetheless recognising that their resilience is dependent on smaller scale 
resilience (again as per recommendations 5 and 6). Quite apart from this 
delineation they must then have the ability to mobilise surplus energy and 
resources to promote the redundancy needed to make these smaller modular 
subsystems more resilient. 
The latter point is the one on which current localisation movements may falter 
given that such resilience implies either higher energy costs for each local 
subsystem, due to redundancy and the loss of benefits of scale (which they may 
well be unable to afford), the simplification of subsystems (and the concurrent 
costs or unwanted cultural or lifestyle changes), or action from actors at larger 
                                                
217 ‘Political’ is used here most broadly in the sense of ‘the polis’: it does not mean purely traditional politics at a 
municipal, state or national level. Instead it refers to engagement with all the relevant residents and stakeholders, 
and can include everything from participatory community meetings and business roundtables to social media 
campaigns and surveys. These questions remain beyond the scope of this thesis, but what matters is that such 
political engagement encompasses as many stakeholder viewpoints as possible. 
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scales to assist such subsystems with the investment costs of establishing this 
redundancy. 
 
Recommendation 4: Horizontal, localised or decentralised decision making 
processes to both promote closer understanding of local processes and events 
and react more quickly to changing events. As per the example of Walmart in 
New Orleans, this does not mean the absence of organisation at higher (more 
central) scales – it involves rather a rejection of centralised plans or policies with 
their attendant inflexibility and path dependence. Instead, the focus (following the 
model of Boyd’s OODA loop or the ecological concept of tight feedback loops) is 
on reactive decisions to events at a local scale. 
Such decision-making processes are also inescapably linked to the next 
recommendation as less system interconnections also mean faster response 
times (again, following the insights of Boyd). 
 
Recommendation 5: Less reliance on system interconnections (modularity): to 
maintain itself a complex ‘far from equilibrium’ system must of course remain 
open to energy inputs from the environment – yet to increase their resilience they 
must reduce both their reliance on extended and fragile logistic chains and the 
danger of cascading failures posed by increasing connectivity (complexity). To do 
this they need to be more modular or self-sufficient in terms of energy inputs. 
Renewable energy sources may be crucial here as they are not limited by the 
issue of resource depletion or in many cases by the need for extended logistical 
chains/networks. 
This obviously raises the issue of system delineation discussed in Chapter 2 and 
addressed in recommendation 1; in particular that the identification of such 
interconnections as either integral to the system (or the larger systems in which 
this is nested) or not is above all a question of purpose and observer viewpoint. 
At the same time it presupposes that each modular system component must 
become a generalist, rather than a specialist. That is, it must duplicate its energy 
supply systems rather than rely on one system at a larger scale and thus it faces 
an increase in energy costs at that particular scale. 
 
Recommendation 6: More redundancy within systems: the need for alternate 
subsystems within complex systems for undertaking exactly the same system 
function. As discussed in Part A redundancy here does not equal complexity; this 
is not a question of structural differentiation but of structural and functional 
repetition (Tainter & Patzek 2012, p75) which is also connected to the delineation 
of larger complex urban systems into spatially or organisationally smaller 
subsystems according to observer viewpoint. 
At the same time this recommendation acknowledges that there is an inverse 
causal relationship between efficiency and redundancy; and thus any such 
program or policy involves a rejection of current 'just-in-time' logistical networks 
focussed exclusively on efficiency (reflecting recommendation 1). 
It is worth (re)acknowledging the absence of a specific case study at this point in the 
thesis. A case study, illustrating how these recommendations would be implemented 
in practice, would undoubtedly have illustrative utility for the reader. However, there 
are issues of complexity that would be obscured by putting forward a specific case, 
given that any such a case would be irredeemably contextual. At the same time, and 
more importantly, any implementation of these recommendations requires political 
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discussion and debate at all scales to inform the key decisions that would have to 
happen: and this would not be provided by the author making these decisions (even 
for illustrative purposes) by diktat.  In the end, the process through which such a 
program could be outlined and then implemented is more important than any 
possible outcomes put forward by the constrained viewpoint of the author.  
 
Some final implications of these recommendations for urban resilience 
Any promotion of such a simplification of urban complexity is predicated on both 
Panarchy’s model of adaptive change and the central point of Tainter that complexity 
costs energy. Both approaches reflect the core tenet of non-equilibrium 
thermodynamics that a reduction of energy use is an unavoidable prerequisite of any 
socio-technological simplification. 
However, such a simplification means addressing the issue of Jevons’ paradox by 
using energy efficiency to promote inefficiencies through the promotion of system 
redundancies. Doing this is counter-intuitive, of course, as redundancies are an 
inefficient use of energy in terms of the stated purpose of any system. The Jevons 
paradox (Alcott, 2005; Tainter & Patzek, 2012), however, demonstrates that 
increased energy efficiency is not generally used to reduce energy usage – instead it 
has the opposite effect, leading to increased system complexity through increased 
energy dissipation. In the end, addressing such attitudes towards efficiency and 
redundancy is a question of cultural and economic values: the topic of Part C. 
Finally, it is important to note that the logic of diminishing returns on complexity does 
not imply a flight from complexity. Instead, it involves the understanding that, for any 
complex system or subsystem, wherever its boundary is drawn, there is an optimum 
level of complexity beyond which any increase becomes counterproductive to the 
system as a whole (or the broader systems in which it is nested) in terms of energy 
and complexity costs relative to returns on that complexity. Understanding how to 
decide what that optimum may be is still a matter for further study, although attempts 
have certainly been undertaken (Korowicz et al, 2010; Tverberg, 2012; Tainter, 1990; 
1992; 1995a/b; 1996; Tainter & Patzek, 2012). Thus this thesis is not a call for 
simplification based on the (commonly misunderstood) concept of anti-technological 
Luddism. The inescapable entanglement of this argument with strongly and widely 
held cultural ideas of Progress is where misunderstandings are most likely to arise. 
To again sum up the essential argument of this thesis in one sentence: 
Increasing complexity is a good thing for socio-technological systems such as 
cities or societies (for a range of reasons including system resilience) - right 
up until the point at which it is no longer. 
In the end, simplification should be considered a spatially and functionally delineated 
approach with regard to the complex and interlocking systems that make up urban 
life – a focus on less interconnections and greater redundancy can only be attempted 
at particular scales and with regard to particular subsystems and should involve an 
awareness of the returns on any level of complexity. Therefore, this is not a 
suggestion to radically simplify life in modern urban environments as a whole: it is not 
a call to return to some romanticised rural Arcadia without the benefits of modern 
science and technology. The benefits of socio-technological complexity are real 
enough – but the ongoing development or even maintenance of such complexity 
through time is always provisional. Instead of a reflexive teleology of technological 
progress, we need to be aware of both the issue of declining returns with regard to 
specific (whether delineated by function or spatial location) complex systems nested 
within the larger complex framework of urban life and the role of human agency 
within such constraints.     
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PART C: The challenges facing urban simplification 
Last night my mate asked to use a USB port to charge his cigarette, 
but I was using it to charge my book. 
The future is stupid. 
Burnett (2014) 
Given the argument outlined in Parts A and B for the targeted simplification of key 
urban systems, this component of the thesis turns to the likelihood of such a policy 
being implemented. It does this by first acknowledging the challenges facing such an 
approach to urban resilience and then discussing some possible ways of overcoming 
them. Above all this element of the argument is based upon a broadly social 
constructivist view of the possibility of simplification.218 Broad attitudinal changes 
towards the need for further complexity could lead to the simplification and thus 
increased resilience of specific urban systems. While this argument does not 
discount the huge challenges (both economic and cultural) involved in such a seismic 
shift in cultural values it does reject the determinist conception of irreversible 
complexity as driven solely by energy availability (Schneider & Kay, 1994a/b; 
Schneider & Sagan, 2005). 
Chapter 7 will outline five main interconnected challenges to urban system 
simplification. Together they comprise a nexus of path dependency which reinforces 
and promotes the ongoing growth of increasing socio-technological complexity. This 
analysis is underpinned by a brief overview of social constructionism and the 
understanding that increasing urban complexity represents what Bourdieu (1995) 
terms an ‘orthodoxy’. 
Chapter 8 argues however that the simplification of specific urban socio-
technological systems is possible, even in the face of such challenges. This optimism 
is justified as increasing energy use is largely driven by social and technological 
complexity, although the reverse causality, as exemplified by the Jevons Paradox 
(see pages 20 and 25), is still a major factor. There are two possible avenues to 
achieving a level of urban system simplification: both are focussed on subverting the 
dominant paradigm of urban system complexity. The first is the opportunity posed by 
disasters and system disruptions while the second is the promotion of incremental 
change in social values towards complexity. The latter avenue involves three 
subversive narratives: 
1. Living/lived examples of alternative models and narratives 
2. Representations of crisis and collapse and/or alternative narratives and 
models 
3. Narratives of systemic resilience as rational self-interest 
 
 
                                                
218 From this point on any use of ‘simplification’ (unless otherwise stated) refers to the ‘real’ simplification this thesis is 
proposing. Thus it is not referring to the widespread hegemonic simplification discussed in chapter 3. 
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Chapter 7: The attractions of increasing complexity 
There is no reason for Fukushima to lead to a general rejection of 
technological progress and a widespread feeling that we should no longer 
attempt to master the forces of nature, as more than one commentator 
suggested after the catastrophe. 
Tertrais (2011), p99 
The challenges to any widespread adoption of the recommendations for urban 
simplification, as described in the previous chapter, are significant. For a range of 
reasons, the current trajectory of growing socio-technological complexity has an 
immense economic, cultural and political momentum. A careful explanation of these 
challenges is therefore necessary if they are to be overcome and any meaningful 
implementation of these recommendations undertaken. 
This chapter’s discussion begins with an acceptance, widely labelled as social 
constructionism, that social reality is the consequence of human interactions. This 
means, to use the formulation of Berger & Luckmann, that “the world of everyday 
life… originates in [human] thoughts and actions, and is maintained as real by these” 
(1981, p69). Bourdieu’s notion of the habitus encapsulates a similar idea of:  
a commonsense world endowed with the objectivity secured by consensus on 
the meaning (sens) of practices and the world, in other words the 
harmonization of agents’ experiences and the continuous reinforcement that 
each of them receives from the expression, individual or collective (in 
festivals, for example), improvised or programmed (commonplaces, sayings), 
of similar or identical experiences. (1995, p80) 
Within such a commonly shared social milieu are certain boundaries of thought or 
belief which are held as self-evident truths. Bourdieu (1995) labels these widely 
accepted limits of what is thinkable and sayable the doxa and argues that the 
participants within any habitus both actively reinforce these doxa while being at the 
same time constrained by them. 
Of course such an understanding of the social world as constructed by human 
interrelations provides grounds for both optimism and pessimism. On the one hand 
such constructivism means that the everyday or ‘common sense’ view of ‘reality’ is 
not externally existent or ‘set in stone’ however much that appears to be the case. 
Social constructivism rejects the essentialism of any socio-technological paradigm 
and thereby insists on the possibility of social change; the subversion of the ‘doxa’ of 
consensual reality (Berger & Luckmann 1981; Bourdieu, 1995). 
However, any socially constructed reality is no less durable or persistent for this 
realisation, and the obduracy of ‘common sense reality’ is indicative of its importance 
for human beings. We need the stability that such a shared consensus provides and 
to challenge it, to ‘subvert the dominant paradigm’, takes an immense effort: 
While I am capable of engaging in doubt about [the everyday world’s] reality, I 
am obliged to suspend such doubts as I routinely exist in everyday life. This 
suspension of doubt is so firm that to abandon it…I have to make an extreme 
transition… I must engage in a deliberate, by no means easy effort. (Berger & 
Luckmann 1981, p37) 
The ever-increasing complexity of contemporary urban society and the crucial role of 
energy within it comprise one habitus within which our urban reality exists. It is the 
‘commonsense world’ of contemporary urban existence. Such a habitus both 
sustains and is sustained by a nexus of interrelated doxa including modes of urban 
growth, town planning, economic activity, hegemonic lifestyle ‘choices’ and 
innumerable artistic representations of The Urban. Furthermore any evidence partly 
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or even completely discrediting any such reality can produce the ‘backfire effect’ 
(Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). This is the tendency for cognitive dissonance to lead, not to 
a change in belief, but to a more forceful affirmation of the original belief (Greer, 
2013). 
This dynamic is clearly outlined in Bourdieu’s outline of the struggle between 
orthodoxy and heterodoxy (1995, p164-171). The doxa is a non-reflexive condition in 
which the prevailing social reality is ’self-evident’: there is no awareness of specific 
alternatives, or even that the ‘alternative’ might exist as a category of thought.219 
However, once this self-evident reality is challenged, and its arbitrary nature 
becomes first a matter of conjecture and then debate, there arises the conflict 
between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. Here social reality enters the realm of the 
contested, as orthodoxy attempts to recreate the “primal state of innocence of the 
doxa” (p169). It therefore constitutes itself in opposition to the heterodox: the 
heretical promotion and discussion of social possibilities and critiques. 
It is the contention of the remaining chapters that this concept of a struggle between 
the orthodox and the heterodox provides a framework for understanding the 
obduracy of the socially constructed reality of socio-technological complexity. The 
orthodoxy of The Wall (and the nexus of ideas around science and technology, 
teleological progress and certainty) is challenged by the heterodox possibility of 
system simplification which this thesis is promoting. 
The orthodoxy of increasing socio-technological complexity is a nexus of cultural 
values, rational self-interest and political imperatives. It is comprised of five primary 
and interconnected obstacles to any meaningful system simplification: 
1. The loss of the benefits of complexity 
2. Attitudes to the ideal of ‘Progress’ 
3. The mantra of efficiency 
4. The invisibility of properly functioning systems 
5. Path dependency 
As recognised in Tainter’s concept of the Energy-Complexity Spiral (Tainter & 
Patzek, 2012), the first four obstacles all feed into the path dependency which is at 
the heart of the orthodoxy of increasing complexity. There are difficulties inherent in 
outlining such a complex causal web through a purely written account and thus 
Figure 15 aims to help demonstrate these inter-linkages. This is itself a (hegemonic) 
simplification of the complexity involved and is no more than a graphic representation 
of the discussion to follow. 
                                                
219 The doxa is unanimous primarily because “…the questions they answer cannot be explicity asked” (Bourdieu 
1997, p168). 
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Figure 15 
The arrows represent the direction of ‘reinforcement’: they show how certain 
elements of the orthodoxy provide support (whether cultural or theoretical) for others. 
Thus The myth of ‘Predictability’ is reinforced by the The invisibility of properly 
functioning systems. Dotted lines, on the other hand, represent a connection in which 
the causality is much less clearly ‘one way’. 
The remainder of this chapter will now discuss the five main challenges to urban 
simplification as outlined above (including their interrelationships). 
 
1) The loss of the benefits of complexity 
The American way of life is not up for negotiations. Period. 
U.S. President George H. W. Bush (1992) 
The first and most obvious problem with any program of simplification is that 
recognised by Tainter (1990): any loss of complexity will inevitably mean the loss of 
the connected benefits and advantages that were the impetus for the increase in 
complexity in the first place. It must be acknowledged here that these losses would 
be demonstrably real and would have measurably negative effects on the lives of 
many. Complex technological advances in medicine, construction, communication, 
transport and many other fields have led to improvements in quality of life in terms of 
health, life expectancy, standards of living and a wide range of other metrics. Without 
this complexity, and the energy use on which it has been based, they cannot be 
maintained (Brown et al, 2011).  
This relationship is particularly stark in post-tsunami Japan. Without nuclear power 
that country is self-sufficient in only 4% of its energy requirements (17% if nuclear is 
included) (Onoue et al, 2012), and this places Japan in a uniquely difficult position 
among industrialised countries. Although in the aftermath of Fukushima the 
Japanese population had overwhelmingly supported replacing nuclear power with 
renewable energy sources (Onoue et al, 2012), this will simply not meet the country’s 
energy needs: “only cutting the use of electrical appliances will do that” (The 
Economist, 2011). The effect on Japanese standards of living and economic growth 
of such a widespread retreat from electricity consumption, absent radical and wide-
reaching social and technological changes, would be wrenching. 
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The lure of convenience 
However, while this connection between complexity and energy is inescapable, a 
critical awareness of what is meant by ‘improvements’ or ‘advancements’ is needed. 
The tendency with ‘black-boxed’ technological complexity, in which the inputs and 
side effects of any technological operation are hidden from the end-user, is for the 
convenience offered by such technology to assume an overwhelming importance as 
a motivating factor for its use. If the actual functioning of any particular system is 
hidden from the user, then the true cost in energy terms is hidden as well.220 The 
tendency is for convenience of use to then become the expression of technological 
Progress: the easier something is to use the better it is (given that other 
characteristics are ‘hidden’).  Thus convenience of use can become the only criterion 
of value.  
This is the point at which to return to Alexander’s critique (2012) of Tainter’s 
argument regarding complexity as a problem solving technique. As outlined in 
Chapter 3 (p51-52), Alexander’s salient point is simply that ‘problem’ is a relative 
(and politically contested) term. What might be a problem for some is merely an 
inconvenience for others. Is the physical effort involved in sweeping leaves with a 
broom a problem or not? If all considerations of energy use and sound or 
environmental pollution are overlooked, and the difficulty involved in using a manual 
broom is the only criterion, then perhaps the latter can be considered a problem. 
However, if it is not a problem is it merely an inconvenience?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the sweeping by hand is considered a problem, then the leaf blower, with all its 
attendant energy costs, is a more complex solution which addresses that problem. It 
is, in the context of sweeping, an expression of progress. However, if sweeping is not 
a problem, then the leaf blower is an expensive, energy-intensive and ultimately 
unnecessary complication. If there is no real problem to be solved then the leaf 
blower is merely offering convenience (with a range of attendant and unpleasant side 
effects).221 
The critical element of Alexander’s critique of ‘the problem’ exists in negotiating the 
qualitative difference between a ‘true’ or ‘valuable’ technological advance and what is 
merely offering increased ’convenience’. Of course such an analysis is irredeemably 
                                                
220 This is connected to the Invisibility of properly functioning systems (p158-159). 
221 Of course, there are real economic consequences with the prospect of lowered consumption (and production) 
implied by such a shift in attitudes towards material goods and services. Seeing many as merely conveniences, and 
no longer necessities, means breaking the connection between an endless growth in production (both driven by and 
allowing the growth of consumption) and the social compact behind modern industrialised societies. It is the prospect 
and reality of endless economic growth (in both production and consumption) that makes both socially acceptable 
levels of employment and expected levels of social services (education, health, etc) possible. Breaking this nexus 
implies serious economic consequences and all the attendant social disruptions and crises this would involve. 
(Quilley, 2011; 2012; 2013) 
The field of ecological economics, and the attendant concept of the ‘zero-growth’ economy (Daly, 1974; Jackson, 
2009; Kallis, 2011. 2015; Kallis & March, 2015), does attempt to address these serious challenges. While a further 
discussion of the economic challenges and consequences is beyond the scope of this thesis it does acknowledge 
that they are real, and suggests that the concept of ‘zero-growth’ economics could provide a way of exploring these 
implications further. 
                
Problem?       …therefore solution? 
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relativistic as there are no universal criteria for identifying or rejecting the common 
conflation of ‘convenience’ with ‘improvement’.222 While this raises the question of our 
cultural attitudes towards technological Progress (which is the second point to be 
addressed in this chapter), some further illustrative examples demonstrate the need 
for such a critical approach. 
The first example is the Air Umbrella (Darrell, 2014): the first serious redesign of the 
humble umbrella for some time. Instead of an expandable fabric skin to shield the 
user from rain, it consists of a handle into which is fitted a lithium battery and electric 
motor driving a high speed fan. These propel air at high speed and pressure out of 
small vents at the head of the device and the continuous jets of air blow any falling 
rain away from the user. The advantages of such a redesigned umbrella are real 
enough. It removes the danger of hitting other pedestrians with your umbrella (or 
being hit by other umbrellas in return) and it cannot be blown inside out by wind 
gusts. Finally it offers convenience of use as it is activated by a simple button with no 
need to open or close a flimsy frame.  
There is no doubt the Air Umbrella is an innovative technological advance that does 
address some of the shortcomings of the traditional umbrella. However its 
convenience of use needs to be balanced against the energy costs of its black-boxed 
complexity as its battery life is only half an hour (or only fifteen minutes for the 
smaller ‘female’ version). At the same time it is predicted to retail at ten times the 
cost of a traditional umbrella and its operation involves the antisocial side-effects of 
an annoying noise and spraying everyone within a certain radius with water (the 
public reaction to such side-effects can be imagined). Finally it is less useful as it 
offers no protection from the sun on hot days. Given these considerations, is the Air 
Umbrella offering a new technological solution to a current or looming challenge or it 
primarily offering novelty and increased user convenience? Do the advantages 
offered justify the technological complexity and resultant energy costs; or does the 
traditional umbrella already offer a suitably simple solution to the challenges posed 
by persistent precipitation? 
A final example of the tension between meaningful technological advancement and 
sheer convenience is provided by the innovation of bottled water. The environmental 
and economic costs223 of this product (Gleick, 2010) again demonstrate the need for 
balancing such costs against the benefits provided, especially when one of the 
primary motivations for buying bottled water is convenience (Anon., 2007). 
The washing machine, however, provides a counter-example to demonstrate that 
humble household technologies can be truly advantageous (and indeed socially 
transformative) rather than merely convenient. Chang (2010) outlines the immense 
changes in the lives of women and thus society as a whole that the washing 
machine224 has made possible. Indeed Chang sees the washing machine as more 
revolutionary than the internet as it has offered not mere convenience but a 
meaningful solution to a real and historically persistent social problem.  
The relevance of Alexander’s recognition of the ‘problem’ as socially constructed 
becomes clear in the next chapter when the discussion turns to possible approaches 
for addressing such resistance to conscious simplification. 
 
                                                
222 The situation is made more difficult by the role of advertising in promoting consumer demand, primarily through 
the identification (or manufacturing) of needs which can then be met by particular products or services. As this 
concept of ‘need’ is therefore the ‘lack’ of the specific product or service it can be seen as analogous to ‘problem’.  
223 These include approximately thirty billion plastic bottles thrown away every year in the US, and manufacturing 
these plastic bottles took the equivalent of between 100 and 160 million barrels of oil in 2007. 
224 Along with other technologies such as the contraceptive pill. In contrast many ‘labour-saving’ innovations such as 
electric bread knives or can openers have instead merely offered a convenience which does not outweigh the costs 
(in terms of increased complexity) they entail. 
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2) Attitudes to the ideal of ‘Progress’ 
Such examples lead into the second closely related major challenge to any attempt 
at simplification. This is the influence of socio-cultural attitudes to the concept of 
‘Progress’:225 a social orthodoxy that is another facet of the cornucopian optimism, 
and the rejection of limits, discussed in Part A of this thesis (Simon, 1996; Gurr, 
1985; Reader 2004, p306-6; Tertrais 2011, p99). The extraordinarily powerful grip of 
this teleological paradigm - labelled ‘solutionism’ by Morozov (2014) and ‘techno-
hubris’ by Homer-Dixon (2002) - is perhaps the most important imperative helping 
drive the increasing complexity of societies.  
Of course, the first obstacle to simplification presented above demonstrates precisely 
why this should be the case - since the birth of human social life complexity has been 
a successful tactic for addressing the challenges societies have faced. This is of 
course one of the central contentions of this thesis - that Progress equals ‘increasing 
technological (and thus social and cultural) complexity to provide (generally 
successful) solutions to current and future challenges’.  
However this is not an orthodox understanding of Progress from the perspective of 
sociological theory or within wider popular or cultural paradigms. Simply outlining 
Tainter’s argument that declining returns on energy investment pose an existential 
challenge to teleological Progress will not create the broad changes in both social 
attitudes and government policies required for any meaningful urban simplification. 
Therefore it is important here to at least briefly acknowledge the strength and 
persistence of Progress as a social paradigm if it is to be challenged. Such a 
challenge is not impossible as there have been heterodox criticisms and outright 
rejections of the various paradigms of Progress as long as they have existed.  
A detailed analysis of sociological treatments of Progress, whether historical or 
contemporary, is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, this thesis does accept 
the generally held view226 that Progress has been and remains a foundational 
element227 of the Western worldview in particular.228 However, while technological 
and/or scientific Progress and moral Progress had been conflated by certain 
Classical and then Enlightenment thinkers,229 they are no longer seen as 
synonymous, or even to some extent coterminous.  This connection had been widely 
criticised and almost as widely rejected by the second half of the 20th century:230  
All theories of progress have failed the test of time… The theory is dead as 
much from neglect as from actual opposition. (Sklair 1970, p111) 
However Sklair is proclaiming here the death of moral (and thus universal 
human/social) progress231 – not technological progress. This is a crucial distinction 
                                                
225 From this point the capitalisation of Progress refers to this general social and cultural paradigm. 
226 See Sklair, 1970; 1971; Elias, 2000; Pinker, 2011; Wessels, 2006; Greer 2008; 2013. 
227 This belief in teleological progress can be traced back to Classical philosophy, Christian theology or the 
Enlightenment (Sklair, 1970). 
228 Sklair (1970) argues that all theories of social development through time are to some extent progress theories, 
whether they accept or reject the teleological advancement of social, technological and even moral development. As 
such they can be further categorised as theories of progress, theories of regress and theories of circularity. 
229 And most clearly by Comtean Positivism (Sklair, 1970). 
230 See Elias, 2000; Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002; Pinker, 2011; Alexander, 2008. Such a rejection is also widely 
reflected in forms of popular culture such as science fiction (Fitting, 2009), although the timing may be different. For 
example Angenot (1985, p130) traces the birth of a French anti-utopian sci fi which “radically dissociates the idea of 
scientific and industrial progress from that of ethical progress” to 1846; two years before the revolutionary wave of 
1848 passed across Europe.  
231 Pinker (2011) however argues strongly that this disillusionment with the concept of moral or social progress is not 
supported by any clear reading of the evidence. He situates himself within a counter-tradition of optimistic progress 
(examples listed on p692) and marshals historical and statistical evidence to argue that, contrary to the prevailing 
trend of pessimism, human societies have progressed in every moral or social sense. While the defensibility or 
otherwise of such arguments is beyond the scope of this thesis the very fact that they are openly articulated 
paradoxically acknowledges the existence of a deep and persistent strand of pessimism regarding the social and 
moral direction of late 20th century industrial society. 
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for this thesis to make, as the idea of technological Progress remains an important 
component of the orthodoxy of socio-technological complexity. Notwithstanding the 
longstanding existence of an opposing tradition of cultural pessimism (Herman, 
1997), the increasingly obvious disjunct between technological and moral and/or 
social Progress can be most obviously traced to the mechanised slaughter of the 
First World War and the industrialised genocide and atomic destruction of the 
Second (Sklair 1970; Elias, 2000).232 The resultant deep disillusionment with the 
concept of progress in human and social morality has to a large extent never 
dissipated.233 Instead technological progress remains to be celebrated in a moral 
vacuum (Sklair, 1971). 
Science and technology therefore remain the one area of human endeavour in which 
Progress is both a deeply cherished ideal and an unconscious expectation.234 
However, the energy costs of such socio-technological complexity, and the existential 
importance of energy for the maintenance of this complexity, are not nearly as well 
understood at any broad cultural level. Thus concepts such as resource depletion 
(Peak Oil) are often too uncomfortable to be acknowledged. The response to 
questions of energy depletion (in addition to the search for efficiency outlined in the 
next section) therefore can retreat to the same cornucopianism and technological 
optimism outlined in Part A. Human ingenuity will drive Progress: technological 
innovation will solve such problems through the development of new resources or 
technological systems (Simon, 1996). In the face of heretical challenges such as 
Peak Oil, the orthodoxy of socio-technological complexity reasserts itself through 
recourse to optimism and faith in the endless march of Progress. 
Connected to this faith in never-ending technological progress is the ‘myth’ of 
predictability. This is the belief that we can predict the future state of complex socio-
technological systems with accuracy and thus the possibility of complete control over 
them is an aspirational goal. The unpredictability of emergent complex systems235 
can be overcome with enough technical aptitude and contextual knowledge. As 
outlined in Part A, such reductionism has been challenged by both developments in 
the hard sciences (Stewart & Cohen, 1994 a/b; 1997), the social sciences (Morin, 
1992; 1999; 2007; Taleb, 2007), and theories of emergent complexity in particular 
(Maturana & Varela, 1974; 1980; O’Connor, 1994; Johnson, 2001; Homer-Dixon, 
2002; 2006; Helbing, 2009; Samet, 2012), yet is still implicit in both government and 
corporate forecasting and socio-economic planning (Allen, 2009; Taleb, 2007) and 
within the ‘hard’ sciences (Nunan et al, 1981).236 It is enough here to note the 
ongoing persistence of this cultural and professional paradigm as a cornerstone of 
the status quo with regard to ever-increasing complexity. 
 
3) The mantra of efficiency 
The third (related) argument for the continuance of the trajectory of ever-increasing 
complexity here is the ‘mantra of efficiency’.237 Any attempt to conclusively define 
such a bifurcated and contradictory concept is extremely difficult as it denotes: 
                                                
232 Again while Elias (2000) agrees that the world wars were influential he also sees other reasons for this disjuncture 
including the fall (however minor) in the status of the European colonial empires relative to their former colonies. 
233 The efforts of Pinker (2011) and other optimists notwithstanding. 
234 The very numbering of our technology (the iPhone 4, then 5, then 6…) implies a linear progression through time. 
235 This does not have to mean the widely discredited notion of complete predictability - even a more humble form of 
predictability as chance operating within determined parameters (equivalent to bounded uncertainty) cannot be 
assumed within emergent complexity. To use the terminology of Taleb (2007) we cannot live completely in 
Mediocrastan. 
236 Also Wahlström’s (1992) discussion of these issues is useful. However, this forms an important part of the next 
section’s treatment of efficiency. 
237 This is the title of the excellent book by Alexander (2008) on which much of this discussion of the philosophical 
nature of ‘efficiency’ is based. 
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a paradoxical rhetoric stressing both the conservative character of efficiency 
and its dynamic and creative potential… Consistent throughout its history has 
been the equation of efficiency with mastery… In modern terms efficiency 
also offered human mastery, through techniques of surveillance and discipline 
and through accounting principles to track the use and transformation of 
materials. Efficiency also helped in mastering other people… (Alexander 
2008, p3).  
The most relevant understanding of efficiency for this thesis relates to the 
measurement of resource use (whether energy, human resources, space or time) in 
the successful functioning of any system (Alexander, 2008). A foundational tenet of 
market economics, the drive for such an operational efficiency with regard to 
operational inputs and outputs underpins the Taylorist model of production and 
management (Taylor, 1911; Alexander 2008). Written during the increasing 
industrialisation of the early 20th century, Taylor’s model of ‘scientific management’ 
aims to enshrine efficiency as a foundational element of the modern industrialised 
world. To do this, he considers the actions of workers as just another ‘operational 
input’ to be subject to the same constraints of efficiency as those of energy or 
physical inputs. The subjectivity and unpredictability of human action (and the 
complex socio-technological systems in which it is embedded) is denied in favour of 
an ‘arrogant’ attempt to plan, predict and control it (Taylor, 1911): 
Planning was a central feature of modernity and modern technological 
society, and the developing concern for efficiency best embodied the idea in 
its technological form: the surveying and apportioning of resources to achieve 
a desired result. (Alexander 2008, p164) 
Critiques of Taylorism (Doray, 1988; O’Neill, 1998) point to the clearly dehumanising 
effects of the regimentation and control of modernist technologies and industry. 
Nonetheless, efficiency remains a powerful concept with technical, economic and 
cultural cachet, not the least due to its “sense of objective plausibility” (Alexander 
2008, p2). The latter may be partly due to its ‘common sense’ orthodoxy (who would 
want to be inefficient?) and partly to the strong flavour of ‘scientism’ implicit its claim 
to encapsulate the complexity of socio-technological systems, plan interventions for 
clearly defined and constrained purposes, and confidently predict the outcomes of 
such actions.  
One crucial component of such an ‘arrogant’ conception of efficiency is ‘cost’: an 
economic measure of the operational effectiveness of any process in terms of its 
inputs and outputs. Cost is therefore a cornerstone of the rational decision-making 
orthodoxy as it provides a metric for determining the rational unwillingness of market 
participants of all scales to incur greater costs (whether financial, temporal or 
otherwise)238 for goods or services. The focus on efficiency through the reduction of 
economic costs is in other words a focus on efficiency of function, rather than 
persistence of function and as such it runs directly counter to the tenets of 
environmental resilience as defined in Part B. To briefly reiterate this difference: 
engineering resilience is concerned with efficiency gains and reducing costs as much 
as possible. Efficiency is a defining characteristic of the engineering approach to 
resilience. On the other hand, environmental resilience is concerned with overall 
system survival and therefore accepts system redundancy to promote adaptive 
capacity. This therefore implies a loss of efficiency (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1994; 
Helbing 2009, p4). 
An increase in redundancy also has obvious connotations for any promotion of 
greater resilience through system simplification and/or the development and 
                                                
238 Strangely enough ‘environmental’ costs do not seem to arouse the same antipathy… 
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maintenance of energy surpluses for reserve adaptive capacity. Such goals inevitably 
require energy increases at various scales and thus increasing costs and as such run 
counter to this doctrine of efficiency: 
Then there is the matter of costs. The conversion of ‘paper plans’ into 
organisational readiness through staff training and crisis exercises can be 
expensive and time consuming. Investing resources to plan for a multitude of 
extreme events that may never happen is no easy sell in a time of budget 
constraints. (Boin & McConnell 2007, p53) 
Even the possibility or danger of complex system collapse due to resource 
constraints does not necessarily lead to a questioning of this mantra of efficiency. 
Instead such awareness can lead people to “see in efficiency a solution to scarcity, a 
way to make less go further, and they summon it whenever a crisis of resources 
strikes” (Alexander 2008, p2).  
However in the end there is a direct and robust causal relationship between this 
particular concept of ‘efficiency’ and the development of socio-technological 
complexity (and thus energy costs). To quote Wahlström (1992) at length: 
The increasing complexity of technological systems is a result of a 
development aimed at increased efficiency. Efficiency is achieved using 
specialization and economics of scale, which tend to increase the number of 
subsystems and their interactions. Efficiency makes it necessary to manage 
upstream resources for meeting downstream demands in the paths of system 
interactions, and this leads to complex planning procedures. Efficiency is 
placing high demands on the control systems with respect to their accuracy 
and abilities to respond to unexpected transients in the system. The strive 
(sic) for increased efficiency encourages a rapid utilization of novel 
technologies. (p353-4) 
To rephrase this in the terminology of Part A: efficiency both drives and is driven by 
hegemonic simplification239 and thus exists in a direct causal relationship to 
increasing socio-technological complexity. This dynamic is furthermore directly 
connected to the fourth challenge of the path dependency of our complex socio-
technological systems and our unwillingness or inability to change our trajectory. 
 
4) The invisibility of properly functioning systems 
Don't it always seem to go  
That you don't know what you've got  
Till it's gone 
Joni Mitchell (1970) Big Yellow Taxi 
As outlined in Part A, the ‘black boxing’ of socio-technological complexity makes that 
complexity essentially invisible. Graham & Thrift (2007) and Verbeek (2004) 
reference Heidegger to discuss not only the importance of the myriad and 
interconnected socio-technological systems that make the contemporary city 
function, but their essential invisibility. These systems create a ‘world’ of functionality 
where ‘business as usual’ is the default setting: 
When somebody uses a tool or piece of equipment, a referential structure 
comes about in which the object produced, the material out of which it is 
made, the future user, and the environment in which it has a place are related 
to each other. But that this is so, according to Heidegger, generally appears 
                                                
239 Here the understanding of efficiency returns to the focus on control and regimentation described by Alexander 
(2008). 
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only when a handy or ready to hand tool or piece of equipment breaks down. 
When this happens, the tool suddenly demands attention for itself. The 
reliable dealings we are used to having with the tool are ruptured, and instead 
of withdrawing from our attention the tool suddenly forces itself upon us 
(Verbeek, 2004, p 79-80 (quoted in Graham & Thrift 2007, p3)). 
Given such a relationship with our tools and the complex systems through which our 
urban reality is maintained, it is generally difficult, bar some serious disruption to 
those same systems, to be aware of their existence and possible vulnerability. This 
invisibility is one of the components of The lure of convenience outlined on pages 
152 and 153: our reliance on systems is driven by the ease with which their presence 
becomes ubiquitous, unremarked, and essential within our everyday lives.  
The invisibility of some socio-technological systems approaches the non-reflexive 
social reality Bourdieu (1995) labels the doxa. The general suite of technologies and 
systems pertaining to electricity would be one such example of a doxic social reality 
for the overwhelming majority of residents in wealthy industrialised cities. As 
acknowledged in Part A, it is often only the failures of these background systems, 
whether these involve merely delays or inconvenience240 or more serious 
consequences,241 which bring them into the foreground (Graham & Thrift 2007; 
Berger & Luckmann, 1982). Absent such disruptions the dictates of efficiency or our 
own complacency hold sway and broad systemic change is unlikely. 
However this of course only applies to cities where such socio-technological systems 
as electricity (and clean water, public hygiene, municipal schooling, access to regular 
food etc) are doxic in nature due to the ubiquity, efficiency and resilience of the 
infrastructures which make them possible. Such urban systems are far from an 
unchallenged doxic reality for any resident of cities with intermittent electricity, or 
dwellers of marginal urban settlements with no regular civic infrastructures at all.  
To conclude, when complex socio-technological systems approach doxic invisibility 
due to their reliability and ubiquity, they are unlikely to be challenged or questioned. 
However, as Bourdieu (1995) suggests, when they are challenged by disruptions or 
crises, heterodox critiques become possible. The next chapter will examine the value 
of these disruptions as prompts for change: they can potentially jolt urban systems 
and cities into new configurations. 
 
5) Path dependency 
If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it 
Apocryphal  
Taken together these interconnected technological, social, political, economic and 
cultural obstacles to changing our socio-technological trajectory constitute a clear 
example of the path dependency implicit in a social constructivist understanding of 
social reality. Introduced in Part A, such socio-technological inertia has been 
variously described as path dependency (Pierson, 2000; Homer-Dixon, 2006), sunk 
costs (Araújo, 2014), ‘the psychology of previous investment’ (Kunstler, 2005; Greer, 
2013), obduracy (Hommels, 2005), ‘generative replication’ (Hodgson & Knudsen, 
2010), or the expression of either a ‘decisional burden’ (Graham & Thrift, 2007) or the 
                                                
240 Such as the departure delays at Washington’s Reagan airport in April 2015 due to an apparently benign iPad map 
update. All American Airlines planes now use cockpit iPads to replace the heavy paper manuals used previously and 
one update to the Reagan airport map led to the online map of that airport crashing. Due to a lack of redundancy (the 
paper maps were of course no longer available as the whole point of the switch to virtual maps was to save weight 
and ultimately petrol and money) the planes were unable to leave (Hern, 2015).  
241 Examples include urban disasters such as New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, or Japan after the 2011 
earthquake and tsunami. 
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‘Energy-Complexity Spiral’ (Tainter & Patzek, 2012). Whatever the description or 
label such tendencies clearly fit within Samet’s second theoretical understanding of 
socio-technological complexity as emerging: 
from the totality of the co-effects of the interactions or transactions within a 
collective regime. In evolutionary or complex systems there is an elaboration 
of structure as the system adapts to its environment as a condition of future 
viability. This leads to persistent features in far-from-equilibrium systems that 
may indicate the form or envelope of the evolutionary trajectory of the system, 
although it is inherently difficult to predict the path in detail. (Samet 2012, 
p834) 
The existence of such ‘persistent features’ in FFE systems can be seen as 
analogous to the creation of pearls in oysters: the presence of a minute grain of sand 
or other foreign substance causes the oyster to excrete nacre to coat it and reduce 
any irritation. Once begun this process continues absent the removal of the resultant 
pearl… Implicit in such a process is the irreversibility of time and thus this concept of 
path dependency in complex systems represents an intersection of thermodynamic 
irreversibility and theories of social and technological development. While Part A has 
discussed the centrality of such path dependency in complex systems, the 
irreversibility it involves makes change extremely difficult as “particular courses of 
action, once introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse” (Pierson 2000, p251) 
Moving from the generalised treatment of path dependency in complex FFE systems 
(in Part A), there is a diverse body of literature examining the tendencies to path 
dependency within cities (Kunstler, 2005; Hommels, 2005; Graham & Thrift, 2007; 
Booth, 2011; Couch et al, 2011). Hommels’ overview (2005) of theoretical planning 
approaches to urban obduracy (Figure 16) places them within three categories. 
 
Figure 16 (Hommels 2005, p342) 
At first sight the Embeddedness approach to urban path dependency is the most 
clearly sympathetic to an understanding of cities as complex adaptive systems as it: 
emphasizes the interrelatedness of elements in an urban sociotechnical 
ensemble. This notion nicely captures the heterogeneous character of cities: 
streets, buildings, distribution networks, development plans, politicians, and 
pressure groups together constitute the large, complex socio technical 
ensemble that the city is. In cities, infrastructure, laws and regulations, traffic 
schemes, usage, urban policies, and town-planning structures are closely 
interconnected. (Hommels 2005, p342) 
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To this list could be added the influence of specific physical geographies (such as 
water or hills), the social geographies of wealth or disadvantage and the larger 
political, environmental, cultural and economic scales into which each urban 
environment is embedded. 
However the other two conceptual understandings of path dependency are also 
relevant to an understanding of the various roadblocks to any program of urban 
simplification. For example the interactionist Frames approach can help explain the 
inertia of urban planning policies and practice through the competing agendas of the 
numerous stakeholders. This approach, with its focus on paradigms or mental 
models, is clearly complementary to a social constructivist approach to social 
change. In particular, such paradigms or mental models correspond to Bourdieu’s 
concept of orthodoxies (1995). Examples of the Frames approach include the 
socially-constructed role of technology and technological expertise (‘every problem is 
a nail to the person with a hammer’) and the understandable persistence of received 
expert knowledge being transmitted largely unchanged to the next generation of 
professional practitioners through both tertiary/academic and on-the-job training 
(Richardson, 2012) Finally there is also the persistence of the ideology of ‘progress’ 
and ever-increasing technological complexity (to link back here to the second 
challenge of The idea of Progress) in both the training and professional and cultural 
environments of technical experts (Nunan et al, 1981; Hommels, 2005). This concern 
with “culturally embedded and collective traditions that persist during a longer period 
of time and transcend local contexts” (Hommels 2005, p342) also demonstrates the 
usefulness of the Persistent Traditions understanding of resistance to change. The 
obvious example here is again the idea of Progress although it can also apply to 
socio-cultural traits such a high level of bicycle usage or a desire for large houses. 
The relevance of these understandings of path dependency will become apparent in 
the next chapter when possible approaches to overcoming such inertia will be 
discussed. 
In the end, the complicated and interwoven relationship between these cultural 
beliefs and the development of complexity constitutes a serious check on any 
attempt at simplification. Unpacking these obstacles is crucial to any understanding 
of the orthodoxy of socio-technological complexity and the way it strongly resists any 
heterodox critique. With such an understanding in mind, the next chapter discusses 
possible ways of addressing this obduracy. The first, reflecting the insights of social 
constructivist ideas of shared consensual reality (Berger & Luckmann 1981; 
Bourdieu, 1995), is through the opportunities offered by serious system disruptions 
and near misses. These offer a conceptual ‘break’ through which such orthodoxies 
are abruptly undermined. The second possibility for heterodox critiques of the 
orthodoxy of complexity is provided by a number of approaches grouped roughly 
under the label of subversive narratives. These narratives (alternative urban 
lifestyles, dystopian science fiction and individual self-interest) are possible stories or 
future scenarios which, through a wide cultural dissemination, may offer a heterodox 
challenge to the ‘common sense reality’ which justifies and drives increasing system 
complexity. 
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Chapter 8: Subverting the paradigm of complexity  
For Fate the willing leads, the unwilling drags along 
Lucius Annaeus Seneca (2015) p200 
To state the situation bluntly, the interconnected challenges outlined in the previous 
chapter must be addressed if any meaningful simplification of contemporary urban 
systems is ever to occur. However, the very nature of such wicked problems (as 
outlined in chapter 2) ensures that a definitive answer to such a nexus of issues is 
unlikely. Indeed the assumption that straightforward responses to such challenges 
can be provided is itself problematic. Instead this chapter argues that what is 
required is a multipronged and incremental chipping away at the current and 
consensual paradigm, bolstered by the inevitable minor setbacks to the smooth and 
invisible functioning of our complex systems. These interruptions to ‘normal 
programming’, as well as the close calls (potentially serious yet averted disruptions), 
provide the opportunities for faster shifts in the social consensus if alternatives are to 
hand when they occur. These avenues for change will now be explored in more detail 
in this chapter.  
It needs to be briefly restated here that these incremental advances must be at and 
across a range of organisational, social, spatial or political scales. The issue of the 
generalist vs the specialist in complex FFE systems, as discussed in Parts A and B, 
underpins the argument that neither a purely ‘bottom up’ or a completely ‘top down’ 
approach will be effective. However valuable or useful individual action at a local 
scale is, it cannot be the basis for a widespread urban simplification as the costs242 
involved (in the service of greater urban resilience) cannot be borne by all equally. 
This lies behind the criticism levelled at movements like Transition Towns (Chatterton 
& Cutler, 2008; Alloun & Alexander, 2014) that they are only relevant to individuals or 
communities with the socio-economic, political or cultural capital to undertake or even 
consider such changes. 
Urban systems simplification therefore requires that resources be mobilised at higher 
scales of organisation and then distributed at lower scales. In short this is a question 
of the distribution of resources and, as such, it implies the need for economics and 
thus politics at a greater scale than the local. Given the range of impediments to 
change outlined in the previous chapter, it is clear that, absent a dictatorship,243 
whether benevolent or otherwise, any program of urban simplification must be based 
upon a broad social awareness of the symbiotic relationship of energy and 
complexity in the maintenance of contemporary urban life and the challenges posed 
by ever-growing socio-technological complexity. In democracies some level of broad 
political consensus as to the need for the simplification of particular urban systems 
must therefore be a precondition for the latter to occur: 
Man’s survival will probably depend on his being able to see what his vast 
human system has become in relation to preceding and possible earth 
systems. And he must acquire the necessary understanding rapidly enough to 
adopt his opinions, folkways, mores, and action programs to the great new 
systems and provide a continuing survival path for them. Since decisions on 
such matters in the arena of public affairs are ultimately made according to 
the beliefs of the citizens, it is the citizens who must somehow include the 
energetics of systems in their education.244 (Odum 1971, p. 6) 
                                                
242 Including both the costs of the simplification itself and then the ongoing costs this will involve. 
243 Or a one party state – the Chinese Communist Party has traditionally been able to implement wide-ranging social 
(Cuntong, 2012) and economic (Li, 2005) policies largely by diktat. 
244 The final sentence in this quote (“Since decisions…”) by Odum clearly demonstrates the relationship and tension 
between the ‘bottom up’ and the ‘top down’ approaches. While any move by citizens to include such issues in their 
education is absolutely crucial some citizens (individuals or communities) will inevitably lack the resources to make 
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The value of crisis 
I felt the iron rudder skip 
The smell of seeping oil, 
The heat of slipping rope. 
Failing hands, failing hope 
Daniel Lanois (1989) Fisherman's Daughter 
The importance of moments of crisis such as war or disaster (whether 
physical/natural or economic) in prompting meaningful social or cultural change is 
widely recognised (Berger & Luckmann, 1982; Bourdieu, 1995; Klein, 2007; Boin & 
McConnell, 2007; Homer-Dixon, 2009; Feldhoff, 2011; Alberti, 2013; Broto et al, 
2014). Such crises are valuable as they make such doxa visible and thus contestable 
(in other words they become merely orthodoxies):245 
…the class of that which is taken for granted, doxa, the sum total of the 
theses tacitly posited on the hither side of all inquiry, which appear as such 
only retrospectively, when they come to be suspended practically. (Bourdieu 
1995, p168) 
Such crises can provide the sort of ‘critical juncture’ (Feldhoff, 2011; Pierson, 2000) 
‘critical transition’ (Alberti, 2013), ‘juncture’ (Pierson, 2000) or ‘window of opportunity’ 
(Stirling, 2014) through which the constraints of path dependency are undermined or 
removed and radical change becomes possible (Klein, 2007; Boin & McConnell, 
2007; Broto et al, 2014; Lavell & Maskrey, 2014). For example, in the immediate 
aftermath of the Japanese earthquake and tsunami, a reduction in energy 
consumption in Japan (the concept of setsuden or conservation) was broadly 
supported and easily implemented (Kingston 2011, p474-5). 
Such moments may be Black Swans (Taleb, 2007) in which particular systems 
components unexpectedly fail or external stressors overwhelm system resilience. 
However they may also be examples (to return to the discussion in Part B) of the 
‘Release’ stage of Panarchy. This is the point at which the complexity of a system 
reaches a tipping point and it then collapses (or simplifies, in Tainter’s terminology) 
(Tainter, 1990; 1996; Janssen et al, 2002). However the mere occurrence of crises 
does of course not mean useful or popular solutions are either inevitable or 
sustainable in the longer term:246 
Crisis is a necessary condition for a questioning of doxa but is not in itself a 
sufficient condition for the production of a critical discourse. (Bourdieu 1995, 
p168) 
Instead a crisis opens up fields of possibility which require new thinking and the 
identification of viable alternatives if any solution is to be achieved. Kuhn (1970) 
argues for a similar role for crises in the development of scientific theory and 
innovation, in particular noting that new paradigm shifts are often instigated by 
scientists who are young or have only recently begun work in their particular field. 
The implication here is that they are less imperfectly inculcated in the reigning 
orthodoxy and are thus more able to think outside its constraints when faced with a 
                                                                                                                                       
such educational changes. In such cases the necessary resources (whether of money, infrastructure, time or 
educational capability) will need to be made available and thus there needs to be at least the beginnings of a 
consensus among those with the ability to make this possible. 
245 “The validity of my knowledge of everyday life is taken for granted by myself and by others until further notice, that 
is until a problem arises that cannot be solved in terms of it” (Berger & Luckmann 1982, p58). 
246 It remains to be seen whether the focus on renewable energy and conservation will become entrenched over the 
mid-to-long term in Japan although at the time of writing this appeared increasingly unlikely (Wingfield-Hayes, 2015). 
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theoretical crisis; thus Planck’s witticism that “Science advances one funeral at a 
time”. 
As any crisis takes hold, the existence of alternatives to the recently undermined 
orthodoxy is a crucial precondition for steering transformations in any desired 
direction:  
The most important conceptual requirement for alternation is the availability of 
a legitimizing apparatus for the whole sequence of transformation. (Berger & 
Luckmann 1982, p179) 
One example is provided by the history of the Mont Pelerin Society and the rise to 
prominence of free-market economics after the crisis of the Keynesian consensus. 
The Society was a classically liberal think tank founded to discuss the importance of 
free-market at a time when the triumph of Keynesianism seemed total (Klein, 2007; 
Manne, 2010; Jones, 2012). Throughout the ‘Thirty Glorious Years’ of economic 
growth,247 from the end of WWII to the oil crisis of 1973, the idea that the Keynesian 
model could collapse seemed, at the least, highly unlikely. Yet the Society continued 
its work and, with the arrival of stagflation (a condition initially regarded as 
inexplicable within Keynesian orthodoxy), it was the free-market theorists of the 
Society who stepped forward to provide not only a convincing explanation but a 
ready plan of action for a ‘whole sequence of transformation’ (Klein, 2007; Manne, 
2010). For Jones (2012) “[p]articular ideas took hold in the 1970’s because they 
provided direct answers to pressing problems” (px). This example is worthy of note 
as it is an example of a radical shift in the (economic) paradigm which occurred (at 
least in places) in democratic societies – and without war or the loss of democratic 
modes of governance. 
Finally, Klein (2007) discusses a number of examples of various systemic shocks, 
including the Boxing Day tsunami of 2004 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. She argues 
it was the free-market theorists (the ‘Chicago Boys’) who were most ready to act 
during the period of disjunction, grief and disorganisation that immediately followed 
such shocks: in many cases (such as the market liberalisation which occurred during 
the Latin American dictatorships) Klein argues that the shock was deliberately 
instigated. Whatever the cause, for Klein the radical changes which resulted from 
these shocks was due to certain free-market policy ideas (privatization, government 
deregulation and deep cuts to social spending) being ready for implementation during 
the ‘window’ of shock and disjunction. The implications of this will be addressed in 
more detail below in the discussion of narratives of social change. 
 
The avoidance of collapse 
Of course at this point the question could be asked; given that the simplification of 
complex urban systems can be defined as a collapse (in complexity), why should 
such a collapse not be welcomed? If the onward march of complexity represents the 
doxa or consensual reality of urban life, then surely any crisis which discredits this 
orthodoxy represents the best chance for undermining it in the longer term? 
The clearest rejection of such an approach is on moral or ethical grounds, given that 
it will (as always) be the less fortunate who will bear the brunt of such ‘creative 
destruction’ (the use of Schumpeter’s term here being quite deliberate). As outlined 
in chapter 4, any concept of urban resilience which involves a cavalier disregard of 
possible human costs is both morally and politically insupportable. The goal of much 
                                                
247 Or in the original French: Les Trente Glorieuses. 
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collapse theory,248 including this work, must be to imagine and prefigure the possible 
collapse in order to forestall it.  
Beyond the obvious ethical concerns, there are two further reasons why waiting for 
the opportunities presented by an unfolding urban crisis is unwise. The first is that the 
increasingly complex nature of our urban systems only ‘raises the stakes’ in terms of 
disruptions (Wahlström 1992; LaPorte & Consolini, 1991). The risk (and possible 
effects) of cascading failures are heightened with increased system complexity: 
It has been argued that technologies have moved into a regime where the 
consequences and costs of major failures are larger than the value of their 
lessons. (Wahlström 1992, p352) 
One example of such a dynamic is provided by nuclear power generation in the light 
of the disasters of Chernobyl and Fukushima, where the lessons learned are 
arguably less valuable than the ongoing effects of such disasters. The food 
production and distribution systems underlying most developed cities also clearly 
demonstrate the dangers of such an approach (Pfeiffer, 2006; Brown, 2008; Spoor et 
al, 2013). Even minor disruptions in any of the interconnected systems by which such 
cities are fed could rapidly shift from being a minor irritation to a serious concern. 
A second closely-related reason to be leery of waiting for the onset of a crisis to 
implement systemic changes is the irreversibility of Eddington’s Arrow of Time. The 
passage of time only increases the sunk costs of our current trajectory and makes 
changes ever more expensive when a crisis eventually arrives. With regard to 
Tainter’s dynamic of declining returns, current trajectories are not stable; they track 
towards greater instability and the increasing chance of a crisis overwhelming current 
systems. ‘Wait and see’ is not tenable approach to urban resilience. 
Thus we are in the somewhat paradoxical position of waiting for the opportunities 
posed by a close call with collapse, without wishing for such a collapse in actuality. 
This is why the need for incremental change remains vital (Hodson & Marvin, 2009; 
Graham & Thrift, 2007; Richardson, 2012; Brown & Vergragt, 2008), and we will now 
turn to three possibilities for subverting the current consensual reality. 
 
Three subversive narrative approaches  
As argued earlier the possibility of conscious human action implies that a program of 
urban system simplification need not be purely reactive in nature. Instead, as with 
Byzantium in the 7th century, an awareness of the possibility or imminence of 
collapse can be enough to trigger changes in socio-technological systems. Such 
changes or adaptations are predictive and anticipatory in nature rather than reactive.  
Narrative is an extremely powerful heuristic for understanding the world in which we 
all live (Greer, 2008, 2013; Taleb, 2007; Mayer, 2006; Goldstein et al, 2015; Mulligan 
et al, 2009), but it can be a force for good or ill. It can offer alternatives to hegemonic 
consensual reality or it can thoughtlessly reaffirm it (as does the narrative of 
Progress). Obviously the interest here is in narratives that subvert this dominant 
narrative of an endless trajectory of technological complexity and instead hold out the 
chance of alternate realities.  
This thesis identifies three possible (and interconnected) narrative approaches to 
inculcating such awareness among a critical mass of any population and thus making 
political action at larger scales possible. It is important to note that like disasters or 
disruptions these subversive narratives can challenge current orthodoxies around 
progress and complexity without necessarily promoting any solutions (such as a 
                                                
248 With the possible exceptions of revolutionary Marxism and the historical pessimism of Spengler… 
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program of urban systems simplification as recommended by this thesis). Just as 
with system disruptions an alternative must be ready at hand if current orthodoxies 
are undermined. 
 
1) Living/lived examples of alternative models and narratives 
This first approach is based on the understanding that most models of alternative 
social organisation or living are themselves based upon some understanding of how 
consensual reality is dysfunctional or otherwise lacking. They are also consciously 
based on a narrative outlining and justifying the alternative model and this provides 
the “legitimizing apparatus” (Berger & Luckmann 1982, p179) for a possible shift in 
urban system organisation. These ‘actually existing’ models demonstrate both the 
possibilities of systemic change and the importance of hope as a catalyst for action.  
Examples have already been provided in chapter 4 of such alternative lifestyles or 
narratives such as downshifting or simplicity, the slow food or locavore movements, 
Transition Towns or the tiny house movement. These all offer an explanatory 
narrative outlining the problems with current lifestyle orthodoxies, such as the 
environmentally and personally destructive effects of consumerism and ‘affluence’ 
(de Graaf et al, 2002; Hamilton & Denniss, 2005; Alexander, 2009; 2013; 2015; 
Kallis, 2011; 2015; Kallis & March, 2015). Many also specifically critique the ongoing 
complexity of urban life as both problematic and unsustainable over time (Alexander, 
2009; 2013; 2015) (although they do not necessarily do so in terms of FFE 
thermodynamics or declining returns on complexity).249 Finally they all offer an 
emancipatory narrative offering a transformation of both individuals and then broader 
social realities. In that sense they provide a critique, a roadmap for change and a 
sense of hopeful possibility (de Graaf et al, 2002; Hamilton & Denniss, 2005; 
Alexander, 2009; 2013; 2015; Kallis, 2011; 2015; Kallis & March, 2015). 
However it is just as noteworthy that such alternative lifestyle models clearly 
demonstrate Alexander’s critique (2012) of the ‘problem’ outlined in chapter 3 (p51-
52). To briefly restate his argument for the final time: these approaches undermine 
the definition of the ‘problem’ (whether the lack of living space in houses, the need for 
cars to facilitate urban transport or the time constraints of modern lifestyles) as a 
normative category within the larger social habitus. The alternative lifestyle argues 
(and in fact demonstrates) in two distinct ways that such issues may not be problems 
which need to be solved (especially not through the further promotion of Tainter’s 
dynamic of ever-increasing complexity). 
Firstly such problems become reconfigured: it is the car-dependence of current urban 
forms which is the problem, rather than the lack of a car. Here the thesis briefly 
returns to the disconnection between structure and function outlined in Part A (p26-
27). This reconfiguration of ‘the problem’ brings the focus clearly onto system 
function, as opposed to system form. A focus on the function of urban transport, for 
example, rather than the form of the car, can help stakeholders imagine alternative 
modes of urban transport to challenge the social orthodoxy of single drivers in cars. 
Of course such differing definitions of ‘urban transport’ or ‘a comfortable-sized house’ 
are championed (as much as the orthodox view is) by different social actors (and 
indeed coalitions of such actors). Therefore the definition of ‘the problem’ thus 
becomes an act of political contestation and a manifestation of power. 
Secondly a problem such as the lack of space within a house can become instead 
merely an inconvenience, against which is balanced the financial and time-saving 
advantages of the tiny house. The important point is that once again ‘the problem’ 
                                                
249 Kallis (2011) and Kallis & March (2015) being noteworthy examples. 
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becomes a contingent and socially constructed category. If such issues are no longer 
defined as problems, then the need to address them through the implementation of 
increasingly complex (and energy costly) solutions is no longer inescapable. 
Alternative models of social development or organisation become possible. 
However one of the problems with such approaches is that their focus on individual, 
local or low scale change carries the risk that they become ‘middle-class lifestyle’ 
affectations for those with the wherewithal to participate (Chatterton & Cutler, 2008). 
Individual rejections of the complexity of contemporary cities won’t lead to broad 
systematic change for the simple reason that not everyone has the resources to 
implement them. Not everyone has the personal, social, financial or temporal capital 
to forgo the benefits of complexity and become a ‘generalist’. At the same time such 
alternative lifestyles can sometimes be ‘preaching to the choir’ in that these models 
are often only accessible among those who have access to the media channels or 
social networks through which they are disseminated. They must be both widely 
disseminated and broadly achievable or realistic to challenge the contemporary 
realities of urban life.  
 
2) Representations of crisis and collapse and/or alternative narratives and models 
It may be difficult to galvanise society to think about resilience unless 
people feel ‘fear’. The challenge is to cultivate a climate in which 
people receive realistic assessments of potential risks, without 
creating undue stress and anxiety. 
(Boin & McConnell 2007, p54) 
This second strategy of narrative subversion is obviously closely related to the first, 
as artistic works can provide narrative treatments of imaginary, possible and actual 
collapse which thereby become instructive ‘spectacles’ and invite reflection. Of 
course there is a plethora of subversive narratives and artistic endeavours being 
produced at any one time within any particular cultural space. However again the 
issue with alternative artistic expression is the same as with alternative lifestyles: it is 
alternative not only in its worldview or vision but also in the audience it attracts. This 
dynamic can be taken to its extreme – if such a work reaches a wider mainstream 
audience then it is, by definition, no longer subversive or alternative. In one sense it 
has ‘succeeded’ by becoming the new orthodoxy. Whether it has provoked any 
meaningful change in the broader habitus by this broader acceptance is always a 
matter of contestation. Thus the dichotomy of the mainstream vs the alternative can 
be problematic when wishing for a broader paradigm shift. 
Given such a dynamic, it is the contention of this thesis that the broader mainstream 
art forms are more relevant here, including film, TV and computer games. Of course 
this focus ignores the treatments of collapse across whole fields of artistic endeavour 
including music (Ihde, 2015) and literature. The latter is most clearly relevant with 
such examples as The Last Man (Mary Shelley’s 1826 novel about an apocalyptic 
plague), A Canticle for Leibowitz (Miller, 1960) and The Machine Stops (Forster, 
1909). This latter short story by Forster in particular deserves a mention as one of the 
earliest examples of a description of civilisational collapse due to the breakdown of 
technological complexity. In fact many examples of collapse literature have been 
made into movies with many of the collapse movies discussed in this chapter 
originally being literary works. Examples include On the Beach (1959), Damnation 
Alley (1974) The Running Man (1987), Ghost in the Shell (1995), I, Robot (2004) and 
World War Z (2013). However, quite apart from the constraints of space, the focus 
remains on cinema because cinema is potentially a much more widely accessible 
form of artistic expression and is thus more relevant to this discussion of artistic 
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narratives with a broad social impact. To provide one example – the many movies 
involving Shelley’s creation Frankenstein’s monster have garnered more viewers, 
and spawned more and varied pop-cultural references, than the original 19th century 
novel. 
Disaster, civilisational collapse and the dangers of unchecked technological 
complexity are common cinematic, televisual and gaming tropes, particularly with 
regard to the various subgenres of science fiction (Sontag, 1979; Broderick, 1993). 
Given its readiness to engage with such themes science fiction provides one of the 
most fertile genres for the development of narratives exploring the concept of 
civilisational collapse. 
There is no space here for any serious treatment of the history of science fiction and 
the development of its themes, philosophies and politics, although it is widely 
acknowledged that the wider social disenchantment with the ideal of Progress has 
been mirrored by the broad genre of science fiction (Parrinder, 1979). An illustrative 
example is provided by the work and career of Hugo Gernsback (as both a writer and 
an editor of sci fi). His ‘Guest of Honour’ speech from the 1952 World Science Fiction 
Congress (Gernsback, 1953; Westfahl, 2007) entitled The Impact of Science-Fiction 
on World Progress, remains a perfect example of the utopianism and techno-
scientific progressivism of mid-20th century science fiction. Yet, by the end of his life, 
his view of sci fi (and of the benefits of science and technology in general) was falling 
out of favour among both the writers and readers of sci fi (Westfahl, 2007; Parrinder, 
1977; 1979). 
The arrival of New Wave sci fi in the 1970’s heralded a shift from the traditional focus 
on technological progress to concerns with the social and individual consequences of 
such developments. In other words, the grand sci fi narratives of utopianism and 
scientific progressivism were challenged in much the same way as other ‘Grand 
Narratives’ across the social sciences in particular. Thus by the 1980’s the 
protagonist in William Gibson’s famous short story ‘Gernsback Continuum’ (1981) is 
plagued by disturbing visions of a utopian alternate future (the ‘Continuum’) based 
clearly upon Gernsback’s vision of 40’s and 50’s science fiction. For Gibson such a 
world (and the worldview upon which it is based) is both retrograde and reactionary. 
The story’s protagonist is only able to reject such visions (seen as both sterile and 
disturbingly racially ‘pure’) by burying himself in all the worst elements of 
contemporary life (drugs, crime, pornography etc). He embraces unpleasant reality to 
banish the unreality of the utopian vision. 
Interestingly, the recent film Tomorrowland (2014)250 is a direct challenge to Gibson’s 
critique (and by extension the wider social disenchantment with Progress and utopian 
dreams). It is set in exactly the sort of utopian mid-20th century sci fi setting (jetpacks 
and giant sky highways) that comprised the ‘Gernsback Continuum’ (not to mention 
Disneyland’s ‘Tomorrowland’). The film had a mixed critical reception with a number 
of reviewers commenting specifically on the ideological subtexts of the film. For 
example: 
Tomorrowland is the most enchanting reactionary cultural diatribe ever 
made… It emerges that Bird, in Tomorrowland, is mounting nothing less than 
a full-throated assault on the nihilism, dystopianism, and what might be called 
the fetishization of apocalypse in today’s movies, TV shows, and books - 
especially YA books that worm their way into the fantasies of impressionable 
kids (Edelstein 2015, n.p.). 
The film was a financial failure for Disney and was dwarfed by the financial success 
of the dystopian Hunger Games (2012-2015) and Divergent (2014) franchises. On 
                                                
250 Tomorrowland website http://movies.disney.com/tomorrowland/ (accessed 22/07/15) 
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the whole, science fiction’s trajectory from the late 1940s has shown the genre 
moving towards its "final emancipation from... its domination by adolescent 
technological fetishism" (Parrinder 1977, quoted in Nunan et al 1981, p316).  
There is a long-recognised connection between the popularity or otherwise of 
science fiction films (as with any genre of film) as relating to the spirit of its times 
(Broderick, 1993). Sci fi in particular speaks to the hopes and fears of its time, from 
the paranoia of the 50’s Cold War, through the apocalyptic films of the 70’s and 80’s 
made under the shadow of The Bomb,251 to more recent examples looking at 
pervasive surveillance, the loss of identity and the increasingly hallucinatory and 
immaterial nature of external reality. Such latter themes have been most notably 
present in Japanese manga (Napier, 2002),252 with animated films such as Akira 
(1988) and Ghost in the Shell (1995) examining the loss of self and identity arising 
from the increasingly blurred distinctions between humanity and technology.253 
However, it is the spectre of collapse that has continued to haunt science fiction 
throughout its history and it is these narratives which are most relevant here. 
The innumerable cinematic sci fi examples of collapse include scenarios which could 
be termed the ‘blackest of black swans’ such as the innumerable examples of zombie 
apocalypse, alien invasion or planetary alignment leading to terrestrial destruction: 
2012 (2009), Independence Day (1996), World War Z (2013), and San Andreas 
(2015) are all illustrative examples of this immense cinema of broadly natural or 
unnatural (ie non-human caused) disaster or apocalypse. 
However there are also examples of less immediately outlandish scenarios including 
nuclear destruction. Broderick (1993) provides an exhaustive catalogue of the 
numerous films dealing with the theme of nuclear apocalypse. Notable illustrative 
examples include On the Beach (1959), Doctor Strangelove (1963), Damnation Alley 
(1974), The Quiet Earth (1985) and One Night Stand (1985). 
Other disaster/collapse plots include global epidemics, with notable examples 
including 12 Monkeys (1995) and Outbreak (1995). The former movie has just been 
reimagined as a 2015 TV series on the US SyFy channel.254 
Another subgenre focusses on runaway technological complexity (Frankenstein 
redux). A few illustrative examples of this huge corpus include Fail Safe (1964), War 
Games (1983), Ghost in the Shell (1995) I, Robot (2004) (not least because Asimov 
wrote the original collection of stories to reject the Frankenstein myth) and the 
Terminator and Matrix franchises. The Jurassic Park franchise (1993; 1997; 2001; 
2015) is perhaps the most successful of the numerous contemporary retellings of 
Frankenstein. 
Finally there are those films which present the clearly Malthusian dynamics of 
unchecked population growth and resource depletion leading to a general economic 
and societal collapse. Examples include Soylent Green (1973), Logan’s Run (1976), 
The Running Man (1987) In Time (2011) and the Mad Max and Hunger Games 
franchises. 
These cinematic scenarios are matched by innumerable computer gaming examples 
of societal collapse. Gaming scenarios include pandemic (The Last of Us, 2013); 
alien invasion (Halo (2001-2015) and Half-Life (1998-2007); and nuclear apocalypse 
(Metro 2033, 2010).255 There is also a growing genre of ‘survival’ or ‘shortage’ games 
                                                
251 In fact the largest subgenre of disaster movies is ‘Survival long after nuclear war’ (or apocalypse more generally) 
(Broderick, 1993). 
252 The term originally referred to a form of print cartoon (the literal translation is ‘Irresponsible pictures’) but is now 
applicable to animated movies and TV series. 
253 Other examples dealing with such themes include The Matrix trilogy (1999; 2003; 2003) and Inception (2010). 
254 http://www.syfy.com/12monkeys (accessed 21/07/15) 
255 Based on the novel of the same name by Glukhovsky (2005). 
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(Wiles, 2015) in particular looking at issues of resource scarcity (examples include 
Banished256 and classic real-time-strategy games such as the SimCity or Age of 
Empire franchises) and the fragility of complex systems (The Division257 and 
Fallout).258 In light of the current popularity of such gaming themes, a connection has 
been made between the rising popularity of Malthusian games and popular 
awareness of the challenges facing contemporary complex societies (Wiles, 2015).  
The question is whether such portrayals of technological and societal collapse offer a 
useful challenge to prevailing orthodoxies or whether Sontag (1979) was correct in 
arguing that science fiction films contain:  
…absolutely no social criticism, of even the most implicit kind... No criticism, 
for example, of the conditions of our society which create the impersonality 
and dehumanization which science fiction fantasies displace onto the 
influence of an alien It. Also, the notion of science as a social activity, 
interlocking with social and political interests, is unacknowledged. Science is 
simply either adventure (for good or evil) or a technical response to danger… 
In science fiction films the antithesis of black magic and white is drawn as a 
split between technology, which is beneficent, and the errant individual will of 
a lone intellectual. (p48) 
It needs to be acknowledged that Sontag’s influential essay (originally written in 
1965) preceded the rise of New Wave sci fi in the 1970’s and so does not address 
the more counter-hegemonic and heterodox work that was created from this time 
onwards. Indeed her critique is unsupportable with regard to a whole range of more 
recent sci fi films, from Jurassic Park (1993) and The Matrix (1993) to The Island 
(2005), In Time (2011) and Divergent (2014).259 Whether such narratives do lead 
directly to attitudinal and then social change is beyond the scope of this work and is 
an area for future empirical research. However, the value of such counter-narratives 
lies in the possibilities they provide for critiquing the hegemonic orthodoxy of 
progress and ever-increasing complexity. Unlike narratives of alternative living or 
social organisation, dystopic sci fi visions do not generally present models of change, 
yet they do provide one method for undermining dominant ideological paradigms to 
make social change possible (Nunan et al, 1981; Imarisha & brown, 2015; Pauley, 
2014). 
 
3) Narratives of systemic resilience as rational self-interest 
In the case of sonic attack survival means ‘Every man for himself’ 
Statistically more people survive if they think only of themselves 
Do not attempt to rescue friends, relatives, loved ones 
You have only a few seconds to escape 
Use those seconds sensibly or you will inevitably die 
Think only of yourself… 
Hawkwind (1973) Sonic Attack 
This third possibility for overcoming a broad social resistance to urban simplification 
is a (possibly) more controversial focus on self-interest as a motivating factor for 
                                                
256 http://www.shiningrocksoftware.com/game/ (accessed 5/3/15) 
257 http://tomclancy-thedivision.ubi.com/game/en-GB/home/#homepage_bgvideo (accessed 5/3/15). An interesting 
component of this game (and which directly echoes elements of this thesis) is the Collapse: the End of Society 
webpage (a simple onlined promotional simulator) which demonstrates the cascading failure of global socio-
technological systems. The simulator can be accessed at http://collapse-thedivisiongame.ubi.com/en/# (accessed 
27/02/16). 
258 http://fallout.bethsoft.com/eng/home/home.php (accessed 5/3/15) 
259 This is even more pronounced in sci fi literature, with the author NK Jemisin being a prime example (Berlatsky, 
2015). 
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broad social change. The concept of self-interest, as determined through the rational 
individual calculation of costs and benefits, is the defining feature of free-market 
economics. Of course this view can be (and has been) widely challenged (Sen, 1977; 
Coughlin, 1993; Edwards, 2002; Miljkovic, 2005; Patel, 2009) but it remains a 
powerfully influential understanding of human nature and its consequences for 
society. Such a narrative of urban resilience would argue for simplification through an 
appeal to this individual self-interest rather than an enlightened global 
cosmopolitanism. It assumes that the political consensus necessary for any 
meaningful level of system simplification could be promoted by a wider 
understanding and awareness of the problems inherent in socio-technological 
complexity, and the consequences for individuals of the failure of such systems. 
Of course, this awareness implies a level of fear of such possibilities coming to pass, 
and any such argument for self-interest will not sit comfortably within the ethical 
framework of a green environmentalism based on conceptions of the individual 
subsumed within larger networks of global society and ecology. While this more 
traditional environmental conscious is undoubtedly focussed on localism and a 
simplified lifestyle of less consumption and energy use the primary motivation 
appears to remain at much larger scales. Hence “Think globally, act locally”: climate 
change in particular necessitates that the issue be approached at a global level.  
However the concept of social change through individual self-interest and fear 
already exists in the literature of social change (Witte & Allen, 2000; Boin & 
McConnell 2007; Mongeau, 2013). The efficacy of localised self-interest as a 
motivator of social change is evident in the tangled strands of libertarianism and 
militant localism in the US survivalist or militia movements (Barkun, 1989; Freilich et 
al, 2001). The resonances between ‘left’ green/environmental localism and ‘right’ 
libertarian/ survivalist localism have already been noted in Part B. The same distrust 
of large hegemonic organisations (corporations for the former, government for the 
latter) and resultant focus on local community self-reliance exists in both movements. 
However, differences are evident over questions of militancy and violence and over 
the tension between local versus global horizons and worldviews. Similarly the 
former worldview might see government action as the palliative, while for the latter it 
is individual free action. Finally, the survivalist movements (as outlined earlier) are 
often motivated by fear: of social collapse, racial holocaust or economic meltdown. 
Fear and self-interest are powerful motivating factors, while the ‘left’ sustainability 
movements are more clearly concerned with the promotion of hope as a catalyst for 
social change (Mulligan et al, 2009; Mulligan, 2014). 
In the face of these obvious differences it is important to remember that the boundary 
delineation of complex systems is always a contingent and contested act. Different 
actors may delineate the systems of which they are part (and over which they have 
either agency or responsibility) at different scales and with different constituent 
elements. However this does not preclude such actors identifying similar challenges 
or even recommending similar programs of action.  
It must be stated here forcefully that this third narrative approach does not mean 
ditching green localism, or enlightened social and environmental globalism, and 
accepting wholesale the survivalist, libertarian or free-market worldviews. It is not 
proposing the complete replacement of hopeful action with motivation by fear; nor is 
it intended to reject the psychological insight of self-determination theory that 
motivations which are self-determined lead to more meaningful and lasting 
behavioural and thus social change (Cooke et al, 2015; Deci et al, 1994). Indeed 
there is a body of research demonstrating that fear can be counterproductive as it 
may only strengthen the resistance to change (Janis & Feshbach, 1953; Mongeau, 
2013): 
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Fear of unlikely future events rarely influences political decisions, which tend 
to play off potential long-term benefits against short-term imperatives. 
Reducing hypothetical losses and avoiding theoretical impacts do not gain 
political traction, as the lack of progress to mitigate climate change highlights. 
Very few politicians, nationally or locally, have won an election on a platform 
of reducing future disaster losses and risks. (Lavell & Maskrey 2014, p276) 
However, as acknowledged earlier, any such appeal to self-interest is only useful 
when possible and achievable avenues for change are present (and presented) 
(Berger & Luckmann 1982; Klein, 2007). 
Above all this is not a zero-sum argument; no one approach to social change should 
be exclusively followed: indeed Mohr et al (2006) argue that focussing exclusively on 
either self-determination or self-interest is likely to lead to failure. Instead, given the 
nexus of path dependency and social obduracy described in the previous chapter, a 
multipronged philosophical approach needs to be considered. 
Social movements can focus too much on why social actors do things – wanting 
consensus on values that may not be realistic given people’s religious or ethnic or 
other value commitments – rather than on getting consensus on what to do. As the 
one of the examples below will demonstrate, some actors may want to simplify and 
localise their food supplies due to environmental concerns while others may be 
motivated by fears over food security. In the end, localising the food supply of any 
particular community or municipality will have positive outcomes, both in terms of the 
global environment and the local security of that community. These differing values 
and motivations can nonetheless lead to a shared plan of action. 
Similar ideas are expressed by both Sen (2004) with regard to the universalism of 
human rights, and by Appiah in his approach (2006) to the ideal of cosmopolitanism. 
The latter, for example, sees cosmopolitanism as a shared living within the world, 
including the ability to agree on shared courses of action with regard to particular 
issues or challenges. Appiah argues that there is no need to agree on every point of 
morality or ethical behaviour in order to do that. He recounts (2006, p37) the 
anecdote of the missionary doctor appalled by the death of babies due to the 
consumption of unboiled water. The scientific narrative of bacterial infection being 
cured by boiling the water has no effect on the behaviour of the parents: 
Then the missionary has another idea. Look, she says, let me show you 
something. She takes some water and boils it. See, she says, there are spirits 
in the water, and when you put it on the fire they flee: those bubbles you see 
are the spirits escaping, the spirits that are making your children sick. Now 
boiling water makes sense. Now the babies stop dying. In belief, as in 
everything else, each of us must start from where we are. 
In short, both these authors and this thesis advocate a focus on the destination, 
rather than the journey. What matters is the outcome. 
For the last time, this thesis returns to the clear “paradigmatic chasm separating two 
fundamentally opposing worldviews” (Buss et al 1986, p97) regarding human action, 
technology and the natural world. First introduced in chapter 2, these are the 
exemptional or Cornucopian worldview and the ecological or Malthusian worldview 
(Cotgrove, 1982; Meader, 1983; Dunlap, 1983a; 1983b; Pearce, 1985; Buss et al, 
1986; Simon, 1996). The former stresses “core values of material economic growth, 
worth of the natural environment as a resource, dominion over nature, and 
confidence in a bountiful future” (Buss et al 1986, p97), while the latter entails “core 
values of nonmaterial self-actualization, the intrinsic worth of the natural environment, 
harmony with nature, and alarm about the prospects of a dreadful future if present 
trends continue” (Buss et al 1986, p97). 
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The former worldview is extremely influential – it is the socially constructed orthodoxy 
of teleological progress, technological development and optimism about the infinite 
possibilities of human ingenuity. It is strongly supportive of technological innovation 
both as a problem-solving tool and an expression of progress. 
Yet, as the orthodox ‘reality’, it defines and reinforces itself through its rejection of 
heterodox counter-narratives. For example, in their research into attitudes towards 
technology and technological risks, Buss et al (1986) identify household/rooftop solar 
panels as the one technological development which is strongly rejected by 
respondents clearly identified with the generally technophiliac ‘Cornucopian’ or 
‘Exemptionalist’ mindset. This rejection is based on the identification of solar panels 
as the one ‘technology’ (broadly defined) which is clearly identified with the 
‘Ecological’ or ‘Malthusian’ perspective (p107). Solar panels are a ‘green’ technology 
and thus seen as somehow undermining the Cornucopian worldview, no matter how 
technologically advanced or innovative they may be. 
This dismissal of solar panels is ideological and will not necessarily be overcome by 
arguments over the validity of the ecological or Malthusian worldview. Instead, the 
promotion of such heterodox arguments is likely to only reinforce the Cornucopian 
orthodoxy. However, as the first example below makes clear, it is possible to view 
(and promote) solar panel installation as personally advantageous. 
 
Examples 
The use of government subsidies and other financial incentives to promote the 
installation of rooftop solar panels by individual households provides a perfect 
example of how such a philosophically ‘multipronged’ approach could play out in 
practice. One of the strongest determining factors in the uptake of rooftop solar by 
individual households in the US (Lee Kwan, 2012; Sarzynsk et al, 2012), the UK 
(Faiers & Neame, 2006) and Australia (Green Energy Trading, 2014) has been the 
cost/benefit analysis for individual households. While concerns over the environment 
and the issue of climate change remain important for many electricity consumers it is 
the financial costs and benefits that remain crucial. In Australia rising electricity bills, 
married to the falling price of solar installations (whether due to government 
subsidies or falling costs), has led to the increasing levels of household installation 
among those most impacted by financial concerns. In fact “[t]here is an inverse 
relationship between average incomes and solar penetration levels (as income levels 
increased, solar uptake declined)” (Green Energy Trading, 2014). In other words, for 
certain elements of the population, rational financial self-interest remains an 
important motivation for installing solar panels and this neither precludes nor 
presupposes concern for the environment and a desire to address climate change. 
To bring this discussion to the specific Australian context: what does this focus on 
self-interest mean at the time of writing, as the Renewal Energy Target (RET) is 
gutted and rooftop solar (and renewal energy in general) is undermined for 
transparently ideological purposes? (Parkinson, 2014a) The criticisms of public 
subsidies for renewable power (Parkinson, 2014b) by Australian proponents of the 
free-market, often as part of a perceived ‘culture war’ against ‘The Left’ (Spratt, 2013; 
Edis, 2014) ignore the massive subsides for coal-based electricity suppliers (Bast et 
al, 2014) and the increasing price competitiveness of solar power (Shah & Booream-
Phelp, 2015). But just as importantly there is an ideological inconsistency at the heart 
of these arguments which a focus on self-interest would bring into sharp focus: 
household solar power represents the individual household as self-reliant and 
independent and unshackled from the monopoly control of the giant power 
distributors. By the tenets of ideological libertarianism, it makes no real sense to 
champion the rights of the giant power companies over the possible liberation of 
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individual households, and this contradiction should be brought to wider attention. In 
fact, one Tea Party organiser in Florida, Debbie Dooley, is taking exactly such an 
ideological slant as she argues for the opening up of that state’s solar energy market 
to individual consumers: 
She is at the spearhead of a campaign to place an initiative before Florida 
voters next year that would give consumers the freedom to choose to buy 
their solar energy from smaller private companies and bypass the mega-
bucks utilities… 
“Let’s remove the barriers, remove the shackles that protect the monopolies 
and allow consumer choice and freedom,” said Dooley, whose Green Tea 
coalition of environmentally conscious conservatives is a key component of 
the Floridians for Solar Choice amalgam… 
“True conservatives champion free-market choice, not government-created 
monopolies that stifle competition.” she said. “Trying to protect monopolies 
from competition is not free-market. You should be bound by your principles 
and develop your position on issues based on your principles, not who your 
financial donors are.” (Luscombe & Pietrasik, 2015)  
When arguing for the retention, or even expansion, of the RET there is no 
contradiction in making such a clear pitch for the self-interest of Australian electricity 
consumers alongside the environmental advantages of solar power. 
A similar dynamic exists with regard to the promotion of food security in developed 
cities that are largely reliant on energy-intensive industrial food supplies. The 
environmental arguments in particular can come from a viewpoint in which the 
system delineation is from a global or non-anthropocentric perspective and 
individuals are exhorted to see themselves as fitting within to this greater whole 
(Wilk, 2006; Robin, 2014). 
However it is also possible to criticise these same food systems from a self-
interested perspective in which municipal or national food security is the primary 
concern and the system delineation is at a much more restricted level. Therefore 
concerns over the food supply can exist within both the environmental/anti-corporate 
and nationalist/protectionist260 ideological frames. This does not mean the many 
serious ideological disagreements between such frames can be ignored or 
supplanted; it merely means that there is the possibility of a common ground in which 
both a global environmentalism and a self-interested localism can identify problems 
with the complexity of contemporary food production and distribution in a city like 
Melbourne. 
 
 
                                                
260 One example of the way can be seen from reference to the website of the contemporary Reclaim Australia 
movement. This Australian nationalist/nativist and anti-Islamic movement lists among its beliefs the following points: 
21. Self-sufficiency in oil, industry and as a food producer for Australia. 
The Lima Agreement pushed Australia to drop its tariffs and allow for a global marketplace for food and 
manufacturing. As a result we have lost our self sufficiency in manufacturing and farming and are now 
dependant on a global marketplace. This places Australia in an (sic) vulnerable economic position. 
22. Australia’s land (sic) from 100% foreign ownership. 
Currently vast tracts of farmland are being bought up by overseas (sic) countries. There may come a time 
when our land produces the food for other nations yet our people have not enough to feed them, what 
then?- will our security forces be used to protect foreign interests against its (sic) own people.  
http://www.reclaim-australia.com/reclaim-what-.html (accessed 24/07/15). Of course Reclaim Australia is also fixated 
on a raft of other clearly neo-fascist ideas (including the ludicrous ‘link’ between the labelling of Vegemite as a halal 
food and the imminent imposition of Sharia law across Australia), so this is not an argument that all their concerns or 
suggested solutions be taken seriously. Instead it is an acknowledgement that a concern with food security does exist 
within Australia and a simplification of food systems (sold from the perspective of self-interest) could have some 
support across the left/right ideological divide.  
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Conclusion 
Any simplification of specific urban socio-technological systems must overcome the 
path dependency created by the intersection of orthodox ideas of progress and 
technology, efficiency, predictability and convenience. While together they create a 
nexus of social, cultural, political and economic obduracy, each factor must be 
understood, and addressed, on its own terms. Yet, as described by Bourdieu (1995), 
such socially constructed orthodoxies are powerful and persistent but not 
unchallengeable: they can be undermined in two ways. 
The first and easiest way for this to occur is through any disruption that makes them 
visible as orthodoxies and thus open to critique. The second path is through the three 
subversive narrative approaches discussed in this chapter which also offer avenues 
for challenging hegemonic approaches. These heterodox narratives should not be 
seen as mutually exclusive, nor should the third (a focus on self-interest) negate any 
sense of hope or optimism about the possibilities of shared or communal urban 
developments.  
Finally, neither such narratives nor disruptions are a ‘silver bullet’ for the challenges 
of urban systems obduracy. The value of both unanticipated disruptions and 
subversive narratives lies in their ability to challenge current orthodoxies yet credible 
and achievable alternatives (such as the targeted simplification of complex urban 
systems) need to be at hand when a space of opportunity has opened up. 
The next (final) chapter of this thesis provides a brief summation of the overall 
argument in its entirety. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion and summary of the argument  
 
At the end of this thesis it is time to briefly summarise the argument. A Malthusian 
limit to growth through the interaction of energy depletion and system complexity is 
clearly applicable to complex adaptive systems like cities. According to the dictates of 
far from equilibrium thermodynamics the maintenance and growth of system 
complexity (whether human or natural) is completely dependent upon sufficient 
energy dissipation. For natural systems such as cyclones or ecosystems their 
complexity is endlessly driven by the existence of energy surpluses. 
However such a deterministic relationship is undermined by human intelligence and 
complicated by social relationships. Thus socio-technological systems such as 
societies, organisations or cities grow more complex as a historically persistent 
problem solving strategy. To solve the challenges they face, these human systems 
implement technological or organisational solutions which increase system 
complexity to better address or encompass changing conditions (either in the 
environment or within the system itself). Energy supplies become necessary for the 
implementation of such problem solving strategies. 
However the necessity of energy for all complex systems, whether human or 
otherwise, comprises a clearly Malthusian limit to growth. Without the continuous 
input of ‘free’ or available energy such complexity collapses. For example, for a 
natural system like a cyclone the movement over land removes the energy gradient 
between warm water and cold air which powers its system complexity and it therefore 
collapses. When it comes to cities, the discovery and utilisation of increasingly 
powerful energy sources drives the development of technological complexity while 
only being made possible by that same complexity. This relationship lies at the heart 
of the ideology of ‘Progress’ and the Wall is the related belief in ever increasing 
complexity as the answer to all the challenges that face cities. However this 
approach can lock cities into a dynamic of ever-increasing complexity and connected 
energy dissipation in the face of endless challenges.  
This summarises the relationship between increasing complexity and increasing 
energy use and its relevance for contemporary cities. 
 
Unfortunately for socio-technological systems such as cities, there remain a number 
of limits to their size and complexity. The most straightforward is a loss of the energy 
which makes their complexity possible and which results in the classic Malthusian 
‘collapse’. However, while this is certainly a possibility, there are three other limits to 
the growth of complexity which are more immediately problematic. 
The first is the declining return on our investments in complexity as a problem-solving 
approach. At some point the returns (in terms of energy invested) fall to a position 
where it is counterproductive to continue the approach of problem solving through 
greater system complexity. When systems reach such a point they either voluntarily 
or involuntarily collapse. In other words, they simplify. This dynamic is independent of 
resource and energy depletion – it can only be permanently negated by access to 
permanently increasing supplies of the energy we currently use or by rejecting the 
ongoing increase in complexity. 
The second limit is posed by the fragility of such increasingly complex systems in 
terms of their own complexity. Complexity (particularly once a certain point has been 
passed) may reduce system resilience. This may happen for a range of interlocking 
reasons. There is the danger of the complexity of any system, and the cascading 
effects of any intervention, surpassing the understanding of any one actor. Cities are 
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systems of emergent complexity and their future trajectories are impossible to predict 
with absolute accuracy. At the same time, there is a tendency to path dependency 
and sunk costs and this can lock systems like cities into particular responses or paths 
of development. This can reduce the flexibility of possible responses to unforseen 
challenges. 
Finally the current energy sources most responsible for the complexity of 
contemporary cities, hydrocarbons, are facing their own challenges. The first is the 
declining returns on energy investments in hydrocarbons as the easiest and 
cheapest sources deplete. The second is the issue of climate change and the need 
to reduce and eventually phase out their use. The problem for contemporary urban 
life is that without the widespread and immediate implementation of another 
comparably high-gain and convenient source of energy, and in greater volume than 
current hydrocarbon reserves, the maintenance of contemporary cities will become 
increasingly difficult. At the same time they become increasing susceptible to 
unexpected shocks and disruptions because their adaptive capacity may shrink if 
their access to energy surpluses is restricted. 
This summarises the challenges facing the resilience of contemporary cities. 
 
Reflecting the understanding of cities as complex adaptive systems their resilience is 
always spatially uneven, temporally contingent and politically contested. In other 
words, theirs is an ecological resilience in which the overall adaptive capacity of such 
systems can require the loss of particular components or subsystems. Determining 
which elements of any particular city are to be preserved and which are less 
important is an inescapably political process. Any concept of urban resilience as an 
apolitical or purely technical characteristic is therefore strongly rejected. At the same 
time, such a concept of urban resilience accepts that absolute knowledge of current 
complexity or accurate predictions of future system states is impossible and the 
search for certainty implied by the Wall is therefore rejected. 
Military theory is relevant to this understanding of urban resilience for a number of 
reasons. Firstly contemporary military theory concerns itself with the analysis of cities 
as complex adaptive systems and the crucial importance of logistics and (energy) 
supplies for the maintenance of their complexity. It similarly has a long history of 
planning for and executing action in environments of extreme unpredictability and 
emergent complexity. Most importantly when addressing such complexity one 
particular strand of military thought rejects the endless development of technological 
complexity in the search for certainty and absolute control. It rejects the Wall and 
instead embraces doubt, uncertainty and the need for simplicity. 
This summarises the nature of urban resilience and the relevance of military theory to 
this overall argument. 
 
The proposed approach to the dilemma of urban resilience is the conscious 
simplification of particular urban systems and subsystems. This simplification does 
not mean completely abandoning the advantages of technological complexity and 
simplifying urban life in its entirety to some pre-industrial idyll. Instead it recommends 
the dismantling of long supply chains and complex organisational or technological 
systems in the case of specific urban systems or subsystems. Technological 
complexity is rejected only where the benefits are determined to be outweighed by 
the costs. Such a simplification is not straightforward as it also means the 
acceptance of the extra costs implied by system redundancy and the loss of the 
benefits of system complexity. However, in light of the various challenges faced by 
complex contemporary cities and their attendant fragility it will improve their resilience 
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to both immediate disruptions and longer scale trends like Peak Oil or climate 
change. 
The original model of urban resilience offered by this thesis is based on the military 
tactic of the hedgehog defence. In such an approach, the defence has a 
decentralised and modular organisation. Each modular component has a level of 
resource (energy) self-sufficiency which necessitates a level of redundancy and a 
rejection of the obsession with efficiency. Each component also has the capacity for 
action independent of system linkages and acts in a reactive manner to changing 
local circumstances. It can respond more quickly to its rapidly changing environment 
without the fragility of extended supply lines or the constraints of centralised plans or 
directives. However, at the same time, it is not a collection of autonomous or 
disconnected actors but shares a common identity and shared strategic goals. 
System components are connected horizontally (across the organisation rather than 
to a central coordinating node) in terms of communication. Finally the resources 
necessary to create such redundancies and excess capacity can only be marshalled 
and distributed downwards by higher scales of organisation. 
This summarises the model of urban resilience proposed by this thesis. 
 
There are a number of challenges to any implementation of such an approach to 
urban system organisation. Above all there is the tendency to path dependency in 
development and maintenance of complex urban systems. Such obduracy is caused 
by the benefits of such complexity, the power of the concepts of Progress and 
efficiency and the invisibility of such complex systems when they are functioning 
properly. 
The most powerful way of addressing such challenges is through the opportunities 
posed by actual or narrowly avoided disruptions or crises. This depends upon 
alternative models of urban organisation being available at the moment when the 
fragility of current approaches becomes obvious. However in the absence of such 
events the simplification of urban systems must be implemented through incremental 
change. Changing mainstream beliefs about progress and the growth of complexity 
involves promoting alternate narratives about the future of cities. Such narratives can 
include lived examples of alternative models of urban social organisation. They could 
also include media and artistic representations of crisis and collapse and the 
resultant alternative narratives of the urban future. The final possibility is the more 
controversial narrative of social change as rational self-interest in the face of 
imminent dangers or crises. Such an approach would once again demonstrate the 
usefulness of military theories around urban collapse. However none of these 
narratives should be seen as exclusive or as supplanting a focus on positive or 
hopeful change (certainly with regard to global challenges like climate change). 
This summarises the challenges facing any simplification of urban systems and the 
possible strategies for overcoming them 
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